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2017 DIGILAW 693 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Bipinbhai Gopalbhai Solanki

2017-03-28

A.J.SHASTRI, S.R.BRAHMBHATT

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The appellant-State has filed the present criminal appeal under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. against the judgment and order, dated 7.4.2006, passed in Sessions Case No. 5 of 2003, by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 1, Valsad, whereby, the trial court has been pleased to acquit the respondents-accused from the charges for which he has been tried. 2. The facts leading to the rise of present criminal appeal are that a complaint came to be registered by one Rasikkumar Mohanlal Patel regarding incident which took place on 22.8.2002. It has been alleged in the complaint that respondents accused attacked the deceased Ranaji with spade and iron rod etc. and done away Ranaji who succumbed to the injuries caused at the behest of respondents accused. It is the case of prosecution that on 22.8.2002 prior to about 3 months, a quarrel took place with deceased Ranaji Vikramsinh Rathod with the respondents accused in connection with one atrocity complaint filed. Keeping that in mind, as per the case of prosecution, these respondents accused armed with weapons attacked the deceased Ranaji wherein, after dragging the deceased accused No. 1 gave a spade blow, whereas accused No. 2 gave a blow with iron rod, accused No. 3 gave 'Parai' blow and accused No. 4 gave stick blow and instigated others to finish the deceased Ranaji. 2.1 It is this case of prosecution came to be investigated by the Investigating Agency, who recorded the statement of witnesses, executed the Panchnama of recovery of weapon and took all necessary steps as were required for investigation and ultimately, after having found adequate material, a charge-sheet came to be submitted before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class for the offence punishable under Section 302 r/w Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 2.2 The learned Magistrate upon receipt of the charge-sheet registered the criminal case but, then, since the same was triable by the court of sessions, in exercise of powers under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C. the case was committed to the sessions which had come up for consideration before the learned learned Joint District Judge, Valsad and same was registered as Sessions Case No. 5 of 2003. 2.3 Pursuant to the committal order passed by the trial court, the trial court, as stated above, was pleased to frame the charge at Exh. 2.3 Pursuant to the committal order passed by the trial court, the trial court, as stated above, was pleased to frame the charge at Exh. 5 against the respondents accused and their plea has also been recorded. But since the respondents accused has denied the offence being committed, the case was put up for further adjudication. 2.4 The record indicates that with a view to prove the case against the respondent accused, the prosecution has led the evidence in the form of oral as well as documentary evidence in the following manner:- S. No. PW No. Name Exhibit 1 PW-1 Dharmeshkumar Arunbhai Mehta 17 2 PW-2 Kaushikkumar Amrutlal 22 3 PW-3 Rasikkumar Mohanbhai Patel 36 4 PW-4 Alpeshkumar Uttambhai 43 5 PW-5 Ashokkumar Janaksinh Thakore 44 6 PW-6 Kishan Tilogibhai 50 7 PW-7 Hiteshbhai Vijaybhai Pandya 51 8 PW-8 Dipak Vijaysinh Rajput 54 9 PW-9 Sangeetaben @ Ganga Pravinbhai 55 10 PW-10 Dr. Ashokkumar Baidhnathsing 58 11 PW-11 Sapnaben Shantilal 62 12 PW-12 Dr. Harshadbhai Kantilal Shah 63 13 PW-13 Zakir Husain Miyalal 66 14 PW-14 Harilal Naginbhai Patel 67 15 PW-15 Prakash Buddhiprasad Kanojiya 72 16 PW-16 Jashwantsinh Jagatsinh Chavda 74 Evidence led by prosecution:- 1 Original Complaint 37 2 Panchnama of place of incident 23 3 Inquest Panchnama 18 4 Panchnama of clothes of deceased 45 5 Panchnama of physical condition 46 6 Muddamal recovery panchnama 75 7 Muddamal recovery panchnama 76 8 Panchnama of physical condition 47 9 Medical certificate 60 10 P.M. Note 59 11 FSL report 77 12 FSL report 78 13 Serological report 79 2.5 After the said evidence is led, a closure pursis came to be given by the prosecution and after recording the statement of the accused persons under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. the case was put up for trial. The trial court had framed the issues for which adjudication is to take place in sessions case and after considering in detail the evidence led by the prosecution and after considering the further statement, the trial court was pleased to pass an order of acquittal and the respondents accused came to be acquitted from the charges for which they have been tried. It is this judgment and order is made the subject matter of present criminal appeal by the appellant-State. 3. Mr. It is this judgment and order is made the subject matter of present criminal appeal by the appellant-State. 