JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The petitioner was one out of the two contestants to the post of Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Baragran, Tehsil Manali, District Kullu H.P. in the elections held on 1.1.2016, the other being respondent No. 4. 2. After polling was over, counting started in the Panchayat Ghar and on opening the ballot boxes, the votes polled by each of the candidate was separated and thereafter counted. 3. It is averred that on counting of the votes, the petitioner secured 471 votes, whereas respondent No.4 secured 465 votes. Respondent No.4 sought re-counting of votes and in the recounting so done, 8 votes of the petitioner was declared invalid and thereby she secured 463 votes, whereas the votes polled in favour of respondent No.4 remained the same i.e. 465. This time it was the petitioner, who objected to the re-counting and resultantly, another recount took place and after this recount, both the parties secured 465 votes each. It is averred that the Assistant Returning Officer without obtaining the consent and without going into the authenticity of the votes declared invalid, went for ‘draw of lots’ in which respondent No. 4 came to be elected. 4. Aggrieved by the election of respondent No.4, the petitioner firstly filed an election petition before the Authorised Officer, however, the same was dismissed and she thereafter assailed the decision by filing an appeal under Section 181 of the Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (for short ‘Act’) before the Deputy Commissioner, who too, vide order dated 15.12.2016 dismissed the same. 5. Aggrieved by the decision rendered by both the authorities below, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing instant writ petition claiming therein the following substantive relief: (i) That order dated passed by both the authorities may be quashed and set aside and election petition filed by petitioner may be allowed by ordering recount of votes as well as for rechecking of invalid votes for knowing the intention of the voter, in the interest of law and justice. 6. The official respondents have contested the petition by filing a joint reply wherein preliminary objections qua maintainability, locus standi etc. have been raised. On merits, it is averred that the entire process of election was conducted by the Assistant Returning Officer in a fair manner as provided by law. 6. The official respondents have contested the petition by filing a joint reply wherein preliminary objections qua maintainability, locus standi etc. have been raised. On merits, it is averred that the entire process of election was conducted by the Assistant Returning Officer in a fair manner as provided by law. It is further averred that the counting and re-counting of the votes had been done in the presence and with the consent of the agents of both the parties and the decision of the Assistant Returning Officer to carry out the draw of lots was as per the mandate of Section 175 (b) of the Act and Chapter 15 of the Handbook of Assistant Returning Officer for which the written consent was neither necessary nor provided for in the aforesaid Act and guidelines. 7. Respondent No.4, who is the elected candidate, has filed a separate reply which in fact is virtually reiteration of the reply filed by the official respondents. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material placed on record. 8. As would be evident from the prayer clause, the petitioner has primarily sought re-counting of votes and, therefore, the moot question is whether such relief can be granted on the mere asking of the petitioner. The position of law has now been crystallized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a large number of decisions, some of which are cited below. 9. In Bhabhi vs. Sheo Govind and others AIR 1975 SC 2117 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “15. The position of law has now been crystallized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a large number of decisions, some of which are cited below. 9. In Bhabhi vs. Sheo Govind and others AIR 1975 SC 2117 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “15. Thus on a close and careful consideration of the various authorities of this Court from time to time it is manifest that the following conditions are imperative before a Court can grant inspection, or for that matter sample inspection, of the ballot papers : (1) That it is important to maintain the secrecy of the ballot which is sacrosanct and should not be allowed to be violated on frivolous, vague and indefinite allegations; (2) That before inspection is allowed, the allocations made against the elected candidate must be clear and specific and must be supported by adequate statements of material facts; (3) The Court must be prima facie satisfied on the materials produced before the Court regarding the truth of the allegations made for a recount; (4) That the Court must come to the conclusion that in order to grant prayer for inspection it is necessary and imperative to do full justice between the parties; (5) That the discretion conferred on the Court should not be exercised in such a way so as to enable the applicant to indulge in a roving inquiry with a view to fish materials for declaring the election to be void; and (6) That on the special facts of a given case sample inspection may be ordered to lend further assurance to the prima facie satisfaction of the Court regarding the truth of the allegations made for a recount, and not for the purpose of fishing out materials. If all these circumstances enter into the mind of the Judge and he is satisfied that these conditions are fulfilled in a given case, the exercise of the discretion would undoubtedly be proper.” 