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2017 DIGILAW 679 (CAL)

IQ City Foundation v. State of West Bengal

2017-08-11

ARIJIT BANERJEE

body2017
JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner no. 1 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IQ City Foundation’) is a society registered under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961. The petitioner no. 2 is the president of IQ City Foundation. 2. IQ City Foundation has established a Health and Knowledge Campus in Durgapur, District Burdwan (in short ‘Knowledge Campus’). IQ City Foundation has promoted the IQ City Medical College and a teaching hospital, called IQ City Narayana Multispecialty Hospital at the Knowledge Campus. The teaching hospital is functional from August, 2012 and the Medical College received its letter of permission from the Medical Council of India on 5 July, 2013. 3. In this writ application the petitioners challenge a Memo dated 25 January, 2017 issued by the Special Secretary to the Government of West Bengal accepting the recommendation of the Permanent Committee for fixation of fees for medical/dental colleges for the session 2016-17. The operative portion of the said memo reads as follows:- “The undersigned is directed by order of the Governor to say that the Governor has been pleased to accept the recommendations of the aforesaid Permanent Committee, and accordingly set the following fee structure for MBBS students at IQ City Medical College and Hospital, Durgapur as mentioned in paragraph – 1 above, subject to the conditions that: (a) In terms of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the fee so fixed by the Committee shall be binding for a period of 2016-17. (b) In terms of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the IQ City Medical College and Hospital, Durgapur cannot charge either directly or indirectly any other amount over and above the amount fixed as fees by the Fee Structure Committee. There shall not be any profiteering or charging of capitation fees. If any other amount is charged, under any head or guise e.g. donations, the same would amount to charging of capitation fees, which will be a clear violation of the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. The IQ City Medical College and Hospital, Durgapur authorities are accordingly directed to submit a compliance report in this regard, and also furnish a report on the amount of fees collected under each head from different categories of students admitted there, on completion of the admission process. All concerned are being informed.” Brief Background of the case:- 4. The IQ City Medical College and Hospital, Durgapur authorities are accordingly directed to submit a compliance report in this regard, and also furnish a report on the amount of fees collected under each head from different categories of students admitted there, on completion of the admission process. All concerned are being informed.” Brief Background of the case:- 4. One question that came up before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Islamic Academy of Education vs. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697 , was whether or not the educational institutions are entitled to fix their own fee structure. Referring to its earlier judgment in the case of TMA Pai Foundation-vs.-State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 , the Apex Court answered the question as follows:- “So far as the first question is concerned, in our view the majority judgment is very clear. There can be no fixing of a rigid fee structure by the government. Each institute must have the freedom to fix its own fee structure taking into consideration the need to generate funds to run the institution and to provide facilities necessary for the benefit of the students. They must also be able to generate surplus which must be used for the betterment and growth of that educational institution. In paragraph 56 of the judgment it has been categorically laid down that the decision on the fees to be charged must necessarily be left to the private educational institutions that do not seek and which are not dependent upon any funds from the Government. Each institute will be entitled to have its own fee structure. The fee structure for each institute must be fixed keeping in mind the infrastructure and facilities available, the investments made, salaries paid to the teachers and staff, future plans for expansion and/or betterment of the institution etc. Of course there can be no profiteering and capitation fees cannot be charged. It thus needs to be emphasized that as per the majority judgment imparting of education is essentially charitable in nature. Thus the surplus/profit that can be generated must be only for the benefit/use of that educational institution. Profits/surplus cannot be diverted for any other use or purpose and cannot be used for personal gain or for any other business or enterprise. Thus the surplus/profit that can be generated must be only for the benefit/use of that educational institution. Profits/surplus cannot be diverted for any other use or purpose and cannot be used for personal gain or for any other business or enterprise. As, at present, there are statutes/regulations which govern the fixation of fees and as this Court has, not yet considered the validity of those statutes/regulations, we direct that in order to give effect to the judgment in TMA PAI's case the respective State Governments/concerned authority shall set up, in each State, a committee headed by a retired High Court judge who shall be nominated by the Chief Justice of that State. The other member, who shall be nominated by the Judge, should be a Chartered Accountant of repute. A representative of the Medical Council of India (in short 'MCI') or the All India Council for Technical Education (in short 'AICTE'), depending on the type of institution, shall also be a member. The Secretary of the State Government in charge of Medical Education or Technical Education, as the case may be, shall be a member and Secretary of the Committee. The Committee should be free to nominate/co-opt another independent person of repute, so that total number of members of the Committee shall not exceed five. Each educational