3. Mr. L.R. Poojari, learned APP for the appellant - State has vehemently contended that while passing the judgment and order, a serious error is committed by the trial court and there also appears to be a clear erroneous approach in evaluating the evidence on record. Learned APP has submitted that though there are eye witnesses to the incident, who are supporting the case of prosecution, still their version is not examined in its proper perspective and thereby, a material irregularity is reflecting from the judgment and order of granting benefit of doubt. Mr. Poojari, learned APP has further submitted the benefit of doubt in the present background of fact ought not to have been granted, more particularly when there are eye witnesses to the incident in question. It has also been pointed out that sufficient material is available on record, adequate medical evidence is also corroborating the case of prosecution and the material which have been led by the prosecution has specifically connected each of the accused persons with specific assertion about the role being played by each one. Learned APP has submitted that the injuries are co-related to the ocular evidence led by the prosecution and there appears to be no reflection in ocular evidence and documentary evidence in getting and establishing the link with the respondents accused and therefore, when entire chain is getting completed, the reasons which are assigned by the trial court are not justified. 3.2 Mr. L.R. Poojari, learned APP has further contended that there are statements of PW-9 - Sangeetaben @ Ganga Pravinbhai, who is examined at Exh. 55 and that of PW-11 - Sapnaben Shantilal, who is examined at Exh. 62 which has completely established the case of prosecution against the respondents accused and in addition thereto, the motive is also established by virtue of the fact that earlier complaint which has been filed under the provisions of the Atrocity Act is also part of the record at Exh. 82 and therefore, when the entire chain of circumstance is getting corroboration by cogent material, there was no justifiable reasons available with the trial court to give a benefit of doubt by merely raising inferences. 82 and therefore, when the entire chain of circumstance is getting corroboration by cogent material, there was no justifiable reasons available with the trial court to give a benefit of doubt by merely raising inferences. Learned APP submitted that the reasons which are assigned by the trial court are not in consonance with the ocular evidence and therefore, there appears to be perversity which has resulted into miscarriage of justice and therefore, on this ground alone, the impugned judgment and order requires to be corrected. Learned APP has further contended that on reading the panchnama of scene of offence, it would appear that there are visible sign of some occurrence which took place which corroborates the version of prosecution. In addition thereto, the independent eye witnesses have narrated from whose testimonies the case of prosecution is established beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, simply because some minor lapses occurred while investigating or putting the case against the respondents accused, such infirmities which are not that much fatal which can vitiate and distort the entire case of the prosecution and therefore, when prosecution has established the case beyond the reasonable doubt, it was not open for the trial court to raise any suspicion with regard to case put up by the prosecution and by referring to some of the testimonies and the material, learned APP has requested the Court to allow the appeal filed by the State by reversing the judgment and order of acquittal. 4. To oppose the stand taken by learned APP, Mr. Vipul B. Sandesha, learned counsel for Mr. S.P. Majmudar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents accused has contended specifically that the order granting benefit of doubt is a well reasoned order and the same is based upon close analysis of entire evidence on record and therefore, there appears to be no irregularity which would suggest any interference by this Court. Mr. Sandesha has further contended that the trial court while granting benefit of doubt has examined the case at threadbare and the analysis has been reflected from the detailed reasoning more particularly from Para-40 of the impugned judgment and to substantiate that, learned counsel has taken us through various observations made by the trial court while granting benefit of doubt to the respondents accused. It has also been contended that the prosecution has not led cogent and adequate material to justify the stand. It has also been contended that the prosecution has not led cogent and adequate material to justify the stand. On the contrary, there are serious lapses fatal in nature while conducting an investigation and though the serious loopholes have been examined at length by the trial court and then, come to conclusion that case has not been proved by prosecution beyond the reasonable doubt and conjoint effect of the analysis of evidence on record and the reasons would clearly indicate that there is no legal infirmity committed by the trial court in passing the order impugned in the appeal and therefore, by drawing attention of the Court and pointing out specifically that judgment and order is passed way back in 2006 and after almost a period of more than 11 years, the same is under scrutiny before this Court in appellate jurisdiction. No doubt, the powers are wide enough to re-examine the entire case as a whole but, as per the say of Mr. Sandesha, simply because another plausible view is available and reflecting from the order, the same may not be substituted, more particularly when the trial court has considered at length the entire evidence and therefore, by referring to these submissions, Mr. Sandesha has requested the Court to dismiss the appeal filed by the State. 