10. In P.K.K. Shamsudeen vs. K.A.M. Mappillai Mohindeen and others AIR 1989 SC 640 , it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that secrecy of the votes and/or ballot is the salutary principles for ordering the recounting. In P.K.K. Shamsudeen vs. K.A.M. Mappillai Mohindeen and others AIR 1989 SC 640 , it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that secrecy of the votes and/or ballot is the salutary principles for ordering the recounting. It was further held that an order of recount of votes must stand or fall on the nature of the averments made and the evidence adduced before the order of recount is made and not from the results emanating from the recount of votes. It is apt to reproduce the relevant observations as contained in paragraphs 13 to 15 of the judgment which reads thus: “13. Thus the settled position of law is that the justification for an order for examination of ballot papers and recount of votes is not to be derived from high sight and by the result of the recount of votes. On the contrary, the justification for an order of recount of votes should be provided by the material placed by an election petitioner on the threshold before an order for recount of votes is actually made. The reason for this salutary rule is that the preservation of the secrecy of the ballot is a sacrosanct principle which cannot be lightly or hastily broken unless there is prima facie genuine need for it. The right of a defeated candidate to assail the validity of an election result and seek recounting of votes has to be subject to the basic principle that the secrecy of the ballot is sacrosanct in a democracy and hence unless the affected candidate is able to allege and substantiate in acceptable measure by means of evidence that a prima facie case of a high degree of probability existed for the recount of votes being ordered by the Election Tribunal in the interests of justice, a Tribunal or court should not order the recount of votes. 14. Viewed in the light of these well enunciated principles, we find that the petitioner has neither made such averments in the petition nor adduced evidence of such a compulsive nature as could have made the Tribunal reach a prima facie satisfaction that there was adequate justification for the secrecy of ballot being breached in the petitioner's case. Factors urged before us by Mr. Padamanabhan such as that the first respondent had accepted the correctness of the recount. Factors urged before us by Mr. Padamanabhan such as that the first respondent had accepted the correctness of the recount. and that he had conceded his defeat and wanted a re-election to be held cannot constitute justifying materials in law for the initial order of recount of votes made by the Tribunal. 15. Mr. Padamanabhan also contended that the purpose and object of the election law is to ensure that only that person should represent the constituency who is chosen by the majority of the electors and that is the essence of PG NO 958 democratic process, and this position has been observed by a Bench of this Court in their order of reference of the case of N. Gopal Reddy v. Bonala Krishnamurty & Ors., CA No. 3730(NCE) of 1986 reported in JT 1987(1) SC-406 and hence it would be a travesty of justice and opposed to all democratic canons to allow the first respondent to continue to hold the post of the President of the Panchayat when the recount disclosed that he had secured 28 votes less than the petitioner. We are unable to sustain this contention because as we have stated earlier an order of recount of votes must stand or fall on the nature of the averments made and the evidence adduced before the order of recount is made and not from the results emanating from the recount of votes.” 11. In Shri Satyanarain Dudhani vs. Uday Kumar Singh and others AIR 1993 SC 367 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that secrecy of ballot papers cannot be permitted to be tinkered lightly and an order of recount cannot be granted as a matter of course and only when the Court is satisfied on the basis of material facts pleaded in the petition and supported by the contemporaneous evidence that the recount can be ordered. It is apt to reproduce the relevant observations contained in paragraph 10 of the judgment, which reads thus: “10. It is thus obvious that neither during the counting nor on the completion of the counting there was any valid ground available for the recount of the ballot papers. A cryptic application claiming recount was made by the