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2017 DIGILAW 674 (JHR)

Jai Prakash Bedia, son of Grijlal Bedia v. Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL)

2017-04-11

SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

body2017
ORDER : The petitioner is seeking confirmation of his date of birth as 16.03.1959. 2. Heard. 3. Mr. Rohit Roy, the learned counsel for the petitioner, referring to Implementation Instruction No.76, submits that there are documents prepared by the employer itself, for example, identity card and the nomination form which reflect a date of birth (in fact, which is the correct date of birth of the employee) different from the date of birth of the petitioner recorded in the Statutory Form-B and while so, the petitioner should have been subjected to age determination in terms of Implementation Instruction No.76. 4. The petitioner was appointed on 10.09.1979 under M/s. BCCL. At the time of his appointment his age was determined as 26 years by the Medical Board on 19.04.1979 and accordingly, his date of birth was fixed as 19.04.1953. In Statutory Form-B his age is recorded as 26 years as on 19.04.1979. The respondents have pleaded that this was accepted by the petitioner by putting his signature on Form-B. His age in another Form-B which was prepared subsequently was also recorded as 26 years as on 19.04.1979. On that basis his date of birth has been fixed as 19.04.1953. In Form-A of the Coal Mines Provident Fund the petitioner himself has disclosed his year of birth 1953. On the basis of these documents, the respondents have contented that the petitioner who himself admitted his age as 26 years in the year, 1979, now on the basis of identity card and a form which was supplied to him for providing the name of nominee cannot claim reassessment of his age. 5. In the above context, it needs to be recorded that a nomination form which is filled in by the employee is kept in records and it is not that the details written therein are scrutinized by the employer. The petitioner has buildup a case on the basis of an objection allegedly recorded by him in the nomination form, stating that in Form-B his date of birth is wrongly recorded. This was done by the petitioner on 25.07.1987. Except this objection entered in the nomination form, the petitioner never raised a dispute in respect of his date of birth nor did he complain about incorrect recording of his date of birth in the Statutory Form-B. In "M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. Vs. This was done by the petitioner on 25.07.1987. Except this objection entered in the nomination form, the petitioner never raised a dispute in respect of his date of birth nor did he complain about incorrect recording of his date of birth in the Statutory Form-B. In "M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Chhota Birsa Uranw" reported in AIR 2014 SC 1975 , the appointee had appeared in the Mining Sardar examination and the employer had accepted his date of birth recorded in the Mining Sardar Certificate, and the genuineness of the School Leaving Certificate produced by the employee was also admitted by the employer. When the service excerpts were furnished to the employee, he raised a dispute in respect of his date of birth, however, it remained unresolved and in this context, the Supreme Court held that if the employer did not decide the dispute, and kept it pending for years, it cannot be said that the employee has raised a dispute at the fag end of his service. As noticed above, the petitioner except recording an objection in the nomination form never raised a dispute. In the above facts, the decision in "M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Chhota Birsa Uranw" cannot be pressed into service to conclude that it is the employee which has raised the dispute in respect of his date of birth at the fag end of his service. No indisputable document in support of his date of birth as claimed by the petitioner has been produced in the present proceeding. 6. Clause-A to the Implementation Instruction No.76 provides determination of age at the time of appointment and Clause-B to the Implementation Instruction No.76 is applicable to the existing employees. Clause-C to the Implementation Instruction No.76 provides that in case the date of birth of an employee cannot be assessed in terms of procedure provided under Clause-B(i)(a) or B(i)(b), his date of birth recorded in the Form-B, CMPF records and identity card will be treated as final. It further provides that where-ever there is variation in the age recorded in the aforesaid records, the matter shall be referred to the Age Determination Committee/Medical Board constituted by the Management for determination of age. It further provides that where-ever there is variation in the age recorded in the aforesaid records, the matter shall be referred to the Age Determination Committee/Medical Board constituted by the Management for determination of age. A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions would disclose that primarily this is for the employer, which finds discrepancy in different records prepared by it, to take a decision to refer the matter for age determination. The alleged discrepancies in different records of the petitioner prepared by the employee were never brought to the notice of the employer. A nomination form is not a protest or complaint which would have been taken note of by the respondents. The petitioner at no stage before filing the writ petition raised a plea based on Implementation Instructions which has been raised by him in the present proceeding, that in view of the conflicting date of birth in different records prepared by the employer, he should have been subjected to Medical Board for determination of his age. The employer has accepted the date of birth of the petitioner as recorded in Form-B which is statutory in nature and binds both the parties. In view of the overwhelming records which record the date of birth of the petitioner as 26 years as on 19.04.1979, the date of birth recorded in the identity card cannot be accepted as conclusive proof of his age. 7. What follows from the aforesaid discussion is that, there is no merit in the writ petition and consequently, it is dismissed.