Institute must place before this Committee, well in advance of the academic year, its proposed fee structure. Along with the proposed fee structure all relevant documents and books of accounts must also be produced before the committee for their scrutiny. The Committee shall then decide whether the fees proposed by that institute are justified and are not profiteering or charging capitation fee. The Committee will be at liberty to approve the fee structure or to propose some other fee which can be charged by the institute. The fee fixed by the committee shall be binding for a period of three years, at the end of which period the institute would be at liberty to apply for revision. Once fees are fixed by the Committee, the institute cannot charge either directly or indirectly any other amount over and above the amount fixed as fees. If any other amount is charged, under any other head or guise e.g. donations, the same would amount to charging of capitation fee. Once fees are fixed by the Committee, the institute cannot charge either directly or indirectly any other amount over and above the amount fixed as fees. If any other amount is charged, under any other head or guise e.g. donations, the same would amount to charging of capitation fee. The Governments/appropriate authorities should consider framing appropriate regulations, if not already framed, whereunder if it is found that an institution is charging capitation fees or profiteering that institution can be appropriately penalised and also face the prospect of losing its recognition/affiliation.” 5. In terms of the said judgment and order of the Hon’ble Apex Court the Permanent Committee was constituted by the State Government by Notification NO. HF/O/MERT/1035/2D-05/2004 dated 1 September, 2008 to decide the fee structure of private medical colleges/dental colleges in the State of West Bengal. The Permanent Committee is headed by a learned retired Judge of this Court. The other members of the said Committee are the respondent nos. 4 to 7. 6. The said Committee finalized the fee structure for the IQ City Medical College for the three annual sessions between 2013-14 and 2015-16 in the following manner:- For the IQ City Medical College, Durgapur, Burdwan For 50 MBBS seats to be filled-up through the NEET-UG examination/Joint Entrance Examination (Medical) merit panel the rules of reservation as applicable For 100 MBBS seats to be filled up by the Management 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 Tuition Fee per Semester (Rs.) 80000 90000 100000 340000 370000 400000 Admission Fee(Rs.) 50000 50000 50000 50000 50000 50000 Caution Money(Refundable)(Rs.) 15000 15000 15000 15000 15000 15000 7. By its letter dated 18 January, 2016 addressed to the Principal Secretary, Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of West Bengal, the IQ City Foundation indicated the fee structure that it proposed to charge for the next three academic years starting with 2016-17 onwards. The fee structure was as follows:- Tuition Fee/Semester (In Rs.) One time Admission Fee (In Rs.) Caution Money Deposit (In Rs.) Govt. Quota(50 seats) 1,50,000/- 50,000/- 15,000/- Management Quota (100 seats) 6,00,000/- 1,00,000/- 15,000/- 8. The matter was referred to the Permanent Committee for fee fixation. The fee structure was as follows:- Tuition Fee/Semester (In Rs.) One time Admission Fee (In Rs.) Caution Money Deposit (In Rs.) Govt. Quota(50 seats) 1,50,000/- 50,000/- 15,000/- Management Quota (100 seats) 6,00,000/- 1,00,000/- 15,000/- 8. The matter was referred to the Permanent Committee for fee fixation. The Committee held meetings on 19 September, 2016, 24 October, 2016, 2 November, 2016 and 16 November, 2016 and decided to recommend to the Government of West Bengal the fixation of fee for MBBS students of IQ City Medical College for the year 2016-17 as under:- For the IQ City Medical College Durgapur For 50 MBBS seats to be filled up through the Joint Entrance Examination (Medical) merit panel and the rules of reservation as applicable For 100 MBBS seats to be filled up by the Management Academic Session 2016-17 2016-17 Tuition Fee per Semester (Rs.) 1,10,000/- 4,40,000/- Admission Fee (Rs.) 50,000/- 50,000/- Caution Money (Refundable) Rs. 15,000/- 15,000/- 9. The aforesaid recommendation of the Permanent Committee for fee fixation was approved/accepted by the Government of West Bengal by issuing the memo which is under challenge in the present writ application. Contention of the petitioners:- 10. Appearing for the petitioners Mr. P.S. Sengupta, Learned Sr. Adv. submitted that it was not the function of the Committee to recommend a fee structure to the State Government but to fix the fee structure. The State Government has no role to play in the matter. The primary right to fix the fee structure is that of the institution. If the proposal of the institution is not found acceptable to the Permanent Committee only then the Permanent Committee can alter/vary the proposed fee structure. However prior to doing so, the Committee must record its reasons as to why the institute’s proposal is not acceptable. Similarly, if the Committee reduces or scales down the fee structure proposed by the institute and fixes a different fee structure, reasons must also be recorded for fixing the fee structure in that particular manner. From the proceedings of the meetings of the Committee disclosed before this Court, no such reasons are discernible. To that extent, rejection of the institute’s proposal and the fee structure fixed by the Committee are arbitrary. 11. Learned Counsel further submitted that the decision of the Committee fixing the impugned fee structure must itself disclose the reasons. Reasons cannot be supplemented. To that extent, rejection of the institute’s proposal and the fee structure fixed by the Committee are arbitrary. 11. Learned Counsel further submitted that the decision of the Committee fixing the impugned fee structure must itself disclose the reasons. Reasons cannot be supplemented. It is not recorded that the fee structure proposed by the institute, if implemented, would result in the institute making profits. In any event, it is not impermissible for an educational institution to earn profits so long as the same are ploughed back for improving the standard and facilities of the institute which will enure to the benefit of the students. 