petitioner-respondent before the Returning Officer. No details of any kind were given in the said application. It is thus obvious that neither during the counting nor on the completion of the counting there was any valid ground available for the recount of the ballot papers. A cryptic application claiming recount was made by the petitioner-respondent before the Returning Officer. No details of any kind were given in the said application. Not even a single instance showing any irregularity or illegality in the counting was brought to the notice of the Returning Officer. We are of the view when there was no contemporaneous evidence to show any irregularity or illegality in the counting. Ordinarily, it would not be proper to order recount on the basis of bare allegations in the election petition. We have been taken through the pleadings in the election petition. We are satisfied that the grounds urged in the election petition do not justify for ordering recount and allowing inspection of the ballot papers. It is settled proposition of law that the secrecy of ballot papers cannot be permitted to be tinkered lightly and an order of recount cannot be granted as a matter of course and only when the Court is satisfied on the basis of material facts pleaded in the petition and supported by the contemporaneous evidence that the recount can be ordered.” 12. In Vedivelu vs. Sundaram and others AIR 2000 SC 3230 the Hon’ble Supreme Court sounded a word of caution in ordering the recounting of votes on the basis of mere allegation without proper evidence with regard to improper acceptance of the valid votes or improper rejection of the valid votes and it was observed as under: “18. From the above pleadings, it is evident that the appellant has not set forth material facts or particulars required for re-count of votes. To justify his contention that there was irregularity or illegality in the counting, except making some general and bald allegations, no other details are given. Though an allegation is made that electoral roll contained the names of dead persons, that the 1st respondent took advantage of the same, and that some persons had impersonated and cast votes in his favour, no details are given as to who committed such irregularity. The appellant has also not mentioned as to how many such votes had been cast in favour of the 1st respondent. The appellant has also not mentioned as to how many such votes had been cast in favour of the 1st respondent. So also, the appellant has not alleged the nature of the illegality or irregularity said to have been committed by the counting officers. How and in what manner there was improper acceptance of invalid votes and improper rejection of valid votes also is not explained by the appellant. In short, the Election Petition is bereft of all details and the appellant, while examined as PW 1, could not supplement anything by way of evidence. 13. In Mahender Pratap vs. Krishan Pal and others (2003) 1 SCC 390 , it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that election petitioner must show by leading evidence that there was serious flaw in counting procedure which materially affected the result of the election. 14. In M. Chinnasamy vs. K.C. Palanisamy and others (2004) 6 SCC 341 , a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that recounting cannot be ordered on a mere asking or only because the margin of votes between the returned candidate and election petitioner is narrow, material facts and particulars have to be pleaded particularly when the onus of proving the allegation is on the election petitioner. It is apt to reproduce the relevant observations as contained in paras 15, 44, 45 and 46 of the judgment, which reads thus: “15. It is not in dispute that in relation to an election petition, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply. In terms of Order VI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is in pari materia with clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 an election petition must contain concise statement of material facts. It is true as contended by Mr. Mani that full particulars are required to be set forth in terms of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act which relates to corrupt practice. The question as to what would constitute material facts would, however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is true as contended by Mr. Mani that full particulars are required to be set forth in terms of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act which relates to corrupt practice. The question as to what would constitute material facts would, however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is trite that an order of recounting of votes can be passed when the following ingredients are satisfied : (1) If there is a prima facie case; (2) material facts therefor are pleaded; (3) the court shall not direct recounting by way of roving or fishing inquiry; and (4) such an objection had been taken recourse to. Xxx xxx xxx xxx 44. The requirement of laying foundation in the pleadings must also be considered having regard to the fact that the onus to prove the allegations was on the election petitioner. The degree of proof for issuing a direction of recounting of votes must be of a very high standard and is required to be discharged. [See Mahender Pratap vs. Krishan Pal and Others - (2003) 1 SCC 390 ]. 