JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. Instant criminal appeal filed under Section 374 CrPC is directed against judgment/order of conviction dated 30.10.2008/31.10.2008 recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Una, District Una, HP, in Sessions Case No. 10 of 2008/Sessions Trial No. 18 of 2008, whereby appellant-accused was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/- under Section 325 IPC and, in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. Other co-accused namely Vivek and Rajvir were acquitted. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case as emerge from record are that PW-1 Amit Sharma, got his statement recorded under Section 154 CrPC Ext. PW-1/A, stating therein that on 21.10.2007, at about 12.15 pm, the accused Ashu Puri (appellant herein), Vivek and Rajvir Singh, in furtherance of their common intention had done away with the life of deceased Harshbardhan at Virbhadra Chowk, Santoshgarh by inflicting fist and kick blows on the person of the deceased, who collapsed and fell down the road itself. Accused fled away from the spot on the scooter of one of accused, Vivek. Deceased was rushed to Kaushal Nursing Home, Santoshgarh by Amit Sharma, Aman, Lucky and Mohinder Mohan (PW-3). Dr. Sanjiv Kaushal (PW-2), after administering one injection, had referred the deceased to Zonal Hospital Una, since it was a medico legal case. However, deceased was rushed to NFL Hospital Naya Nangal, where he had been declared dead. Deceased was thereafter brought to the Zonal Hospital, Una. Post-mortem of deceased was got conducted at Zonal Hospital, Una, by the police. Post-mortem came to be conducted on 22.10.2007, vide Ext. PW-11/B. As per opinion of the two member Board, who had conducted post mortem on the body of deceased, and had issued post-mortem report, Ext. PW-1/B, deceased died due to rupture of Aorta and head injury leading to haemorrhagic shock and death. On the basis of aforesaid complaint, having been made by PW-1, a formal FIR Ext. PW-20/A came to be registered at Police Station, Haroli, District Una. Police, after completion of investigation, presented the Challan, in the competent Court of law. The learned trial Court, being satisfied that prima facie case exists against accused, charged them under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 3. PW-20/A came to be registered at Police Station, Haroli, District Una. Police, after completion of investigation, presented the Challan, in the competent Court of law. The learned trial Court, being satisfied that prima facie case exists against accused, charged them under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 3. Subsequently, learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence adduced on record by the prosecution, held appellant-accused namely Ashu Puri guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 325 IPC and, sentenced as stated above, whereas other two accused namely Vivek and Rajvir were acquitted by the Court below of the charges framed against them by holding that evaluation of totality of the circumstances suggests that Vivek and Rajvir had no common intention to commit offence alongwith accused Ashu Puri. At this stage, it may be noticed that no appeal, whatsoever, was filed by the State against acquittal of aforesaid persons, namely Vivek and Rajvir, as such, judgment of acquittal qua them has attained finality. 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment of conviction under Section 325 IPC, appellant-accused Ashu Puri has approached this Court by way of this appeal seeking his acquittal, after setting aside judgment of conviction recorded by learned Court below. 5. Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned counsel representing the appellantaccused, while referring to the judgment of conviction recorded by the learned Court below, vehemently argued that impugned judgment is against law and facts of the case, as such, deserves to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel, while inviting attention of this Court to the acquittal of the other co-accused by the learned Court below, vehemently argued that since other two accused were acquitted by the learned Court below, it can be safely assumed that they did not participate in the commission of offence at all and as such, it was very essential for the prosecution to have proved beyond reasonable doubt that injury, which caused death of deceased was inflicted by the appellant, Ashu Puri alone, rather, beatings have been attributed to both, appellant as well as Rajvir Singh, without specifying individual role, as such, it was not possible for the learned Court below to conclude that out of the two, only the appellant gave fatal blow. Mr. Mr. Chandel, learned counsel representing the appellant, further contended that no conviction, if any, under Section 325 IPC, could be recorded by the learned Court below, against appellant, on the basis of evidence adduced on record by the prosecution, which, on the face of it is contradictory. In this regard, Mr. Chandel, learned counsel representing the appellant, contended that bare perusal of FIR indicates that the injured was taken to District Hospital, Una, from the place of occurrence, whereas, evidence brought on record is to the contrary, which shows that injured was first taken to Nangal and thereafter, his dead body was brought to the District Hospital, Una. Mr. Chandel, further contended that the learned Court below erred in not taking note of the fact that alleged crime had taken place at 12.15 pm, whereas, case was registered at 3.30 pm and special