12. Mr. Sengupta then submitted that there is complete non-application of mind on the part of the Permanent Committee. The IQ Medical College asked for approval of fee structure for three academic years starting from 2016-17 onwards. This was in terms of the direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Islamic Academy of Education (supra). However, the Permanent Committee considered and fixed the fee structure for only the academic year 2016-17. 13. Learned Counsel then submitted that all financial facts and figures pertaining to the running of the institute were supplied to the Permanent Committee as called for by it. The Committee did not consider the financial loss incurred by the petitioner institution for the year ending 2012-13(Rs. 0.17 crores), financial loss incurred by the institute for the year ending 2013-14(Rs. 12.09 crores), accumulated financial loss for the year ending 2013-14 (Rs. 12.27 crores), financial loss for the year ending 2014-15 (10.96 crores), accumulated financial loss for the year ending 2014-15 (Rs. 23.23 crores), financial loss for the year ending 2015-16 (Rs. 0.71 crores), accumulated financial loss for the year 2015-16 (23.95 crores) and projected financial loss for the year ending 2016-17 (7.86 crores). The Committee also did not take into account the projected amount for procurement of medical equipment for the year 2017 (Rs. 12.01 crores) and the cost of the proposed Oncology Centre (more than Rs. 50 crores). 14. Learned Counsel submitted that these facts and figures relating to the financial loss of the institute and for future plans for expansion and/or betterment of the institution should have been considered by the Committee as per the direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Islamic Academy of Education (supra). 15. Mr. 50 crores). 14. Learned Counsel submitted that these facts and figures relating to the financial loss of the institute and for future plans for expansion and/or betterment of the institution should have been considered by the Committee as per the direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Islamic Academy of Education (supra). 15. Mr. Sengupta then submitted that the present infrastructure of the petitioner institute comprises a 50 acres campus and built up area of more than 11 lac sq. feet. There are extra speciality departments of Cardiology, Urology Nephrology etc.. The institute has partnered with Dr. Devi Shetty run Narayana Hrudayalaya to operate the departments of Cardiology and Nephrology for better grooming of the students. The institute has acquired state of art medical equipment during the year 2016 at the cost of Rs. 18.11 crores. These factors like infrastructure, facilities available and investments made should have been considered by the Committee as mentioned in the judgment in the Islamic Academic of Education (supra) case, but the Committee has not done so. 16. Learned Counsel then referred to the Hon’ble Apex Court’s decision in the case of P.A. Inamdar-vs.-State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537 , and in particular paragraphs 149 and 150 of the reported judgment which read as follows:- “149. However, we would like to sound a note of caution to such Committees. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have severely criticised the functioning of some of the Committees so constituted. It was pointed out by citing concrete examples that some of the Committees have indulged in assuming such powers and performing such functions as were never given or intended to be given to them by Islamic Academy. Certain decisions of some of the Committees were subjected to serious criticism by pointing out that the fee structure approved by them was abysmally low which has rendered the functioning of the institutions almost impossible or made the institutions run into losses. In some of the institutions, the teachers have left their job and migrated to other institutions as it was not possible for the management to retain talented and highly qualified teachers against the salary permitted by the Committees. Retired High Court Judges heading the Committees are assisted by experts in accounts and management. They also have the benefit of hearing the contending parties. Retired High Court Judges heading the Committees are assisted by experts in accounts and management. They also have the benefit of hearing the contending parties. We expect the Committees, so long as they remain functional, to be more sensitive and to act rationally and reasonably with due regard for realities. They should refrain from generalizing fee structures and, where needed, should go into accounts, schemes, plans and budgets of an individual institution for the purpose of finding out what would be an ideal and reasonable fee structure for that institution. 150. We make it clear that in case of any individual institution, if any of the Committees is found to have exceeded its powers by unduly interfering in the administrative and financial matters of the unaided private professional institutions, the decision of the Committee being quasi-judicial in nature, would always be subject to judicial review.” 17. Mr. Sengupta finally referred to a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Life Corporation of India-vs.-A Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 , wherein the Apex Court at paragraph 19 of the judgment observed that the word ‘consider’ is of great significance. It carries a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. The said term ‘consider’ postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Formation of opinion by a statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. Learned Counsel submitted that the Committee did not consider the relevant factors and hence the fee structure approved by it cannot be sustained. Contention of the State: 18. Mr. Jaharlal Dey, Learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the State submitted that the Permanent Committee is an expert body which has come to a finding on the basis of materials before it. Such finding cannot be challenged by way of judicial review. In support of his submission, learned Counsel relied on Sai Bhaskar Iron Limited-vs.