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2017 DIGILAW 668 (RAJ)

Nrasinghdas S/o Shri Dau Lal v. Gulab Chand S/o Shri Brajratan

2017-03-02

SANGEET LODHA

body2017
ORDER : Sangeet Lodha, J. This writ petition is directed against order dated 20.12.16 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bikaner in Appeal No. 131/07 (CIA No.178/14), whereby an application preferred by the petitioner seeking leave to amend the reply, stands rejected. 2. The relevant facts are that the respondents filed a petition seeking petitioner's eviction from a commercial premises, a shop, on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement. The bona fide requirement was pleaded in terms that the premises is required for establishing the office of respondent no.2, who is an advocate by profession. The petition was contested by the petitioner by filing a reply thereto. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Rent Tribunal framed the issues and the parties led their evidence. The petition stands allowed by the Rent Tribunal. Aggrieved thereby, an appeal preferred by the petitioner is pending consideration before the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bikaner. 3. The petitioner preferred an application before the Appellate Rent Tribunal seeking leave to amend the reply. The petitioner sought to incorporate the averments in the reply to the petition filed before the Rent Tribunal in terms that recently, the second respondent has given a shop adjoining to the disputed shop to Ashok Courier on rent and further that the second respondent is not engaged in the profession of advocacy rather, he is engaged in the work of share marketing and has also established a marble factory in the name of Kamdhenu Marble and thus, he has no bona fide requirement of the premises. 4. The application stands rejected by the Appellate Rent Tribunal by the order impugned. Hence, this petition. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that it is settled law that in the matter with regard to eviction of tenant from a premises on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement, the subsequent events showing that the bona fide requirement does not exist, can always be looked into by the Rent Tribunal and Appellate Rent Tribunal. Learned counsel submitted that during the pendency of the proceedings, the shop fallen vacant has been let out which shows the necessity as pleaded by the respondents, is not bona fide. Learned counsel submitted that the Rent Tribunal has seriously erred in rejecting the application preferred ignoring the settled position of law. 6. Learned counsel submitted that during the pendency of the proceedings, the shop fallen vacant has been let out which shows the necessity as pleaded by the respondents, is not bona fide. Learned counsel submitted that the Rent Tribunal has seriously erred in rejecting the application preferred ignoring the settled position of law. 6. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel and perused the material on record. 7. The question with regard to amendment of the reply in a petition seeking eviction on the ground of bona fide necessity, where the bona fide requirement is alleged to have become extinct on account of subsequent developments has been dealt with by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again in the various decisions. 8. In Hasmat Rai v. Raghu Nath Prasad, (1981) 3 SCC 103 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed : "If a landlord bona fide requires possession of a premises let for residential purpose for his own use, he can sue and obtain possession. He is equally entitled to obtain possession of the premises let for non-residential purposes if he wants to continue or start his business. If he commences the proceedings for eviction on the ground of personal requirement he must be able to allege and show the requirement on the date of initiation of action in the Court which would be his cause of action. But that is not sufficient. This requirement must continue throughout the progress of the litigation and must exist on the date of the decree and when we say decree we mean the decree of the final Court. Any other view would defeat the beneficial provisions of a welfare legislation like the Rent Restriction Act." 9. However, in the matter of "Gaya Prasad v. Sh. Pradeep Srivastava", 2001(1) RCJ, 522(SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed : "The crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps the utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in out litigative slow process system subsists. If every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in out litigative slow process system subsists. The subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. It is pernicious, and unjust to shut the door before the applicant just on the eye of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period." (emphasis supplied) 10. In the matter of "Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal." (2002) WLC, SC(Civil),169, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the question of Courts power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief, observed that for the said purpose following triad conditions must be satisfied: (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the Court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. 11. In "Pratap Rai Tanwani & Anr. v. Uttam Chand & Anr.", (2004) 8 SCC, 490, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed : "7. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period." 12. Thus, upshot of the various decisions of the Apex Court and this Court is that if the subsequent events sought to be brought on record by way of amendment of the pleadings are of such nature that the bona fide requirement of the suit premises by the landlord stands completely eclipsed, then such amendment which is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the issue with regard to bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord may be allowed by the Courts at any stage of the proceedings. Of course, such subsequent event must be brought to the notice of Court by making an appropriate application promptly. 13. In the backdrop of position of law settled as above, adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be noticed that in the application seeking leave to amend the reply, the petitioner intended to incorporate absolutely vague averments, alleged to be based on subsequent event. It is stated that the respondent has given one shop adjoining to the disputed shop to Ashok Courier recently but no specific details have been set out in the application as to when the premises was vacated and when it was let out by the respondent to Ashok Courier as alleged. It is also not set out in the application as to when the respondent has left the profession of advocacy and started the business of share marketing as alleged. Suffice it to say that averments made in the application in no manner leaded to the conclusion that the amendment sought for is based on subsequent event. That apart, there is no material placed on record substantiating the plea that bona fide necessity as pleaded by the second respondent stands totally eclipsed. 14. Suffice it to say that averments made in the application in no manner leaded to the conclusion that the amendment sought for is based on subsequent event. That apart, there is no material placed on record substantiating the plea that bona fide necessity as pleaded by the second respondent stands totally eclipsed. 14. Thus, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, in the considered opinion of this Court, the Appellate Rent Tribunal has committed no error in rejecting the application preferred by the petitioner seeking leave to amend the reply at the appellate stage. 15. The petition is therefore, dismissed in limine.