report, reached the learned Magistrate at 8.30 pm, when distance between Haroli and Una is just 16 kms. Mr. Chandel, further contended that it is admitted case of the prosecution that on the day of occurrence, there was a fair at Santoshgarh and a lot of people had come to witness the same. He further stated that alleged incident was witnessed by a number of persons, but, despite that no independent witness was associated /cited by the prosecution to prove it story. PW-1 and PW-5, Amit Sharma and Mohinder Mohan, who are close relatives and were introduced as eye witnesses deliberately to given strength to the story of the prosecution. A bare perusal of statements having been made by the aforesaid witnesses, clearly suggests that they were not present on the spot of occurrence at the time of alleged incident. PW-3 Mohinder Kishore, had come to the spot alongwith Chander Mohan and deceased Harshbardhan on scooter, as such, he was the only person, who was present on the spot alongwith Chander Mohan, when alleged incident took place. Mr. Chandel, further contended that in case, statement having been made by PW-4 Mohinder Mohinder Kishore, is read in its entirety, it clearly suggests that he heard sound of one slap allegedly having been given to Harshbardhan, as a result of which, he fell down from the scooter. Mr. Mr. Chandel, further contended that in case, statement having been made by PW-4 Mohinder Mohinder Kishore, is read in its entirety, it clearly suggests that he heard sound of one slap allegedly having been given to Harshbardhan, as a result of which, he fell down from the scooter. Mr. Chandel further stated that there is no explanation worth the name that why other person, namely Chander Mohan was not associated by the prosecution, because, there is no mention of his statement, if any, recorded by the prosecution, during investigation. While concluding his arguments, Mr. Chandel, made this Court to travel through statements of PW-3 vis-à-vis statement of PW-4 Mohinder Kishore to demonstrate that no reliance, if any, could be placed upon their version, in view of material contradictions in their statements with regard to their presence on the spot, as well as alleged beatings given to the deceased by the appellant, Ashu Puri. Lastly, Mr. Chandel, contended that once, learned Court below, on the basis of ocular and medical evidence, adduced on record by the prosecution, had come to the conclusion that accused Ashu Puri, did not have intention of causing death or such a fatal injury, as he knew likely to cause death of Harshbardhan and which was sufficient in ordinary course of nature, to cause death and apparently he also did not have knowledge that his fist and kick blows were so imminently dangerous that it would cause death of Harshbardhan, or such a fatal injury as was likely to cause death, there was no occasion for the learned Court below to conclude that since fist blows were given on vital portion of body, it can safely be presumed that he did have knowledge and intention to inflict grievous injuries to the deceased. In this regard, Mr. Chandel, invited attention of this Court to post-mortem report to demonstrate that only one injury on head, showing bruise of 2x2 cm behind right ear, was found/detected and during post mortem, no corresponding injury was found on the skull in the shape of fracture and as such it can not be presumed that blow by accused was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Mr. Mr. Chandel, further contended that apart from above, bare perusal of Section 320, wherein, grievous hurt has been defined, nowhere suggests that injury as described by medical expert in the instant case, can be termed to be grievous. With the aforesaid arguments, Mr. Chandel prayed that instant appeal may be accepted and appellant may be acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 325 IPC, after setting aside judgment of conviction recorded by the learned Court below. Apart from above, Mr. Chandel, contended that in case, aforesaid submissions having been made by him do not find favour with this Court, in that eventuality, this Court may consider prayer of appellant, for extension of benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, being first offender, keeping in view his age and especially fact that the appellant has already remained in custody for thirteen months. 6. Mr. M.L. Chauhan, Additional Advocate General, while refuting the aforesaid arguments having been made by Mr. Chandel, learned counsel representing the appellant, strenuously argued that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment of conviction, recorded by learned Court below, rather, perusal of same suggests that learned Court below has taken a lenient view while holding appellant guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 325 IPC. While inviting attention of this Court, to impugned judgment of conviction vis-à-vis evidence having been adduced on record by the prosecution, Mr. Chauhan, contended that learned Court below has dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously, while coming to the conclusion that appellant was guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 325 IPC, as such, there is no scope of interference by this Court and present appeal deserves to be dismissed. While inviting attention of this Court to the statements of PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4, Mr. Chauhan, contended that prosecution successfully proved on record beyond reasonable doubt that accused gave beatings to the deceased Harshbardhan, who, as a result of this, passed away. While referring