-AP Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2016) 9 SCC 134 and Sunil Kumar-vs.-Bihar Public Service Commission, (2016) 2 SCC 495 . I shall revert back to these decisions later. Contention of the respondent nos. 3 to 6 and respondent no. 7 (in so far as his role as a Committee Member is concerned) 19. Mr. I shall revert back to these decisions later. Contention of the respondent nos. 3 to 6 and respondent no. 7 (in so far as his role as a Committee Member is concerned) 19. Mr. Sirsanya Bandopadhyay, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the aforesaid respondents referred to paragraph 150 of the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of PA Inamdar (supra), and submitted that the Committee’s decision can be interfered with by the Writ Court only if the Committee is found to have interfered with the administrative and financial matters of the private professional institutions. There is no such interference in the present case. Hence, the writ application is not maintainable. 20. Learned Counsel further submitted that although the fee structure that the Committee had fixed for the petitioner institute for the academic years 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-16 was much lower than that which the institute had proposed, yet, the institute did not challenge such fixation by the Committee. This was obviously because the proposal of the institute was artificially inflated. 21. Further, for the previous three academic years for MBBS seats to be filled up by the Management the institute had proposed fee of Rs. 6 lacs. For the academic year 2016-17 also the institute has proposed Rs. 6 lacs for the seats in Management quota. This is illogical and clearly goes to show that the institute’s proposal is unreasonable. 22. Learned Counsel then referred to the minutes of the Committee’s meeting dated 16 November, 2016 and submitted that it would appear therefrom that the profit before tax in 2015-16 had improved by more than Rs. 10 crores in as much as loss of Rs. 10.96,67,577/- had come down to Rs. 71,32,715/-. This would also show that the fee structure fixed by the Committee for the academic years 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-16 was adequate. Considering the rate of inflation in June 2016 was approximately 6.60 per cent, the Committee increased fees by 10 per cent for the academic year 2016-17 and the institute cannot have any legitimate grievance regarding the same. 23. Mr. Bandopadhyay relied on the following decisions:- (i) TMA Pai Foundation-vs.-State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 . Learned Counsel relied on paragraphs 56 and 57 of the reported judgment which read as follows:- “56. An educational institution is established for the purpose of imparting education of the type made available by the institution. 23. Mr. Bandopadhyay relied on the following decisions:- (i) TMA Pai Foundation-vs.-State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 . Learned Counsel relied on paragraphs 56 and 57 of the reported judgment which read as follows:- “56. An educational institution is established for the purpose of imparting education of the type made available by the institution. Different courses of study are usually taught by teachers who have to be recruited as per qualifications that may be prescribed. It is no secret that better working conditions will attract better teachers. More amenities will ensure that better students seek admission to that institution. One cannot lose sight of the fact that providing good amenities to the students in the form of competent teaching faculty and other infrastructure costs money. It has, therefore, to be left to the institution, if it chooses not to seek any aid from the government, to determine the scale of fee that it can charge from the students. One also cannot lose sight of the fact that we live in a competitive world today, where professional education is in demand. We have been given to understand that a large number of professional and other institutions have been started by private parties who do not seek any governmental aid. In a sense a prospective students has various options open to him/her where, therefore, normally economic forces have a role to play. The decision on the fee to be charged must necessarily be left to the private educational institution that does not seek or is not dependent upon any funds from the government. 57. We, however, wish to emphasize one point, and that is that inasmuch as the occupation of education is, in a sense, regarded as charitable, the government can provide regulations that will ensure excellence in education, while forbidding the charging of capitation fee and profiteering by the institution. Since the object of setting up an educational institution is by definition "charitable", it is clear that an educational institution cannot charge such a fee as is not required for the purpose of fulfilling that object. To put it differently, in the establishment of an educational institution, the object should not be to make a profit, inasmuch as education is essentially charitable in nature. To put it differently, in the establishment of an educational institution, the object should not be to make a profit, inasmuch as education is essentially charitable in nature. There can, however, be a reasonable revenue surplus, which may be generated by the educational institution for the purpose of development of education and expansion of the institution.” (ii) Shri Maheshwar Prasad Srivastava vs. Suresh Singh, (1977) 1 SCC 627 . Learned Counsel relied on the observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court that in matters involving consideration of questions regarding adequacy or sufficiency of training, the Public Service Commission, having the benefit of expert opinion, is better situated to judge whether a particular candidate is qualified for a particular post and courts should hesitate to interfere with the discretion of the appointing authority, so long as it is exercised bone fide. Learned Counsel submitted that the Permanent Committee consists of experts in the matter of finance and hence the Court should not interfere with the decision of the Committee. (iii) Commissioner of Income Tax-vs.