45. In T.H. Mustaffa (supra), this Court held that when the pleadings do not contain the material facts and necessary particulars, any amount of evidence would be insufficient. 46. Even in the recount it was found that the returned candidate has not secured majority of the votes, the result could not have been disturbed, unless prima facie case of high degree of probability existed for recount of votes. [See P.K.K. Shamsudeen vs. K.A.M. Mapillai Mohindeen - (1989) 1 SCC 526 at 530, 531]. 15. Notably, the ratio of the aforesaid judgment was reiterated by another three Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chandrika Prasad Yadav vs. State of Bihar and others (2004) 6 SCC 331 in the following terms: 20. It is well-settled that an order of recounting of votes can be passed when the following conditions are fulfilled: (i) A prima facie case; (ii) Pleading of material facts stating irregularities in counting of votes; (iii) A roving and fishing inquiry shall not be made while directing recounting of votes; and (iv) An objection to the said effect has been taken recourse to. 21. The requirement of maintaining the secrecy of ballot papers must also be kept in view before a recounting can be directed. 21. The requirement of maintaining the secrecy of ballot papers must also be kept in view before a recounting can be directed. Narrow margin of votes between the returned candidate and the election petitioner by itself would not be sufficient for issuing a direction for recounting.” 16. In Kattinokkula Murali Krishna vs. Veeramalla Koteswara Rao and others (2010) 1 SCC 466 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that merely because there was a narrow margin of votes between returned candidate and election petitioner does not per se given rise to a presumption that there had been irregularity or illegality in the counting of votes. It was further held that the Tribunal could not have ordered the recounting only on a bald plea that some irregularities and illegalities had been committed in counting. It is apt to reproduce the relevant observations as contained in paragraphs 15, 16, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the judgment, which read thus: “15. Before examining the merits of the issues raised on behalf of the parties, it would be appropriate to bear in mind the salutary principle laid down in the Election Law that since an order for inspection and re-count of the ballot papers affects the secrecy of ballot, such an order cannot be made as a matter of course. Undoubtedly, in the entire election process, the secrecy of ballot is sacrosanct and inviolable except where strong prima facie circumstances to suspect the purity, propriety and legality in the counting of votes are made out. The importance of maintenance of secrecy of ballots and the circumstances under which that secrecy can be breached, has been considered by this Court in several cases. 16. It would be trite to state that before an Election Tribunal can permit scrutiny of ballot papers and order re-count, two basic requirements viz. (i) the election petition seeking re-count of the ballot papers must contain an adequate statement of all the material facts on which the allegations of irregularity or illegality in counting are founded, and (ii) on the basis of evidence adduced in support of the allegations, the Tribunal must be, prima facie, satisfied that in order to decide the dispute and to do complete and effectual justice between the parties, making of such an order is imperatively necessary, are satisfied. Broadly stated, material facts are primary or basic facts which have to be pleaded by the election petitioner to prove his cause of action and by the defendant to prove his defence. But, as to what could be said to be material facts would depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. 23. Having viewed the matter in the light of the principles enunciated above, we are constrained to hold that the Election Tribunal as also the High court lost sight of the parameters to be applied while considering the petition seeking re-counting of votes. It is manifest from the afore-extracted paragraph 4 of the election petition, containing the grounds of challenge, the allegations regarding irregularity or illegality in the counting of votes were not only vague, even the basic material facts as could have made the Election Tribunal record a prima facie satisfaction that re-count of ballots was necessary, were missing in the petition. It is pertinent to note that upon consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, the Election Tribunal had itself observed that the election petitioner had failed to state any material facts regarding the failure of the Election Officer to mention reasons for rejection of votes and further there was no specific allegation as to on which table the votes polled in favour of the election petitioner were mixed with the votes polled in favour of the appellant; and on which table the votes polled in his favour were rejected as invalid. Precisely for this reason, and in our view rightly, the Election Tribunal had declined to take into consideration the evidence adduced by the election petitioner on the point. 