to the MLC/post-mortem report, Ext. PW-11/B, submitted by medical board, which conducted post mortem on the body of deceased, Mr. Chauhan, contended that head injury caused with the fist blows on the head of deceased is also one of the causes of death of deceased as such there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment of conviction recorded by learned Court below. PW-11/B, submitted by medical board, which conducted post mortem on the body of deceased, Mr. Chauhan, contended that head injury caused with the fist blows on the head of deceased is also one of the causes of death of deceased as such there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment of conviction recorded by learned Court below. Since blows were given on vital portion of body, it can be safely presumed that accused-appellant Ashu Puri did same with the knowledge and intention of causing grievous injury on the person of injured, as a result of which, Harshbardhan lost his life. While concluding his arguments, Mr. Chauhan opposed the prayer for extending the benefit of probation made on behalf of appellant by stating that no leniency, if any, can be shown to appellant, who has admittedly caused death of one person. Mr. Chauhan, contended that any leniency shown to such a person would send a wrong message to the society. With aforesaid submissions, Mr. Chauhan, learned Additional Advocate General, prayed that present appeal deserves to be dismissed, being devoid of any merit. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully. 8. Before ascertaining the correctness and genuineness of submissions having been made by the learned counsel representing the parties, vis-à-vis impugned judgment of conviction recorded against appellant, it may be noticed that appellant namely Ashu Puri was charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, alongwith co-accused namely Vivek and Rajvir. However, learned Court below, on the basis of evidence adduced on record, held appellant guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 325 IPC and acquitted other accused namely Vivek and Rajvir Since. It is apparent from the bare perusal of judgment that learned Court below, after having gone through the evidence adduced on record by prosecution was convinced and satisfied that perusal of ocular and medical evidence on record nowhere suggests that appellant-accused Ashu Puri , did have intention of causing death or such bodily injury, as he knew likely to cause death of deceased Harshbardhan or which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Learned Court below has also come to the conclusion, on the basis of evidence adduced on record that apparently appellant did not have knowledge that his fist and kick blows were so imminently dangerous, it would, in all probabilities, cause death of deceased, or such bodily injury as was likely to cause his death. However, learned Court below, after having perused medical evidence adduced on record, as well as statements having been made by prosecution witnesses, came to the conclusion that since fist blows were given on vital parts of body, it can be safely presumed that appellant did have intention and knowledge to inflict grievous injury to the deceased. Accordingly, learned Court below held appellant guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 325 IPC. 9. It may be noticed at this stage, that aforesaid findings were not laid challenge before any competent Court of law by the respondent-State, as such same have attained finality. It appears that the State was satisfied with the conviction recorded against accused under Section 325 IPC, as such, it chose not to file any appeal, whereas, appellant-accused, being aggrieved with his conviction under Section 325 IPC, filed instant appeal. Since, there is no dispute qua aforesaid findings, having been rendered by learned Court below, whereby appellant-accused has been acquitted of charge framed Section 302 IPC, this Court, sees no occasion to examine/analyse evidence available on record from that point of view, rather, this Court is only required to examine the correctness of findings returned by learned Court below, on the basis of which appellant-accused has been held guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 325 IPC. 10. During arguments, Mr. Chandel, while inviting attention of this Court to the MLC Ext. PW-11/B contended that there was no grievous injury caused on the person of deceased Harshbardhan, on the basis of which, appellant could be held guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 325 IPC. There was a bruise 2x2 cm behind right ear and there was no corresponding injury on the skull in the shape of fracture and as such, by no stretch of imagination, it could be presumed that blow given by accused was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. As per Mr. There was a bruise 2x2 cm behind right ear and there was no corresponding injury on the skull in the shape of fracture and as such, by no stretch of imagination, it could be presumed that blow given by accused was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. As per Mr. Chandel, injury as referred to above, can not be termed as, ‘ grievous’, because, even as per medical report, bruise of 2x2 cm was found behind right ear(dark blue coloured) and there was no bleeding at all. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that injury, as described by the medical evidence nowhere falls in the definition of ‘grievous’ injury, under Section 325 IPC. To substantiate aforesaid argument, of Mr. Chandel, made this Court to take note of Section 320 IPC, which is reproduced below: “320. Grievous hurt.