-Mahindra and Mahindra Limited, (1983) 4 SCC 392 . Learned Counsel relied on paragraph 11 of the reported judgment in support of his submission that only if the action or decision of an authority is perverse or is such that no reasonable body of persons, properly informed, could come to or has been arrived at by the authority by mis-directing itself by adopting a wrong approach or has been influenced by irrelevant or extraneous matters, the Court would be justified in interfering with the same. (iv) Arun Kumar Agarwal-vs.-Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 1 . Learned Counsel relied on paragraph 70 of the reported judgment which reads as follows:- “70. In such circumstances, we find no merit in the writ petition which was filed without appreciating or understanding the scope of the decision or the decision-making process concerning economic and commercial matters which gives liberty to States and its instrumentalities to take appropriate decision after weighing advantages and disadvantages of the same and this Court sitting in this jurisdiction, as already indicated, is not justified in interfering with those decisions, especially when there is nothing to show that those decisions are contrary to law or actuated by mala fide or irrelevant considerations. The writ petition, therefore, lacks merits. Hence, the same is dismissed.” (v) Jal Mahal Resorts (P) Ltd.-vs.-K. P. Sharma, (2014) 8 SCC 804 . The writ petition, therefore, lacks merits. Hence, the same is dismissed.” (v) Jal Mahal Resorts (P) Ltd.-vs.-K. P. Sharma, (2014) 8 SCC 804 . Learned Counsel relied on paragraph 140 of the judgment which reads as follows:- “140. At this juncture, we take note of two overriding considerations which combined, narrow the scope of review. The first is that of deference to the views of administrative experts and the other we take assistance from the words of Chief Justice Neely who expressed as follows: “I have very few illusions about my own limitations as a judge and from those limitations I generalise to the inherent limitations of all appellate courts reviewing rare cases.” The learned Chief Justice further observed as follows: “I am not an accountant, electrical engineer, financier, banker, stock broker, or systems management analyst. It is the height of folly to expect judges intelligently to review a 5000 page record addressing the intricacies of public utility operation. It is not the function of a judge to act as a super board, or with the zeal of a pedantic schoolmaster substituting its judgment for that of the administrator. The result is a theory of review that limits the extent to which the discretion of the expert may be scrutinized by the non-expert judge. It was suggested that the alternative for the court is to desist itself from interference on technical matters, where all the advantages of expertise lie with the agencies. If the court were to review fully the decision of an expert body such as State Board of Medical Examiners, ‘it would find itself wandering amid the maze of therapeutics or boggling at the mysteries of the pharmacopoeia’.” (vi) An unreported judgment of a Single Judge of this Court in WP 285 of 2015 (Utpal Bakshi-vs.-The Registrar General, High Court, Calcutta). Learned Counsel relied on paragraph 18 of the judgment which reads as follows:- “18. No employee can claim promotion as a matter of right. Before granting promotion to an employee, the employer is entitled to ensure that his skill and competence is commensurate with the duty that he has to discharge in the higher post. For this purpose the employer is well within its right to test the employee who aspires for promotion. No employee can claim promotion as a matter of right. Before granting promotion to an employee, the employer is entitled to ensure that his skill and competence is commensurate with the duty that he has to discharge in the higher post. For this purpose the employer is well within its right to test the employee who aspires for promotion. In the present case, an Expert Committee comprising of three Hon’ble Judges of this court conducted the selection test and did not find the petitioner fit for the higher post. The petitioner has not challenged the recommendation of the Special Committee nor is the Writ Court competent to sit in judgment on the decision of such an Expert Committee.” Court’s View:- 24. It is not in dispute that the Permanent Committee for fee fixation was constituted as per the directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Islamic Academy of Education (supra). The object of constituting such a Committee was to give effect to the judgment in TMA Pai Foundation (supra). The constitution of the said Committee was also in accordance with the direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Islamic Academy of Education (supra) case. The modus operandi prescribed by the Apex Court was that an educational institute shall place before the Committee the fee structure that it proposed to apply for a particular academic year, along with the books of accounts and all documents relevant for fixation of the fee structure. If the Committee finds the proposed fee structure to be reasonable and justified, it can approve the same. If not, the Committee can propose some other fee structure which would be binding on the institute. 25. I am in agreement with Mr. Sengupta, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the primary right to fix the fee structure is that of the educational institute. This was also recognized in TMA Pai’s (supra) case, where it was observed that if an institution does not seek Government aid, the matter of determining the scale of fee that it can charge from the students must be left to the institution. This was also recognized in TMA Pai’s (supra) case, where it was observed that if an institution does not seek Government aid, the matter of determining the scale of fee that it can charge from the students must be left to the institution. Although the Apex Court observed that imparting of education is essentially a charitable act and charging of capitation fee and profiteering by the institute should be forbidden, the Apex Court repeated that “the decision on the fees to be charged must necessarily be left to the private educational institution that does not seek or is not dependent upon any funds from the Government.” In that case, the Apex Court also observed that the fee structure may be such as to generate a ‘reasonable revenue surplus’ for the purpose of ‘development of education and expansion of the institution.’ 