5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record in the context of reasons assigned by the trial court, first of all we deem it proper to point out some of the reflections appearing in the order passed by the trial court. Upon analysis of evidence, the trial court has come to the conclusion that two ladies came to the complainant and other friends who were standing and had conveyed that the deceased Ranaji is being dragged by Bipinbhai and family members and therefore, it appears from the version that two ladies have seen the incident. However, when after a period of 3 days when witness Alpeshbhai is approached by police, he recorded as if he has actually seen the commission of crime which is far from truth as is appearing. The trial court has further also found that there is not a single witness available with the prosecution that how the incident in question has erupted and how the respondents accused went in the wada of the house of the deceased. The trial court has further also found that there is not a single witness available with the prosecution that how the incident in question has erupted and how the respondents accused went in the wada of the house of the deceased. These testimonies have been examined minutely by the trial court in which PW-4 - Alpeshbhai, who is examined at Exh. 43, has deposed that he has seen all the accused giving blows on the deceased Ranaji. But then, in co-relation with the testimony of PW-9 - Sangeetaben, who is examined at Exh. 55, the trial court has found no confidence in testimony of witness Alpeshbhai. 6. It has also been observed by the trial court that though the incident in question has happened on 22.8.2002 in the evening hours, the recording of statement by police is taking place after almost 3 days' period i.e. on 25.8.2002 and there seem to be no explanation about such delay being caused. The trial court has further analyzed the evidence of PW-11 - Sapnaben, who is examined at Exh. 62, who disclosed before the police after 3 days i.e. on 25.8.2002 and therefore, both the lady members, who got recorded their statements after 3 days as have been considered by the trial court as a chance witnesses and in the absence of any much corroboration, it appears that no confidence is generated out of it as found by the trial court. Apart from this, the ocular evidence having not been generating any confidence as concluded by the trial court, yet another circumstance is examined by the trial court in which the Investigation Officer has not only recorded the statement of witnesses belatedly but, has not even bothered to collect the blood stains clothes of the persons, who took the deceased to the hospital for treatment. It has also been observed by the trial court that as per the say of prosecution, there was profuse bleeding but then, the blood stain clothes have not been recovered of those witnesses who took the deceased to the hospital and even the seat covers of the car have also not been sent for analysis nor even the panchnama is executed for a pretty longer period and it is also illogical that such maruti car was on run for almost 7 days with blood stained seat covers which is found to be improbable. The trial court also surprisingly found that though the dead body of Ranaji is being brought at village Kalgam, though police officers were present, however, surprisingly the inquest panchnama has not been executed. 7. It has also been observed and concluded that the weapons which were utilized as alleged, though have been recovered and for that, discovery panchnama is drawn in view of Section 27 of the Evidence Act but then, a joint discovery is held vide Exh. 75 and this joint discovery has found to be not in consonance with the requirement of law and while passing the judgment and order, this has been taken serious note of. 8. The very discovery is found not as per the requirement of Section 27 of the Evidence Act but then, the manner in which such discovery is made, has not been generating any confidence in the case of prosecution. From the evidence, the trial court also found that prosecution has miserably failed in establishing the main element to attract Section 34 r/w Section 302 of the IPC about in furtherance of common intention. Upon analysis of evidence, the trial court has found that there is no explanation as to how the incident took place inside the house of respondents and therefore, the manner in which the incident in question stated to have occurred, the element of common intention is not getting established beyond the reasonable doubt and therefore also, this is one of the factors weighed with the trial court in passing the order. 9. In addition thereto, it has also been found by the trial court that each of the injuries have not been explained in the evidence and which accused has inflicted which blow is not getting segregated and who has utilized which weapon is also not getting established and therefore, in the absence of any such explanation of vital importance, the trial court found that case cannot be said to be established by prosecution beyond the reasonable doubt. 