—The following kinds of hurt only are designated as “grievous”:— (First) — Emasculation. (Secondly) —Permanent privation of the sight of either eye. (Thirdly) — Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear, (Fourthly) —Privation of any member or joint. (Fifthly) — Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint. (Sixthly) — Permanent disfiguration of the head or face. (Seventhly) —Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. (Eighthly) —Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.” 11. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that learned Court below, while taking note of the ocular and medical evidence, available on record, came to the conclusion that accused did not have intention of causing death or such bodily injury, as he knew likely to cause death of deceased, but learned Court below, taking note of the fact that fist blows were given on vital portions of body, came to conclusion that appellant did have the intention /knowledge to inflict grievous injury to the deceased. 12. Though, this Court, after having carefully perused kinds of hurts, defined as ‘grievous’, under Section 320 IPC, sees some force in the arguments of Mr. Chandel, that injury as mentioned in MLC, Ext. 12. Though, this Court, after having carefully perused kinds of hurts, defined as ‘grievous’, under Section 320 IPC, sees some force in the arguments of Mr. Chandel, that injury as mentioned in MLC, Ext. PW-11/B, may not strictly fall in the categories of grievous hurt as defined under Section 320 IPC, but, if it is proved on record that fist blows were given on head of deceased, as a result of which, he suffered head injury, in that eventuality, case at hand, can be stated to fall under eighth category i.e. any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. 13. In the instant case, as clearly emerges from Ext. PW-11/B(MLC), deceased died due to rupture of aorta and head injury, leading to haemorrhagic shock and death. 14. True it is, apparently, at the time of examination of body of deceased, a bruise of 2x2 cm was found present behind right ear (dark blue in colour), but, on opening cranium, there was evidence of intra cerebral haemorrhage on right side of fronto-temporal lobe and about 50 ml dark coloured blood was found in the intra-cranial cavity. It would be profitable to reproduce specific finding qua the issue returned by medical board: “II-CRANIUM AND SPINAL CORD” On opening the cranium there was evidence of Intra cerebral Hg (Haemorge) on (R) side of fronto-temporal lobe. About 50ml dark coloured blood found in intracranial cavity. III- THORAX 1. Walls, ribs and cartilages Intact 2. Pleurae Congested 3. Larynx and trachea empty 4. Right Lung Congested 5. Left Lung Congested 6. Pericardium Heart (R) chamber full of dark coloured blood (L) Chamber empty 7. Large Vessels etc. Abdominal Aorta has 1cm ruptured area at level of D12- L1C about 2000 cc blood in the abdominal cavity.” 15. After, having carefully perused aforesaid finding returned by medical board, which has conducted post mortem of deceased, this Court, has reasons to presume that though fist blows, if any, given to deceased on his head may not have caused external injury, but it definitely caused haemorrhage inside cranium, which, on opening, suggested that there was intra-cerebral haemorrhage on right side of fronto-temporal lobe, as a result of which, 50 ml dark coloured blood had also oozed out. 16. 16. As per Section 325 IPC, whoever, except as the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Perusal of aforesaid provision nowhere suggests that there should be ‘intention and knowledge’ if any, to inflict grievous injury, rather, careful perusal of aforesaid provision of law suggests that somebody voluntarily causing grievous hurt would be liable for punishment under Section 325 IPC. 17. Hence this Court, after having carefully perused definition of ‘grievous hurt’, especially eighth category of Section 320 IPC, sees no force, much less substantial, in the aforesaid arguments having been made by Mr. Chandel, that no grievous hurt in terms of Section 320-IPC was caused on the person of deceased, rather, injury found on head of deceased, if seen/examined, vis-à-vis medical opinion rendered by the medical board, it can be safely inferred that injury was grievous in nature, which endangered life of deceased. Apart from above, perusal of post-mortem report/MLC Ext. PW-11/B, clearly suggests that one of the causes of death of deceased was head injury, leading to haemorrhagic shock and death. 18. Now, this Court would proceed to examine whether findings returned by learned Court below are correct or not, that appellant had given fist blows on vital portions of the body and on the basis of same, could it be concluded that appellant-accused had intention and knowledge to inflict grievous injury to the deceased. In the instant case, though prosecution in order to prove its case, examined 22 witnesses but after having carefully perused record, this Court finds that statements having been made by PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4 would be material to determine whether fist and kick blows were inflicted on the person of the deceased Harshbardhan by accused Ashu Puri in the alleged incident or not. PW-1 Amit Sharma, in his statement stated that on 21.10.2007, at about 11.30 am, he went to Santoshgarh from his village to get his scooter repaired. He further stated that since market was closed being Sunday, he proceeded towards Virbhadra Chowk to look for a mechanic namely