26. Thus, the main function of the fee fixation Committee as I have understood, is to ensure that unreasonably high scale of fees is not fixed by an institute and an educational institution cannot transform itself into a profit making engine. This is not to say that no profit can be generated by an educational institution. However, such profit must be utilized for the betterment of the facilities provided for the students of the institute and for improving the general standard of the institution and the quality of the education imparted therein. If the fee fixation Committee finds the fee structure proposed by an institution to be unacceptable, it must record reasons therefore, Only then, would the Committee be entitled to propose a different fee structure. The Committee must explain with sufficient clarity as to what is wrong with the scale of fees suggested by the management of the institution. In my opinion, without recording a clear finding supported by reasons to the effect that the Managing Committee’s proposal is unfair or unreasonable or otherwise unacceptable, the fee fixation Committee does not get jurisdiction to propose a different fee structure. 27. In the present case, the fee fixation Committee held meetings on 19 September, 2016, 24 October, 2016, 2 November, 2016 and 16 November, 2016. I have carefully gone through the minutes of the meetings of the Committee which have been annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the members of the Committee. 27. In the present case, the fee fixation Committee held meetings on 19 September, 2016, 24 October, 2016, 2 November, 2016 and 16 November, 2016. I have carefully gone through the minutes of the meetings of the Committee which have been annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the members of the Committee. One would look in vain for reasons in support of the Committee’s decision to recommend the fee structure in the manner it has done. There is nothing in the minutes of the proceedings regarding why the fee structure proposed by the Managing Committee of the petitioner cannot be approved. The operative portion of the Committee’s report reads as follows:- “The Committee has gone through all the information and explanations submitted by IQ City Medical College. It has also taken into cognizance the fact that the fees of IQ City Medical College have been fixed up to 2015-16 and IQ City Medical College have requested for fee fixation only for the year 2016-17. In the light of such facts and circumstances, the general rise in the inflationary index, and plans of IQ City Medical College to further upgrade facilities, the Committee decided to recommend to the Government of West Bengal the fixation of fees for MBBS students for the year 2016-17 as under.’ 28. There is absolutely no reason in support of the figures arrived at by the Committee. It cannot be gainsaid that in the absence of reasons, a decision, be it of a judicial authority or a quasi-judicial authority or an executive authority or an administrative authority becomes arbitrary. Reasons are the life-blood of a decision. The reasons indicate as to how the mind of an authority has worked in coming to a particular conclusion. Giving of reasons in support of a decision has become a part of the principles of natural justice. An unreasoned decision is an anti-thesis of the Rule of Law. It is anathema to the administration of justice. If reasons are not recorded in support of a decision, a supervisory or appellate forum will not know what prompted the authority to come to such decision. An unreasoned decision is not a decision at all. The law of the land would not countenance such a decision. 29. It is anathema to the administration of justice. If reasons are not recorded in support of a decision, a supervisory or appellate forum will not know what prompted the authority to come to such decision. An unreasoned decision is not a decision at all. The law of the land would not countenance such a decision. 29. Furthermore, the Committee has not acted in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Islamic Academy of Education (supra), and also in TMA Pai Foundation (supra). In Islamic Academy of Education’s case the Apex Court observed that ‘the fee structure for each institute must be fixed keeping in mind the infrastructure and facilities available, the investments made, salary paid to the teachers and staff, future plans for expansion and/or betterment of the institution, etc.” In PA Inamdar (supra), the Apex Court sounded a note of caution to the Committees set up for fixing the fee structures of education institutions. It was noted that in some of the institutions teachers have left their jobs and have taken up more lucrative offers as it was not possible for the management to retain talented and highly qualified teachers against the salary permitted by the Committee. The Committee in the present case has members who are experts in accounting and administration. As observed by the Apex Court in PA Inamdar (supra), the Committee should be more sensitive to the needs and requirements of a particular institute and act rationally and reasonably with due regard to realities. Fee structures should not be generalized and depending on the circumstances, the Committee should go into the accounts, schemes, plans and budgets of the institution in question for the purpose of fixing an ideal and reasonable fee structure for that institution. 30. In the present case, I do not find in the report of the Committee or in the minutes of the proceedings before the Committee any meaningful discussion regarding what are the projected expenditures of the petitioner institute for the academic years in question, weather such expenditures are essential and reasonable and what is to be a commensurate fee structure that would generate sufficient funds for the management of the institution to meet such expenses and run the institute efficiently for the best benefit of the students. I find the fixation of fee structure by the Committee to be completely arbitrary. 