10. From the evidence on record, the trial court has also come to the conclusion that two witness, viz., PW-6 - Kishan Tilogibhai, who is examined at Exh. 50 and PW-8 - Dipak Vijaysinh Rajput, who is examined at Exh. 10. From the evidence on record, the trial court has also come to the conclusion that two witness, viz., PW-6 - Kishan Tilogibhai, who is examined at Exh. 50 and PW-8 - Dipak Vijaysinh Rajput, who is examined at Exh. 54, have turned hostile and not supported the case of prosecution and therefore, a stinking material is not corroborating the story put up by the prosecution and therefore, the benefit of doubt is granted by the trial court. The further analysis of evidence has derived the trial court to come to the conclusion that serious lapses have been maintained by investigating machinery. The case diary which is of vital importance is completely destroyed and not available except the last pages and for that, evasive answer is reflecting from the testimony of Investigating Officer. It is further admitted fact reflecting from testimony of Investigating Officer that statements of PW-5, PW-9 and PW-11 have been recorded after a period of 3 days and though this evidence can be said to be cogent, the same has lost its significance in view of the fact that they have been recorded after almost a period of 3 days. The panchas related to discovery panchnama have turned hostile and not supporting the case of prosecution and most material fact which has been found by the trial court that though the incident in question has occurred on 22.8.2002, the muddamal which has been recovered/discovered sent for FSL on 5.9.2002 and why this delay has happened, there appears to be no explanation from the record. In addition thereto, the muddamal is to be sealed and to be kept in proper safe custody till it is sent for analysis. Admittedly, no head seal is found on such recovery of muddamal. Further material fact which has been found that there is no attempt made by investigating machinery to discover the blood group of accused persons so that some corroboration can take place to the case of prosecution and therefore, these are the infirmities specifically found by the trial court on evaluation of evidence on record which is doubt the theory of prosecution. Further it has been found by the trial court that even the panchnama of scene of offence is executed on 2nd day, for which also no explanation is coming forth and therefore, by this, uncorroborated evidences appearing on the record, the trial court appeared to have disbelieved the testimony of those two witnesses which were material to the case of prosecution and therefore, in the background of this set of circumstance, a benefit of doubt is given by judgment and order passed on 7.4.2006. 11. In the context of aforesaid conclusion arrived at by the trial court, there appears to be no legal infirmities which can cause or result in miscarriage of justice. But still, however, since the death has occurred, with a view to ensure that whether any perversity is reflecting or whether there is any lapse of vital nature is reflecting in the order, we have gone through even independently the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence. While going through the evidence and assessing even independently, we have seen first of all the scene of panchnama at Exh. 23 which appears to have not been corroborated by the independent panch witnesses. From this, it is reflecting that though the incident in question has happened on 22.8.2002, a panchnama appears to have been drawn belatedly and from this panchnama, it is revealing that there are no incriminating sign visible about the scuffle which might have taken place as per the say of prosecution. In addition thereto, a surprising fact is found from inside the house of Bipinbhai wherein, there was damaged household material was found which might have destructed on account of some circumstance which is not revealing and further some half burnt material also found which indicates that something unnatural has taken place at scene of offence and therefore, there appears to be some unnatural circumstance which took place at the house of respondent accused which is not revealing from the record. In addition thereto, a further statement which has been recorded by the trial court in the form of statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., a specific explanation has been given that on the contrary, village people had attacked the house of the respondents and on the contrary, an attempt is made to ignite the fire in the house and therefore, the accused persons with family members had run away from the village in as it is form. Now, this explanation which is coming out from the further statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., if we correlate the same with the panchnama of scene of offence, the real incident is not coming out from any of the statements or testimonies of witnesses who have been examined. 12. The evidence is also suggesting that there are serious lapses on the part of investigating machinery which has weaken the case of prosecution. First of all, from the scene of offence, no visible sign of scuffle is emerging. Secondly, the blood stained clothes have not been recovered from the witnesses, who took the deceased to the hospital and the maruti car in which the deceased was taken to the hospital is also appears to have not dealt with for a pretty long period and it is highly surprising that said car has been unnoticed for a pretty long period of 7 days as seat covers of it might have the sign of blood of the deceased. A further fact which is emerging is that no attempt is made by the Investigating Officer to evaluate the blood group of the accused so as to correlate with the case of prosecution and in addition to this, the testimony of other witness, namely, PW-4 and PW-5 are found to be not in consonance with two lady witnesses, who claimed to have seen the actual occurrence. The testimony of those