Pawan Kumar. It has also come in his statement that Mohinder Mohan, PW-3, met him near Bus Stand. When he reached Virbhadra Chowk, he saw Ashu Puri inflicting fist and kick blows to the deceased Harshbardhan. He further stated that since market was closed being Sunday, he proceeded towards Virbhadra Chowk to look for a mechanic namely Pawan Kumar. It has also come in his statement that Mohinder Mohan, PW-3, met him near Bus Stand. When he reached Virbhadra Chowk, he saw Ashu Puri inflicting fist and kick blows to the deceased Harshbardhan. He further stated that deceased had fallen down on road and accused, thereafter, ran away from the spot on the scooter of one of the accused, Vivek. He further stated that in the meantime, Mohinder Mohan PW-3 also reached the spot and, he, alongwith Amit, Aman and one Lucky took deceased to Kaushal Nursing Home. 19. PW-3 Mohinder Mohan deposed before the Court below that at the relevant time, he was on his way to Santoshgarh and had met PW-1 Amit Sharma at Santoshgarh. He also stated that when he reached Virbhadra Chowk, he saw few boys fighting and when he went to the spot to have a look at the fight, he saw accused Ashu Puri inflicting fist and kick blows to the deceased. By the time he could intervene, Ashu Puri fled from the spot on scooter of Vivek, which was already in starting mode. He stated that Harshbardhan collapsed on the spot and was unconscious. It has also come in his statement that accused inflicted blows on almost every part of body of deceased. He further stated that accused Ashu Puri, gave blows of kick on his head and stomach of deceased, even after he had fallen on the road. He like PW-1 also stated that he alongwith Amit Sharma, Aman and Lucky took deceased to Kaushal Nursing Home. PW-4, Mohinder Kishore, on whose scooter, deceased Harshbardhan had come to Virbhadra Chowk, alongwith one Chander Mohan, deposed before the Court that he alongwith Harshbardhan and Chander Mohan, had come to Virbhadra Chowk, on scooter and while going to Royal Garden, at Tahliwal, to witness Dussehra Festival, they had stopped at Virbhadra Chowk to purchase cigarettes. He stated that when he started the scooter, he heard noise of slapping somebody. Deceased Harshbardhan fell on the road. He also stated that thereafter, deceased was taken to Kaushal Nursing Home by him and Chander Mohan. As per statement of this witness, he was driving scooter and his back was towards deceased and as such, he had not seen anyone hitting deceased. Deceased Harshbardhan fell on the road. He also stated that thereafter, deceased was taken to Kaushal Nursing Home by him and Chander Mohan. As per statement of this witness, he was driving scooter and his back was towards deceased and as such, he had not seen anyone hitting deceased. Record suggests that this witness was declared hostile. After having carefully perused statement/deposition having been made by aforesaid witness, it can be safely concluded that on 21.10.2007, alleged incident took place at Virbhadra Chowk, Santoshgarh. Though there appears to be minor contradictions in the statements of PW-1 and PW-3, with regard to their reaching the spot, but, if their statements are read in conjunction, both these witnesses have unequivocally stated that when they reached Virbhadra Chowk, they saw Ashu Puri inflicting fist and kick blows to the deceased Harshbardhan. Though, PW-1 has not stated specifically that fist and kick blows were given on almost all parts of the body of deceased, but PW-3 Mohinder Mohan has specifically stated that Ashu Puri inflicted blows on almost all parts of body of deceased and even after deceased had fallen on road from the scooter, accused Ashu Puri kept on giving kick blows on head and stomach of deceased. Cross-examination conducted on these witnesses, nowhere suggests that defence was able to shatter their testimony, because, there is nothing, from where it can be inferred that defence was able to extract anything contrary to what was stated in their examination-in-chief. Mohinder Kishore, PW-4 though, in his statement stated that he had not seen anyone hitting accused, but, even if his statement is ready in its entirety, it certainly suggests that somebody slapped deceased Harshbardhan and he fell on road. Statement having been made by Mohinder Mohinder Kishore, PW-4 certainly corroborates version put forth by PW-1 and PW-3, with regard to fight allegedly having taken place at Virbhadra Chowk on the date of alleged occurrence. Statement of PW-4, further corroborates version put forth by PW-1 and PW-3 that in the aforesaid alleged incidence, beatings were given to deceased Harshbardhan, as a result of which, he fell on the road, PW-4, who was admittedly declared hostile, may not have stated specifically that beatings on the person of deceased were given by appellant-accused Ashu Puri, but it certainly proves on record that deceased Harshbardhan fell on road on account of being hit by somebody. Apart from above, Mohinder Mohinder Kishore, PW-4 has not specifically stated that deceased was not slapped by Ashu Puri, rather, it has come in his statement that since he was driving the scooter, his back was towards deceased and he was unable to see anyone hitting deceased, as such, this Court, is of the view that version put forth by PW-1 and PW-3, wherein they have categorically stated that deceased Harshbardhan was inflicted fist and kick blows by accused, Ashu Puri, can not be simply ignored and brushed aside in view of statement having been made by PW-4, who has also admitted factum of deceased having fallen on road, after being hit by somebody. PW-3 has categorically stated that Ashu Puri, appellant-accused inflicted blows on almost all parts of body of deceased and he had given kick blows on head and stomach of the deceased. Though, perusal of medical evidence, nowhere speaks of injury, if any, on other parts of body, save and except on head, but, as per medical evidence, a bruise of 2x2 cm was found present behind right ear and there was evidence of intra cerebral haemorrhage on right side of fronto-temporal lobe. 20. PW-11, Dr. S.K. Bansal, who was one of the members of the Board, which conducted post mortem on the body of deceased, specifically stated that following injuries were fond on the person of deceased: “1. A bruise of 2x2cm was present behind right ear. Dark blue in colour. 