ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original respondent no.3 being aggrieved and feeling dissatisfied by the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 3117 of 1996(R) dated 15th September, 2004 whereby, the petition preferred by the respondents being C.W.J.C. No. 3117 of 1996(R) has been allowed by the learned Single Judge and the award passed by the Labour Court, Hazaribagh in Reference Case No.4 of 1989 dated 29th December, 1995 has been quashed and set aside and therefore, the original respondent no.3 has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Factual Matrix It appears from the facts of the case that one of the Organizations of the Government viz. Rural Engineering Organization, Giridih had engaged this appellant (original respondent no. 3 in the writ petition) as a daily rated worker or casual worker. This appointment was given without any public advertisement, without following the rules of recruitment for the public post, without any test and without any interview. Thus, it was a back door entry. For intermittent periods from 1st December, 1980 to 31st May, 1984 for some period she was given the work. The said period for which this appellant has worked are as under: (a) 01.12.1980 to 31.01.1982, as submitted by the counsel for the appellant. (62 days) (b) 01.12.1982 to 31st March, 1983. (121 days) (c) 01.04.1984 to 31st May, 1984. (61 days) thereafter, the work was never given by the respondents to this appellant. Industrial dispute was raised by this appellant under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and the reference was made to the Labour Court, Hazaribagh in the following terms. “Whether the termination of the services of Smt. Chandrawati Devi, Office Peon, Rural Engineering Organization is proper? If not is she entitled to reinstatement and to get any kind of relief?” Reference Case No. 4 of 1989 was instituted in the Labour Court, Hazaribagh and on the basis of the evidences given by the Management and this appellant Reference was decided and the award was passed by the Labour Court, Hazaribagh on 29th December, 1995 (Annexure2 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal) whereby, the order of reinstatement has been passed by the Labour Court, Hazaribagh and for some periods the wages have been awarded. The aforesaid award passed by the Labour Court, Hazaribagh was challenged by the respondent-Management in writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 3117 of 1996(R) before this Court which was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 15th September, 2004. Being aggrieved and feeling dissatisfied by the aforesaid decision rendered by the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition preferred by the Management whereby, the award, passed by the learned Labour Court, Hazaribagh was quashed and set aside in Reference Case No. 4 of 1989. Hence, original respondent no.3 has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 3. Arguments canvassed by the counsel for the appellant (original respondent no.3 in the writ petition): Counsel for the appellant submitted that this appellant has worked for more than 240 days and her services have been terminated without giving any notice and hence, there is violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the Labour Court, Hazaribagh, for grant of order of reinstatement with certain wages for certain periods. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that all the Government Departments are not sovereign functions of the Government. If the economic activities of the Government is going on in few of the departments and if such departments are fulfilling the test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa and others reported in (1978) 2 SCC 213 the said department can be an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent Management. It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellant that the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in [1997(2) PLJR 38(SC)] is a per incuriam judgment looking to para no. 143 of the decision rendered by seven Judges' Bench reported in (1978) 2 SCC 213 . Counsel appearing for the appellant has also relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1997) 8 SCC 767 and submitted that the Telecom Department of Government is an Industry. 143 of the decision rendered by seven Judges' Bench reported in (1978) 2 SCC 213 . Counsel appearing for the appellant has also relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1997) 8 SCC 767 and submitted that the Telecom Department of Government is an Industry. There is no difference between Rural Engineering Organization at Giridih and such type of departments are not the sovereign functions of the Government and hence, the learned Single Judge has arrived at wrong conclusion that Rural Engineering Organization at Giridih is not an Industry. Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that as this appellant has completed more than 240 days working and without any notice and without any compensation the services of this appellant has been brought to an end. Such termination has been rightly held as illegal termination and therefore, order of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court, Hazaribagh in the award dated 29th December, 1995 in Reference Case no.4 of 1989 may be held as valid one by quashing and setting aside the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 3117 of 1996(R) dated 15th September, 2004 and hence, the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Arguments canvassed by the counsel for the respondents: Counsel for the respondents submitted that those who are illegally appointed cannot be reinstated. There was no advertisement, no interview, no application, no test and at the sweet will and at the desire of the high ranking administrative officers, appellant has got employment on public post as back door entry. Such type of employee can be terminated, the way in which they were appointed. Back door entrants in the public employment should go out in the same manner. Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that illegally appointed employee cannot be treated as workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Such type of employee cannot be reinstated by the Labour Court, Hazaribagh. Counsel appearing for the respondents (original petitioners) submitted that there is no appointment letter given to this appellant nor this appellant has compete with rest of the candidates for getting employment nor has she been appointed towards a regular vacancy or against sanctioned post. Such type of employee cannot be reinstated by the Labour Court, Hazaribagh. Counsel appearing for the respondents (original petitioners) submitted that there is no appointment letter given to this appellant nor this appellant has compete with rest of the candidates for getting employment nor has she been appointed towards a regular vacancy or against sanctioned post. Anyone who is working with the Government or with its instrumentality, and if they are illegal appointees they cannot be reinstated by the Labour Court, otherwise, a thing which cannot be done directly will be done indirectly i.e. those who are unable to get employment in a legal way will get employment by such type of methodology. This aspect of the matter have been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge by quashing and setting aside the award passed by the Labour Court in Reference Case No. 4 of 1989 and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court. 5. Reasons: Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we see no reason to entertain this Letters Patent Appeal mainly for the following facts and reasons: (i) Without any public advertisement, without any application of this applicant, without any test, without any interview and without following the rules of recruitment as a back door entry this appellant was appointed as a Causal Labourer or Daily Rated Worker (Peon) for some periods as stated hereinabove by the Rural Engineering Organization, Giridih. (ii) There are already existing rules of recruitment with the aforesaid Rural Engineering Organization, Giridih. They were more observed in a breach than in compliance. It has become fashion in this country for few Head of such type of Institution or Organization, to give public employment, as Class-IV employee without public advertisement, without any test or interview or without following regular procedure to give public employment. They are fond of doing favour to few fortunates. They are more charitable than the law. Unauthorizedly, by these type of backdoor entrants, after some passage of time or efflux of time, demands are being raised or industrial disputes are being raised for their reinstatement, if they are not given work after some periods, only on the ground that they have worked for more than 240 days. They are more charitable than the law. Unauthorizedly, by these type of backdoor entrants, after some passage of time or efflux of time, demands are being raised or industrial disputes are being raised for their reinstatement, if they are not given work after some periods, only on the ground that they have worked for more than 240 days. It ought to be kept in mind by the Subordinate Courts and the Industrial Courts and Tribunals that working of 240 days is not a touch stone that such employee should be given the reinstatement. “Working of 240 days” is not a “Midas Touch” that those who have worked for 240 days, they must be conferred a title of regular employee and should be given reinstatement. Even if any employee has worked for more than 240 days, still their employment is illegal, (a) if, grant of their employment, runs counter to the rules of recruitment; (b) if their employment is just based upon only on charity, by high ranking administrative officers for grant of employment; (c) if their employment is without any public advertisement and without any application thereunder and without holding any test or interview; (d) if their employment is made without giving opportunity to the rest of the public at large, especially for the public employment, such type of employees even if they worked for 240 days in a continuous year they cannot be given reinstatement. This cardinal principle has not been properly appreciated by the Labour Court, Hazaribagh while passing an award in Reference Case No. 4 of 1989 dated 29th December, 1995 and no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in quashing and setting aside the said award of the Labour Court, Hazaribagh. (iii) The so called “Midas Touch” upon which the Labour Court has proceeded for reinstatement i.e. working of more than 240 days has already been explained by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, U.P. v. Anil Kumar Mishra and Others reported in (2005) 5 SCC 122 especially in paragraph no. 5 as under: “5. We are unable to uphold the