witnesses is to be correlated then, there appears to be not only a contradiction but their versions which have been recorded is at the belated stage and for that, there appears to be no explanation and therefore, on the basis of preponderance of probability, the case appears to have not been established beyond the reasonable doubt. The testimony of those witnesses is to be correlated then, there appears to be not only a contradiction but their versions which have been recorded is at the belated stage and for that, there appears to be no explanation and therefore, on the basis of preponderance of probability, the case appears to have not been established beyond the reasonable doubt. The medical evidence coupled with other material on record being not getting corroborated, the reasons which are reflecting in the order of acquittal cannot be said to be so perverse which vitiates the very exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court. On the contrary, from the reading of the order, it appears that the trial court has considered each of the evidence, analyzed the same and then, has come to the conclusion and therefore, when the material on record is dealt with and satisfaction is arrived at, the same cannot be simply be set at naught even if another plausible view is visible and this is on account of fact that the trial court had an opportunity to see the demeanor of the witnesses at the time when the deposition was taking place and therefore, his evaluation of those ocular evidence must be given predominance and therefore, keeping in mind the scope of appellate jurisdiction in dealing with an order of acquittal, we are of the considered opinion that the conclusion which has been arrived at is not suffering from any such legal infirmity or perversity which may result into exercise of jurisdiction and accordingly, we found that no case is made out by the State to reverse the order of acquittal. It is cardinal principle of law in criminal jurisprudence and it is the sole responsibility of the prosecution to prove the case beyond the reasonable doubt and the trial court has found that such test of ascertaining has not been established on the basis of analysis of evidence and therefore, we see no other distinguishable circumstance to dislodge the finding and the conclusion arrived at by the trial court and we accordingly found that this is not a fit case to reverse the order of acquittal. 13. 13. While coming to this conclusion, we are mindful of the fact that no doubt, the appellate court has ample powers to reassess the entire material but, then even if plausible view is available, a different view may not be substituted qua that of the trial court more particularly when the trial court had an opportunity to see the demeanor of witnesses and therefore, overall analysis of present background led us to consider the proposition laid down by the Apex Court on the issue of exercising appellate jurisdiction which deserves to be quoted hereinafter. 13.1 In the decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para.55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P. (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598, as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: (i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; (ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; (iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; (v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; (vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180, particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 and Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994)." 13.2 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014 (9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed as observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31. 13.3 In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015 (5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (See Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 13.4 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph No. 21 observed thus: "21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary, (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 ." 14. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 ." 14. In the premise aforesaid, we have given our anxious thought to the entire material on record, compared the same with the finding arrived at by the trial court and upon close scrutiny and reassessment of the evidence, we are of the considered opinion that chain is not connecting completely to hold the respondents accused as guilty of an offence beyond reasonable doubt and in such a suspicious circumstance, it is not just and proper for the appellate court to substitute the finding and hold them guilty. Perversity is not getting reflected and manifest error is not appearing which may turn out to be a miscarriage of justice and therefore, in the absence of such element, we are unable to accept the contentions raised by learned APP and accordingly, we find no error committed by the trial court and therefore, the appeal filed by the State being meritless deserves to be dismissed. 15. In view of above, the present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order, dated 7.4.2006, passed in Sessions Case No. 5 of 2003, by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 1, Valsad, is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds shall stand cancelled. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith. Appeal Dismissed.