2. On opening the cranium there was evidence of intra Cerebral Haemorraghe on right side of fronto-temporal lobe. About 50 ML dark coloured blood found in intracranial cavity. 3. Abdominal Aorta has 1cm ruptured area at level of D12-L1 with about 2000 CC blood in the abdominal cavity.” 21. Though, as per opinion of two-member Board, deceased died due to rupture of aorta but, it has also been concluded in the report that head injury led to haemorrhagic shock and death, which is also one of the causes of the death. It has also come in the statement of aforesaid prosecution witness that head injury as detected in the post mortem, was possible by fist blows and falling upon hard surface. Medical board has specifically concluded that both the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 22. It has also come in the statement of aforesaid prosecution witness that head injury as detected in the post mortem, was possible by fist blows and falling upon hard surface. Medical board has specifically concluded that both the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 22. This Court, after having carefully perused prosecution evidence, especially, as has been discussed above, sees no mis-appreciation or mis-construction of evidence led on record by the prosecution, rather, this Court is of the view that learned Court below, while holding appellant-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 325 IPC, has read evidence in its right perspective and has dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously. Testimony of PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4, as has been discussed in detail, is sufficient to conclude that accused committed offence punishable under Section 325 IPC. 23. This court, after having carefully examined statements made by material prosecution witnesses, i.e. PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4, who had an occasion to see the alleged incident, with their eyes,, at first instance, sees no occasion to refer to other evidence led on record by prosecution, while ascertaining correctness of findings returned by the learned Court below, on the face of which, appellant-accused came to be convicted under Section 325 IPC. 24. Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned counsel representing the appellant-accused, while referring to the statement of Bishan Kumar (PW-9), father of deceased, made an endeavour to suggest that presence of PW-1 and PW-3 at the site of occurrence is highly doubtful because, it has specifically come in the statement of Bishan Kumar, PW-9, that Amit Sharma and Mohinder Mohan, PW-1 and PW-3, reached five minutes earlier to him at Kaushal Nursing Home. Aforesaid submission having been made by Mr. N.S. Chandel, may not persuade this Court to conclude that PW-1 and PW-3 were not witnesses to the alleged incident, because, it has specifically come in the statement of Mohinder Mohinder Kishore, PW-4, that he made a phone call to the father of the deceased from Nursing Home. It has specifically come in the statements of PW-1 and PW-3, that once appellant-accused fled away from the spot of occurrence, they took deceased to Kaushal Nursing Home. 25. It has specifically come in the statements of PW-1 and PW-3, that once appellant-accused fled away from the spot of occurrence, they took deceased to Kaushal Nursing Home. 25. True it is, that there is no corresponding injury on the skull in the form and shape of fracture and similarly, no blunt object or weapon was used, but gravity of assault can be certainly gauged by injury No.1, which was admittedly on the vital portion of the body. Since, it has specifically come in the statement of PW-3 that Ashu Puri (accused) inflicted blows on almost every part of body of deceased, it can be safely concluded that injury caused on head, which was also cited as one of the causes of death by medical expert, was caused due to fist and kick blows given/inflicted on the head of the deceased by the appellant. Apart from this, it has also come in the statement of PW-3 that accused Ashu Puri gave kick blows on the head and stomach of the deceased, as such this Court sees no illegality or infirmity in the finding returned by the learned Court below that since, fist blows were given on vital portion of body, it can safely be presumed that appellant-accused did have the intention and knowledge to inflict grievous injury to the deceased. Otherwise also, while holding an individual liable for punishment under Section 325 IPC, for causing grievous hurt, as defined under Section 320 IPC, intention and knowledge, if any, may not be relevant, rather, ‘voluntarily’ causing grievous injury is sufficient to punish a person under Section 325 IPC. 26. To constitute an offence of ‘voluntarily causing hurt’, there must be correspondence between result and intention or the knowledge of the accused