31. I find the fixation of fee structure by the Committee to be completely arbitrary. 31. It is also well-established that the reasons in support of a decision arrived at by an executive or a quasi-judicial authority must appear from the decision itself. The decision must speak for itself. Reasons cannot be supplemented subsequently. This proposition of law is so well-established that I do not deem it necessary to refer to any other authority excepting the celebrated decision of the Apex Court in MS Gill-Vs-Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 . In the present case, learned Counsel representing the Committee tried his best to support the decision of the Committee by making very attractive arguments but I am afraid, an unreasoned decision cannot be sought to be validated by citing reasons in support thereof by way of filing affidavits or by way of making submissions from the Bar. An unreasoned decision is a dead decision and life cannot be infused into the same by subsequently purporting to supply reasons for the decision to justify the same. 32. The impugned decision of the Committee also suffers from the vice of non-application of mind on the part of the Committee. The petitioner college submitted a proposed fee structure for the academic year 2016-17 onwards for three academic years starting from 2016-17 as would appear from the petitioner’s letter dated 18 January, 2016 written to the Principal Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Department of Health and Family Welfare. In accordance with the guidelines of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Islamic Academy of Education (supra) case, the Committee should have fixed the fee structure for three academic years. However, it did so only for the academic year 2016-17. This is also a glaring infirmity in the decision impugned in this writ application. In this connection, it is pertinent to note the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Life Corporation of India-vs.-A Masilamani (supra) to the effect that the formation of opinion by a statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with a reference to the material available on record and the order of the authority should itself reveal such application of mind. 33. I am also at a loss to understand as to why the Committee recommended the fee structure that it found to be proper to the State Government. 33. I am also at a loss to understand as to why the Committee recommended the fee structure that it found to be proper to the State Government. I enquired of learned Counsel appearing for the respondents as to what is the role of the State Government in the matter since as per the direction of the Apex Court it is the fee fixation committee which has to fix the fee structure whether by way of approval of the institute’s proposal or by modifying the same. No light could be thrown on that point by learned Counsel for the respondents. As I have understood the Permanent Committee for fixation of fees is the final authority for fixing a fee structure of an educational institution like the petitioner institute and no approval of the State Government is required. 34. I am unable to accept the submissions made on behalf of the respondent nos. 3 to 7 that PA Inamdar (supra) lays down that the Writ Court can interfere with the decision of the Committee only if it is found that the Committee has interfered with the administrative and financial matters of the private professional institute in question. The said decision does not lay down any such proposition of law. As I read it, the decision does not enumerate, exhaustively or otherwise, the circumstances in which the Writ Court can intervene. If the decision of the Committee is arbitrary in the sense that it is not informed with reasons, the same can surely be interfered with in the exercise of the power of judicial review. 35. The other submissions made by learned Counsel for the respondent nos. 3 to 7 on factual aspects, pertain to the sufficiency or otherwise of the fee structure sought to be fixed by the Committee. This court in the exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution will not go into such questions. The Committee has been set up consisting of learned and honourable members of the society who are experts in their own fields. This court will not sit in appeal on merits over the decision of the Committee. However, since in judicial review, the decision making process is scrutinized and since I have found the process to be faulty, I feel impelled to intervene. This court will not sit in appeal on merits over the decision of the Committee. However, since in judicial review, the decision making process is scrutinized and since I have found the process to be faulty, I feel impelled to intervene. I propose to remand the matter back to the Committee who will take a fresh decision in the matter in the light of the observations made herein and adhering to the guidelines of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the decisions referred to above. 36. I have also carefully considered the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and of this Court referred to and relied upon by learned Counsel for the respondents. I respectfully agree with the proposition of law laid down in such decisions. However, in my opinion, the said decisions do not advance the case of the respondents. None of the decisions relied upon by learned Counsel for the respondents lays down that under no circumstances the decision of an expert committee can be interfered with in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction. 37. In Sunil Kumar-vs.-Bihar Public Service Commission (supra), the question that fell for determination by the Apex Court was whether in the case of Sanjay Singh-vs.