JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. 1. The instant appeal is directed against the impugned verdict pronounced by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una, District Una, H.P. whereby he acquitted the accused for the charge framed against him for his committing an offence punishable under Sections 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 2. The brief facts of the case are that a complaint was filed by the complainant against the accused for his committing an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). In sequel there to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate upon recording preliminary evidence adduced thereupon, there before by the complainant took cognizance upon the complaint also he charged the accused for his committing an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 3. In order to prove the charge, the complainant examined 3 witnesses. On closure of complainants’ evidence, the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded in which he pleaded innocence and claimed false implication. He chose to lead evidence in defence. 4. On an appraisal of the evidence on record, the learned trial Court returned findings of acquittal upon the accused. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has concertedly and vigorously contended qua the findings of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court standing not based on a proper appreciation of evidence on record, rather, theirs standing sequelled by gross mis-appreciation of material on record. Hence, he contends qua the findings of acquittal warranting reversal by this Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and theirs being replaced by findings of conviction. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent has with considerable force and vigour contended qua the findings of acquittal recorded by the Court below standing based on a mature and balanced appreciation of evidence on record and theirs not necessitating interference, rather theirs meriting vindication. 7. This Court with the able assistance of the learned counsel on either side has with studied care and incision, evaluated the entire evidence on record. 8. 7. This Court with the able assistance of the learned counsel on either side has with studied care and incision, evaluated the entire evidence on record. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the complainant has made a concerted assault upon the tenacity of the reason assigned in the impugned judgment by the learned trial Magistrate concerned, whereby he proceeded to record a finding of acquittal upon the accused, reason thereof is comprised in the factum of the provisions engrafted in clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1981, provisions where of stand extracted Here in after:- “the payee or the holder in due course of the cheques, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheques, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheques as unpaid; and not begetting satiation, in sequel with the enjoined preemptory mandate constituted therein remaining accomplished hence barring him to take cognizance upon the apposite complaint. The learned counsel appearing for the complainant/appellant, has contended, that the aforesaid reason stood anvilled upon the factum of UPC receipt borne on Ext.PC “not” holding statutory parity with an acknowledgement appended along with the apposite Registered letter borne in Ext.PD “significantly” when the presumption of service upon the addressee concerned stands embodied in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to stand solitarily contemplated therein to stand attracted only with respect to service concerted under a registered post “unless” the contrary stands proven also the aforesaid statutory presumption embodied therein singularly appertaining to service concerted through Registered Post upon the addressee concerned “getting added strength” besides momentum from the evident fact of the cover of the registered post besides appended therewith acknowledgement holding reflections therein with respect to the accurate/ precise address “of” the addressee. Consequently, for attracting the mandate of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provisions where of stand extracted here in after:- Section 27 in The General Clauses Act, 1897 27 Meaning of service by post. Consequently, for attracting the mandate of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provisions where of stand extracted here in after:- Section 27 in The General Clauses Act, 1897 27 Meaning of service by post. - Where any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression serve or either of the expressions give or send or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.” Vis-à-vis service concerted to be effectuated through RAD cover upon the addressee, it is imperative to prove that the face of the registered envelope besides the A.D. appended therewith “both” holding the precise/correct address “of” the addressee yet when the AD cover hereat stood hence remained undelivered upon the addressee, thereupon the statutory presumption of its being served upon the addressee/accused “visibly gets eroded” “significantly” when its non delivery upon the addressee constitutes proof in rebuttal of its statutory service being effectuated upon the addressee/accused, especially, when the evident factum of its standing returned undelivered “constituted” within the ambit of the coinage “unless the contrary is proved” occurring there in, “firm evidence” for dislodging the vigor of the statutory presumption also comprises evidence is disproof of the statutory presumption constructed upon service endeavoured to be made upon the accused/addressee “through RAD cover”. Furthermore, the aforesaid presumption though also stands attracted in the event of despite the normal time of its delivery upon the addressee evidently expiring “yet” thereat “the” AD appended there with remaining unreturned by the post man concerned, however, when reiteratedly here at both the RAD besides the acknowledgement due appended there with evidently standing returned undelivered, there from it is befitting to conclude that the address of the addressee/accused being not his correct address, thereupon the effect of the statutory presumption imputed to service concerted through RAD cover upon the accused “is” overwhelmingly eroded. 9. 9. Be that as it may, with evidently the apposite statutory mandatory presumption embodied in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, provisions whereof stand extracted hereinabove being foisted upon service concerted through RAD cover upon the addressee/accused, there upon the service upon the addressee/accused “through” UPC borne in Ext.PC hence with its not standing explicitly encompassed within the relevant statutory domain, corollary where of “is” that the vigour of the mandate of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act is unattractable vis-à-vis service concerted “through” Ext.PC upon the accused/addressee. 10. Consequently, when within the ambit of the preemptory mandate of clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act, provisions whereof stands extracted hereinabove, the prima donna condition of the accused peremptorily standing served with a mandatory notice also when the aforesaid statutory condition warranted its preemptory evident satiation, for hence empowering the Magistrate to take cognizance upon the complainant, “whereas” the relevant aforesaid indispensable statutory condition not evidently begetting satiation, hence barred the magistrate concerned to take cognizance upon the complainant. Consequently, in the Magistrate ordering refusal to take cognizance upon the compliant does not render his order to suffer from any legal error. 11. The learned counsel for the complainant appellant has contended that the aforesaid reason assigned by the learned trial Magistrate to take cognizance upon the complaint warrants interference. In making the aforesaid submission he relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in Ajeet Seeds Limited Vs. K.Gopala Krishnaiah (2014) 12 SCC 685 :- “It is thus clear that Section 114 of the Evidence Act enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. Section 27 of the GC Act gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. It is not necessary to aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business.” 12. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business.” 12. However, any reliance by him upon the aforesaid verdict is grossly misplaced, as the relevant paragraph thereof, does not make any explicit pronouncement that even with respect to a receipt issued by the postal authorities concerned with respect to a letter sent under UPC, the presumption embodied in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act rendering the relevant statutory presumption being attractable thereupon, contrarily there is a vivid echoing therein that since the presumption embodied in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act “on evident satiation” of the ingredients spelt therein standing begotten also there upon renders hence insignificant any want of any communication in respect thereof in the complaint besides rendering insignificant any want of the witnesses concerned not testifying in respect thereof, conspicuously, when evidence in respect of ingredients thereof standing proven alone enjoy credit worthiness. Be that as it may, with the preemptory mandate of the apposite clause of Section 138 of the Act not begetting any satiation, thereupon it is befitting to conclude that hence with the complainant not begetting any compliance there with, thereupon the magistrate concerned stood barred to take cognizance upon the complaint. Hence, I find no merit in the appeal. The same is dismissed. The impugned judgment of the learned trial Court is maintained and affirmed.