and one can not be convicted for offence under Section 325 IPC, even if resultant hurt was grievous and individual had only intended or knew same likely to cause only simple hurt (See: AIR 1958 Pat 452 , Rambaran Mahton vs The State). But, in the instant case, as clearly emerges from the record that intention of the appellant was not to cause simple hurt, rather, his intention was to cause /inflict serious injury to the deceased. But, in the instant case, as clearly emerges from the record that intention of the appellant was not to cause simple hurt, rather, his intention was to cause /inflict serious injury to the deceased. Had the accused any intention to cause or to inflict simple hurt, he had no occasion, whatsoever, to inflict fist and kick blows on all parts of body, especially head and stomach of the deceased. It has specifically come in the evidence that appellant-accused gave fist/kick blows on the head and stomach of deceased, even after deceased had fallen down on the road, from the scooter. 27. Testimony of PW-1 Amit Sharma and PW-3 Mohinder Mohan, can not be only impeached on the ground that they are related to the deceased. True it is, as emerges from the record, PW-1 Amit Sharma and PW-3 Mohinder Mohan are closely related to the deceased but by now it is well settled that merely because witnesses are related, they can not be termed to be interested or partisan witnesses, rather, Courts, in such like situations, are supposed to analyse/examine the evidence cautiously while placing reliance upon their version. Though, it emerges from the statement of PW-4 Mohinder Mohinder Kishore, that at the time of alleged incident, PW-1 Amit Sharma and PW-3 Mohinder Mohan, were not present at the spot but if statements of PW-1 and PW-3 are read in their entirety, there appears to be no contradiction, much less material, as far as their reaching on the spot is concerned, because, PW-1 and PW-3 have specifically stated that when they reached Virbhadra Chowk, they saw accused inflicting fist and kick blows on the person of the deceased, as a result of which, deceased fell down from the scooter. Rather, PW-3, Mohinder Mohan, has specifically stated that he witnessed occurrence from about 30-35 feet, but PW-1 Amit Sharma has specifically stated that Mohinder Mohan, PW-3 met him on the way to Bus Stand, and when he reached Virbhadra Chowk, he saw accused Ashu Puri inflicting fist and kick blows. Aforesaid version put forth by PW-1 and PW-3 corroborates version put forth by PW-4. 28. Their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinay Kumar Rai and another v. State of Bihar reported in (2008) 12 SCC 202 have held that merely because eye-witnesses are family members, their evidence can not be discarded. Their lordships have held as under: “11. Aforesaid version put forth by PW-1 and PW-3 corroborates version put forth by PW-4. 28. Their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinay Kumar Rai and another v. State of Bihar reported in (2008) 12 SCC 202 have held that merely because eye-witnesses are family members, their evidence can not be discarded. Their lordships have held as under: “11. Merely because the eye-witnesses are family members their evidence cannot per se be discarded. When there is allegation of interestedness, the same has to be established. Mere statement that being relatives of the deceased they are likely to falsely implicate the accused cannot be a ground to discard the evidence which is otherwise cogent and credible. We shall also deal with the contention regarding interestedness of the witnesses for furthering prosecution version. “5. ….Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases, the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible. (6) In Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab, ( AIR 1953 SC 364 ) it has been laid down as under :- "26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are l ikely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalization. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalization. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts." (7) The above decision has been followed in Guli Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan ( 1974 (3) SCC 698 ) in which Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras ( AIR 1957 SC 614 ) was also relied upon. (8) We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a close relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip Singh's case (supra) in which surprise was expressed over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the Members of the Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed : "25. We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the a High Court that the testimony of the two eye-witnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in - 'Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan', ( AIR 1952 SC 54 at p. 59). We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgments of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel." (9) Again in Masalti and Ors. v. State of U. P., ( AIR 1965 SC 202 ) this Court observed : "14……..But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses ...........The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct." To the same effect is the decisions in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, ( AIR 1973 SC 2407 ); Lehna v. State of Haryana, ( 2002 (3) SCC 76 ) and Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v. State of Orissa, ( 2002 (8) SCC 381 ). The above position was also highlighted in Babulal Bhagwan Khandare and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, ( 2005 (10) SCC 404 ) and in Salim Sahab v. State of M. P., ( 2007 (1) SCC 699 ).” 