JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J.—By way of this appeal, the Insurance company has felt aggrieved by the award passed by the Claims Tribunal. The respondents are served and are represented by several Advocates. Though the matter is called out several times, learned counsel has chosen not to represent the claimants or the owner as the case may be and, therefore, this appeal is decided in their absence. 2. I have perused the judgment, evidence on record and grounds of appeal. 3. The Insurance company has felt aggrieved by the award of the Tribunal. Decreeing motor claim petition No. 119 of 1988 under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), the Tribunal allowed a sum of Rs. 3,44,000/- to the parents of the deceased as against claim petition of Rs. 10,55,000/- with 12% interest. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that from the facts as emerged, the Tribunal has misread the evidence and has held the driver of the truck solely responsible for the accident whereas Ashok Kumar was equally negligent and was also a tortfeasor as he was driving the Car in rash and negligent manner. It is further submitted that the liability of the Insurance company under the policy was one of limited nature and it was not for covering unlimited third party claims which were overlooked by the Tribunal. 5. It is submitted that the multiplier of 25 would never have been applied by the Tribunal and the Tribunal considered the income on the exaggerated part. It is submitted that the multiplier should have been awarded looking to age of the parents and not that of deceased and requires to be rectified. It is submitted that father of deceased cannot be said to be dependent on deceased as he has his own dependent business. 6. For appreciating all 3 issues raised before this Court, it would be necessary to advert one by one. The principles for deciding negligence, are enunciated or discussed by the Apex Court and by the British Court of Law also which are enumerated herein below. 7. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. The principles for deciding negligence, are enunciated or discussed by the Apex Court and by the British Court of Law also which are enumerated herein below. 7. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 8. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well-settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 9. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 10. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. ‘Hit and run’ cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 11. These provisions (Section 110A and Section 110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was ‘new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 12. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 12. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if Courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well-settled and, therefore, Court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, 2005 ACJ (SC) 1840). 13. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part of driver of another vehicle. 14. I have perused the judgment of the Tribunal and the fact that driver of the truck i.e. Dwarika Prasad Sahu was charge-sheeted is a proved fact. The truck, which is a big vehicle, came from wrong side and dashed with the Car. One another person Sundeep was also travelling alongwith the deceased Ashok Kumar, was also injured. The impact was so great that Sundeep had to be admitted in medical college and had a haemorrhage which shows the impact of the accident and, therefore, I do not think that submission made by learned counsel for the Insurance company that it was a case of contributory negligence, that the accident occurred. Balram Singh Yadav, who was the driver of the truck, has not stepped into the witness box. As against this, Ram Sahai, who was also a person travelling in the Car, has been examined as PW-1. All these facts show that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the truck. Balram Singh Yadav, who was the driver of the truck, has not stepped into the witness box. As against this, Ram Sahai, who was also a person travelling in the Car, has been examined as PW-1. All these facts show that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the truck. Two independent witnesses sugar Singh, PW-2, and Bhagwat Kishore, PW-3, have also stated, on oath, that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of truck by its driver. The driver was arrested in that case by the police and charge-sheet for rash and negligent driving, was submitted against the driver Balram Singh Yadav, opposite party No. 2. Thus, I concur with the finding of facts as far as negligence is concerned. 15. This takes this Court to the second issue regarding limited liability. I have perused the cover note rather certificate of Insurance and third party insurance amount of Rs. 296/- was paid in those days. There is no endorsement that it is limited liability policy. Rather no such issue was ever framed by the Tribunal nor was it agitated before the Tribunal regarding limited liability and hence this submission, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. 16. As far as the last contention is concerned, there is force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the multiplier of 25 could never have been applied. The income of the deceased was considered Rs. 18,000/- per annum as he had paid and was exempted from the income-tax and his income was considered as Rs. 22,000/- and instead of ½, 1/3rd was deducted and that is how the Tribunal assessed the income of the deceased. Learned counsel for the respondents-claimants relied on the judgment in Union of India v. Sudhir Khanna, 1990 (1) ACC 275. 17. If the annual dependency considered by the Tribunal is Rs. 15,000/- per year and multiplied by 25, then the total dependency comes to Rs. 3,75,000/-. There was also loss of estate and assessed Rs. 50,000/-, on that head, as was done by the Hon’ble Himanchal Pradesh High Court in the case of Audhir Khanna. In addition to this, Rs. 5000/- are also given towards funeral expenses. Thus, the total amount of compensation comes to Rs. 4,30,000/- 18. In the end the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 3,44,000/-. 50,000/-, on that head, as was done by the Hon’ble Himanchal Pradesh High Court in the case of Audhir Khanna. In addition to this, Rs. 5000/- are also given towards funeral expenses. Thus, the total amount of compensation comes to Rs. 4,30,000/- 18. In the end the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 3,44,000/-. Under the head of future prospect, nothing was considered by the Tribunal. The Tribunal deducted 20% of the amount was paid lump sum which was also not permissible. If we consider the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the multiplier could not have been more than 18 as per judgment in Smt. Sarla Verma and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, 2009 ACJ 1298 , then also total quantum would not be more than that awarded. The income and future prospect alongwith other aspect would bring about a figure to Rs. 3,44,000/- if not more and hence deduction of 20% itself brought down the multiplier from 25 straightway to 15 in the end, therefore, no fault can be found with the Tribunal as far as the compensation is concerned. This takes this Court to last submission that rate of interest would not have been 12%, there is force in the said submission. The reference to the decision in National Insurance company Limited v. Chintan Arun Kumar Raval and another, in First Appeal No. 2440 of 2014 and other matters decided on 16.9.2014 by a Division Bench of High Court of Gujarat (comprising of Hon. Mr. Justice M.R. Shah and Hon.Dr. Justice K.J. Thaker), wherein it has been held that it is a discretion of the Court to decide the rate of interest but has to be prevalent rate of interest which would be given by the banks at that time. The rate of interest shall be 9% from the date of filing of the claim petition till realization. 19. The appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and decree shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent. The amount still lying in Fixed Deposit, the amount be calculated and be refunded to the Insurance company.