JUDGMENT & ORDER : Aggrieved by the order dated 8-2-2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), West Tripura, Agartala in Misc. (Ex) Case No.4 of 2015, rejecting the objection of the petitioner U/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure against the execution proceeding, this civil revision has been filed. 2. This petition is filed by Sri Vinit Singh Rathore, who is the Manager of the firm under the name and style of “Narendrapur Cha Bhagan” on the authorization of the petitioner-company, namely, “M/s Maheshpur Tea & Industry Private Ltd.”, which is a company registered under the Companies Act with its Head Office at 16, Bone Field Lane, Kolkata. The respondent Nos.1 to 3, who are the decree holders, instituted Money Suit No.7 of 2005 seeking damages against the Narendrapur Cha Bhagan (Narendrapur Tea Estate) and others for the death of one Sandhay Patanti and Amita Patanti due to electrocution. The suit was decreed ex-parte on 24-3-2012 holding the said Narendrapur Tea Estate liable for their death and directing it to pay damages to the tune of ?3,00,000/- along with interest @ 6% per annum. The decree-holders filed execution case, which was objected by the Manager of Narendrapur Tea Estate by filing written objection U/s 47, CPC on the ground that the execution case filed against the Tea Estate was not maintainable; the Tea Estate was wrongly arraigned through the Manager of the Tea Estate, who received the summons but who subsequently resigned from his post and left the same. According to the petitioner, there was no proper representation of Tea Estate in the suit and further that the decree was not executable as the owner of the garden was not made a party to the suit. After hearing the parties, the learned Civil Judge held that a Manager of a Tea Garden managed the entire function/business of the tea garden and the service of summons upon him cannot, therefore, be said to be improper. He further held that a decree cannot be held to be inexecutable due to improper service of summons or in the absence of proper representation of a particular party. According to the learned Civil Judge, it is a settled law that an executing court cannot go behind the decree and cannot entertain any objection on the ground that the decree is incorrect in law or on facts. According to the learned Civil Judge, it is a settled law that an executing court cannot go behind the decree and cannot entertain any objection on the ground that the decree is incorrect in law or on facts. As no material or ground was placed before him to indicate that the decree is a nullity and the decree cannot, therefore, be executed. He, therefore, rejected the objection U/s 47 CPC. This is how this civil revision comes up before this Court. 3. Assailing the impugned order, Mr. D.K. Biswas, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the firm named Narendrapur Tea Estate is not a juristic person, and the summons served upon it through the manager cannot be treated as proper service of summons upon the petitioner; the decree passed by the trial court under such circumstances cannot be bind upon the petitioner or is executable against it. He contends that as the decree was wrongly passed against the petitioner, which was never made a party in the suit, the decree is a nullity and cannot be executed. Contending that the impugned order is a nullity being without jurisdiction, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law and is liable to be set aside. Mr. N. Majumder, the learned counsel for the decree-holders-respondents, supports the impugned order and submits that no interference is called for. 4. The law is now well-settled that an executing court cannot go behind the decree. It must take the decree as it stands and executes it according to its terms. It has no power to vary or modify the terms. It has no power to question its legality or correctness. This is based on the principle that a proceeding to enforce a judgment is collateral to the judgment and, therefore, no enquiry into its regularity or correctness can be permitted in such a proceeding. In case of inherent lack of jurisdiction, the decree passed by the court is a nullity and its invalidity could be set up wherever and whenever it is sought to be enforced, whether in execution or in collateral proceedings. In such a case there is no question of going behind the decree, for really in the eye of law there is no decree at all. However, inherent lack of jurisdiction must appear on the face of the record. In such a case there is no question of going behind the decree, for really in the eye of law there is no decree at all. However, inherent lack of jurisdiction must appear on the face of the record. Hence, if the decree on the face of it discloses some material on the basis of which the court could have passed the decree, it would be valid. In such a case, the executing court must accept and execute the decree as it stands and cannot go behind it. To allow the executing court to go behind that limit would be to exalt to the status of a superior court sitting in appeal over the decision of the court which has passed the decree. No doubt, a plea regarding inexcusability of the decree can be raised in execution even though that plea was not raised before the decree was passed. But if such a plea requires investigation of facts and was not raised during trial, the court would not permit the question to be raised. As rightly held by the learned Civil Judge, the summons was received and the suit was contested, may be half-heartedly, by the then Manager of the Tea Estate, who managed the entire business of the Tea Estate. Moreover, the Tea Estate in question is apparently owned by the petitioner-company. Therefore, just because the suit was ultimately decreed against the Tea Estate does not mean that the decree becomes a nullity; at the most it could be an irregularity. In my judgment, the learned Civil Judge does not commit any jurisdictional error in rejecting the objection of the petitioner U/s 47, CPC; no interference is, therefore, warranted. 5. For the reasons stated in the foregoing, there is no merit in this revision petition, which is, accordingly, dismissed. The parties are, however, directed to bear their respective costs. The interim order dated 31-3-2016 stands vacated.