29. Their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Israr v. State of U.P. reported in AIR 2005 SC 249 have held that relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal the actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. Their lordships have held as under: “12. We shall first deal with the contention regarding interestedness of the witnesses for furthering prosecution version. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases, the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible.” 30. Their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nankaunoo vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2016) 3 SCC 317 , have explained the difference between “intention” and “knowledge” and have held that knowledge is bare awareness and not the same thing as intention and such consequences shall ensue. As compared to “knowledge”, “intention” requires something more than the mere foresight of the consequences, namely, the purposeful doing a thing to achieve a particular end. Their lordships have held as follows: “11. Intention is different from motive. It is the intention with which the act is done that makes a difference in arriving at a conclusion whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder. Their lordships have held as follows: “11. Intention is different from motive. It is the intention with which the act is done that makes a difference in arriving at a conclusion whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder. The third clause of Section 300 IPC consists of two parts. Under the first part it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict the injury that is present and under the second part it must be proved that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Considering the clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC and reiterating the principles in Virsa Singh's case, in Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Administration) (1991) 2 SCC 32 , para (12), this Court held as under:- "Referring to these observations, Division Bench of this Court in Jagrup Singh case, (1981) 3 SCC 616 observed thus: (SCC p. 620, para 7) "These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. The test laid down in Virsa Singh case, AIR 1958 SC 465 for the applicability of Clause Thirdly is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law." The Division Bench also further held that the decision in Virsa Singh case AIR 1958 SC 465 has throughout been followed as laying down the guiding principles. In both these cases it is clearly laid down that the prosecution must prove (1) that the body injury is present, (2) that the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, (3) that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury that is to say it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. In other words Clause Thirdly consists of two parts. The first part is that there was an intention to inflict the injury that is found to be present and the second part that the said injury is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Under the first part the prosecution has to prove from the given facts and circumstances that the intention of the accused was to cause that particular injury. Whereas the second part whether it was sufficient to cause death is an objective enquiry and it is a matter of inference or deduction from the particulars of the injury. Under the first part the prosecution has to prove from the given facts and circumstances that the intention of the accused was to cause that particular injury. Whereas the second part whether it was sufficient to cause death is an objective enquiry and it is a matter of inference or deduction from the particulars of the injury. The language of Clause Thirdly of Section 300 speaks of intention at two places and in each the sequence is to be established by the prosecution before the case can fall in that clause. The 'intention' and 'knowledge' of the accused are subjective and invisible states of mind and their existence has to be gathered from the circumstances, such as the weapon used, the ferocity of attack, multiplicity of injuries and all other surrounding circumstances. The framers of the Code designedly used the words 'intention' and 'knowledge' and it is accepted that the knowledge of the consequences which may result in doing an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. Firstly, when an act is done by a person, it is presumed that he must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow. But that knowledge is bare awareness and not the same thing as intention that such consequences should ensue. As compared to 'knowledge', 'intention' requires something more than the mere foresight of the consequences, namely the purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end." 31. After, having bestowed my thoughtful consideration, I see no illegality or infirmity in the judgment passed by learned Court below, thereby convicting the appellant under Section 325 IPC, as such, same is upheld. 32. However, this Court, taking note of the fact that appellant-accused has already remained in custody for more than thirteen months, coupled with the fact that he is a young person of 30 years , deems it fit to modify the sentence awarded by the learned Court below from two years rigorous imprisonment to imprisonment already undergone by him. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. Bail bonds furnished by the accused are cancelled and discharged.