24. It is a settled principle of law that evidence beyond the pleadings can neither be permitted to be adduced nor such evidence can be taken into consideration. Moreover, even the two material issues, viz. as to whether the counting of votes by the Election Officer was in accordance with the rules and regulations as also whether the votes polled in favour of the election petitioner were rejected as invalid or there was improper mixing of the votes have been found in favour of the appellant. Moreover, even the two material issues, viz. as to whether the counting of votes by the Election Officer was in accordance with the rules and regulations as also whether the votes polled in favour of the election petitioner were rejected as invalid or there was improper mixing of the votes have been found in favour of the appellant. It is evident from the observations of the Election Tribunal, extracted in Para 7 above, that the sole factor which had weighed with it to order re-count was that no prejudice will be caused to the appellant if the ballot papers are re-counted. Similarly, the factor which weighed with the High Court to affirm the view of the Election Tribunal is that re-counting of votes will reinforce the transparency in the process of election, particularly when the margin of votes was very narrow. 25. It needs to be emphasised that having regard to the consequences emanating from the direction of re-counting, which may even breach the secrecy of ballot, the doctrine of prejudice is an irrelevant factor for ordering re-count. Similarly, a narrow margin of votes between the returned candidate and the election petitioner does not per se give rise to a presumption that there had been an irregularity or illegality in the counting of votes. In the first instance, material facts in this behalf have to be stated clearly in the election petition and then proved by cogent evidence. Undoubtedly, the onus to prove the allegation of irregularity, impropriety or illegality in the election process on the part of the Election Officer is on the election petitioner and not on the Election Officer, as held by the authorities below. In the present case, both the forums below have found that material facts were lacking in the election petition. Having held so, in our view, the election petition should have been dismissed on this short ground alone. In that view of the matter, the observation of the Election Tribunal, as affirmed by the High Court, that the Election Officer had failed to say anything regarding corrections and over-writings in Form 26, are neither factually nor legally sound. 26. Having held so, in our view, the election petition should have been dismissed on this short ground alone. In that view of the matter, the observation of the Election Tribunal, as affirmed by the High Court, that the Election Officer had failed to say anything regarding corrections and over-writings in Form 26, are neither factually nor legally sound. 26. We are of the opinion that in the light of the afore-noted factual scenario and the fact that findings of the Election Tribunal on issues No.1 and 2 were in favour of the appellant, except for a bald plea that some irregularities and illegalities had been committed in counting, there was no material on record on the basis whereof the Election Tribunal could have arrived at a positive finding that a case to order re-count of the ballot papers had been made out. For all these reasons, we are convinced that the order of re-count passed by the Election Tribunal was illegal and the High Court erred in upholding it. 27. In view of the afore-going discussion, the appeal is allowed; the order passed by the Election Tribunal ordering re-count of the ballot papers, and affirmed by the High Court is set aside. The appellant shall be entitled to costs, quantified at Rs.20,000/-.” 17. The aforesaid proposition was further reiterated by a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arikala Narasa Reddy vs. Venkata Ram Reddy Reddygari and another (2014) 5 SCC 312 , reiterating that the Court cannot go beyond pleadings and allow recounting just to enable election petitioner to indulge in roving inquiry. Material facts and full particulars must be properly pleaded stating particular irregularity in counting votes due to which the election was materially affected and evidence must be led in support thereof, in absence of such pleading evidence cannot be considered. 18. Material facts and full particulars must be properly pleaded stating particular irregularity in counting votes due to which the election was materially affected and evidence must be led in support thereof, in absence of such pleading evidence cannot be considered. 18. The principles that can be culled out from the law on the subject as expounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions are as follows: (i) A prima-facie case; (ii) Pleading of material facts stating irregularities in counting of votes; (iii) A roving and fishing inquiry shall not be made while directing recounting of votes; (iv) An objection to the said effect has been taken recourse to; and (v) The Court must be prima-facie satisfied on the material placed before it regarding the truth of the allegations made for a recounting. 19. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles as also the exposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, now we proceed to determine as to whether the case of the petitioner is covered by any of the principles culled out above. 20. Adverting to the election petition, it would be noticed that the petitioner has not even cared to plead the material facts regarding irregularity in the counting of votes and we are disposed to think that what the petitioner in fact seeks is nothing but a fishing and roving fishing inquiry which is impermissible in law. The petitioner has failed to specify any allegations with respect to the alleged illegality and so called irregularity committed while counting and has further failed to point out much less prove that there was improper acceptance of invalid votes or improper rejection of the valid votes. As observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in absence of proper pleading to this effect coupled with clinching evidence to support such pleading an order of recounting cannot be made as a matter of recourse. 21. Therefore, in absence of any specifications with regard to the ground on which the election of respondent No.4 was being questioned together with the summary of the circumstances to justify the election being questioned on such ground, it was obviously not open for the authority to direct recounting and, therefore, both the authorities below committed no irregularity much less illegality in rejecting the claim put-forth by the petitioner. 22. 22. At this stage, we may also note that during the pendency of this petition, the petitioner had moved an application seeking therein direction to respondent No.2 to provide information as per Rule 83 of the H.P. Panchayati Raj (Election Rules), wherein she expressed her apprehension that some of the votes casted in favour of the Pradhan were likely to be found in the ballot boxes of the Block Development Committee (BDC Ward No.23, Pargna Tehsil Manali, District Kullu) as also in the ballot boxes of Zila Parishad (Ward No.14 Nasogi) for whose elections were held simultaneously with the elections of Pradhan and accordingly this Court vide order dated 12.5.2017 appointed the SDM, Kullu as a Commissioner to undertake this exercise. 23. In compliance to the orders, the SDM, Kullu has submitted his report in a sealed cover which was opened in the presence of the counsels for the parties in the open court during the hearing of the petition on 2.6.2017 wherein he has reported that no vote was found to be casted in favour of the Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Baragran in any of the two ballot boxes. 24. As a last effort, learned counsel for the petitioner would place strong reliance upon the judgment passed by a learned Division Bench of this Court in Nitu Bal vs. State of H.P. through Secretary (Panchayati Raj) 2012 (3) Him. L. R. 1808, to contend that it is only the person, who has secured the majority of the votes can be declared as elected. Obviously, there cannot be any quarrel with the proposition as expounded in the aforesaid case, but we are complete at a loss to understand as to how the ratio of the aforesaid judgment is applicable to the facts of the instant case. 25. To be fair to learned counsel for the petitioner, he also referred to a judgment rendered by learned Single Judge of this Court in Natwar Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, CWP No. 355 of 2012, decided on 30.4.2013 and also placed reliance upon a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuldeep Singh Pathania vs. Bikram Singh Jaryal (2017) 1 SCC 249. But we hardly find any of these judgments to be in any way helpful to the petitioner and rather, in case the judgment in Natwar Singh’s case (supra) is perused, it only reiterates what we have stated above, whereas the judgment in Kuldeep Singh Pathania case (supra) does not even remotely deal with the proposition posed for consideration before this Court. 26. As regards the orders passed by the authorities below, no fault can be found with the orders passed by them. After all, they were to decide the case on the basis of the pleading of the parties and in absence of any specific pleading, obviously the so called evidence could not have been considered. (Refer: Arikala Narasa Reddy vs. Venkata Ram Reddy Reddygari and another (2014) 5 SCC 312 ). 27. Insofar as the decision of respondent No.5 to carry out the draw of lots is concerned, the same is clearly provided for under Section 175 (b) of the Act and Chapter 15 of the Handbook of Assistant Returning Officer. 28. As a result of aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending applications if any, stands disposed of.