order of the High Court. There were no sanctioned posts in existence to which they could be said to have been appointed. The assignment was an ad hoc one which anticipatedly spent itself out. 5 as under: “5. We are unable to uphold the order of the High Court. There were no sanctioned posts in existence to which they could be said to have been appointed. The assignment was an ad hoc one which anticipatedly spent itself out. It is difficult to envisage for them the status of workmen on the analogy of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, importing the incidents of completion of 240 days’ work. The legal consequences that flow from work for that duration under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are entirely different from what, by way of implication, is attributed to the present situation by way of analogy. The completion of 240 days’ work does not, under that law import the right to regularisation. It merely imposes certain obligations on the employer at the time of termination of the service. It is not appropriate to import and apply that analogy, in an extended or enlarged form here.” (Emphasis supplied) (iv) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. And another v. S.C. Pandey reported in (2006) 2 SCC 716 especially in paragraph no. 17 as under: “17. The question raised in this appeal is now covered by a decision of this Court in M.P. Housing Board v. Manoj Shrivastava wherein this Court clearly opined that: (1) when the conditions of service are governed by two statutes; one relating to selection and appointment and the other relating to the terms and conditions of service, an endeavour should be made to give effect to both of the statutes; (2) a daily-wager does not hold a post as he is not appointed in terms of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and in that view of the matter he does not derive any legal right; (3) only because an employee had been working for more than 240 days that by itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service; (4) if an appointment has been made contrary to the provisions of the statute the same would be void and the effect thereof would be that no legal right was derived by the employee by reason thereof.” (Emphasis Supplied). (v) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Dan Bahadur Singh and others reported in (2007) 6 SCC 207 especially in paragraph no. 18 as under: “18. The next question which requires consideration is whether completion of 240 days in a year confers any right on an employee or workman to claim regularisation in service. In Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Anil Kumar Mishra it was held that the completion of 240 days’ work does not confer the right to regularisation under the Industrial Disputes Act. It merely imposes certain obligations on the employer at the time of termination of the services. In M.P. Housing Board v. Manoj Shrivastava (para 17) after referring to several earlier decisions it has been reiterated that it is well settled that only because a person had been working for more than 240 days, he does not derive any legal right to be regularised in service. This view has been reiterated in Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens Ltd. The same question has been examined in considerable detail with reference to an employee working in a government company in Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen and paras 34 and 35 of the Report are being reproduced below: (SCC p. 426) “34. Thus, it is well settled that there is no right vested in any daily wager to seek regularisation. Regularisation can only be done in accordance with the rules and not dehors the rules. In the case of E. Ramakrishnan v. State of Kerala this Court held that there can be no regularisation dehors the rules. The same view was taken in Kishore (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra and Union of India v. Bishamber Dutt. The direction issued by the Services Tribunal for regularising the services of persons who had not been appointed on regular basis in accordance with the rules was set aside although the petitioner had been working regularly for a long time. 35. In Surinder Singh Jamwal (Dr.) v. State of J&K it was held that ad hoc appointment does not give any right for regularisation as regularisation is governed by the statutory rules.” (Emphasis Supplied). (vi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vice-Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare And Another reported in (2016) 1 SCC 521 especially in paragraph nos. (vi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vice-Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare And Another reported in (2016) 1 SCC 521 especially in paragraph nos. 18 as under: “18. In considering the violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in Incharge Officer v. Shankar Shetty and after referring to the various decisions, this Court held that the relief by way of back wages is not automatic and compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice and it reads as under: “2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement of a daily wager has been brought to end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the ID Act’)? The course of the decisions of this Court in recent years has been uniform on the above question. 