-UP Public Service Commission, (2007) 3 SCC 720 , the Apex Court had laid down any principle regarding the methodology that has to be adopted by the Public Service Commission while assessing the answer scripts of the candidates in a public examination. In that context the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows:- “We cannot understand the law to be imposing the requirement of adoption of moderation to a particular kind of examination and scaling to others. Both are, at best, opinions, exercise of which requires an in-depth consideration of questions that are more suitable for the experts in the field. Holding of public examinations involving wide and varied subjects/disciplines is a complex task which defies an instant solution by adoption of any singular process or by a strait jacket formula. Not only examiner variations and variation in award of marks in different subjects are issues to be answered, there are several other questions that also may require to be dealt with. Variation in the strictness of the questions set in a multi-disciplinary examination format is one such fine issue that was coincidentally noticed in Sanjay Singh (supra). Not only examiner variations and variation in award of marks in different subjects are issues to be answered, there are several other questions that also may require to be dealt with. Variation in the strictness of the questions set in a multi-disciplinary examination format is one such fine issue that was coincidentally noticed in Sanjay Singh (supra). A conscious choice of a discipline or a subject by a candidate at the time of his entry to the University thereby restricting his choice of papers in a public examination; the standards of inter subject evaluation of answer papers and issuance of appropriate directions to evaluators in different subjects are all relevant areas of consideration. All such questions and, may be, several others not identified herein are required to be considered, which questions, by their very nature should be left to the expert bodies in the field, including, the Public Service Commissions. The fact that such bodies including the Commissions have erred or have acted in less than a responsible manner in the past cannot be a reason for a free exercise of the judicial power which by its very nature will have to be understood to be, normally, limited to instances of arbitrary or mala fide exercise of power.” In my opinion, the aforesaid decision was rendered by the Apex Court in a completely different factual context and has no manner of application to the facts of the instant case. No absolute proposition of law has been laid down by the Apex Court in the said decision. In Sai Bhaskar Iron Limited-vs.-AP Electricity Regulatory Commission, (supra), the Apex Court observed that the scope of interference by way of judicial review in matters reserved for expert bodies is limited. The Court cannot substitute its opinion. Price fixation is not the function of the Court. Such observations were made in the context of fixation of electricity tariff by the competent Authority. The Apex Court referred to its earlier decision in the case of Association of Industrial Electricity Users-vs.-State of AP, (2002) 3 SCC 711 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court had observed that judicial review in a matter with regard to fixation of tariff has not to be as that of an Appellate Authority in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. All that the High Court has to be satisfied with is that the Commission has followed the proper procedure and unless it can be demonstrated that its decision is on the face of it arbitrary or illegal or contrary to the statute, the Court will not interfere. Fixing a tariff and providing for cross subsidy is essentially a matter of policy and normally a Court would refrain from interfering with a policy decision unless the power exercised is arbitrary or ex facie bad in law. There can be no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid decision. However, in my opinion, in the facts of the present case, the scale of fees fixed by the Permanent Committee is arbitrary and going by the aforesaid decision, judicial intervention is permissible. 38. As regards the decisions to the effect that price fixation/tariff fixation/fee fixation are the functions of an expert committee and the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction should not substitute its own decision in the place and stead of the decision of such a Committee, the proposition of law is unexceptionable. However, I do not propose to fix the fee structure for the petitioner institute. 39. In view of the aforesaid, this writ application succeeds. The report of the expert committee and the memorandum dated 25 January, 2017 issued by the Special Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, which are impugned in this writ application, are set aside. The issue of fixation of fee structure for the petitioner institute for three academic years starting from 2016-17 is remanded to the Permanent Committee which will take a fresh decision in the matter in the light of the observations made in this judgment as also the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of TMA Pai Foundation (supra), Islamic Academy of Education (supra) and PA Inamdar (supra). The Committee shall issue a fresh notice to the institute and any other interested party. The petitioners shall be at liberty to file a fresh proposal supported by all relevant documents regarding the fee structure for the three academic years beginning 2016-17 within a week from receipt of such notice. The Committee shall take a reasoned decision in the matter after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and all other interested parties. The petitioners shall be at liberty to file a fresh proposal supported by all relevant documents regarding the fee structure for the three academic years beginning 2016-17 within a week from receipt of such notice. The Committee shall take a reasoned decision in the matter after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and all other interested parties. The entire process should be completed within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order by the learned Chairman of the Committee to be communicated to him by the petitioners forthwith. The decision of the Committee shall be communicated to the petitioners within a week from the date of the decision. 40. WP No. 14910(W) of 2017 is accordingly disposed of. 41. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities.