JUDGMENT : Rajesh H. Shukla, J. 1. The present Second Appeal is filed by the Appellant being aggrieved with the impugned judgment and order in Regular Civil Appeal No. 19 of 2015 by the learned Additional District Judge, Amreli dated 4.7.2016 confirming the judgment and order in Hindu Marriage Petition No. 11 of 2013 by the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Amreli dated 18.6.2015 posing the substantial questions of law as follows: "(i) Whether the courts below have committed error in not considering that the appellant had not voluntarily left the marital home but the respondent has deserted the appellant without any reason? (ii) Whether the courts below have erred in not considering the aspect that merely on not filing the complaint, cannot give rise to a ground of presumption of not having torturous behaviour of the respondent? (iii) Whether both the courts below have committed error in passing the decree u/s. 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act though there are positive and specific assertions of cruelty and misbehaviour of the respondent?" 2. The background of the facts briefly summarized is that the Hindu Marriage Petition No. 11 of 2013 came to be filed by the Respondent husband under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for restitution of conjugal rights and that after the marriage, the Appellant wife deserted without sufficient cause. It also submitted that the husband agreed for living separately and he was separated from the family. The letters by the husband have not been placed on record by the Appellant wife. The compromise was also arrived at and they started living separately in a rented house. The Appellant/Original Respondent in HMP No. 11/2013 - wife is educated having Sanad to practice as an Advocate. She was also having a job as a teacher in school for which the Petitioner Husband would leave her at the school. When she was pregnant, the husband used to take care as stated by her. Thereafter, when she was at the parental house, the husband - Respondent herein by letter suggested to take her back, but she was not willing and as the separation remained, the husband filed the Petition under Section 9 of the Act for restitution of conjugal rights. 3. Thereafter, when she was at the parental house, the husband - Respondent herein by letter suggested to take her back, but she was not willing and as the separation remained, the husband filed the Petition under Section 9 of the Act for restitution of conjugal rights. 3. The court below on appreciation of material and evidence granted the decree of the restitution of conjugal rights appreciating the aspect of matrimonial law that once the spouse is entitled to the society and comfort of the other spouse and where either spouse has abandoned or withdrawn from the society of the other without reasonable excuse or just cause, the court should grant a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. In spite of this decree passed in HMP No. 11/2013, the Appellant wife did not join the husband and preferred an Appeal being Regular Civil Appeal No. 19 of 2013 before the District Court. The District Court also on appreciation of material and evidence dismissed the Appeal which has led to the present Second Appeal posing the questions of law as stated above. 4. Heard learned Advocate Ms. Renu Singh with learned Advocate Shri Kalpesh N. Shastri for the Appellant and learned Advocate Shri Sandeep R. Limbani for the Respondent. 5. Learned Advocate Ms. Renu Singh referred to the papers at length and submitted that the application made under Section 9 of the Act is required to be considered and such an application was filed only to seek divorce. She also referred to the aspect of harassment and submitted that both the courts below failed to consider that the Appellant wife had not left the husband but the Respondent husband did not take care and therefore she was required to leave the matrimonial house. She submitted that the courts below have failed to appreciate that merely because she has not filed the complaint for harassment should not come against her as she may not have filed such complaint to salvage the marriage. Learned Advocate Ms. Renu Singh also referred to the observations made in paragraphs 34 and 40 of the judgment of the trial court. Learned Advocate Ms. Renu Singh also referred to the observations made in paragraphs 34 and 40 of the judgment of the trial court. She emphasized that the parties are not living together since 18.3.2012 and therefore though the reference is made to this date it has been clearly observed that the Appellant wife had contacted the husband for the purpose of engagement ceremony at the uncle's house of the Appellant-Original Respondent - wife. She therefore submitted that the aspect of harassment as well as demand was made from the parental house which could not be fulfilled and led her to leave the house and therefore decree for restitution of conjugal rights could not have been passed. She therefore submitted that both the courts below have failed to appreciate this relevant aspect. Learned Advocate Ms. Renu Singh therefore submitted that the present Second Appeal may be allowed. 6. Learned Advocate Shri Sandeep R. Limania for the Respondent referred to the papers as well as the impugned judgment and order and pointedly referred to the documents which have been placed on record and the discussion about the same in paragraph 57 of the judgment of the trial court. He pointedly referred to the findings recorded in paragraph 57 and 58 of the judgment of the trial court referring to Exhibit 40 to 65. He submitted that the say of the Respondent/Original Applicant-husband that the Appellant wife was given a total liberty and he tried his best for her development as well as to save the matrimonial life itself is sufficiently corroborated by the fact that she was permitted to complete her MA and thereafter LL.B. When she was ill he has taken care which is sufficiently corroborated by documentary evidence at Exh.40 to 65. He submitted that on the other hand the letters which are said to have been addressed by the Respondent husband to the Appellant for requesting her to come back, has not been placed on record by the Appellant. In fact the Appellant herein in her cross-examination has also admitted that when she was at her matrimonial home, the Respondent husband had helped her in her education and development. In fact the Appellant herein in her cross-examination has also admitted that when she was at her matrimonial home, the Respondent husband had helped her in her education and development. Therefore, the averments and the allegation that her life was in danger and therefore she did not come to the matrimonial house has not been rightly believed and it could not be excused to avoid the restitution of conjugal rights and therefore the courts below have passed a decree which is sought to be challenged. 7. Learned Advocate Shri Limbani has also referred to the aspect suggesting the willingness of the husband on the basis of the discussions and the findings arrived at in the judgment of the courts below and submitted that the Respondent husband was willing to take her back and the findings recorded on appreciation of material and evidence by the trial court in paragraph 63 referring to Section 114 of the Evidence Act is just and proper. He emphasized that she has admitted that the husband had written letters to come back and stay at the matrimonial home. These letters have not been placed on record and she has also stated that she does not want to produce the same and therefore relying upon the provisions of Section 114 of the Evidence Act the presumption was made. Learned Advocate Shri Limbani therefore submitted that there are concurrent findings of facts and the same may not be disturbed in the Second Appeal. He submitted that there is no substantial question of law which can be said to have been involved and therefore the present Second Appeal may not be entertained. 8. In view of these rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the present Second Appeal deserve consideration. 9. As could be seen from the background of the facts referred to herein above and the judgment of both the courts which has discussed threadbare material and evidence placed on record, it cannot be said that the judgment of the trial court confirmed by the first appellate court is erroneous much less perverse which would call for any interference in exercise of discretion under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. 10. As discussed herein above in fact the overall appreciation of material and evidence in suggesting the willingness of the husband which has also been considered while appreciating the evidence is required to be noted. In fact the Respondent husband was ready and willing for which there is a specific reference about the willingness of the husband for some compromise which was sought to be made. Further, the reliance made on the letters which have not been brought on record deliberately by the Appellant wife would certainly attract Section 114 of the Evidence Act leading to a presumption. Moreover, the court below have referred to her own evidence where she has admitted that the Respondent husband had cooperated and supported for her development and education for pursuing the education for the purpose of MA and thereafter LL.B. Not only that she has also admitted that when she was ill, the husband had taken care. Moreover, as it appears, the Respondent husband is said to have kept the house on rent for living separately from the Respondent husband's mother and they had stayed separately for about 6 months. All these go to suggest about the efforts of the Respondent husband to save the matrimonial ties. On the other hand, as stated and discussed at length the wife does not come out with a specific excuse or the reasons except the bare averments that she did not stay as she felt her life was in danger without any reference to the details. Admittedly the husband had written letters to call her back which have not been placed on record but she has also stated that she would not place it on record which has attracted Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the discussion and appreciation of material and evidence by both the courts below cannot be said to be erroneous much less perverse. The substantial question of law posed referred to the aspect of only an appreciation of material and evidence with regard to desertion. The Question No. 3 that the courts below have committed an error in passing the decree under Section 9 of the Act refers to only an assertion about cruelty and misbehaviour without any positive material or details. Thus the question itself refers to assertions without even prima facie suggesting the harassment which is sought to be canvassed. The Question No. 3 that the courts below have committed an error in passing the decree under Section 9 of the Act refers to only an assertion about cruelty and misbehaviour without any positive material or details. Thus the question itself refers to assertions without even prima facie suggesting the harassment which is sought to be canvassed. On the other hand both the courts below have discussed with much details and evidence including her own admission in the cross-examination with regard to the conduct of the Respondent husband where she has admitted that he had taken care and interest in her development and her studies as well as when she was not well. This itself would suggest that the present Second Appeal cannot be entertained. 11. The Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the broad guidelines with regard to the scope of exercise of discretion under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Second Appeals particularly after the amendment made in the Code in 1976. A word of caution has been expressed that while exercising the discretion under Section 100 of the Code in Second Appeals, the High Court may not normally disturb the concurrent findings of facts unless substantial question of law is involved. As discussed above, there is no question of law much less any substantial question of law which can be said to have been involved and therefore it would not be justified to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts which have been arrived at by discussion of material and evidence with much details. 12. Moreover, the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment in case of Gurdev Kaur and Others vs. Kaki and Others, 2007 (1) SCC 546 has clearly observed: "Now, High Courts can interfere thereunder only where substantial questions of law are involved and have been formulated in the memorandum of appeal - The amendment clearly indicates that the legislature never intended the second appeal to become a third trial on facts or one more dice in the gamble." 13. Therefore, the present Second Appeal deserve to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed. Civil Application accordingly stands disposed of. Notice is discharged. Appeal Dismissed.