3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, delivering the judgment of this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court, namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, M.P. Admn. v. Tribhuban, Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, Jaipur Development Authority v. Ramsahai, GDA v. Ashok Kumar and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case, SCC pp. 330 & 335, paras 7 & 14) ‘7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. *** 14. Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. *** 14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee.’ 4. Jagbir Singh has been applied very recently in Telegraph Deptt. v. Santosh Kumar Seal, wherein this Court stated: ‘11. In view of the aforesaid legal position and the fact that the workmen were engaged as daily wagers about 25 years back and they worked hardly for 2 or 3 years, relief of reinstatement and back wages to them cannot be said to be justified and instead monetary compensation would subserve the ends of justice.” (Emphasis Supplied). In view of the aforesaid decisions even if any employee has worked for more than 240 days, but, if his basic appointment itself is illegal, without any public advertisement and without any procedure as established by law, such type of employee cannot be reinstated. (vii) Back door entrants in the public employment have no place to continue with such employment. Back door entrants are threat to efficient candidates who are waiting for the public employment under Article 14 to be read with Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Public at large must be given an opportunity to compete with each other for getting public employment. This can be done only when the public advertisement will be given for the public post. (viii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Others Vs. Chandreshwar Pathak reported in (2014) 13 SCC 232 especially in paragraph nos. 10 to 13 as under: “10. This can be done only when the public advertisement will be given for the public post. (viii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Others Vs. Chandreshwar Pathak reported in (2014) 13 SCC 232 especially in paragraph nos. 10 to 13 as under: “10. The order of appointment, in the present case, is as follows: “In the light of the order passed by the Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Bihar, Patna, vide his Letter No. 6/86 F3 Shri Chandeshwar Pathak, s/o Shri Devnarayam Pathak of Village Haraji, PO Haraji, PS Dimbara, District Chhapra was appointed as Constable temporarily from 14-1-1988 afternoon on the condition that his previous character found satisfactory and as and when necessary, his service shall be terminated without assigning any reason or show cause. His pay scale shall be Rs 425-10,565 EB-10-605 with the basic pay of Rs.425. He has been allotted CT No. 390.” It is clear from the above order that the appointment has been given only on the asking of the Inspector General of Police. There is nothing to show that any advertisement was issued giving opportunity to all eligible candidates to compete or any selection process was undertaken before appointment of the respondent. 11. In State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, it was observed as under: “Appointment/employment without advertisement “35. At one time this Court had been of the view that calling the names from employment exchange would curb to certain extent the menace of nepotism and corruption in public employment. But, later on, came to the conclusion that some appropriate method consistent with the requirements of Article 16 should be followed. In other words there must be a notice published in the appropriate manner calling for applications and all those who apply in response thereto should be considered fairly. Even if the names of candidates are requisitioned from employment exchange, in addition thereto it is mandatory on the part of the employer to invite applications from all eligible candidates from the open market by advertising the vacancies in newspapers having wide circulation or by announcement in radio and television as merely calling the names from the employment exchange does not meet the requirement of the said article of the Constitution. (Vide Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union v. Delhi Admn., State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, Excise Supt. (Vide Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union v. Delhi Admn., State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, Excise Supt. v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao, Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh, Binod Kumar Gupta v. Ram Ashray Mahoto, National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh, Deptt. of Telecommunications v. Keshab Deb, State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh and State of M.P. v. Mohd. Abrahim.) 36. Therefore, it is a settled legal proposition that no person can be appointed even on a temporary or ad hoc basis without inviting applications from all eligible candidates. If any appointment is made by merely inviting names from the employment exchange or putting a note on the notice-board, etc. that will not meet the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such a course violates the mandates of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as it deprives the candidates who are eligible for the post, from being considered. A person employed in violation of these provisions is not entitled to any relief including salary. For a valid and legal appointment mandatory compliance with the said constitutional requirement is to be fulfilled. The equality clause enshrined in Article 16 requires that every such appointment be made by an open advertisement as to enable all eligible persons to compete on merit.” 12. No contrary view of this Court has been cited on behalf of the respondent. Moreover, another Division Bench of the same High Court has upheld termination in similar matter as noted earlier against which SLP has been dismissed by this Court as mentioned earlier. 13. Accordingly, it has to be held that in the absence of any advertisement or selection process, the appointment of the respondent is not protected and could be validly terminated. The learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the writ petition while the Division Bench erred in interfering with the same.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision, the employment of this appellant cannot be protected because her appointment itself was not in accordance with law and without any public advertisement. This appellant was appointed as a casual worker/daily rated worker. (ix) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ashif and others Vs. State of Bihar and Others reported in (2010) 5 SCC 475 especially in paragraph nos. 13 and 14 as under: “13. This appellant was appointed as a casual worker/daily rated worker. (ix) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ashif and others Vs. State of Bihar and Others reported in (2010) 5 SCC 475 especially in paragraph nos. 13 and 14 as under: “13. Applying the test laid down by this Court in Umadevi (3) case and the cases referred to above, to the case at hand, there is no gainsaying that the appointments of the appellants as Primary Health Workers were totally illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution which guarantee equality of opportunity to all those who were otherwise eligible for such appointments. The Chief Medical Officer who had made the appointments was not vested with the power to do so nor were the claims of other candidates eligible for appointments against the posts to which the appellants were appointed, considered. Surprisingly, the appointments had come by way of absorption of the appellants who were working as Voluntary Health Workers on a monthly honorarium of Rs 50 only. 14. The High Court has, in our opinion, correctly held that there was no cadre of Voluntary Health Workers who were working on an honorarium in Staterun dispensaries. The very nature of the appointment given to the appellants as Voluntary Health Workers was honorary in nature which entitled them to the payment of not more than Rs 50 per month. It is difficult to appreciate how the Chief Medical Officer could have regularised/absorbed such Voluntary Health Workers doing honorary service against the post of Primary Health Workers which carried a regular pay scale and which could be filled only in accordance with the procedure prescribed for that purpose. The appointment of the appellants against the said posts was thus manifestly illegal and wholly undeserved to say the least. Inasmuch as these appointments came to be cancelled pursuant to the said directions no matter nearly a decade and a half later the termination could not be said to be illegal so as to warrant interference of a writ court for reinstatement of those illegally appointed. The High Court was, in that view of the matter, justified in declining interference with the order of cancellation and dismissing the writ petitions.” (Emphasis Supplied). (x) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. State Co-op. The High Court was, in that view of the matter, justified in declining interference with the order of cancellation and dismissing the writ petitions.” (Emphasis Supplied). (x) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. State Co-op. Bank Ltd., Bhopal Vs. Nanuram Yadav and others reported (2007) 8 SCC 264 especially in paragraph no. 24 it has been observed that “those who come by back door should go through that door”. (xi) In view of the aforesaid decisions, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in quashing and setting aside the award passed by the Labour Court in Reference Case no. 4 of 1989 dated 29th December, 1995 reinstating this appellant. There cannot be reinstatement of such type of back door entrants. (xii) It has been categorically stated by the Management witness no.1 that this appellant was only appointed as a Daily Rated Worker and thus, she has not been appointed against the sanctioned vacant post and that too only for the periods: (a) 01.12.1980 to 31.01.1982; (62 days) (b) 01.12.1982 to 31.03.1983; (121 days) (c) 01.04.1984 to 31.05.1984. (61 days) 6. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in quashing and setting aside the award, passed by the learned Labour Court, Hazaribagh in Reference Case No. 4 of 1989 dated 29th December, 1995 and we see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 3117 of 1996(R). Hence, there is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and the same is hereby, dismissed. 7. Registrar General of this Court is directed to send a copy of this judgment and order to all the Chairman’s and Members, Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals in the State of Jharkhand as well as to all the Principal District Judges of the State of Jharkhand as well as to the Director, Jharkhand Judicial Academy, Ranchi.