JSC Apartment Owners Welfare Association, Represented by its President Hariwansh Roy v. State of Karnataka, Urban Development Department, Represented by the Principal Secretary
2017-04-05
R.S.CHAUHAN
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has challenged the legality of the order dated 10.06.2016, passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, whereby the learned Tribunal has dismissed an application filed by the petitioner under Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, for impleading him as party-respondents in an Appeal filed by respondent No.4, Mr. J. Ajay Srinivas, wherein the respondent No.4 had challenged a notice issued by the BBMP under Section 308 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, (‘KMC Act’, for short) 2. Briefly the facts of the case are that the petitioner claims to be an Association, registered under Societies Registration Act, 1960. The Association consists of apartment owners of a building, namely ‘Sapthagiri Janardhan Suncity’ located at property bearing No.32/3, Seenappa Layout, New BEL Road, Devasandra, Bangalore. The petitioner Association claims that it is entrusted with the task of addressing complaints raised by various apartment owners of the said building. According to the petitioner, during August-July 2014, it had received certain complaints from the residents of the 6th and 7th floor of the Sapthagiri Janardhan Suncity. According to the complainants, water was seeking into their flats, and there was stagnation of water on the roof. Therefore, the property of 6th and 7th floor were being damaged by the seepage of water. Upon inspection, it was discovered that respondent No.4, Mr. J. Ajay Srinivas, who is not only the developer of the building, but was also a resident of the pent house of the building, had created a roof top garden without adopting standard water proofing measures. Due to the illegal cultivation of the garden, the flats on the 6th and 7th floor were being damaged. Despite the fact that the petitioner Association had requested the respondent No.4 to take necessary steps in terms of waterproofing or grouting, but the respondent No.4 failed to do so. Therefore, the petitioner’s Association brought the illegal construction of the garden to the notice of respondent No.2, the BBMP, by filing a complaint. Upon the complaint made by the petitioner Association, the BBMP issued a notice under Section 308 of the KMC Act to the respondent No.4, and directed him to remove the roof top garden within a span of seven days. 3. Since the respondent No.4 was aggrieved by the said notice, he filed an appeal before the Karnataka Appellate Authority.
Upon the complaint made by the petitioner Association, the BBMP issued a notice under Section 308 of the KMC Act to the respondent No.4, and directed him to remove the roof top garden within a span of seven days. 3. Since the respondent No.4 was aggrieved by the said notice, he filed an appeal before the Karnataka Appellate Authority. During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioner Association filed an application under Order 1, Rule 10(2) of CPC for impleadment. But by order dated 10.06.2016, the learned Tribunal has rejected the said application. Hence, the present petition before this Court. 4. Mr. Joseph Anthony, the learned counsel for petitioner, has vehemently contended that the BBMP issued the notice to the respondent No.4 only due to the compliant filed by the petitioner Association. Secondly, the apartments of members of the petitioner Association, namely the flats of 6th and 7th, floor are being damaged by the illegal construction raised by the respondent No.4. Therefore, the interest of the members of the petitioner Association is involved in the preset case. Hence, according to the learned counsel, the petitioner Association is both the necessary, and a proper party to the list pending before the learned Tribunal. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, and perused the impugned order. 6. The issue being raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is squarely covered by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Others [ (1992) 2 SCC 524 ] in the said case the appellant, Ramesh H. Kundanmal, was in possession of the service station erected on the land held by respondent No.2, therein, the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., as a lessee. The Respondent No.1, the Municipal Corporation of greater Bombay issued a notice to the appellant under Section 351 of the Municipal Council Act with regard to the alleged illegal construction raised by the appellant on the first floor of the service station. Since the appellant was aggrieved by the said notice, he filed a suit for injunction against the Municipal Council. During the proceeding of the suit, the respondent No.2 filed an application for being impleaded as party defendant in the suit. The learned trial court allowed the application. The appellant challenged the said order before the High Court.
Since the appellant was aggrieved by the said notice, he filed a suit for injunction against the Municipal Council. During the proceeding of the suit, the respondent No.2 filed an application for being impleaded as party defendant in the suit. The learned trial court allowed the application. The appellant challenged the said order before the High Court. The High Court upheld the order passed by the learned trial court. Thus, Mr. Ramesh Hiralal Kundanmal filed a SLP before the Apex Court. 7. The issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was as under: Whether respondent No.2 is a necessary or proper party to be joined as defendant under Or. 1, Rule 10 of CPC, in the suit instituted by the appellant against respondent No.1, or not? Answering this issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: The case really turns of the true construction of the rule in particular the meaning of the words “whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon ad settle all the questions involved in the suit”. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 gives a wide discretion to the Court to meet every case of defect of parties and is not affected by the inaction of the plaintiff to bring the necessary parties on record. The question of impleadment of a party has to be decided on the touchstone of Order 1 Rule 10 which provides that only a necessary or a proper party may be added. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. The addition of parties is generally not a question of initial jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further opined as under: It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally have that effect. But that appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main objective. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party.
But that appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main objective. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved, that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtaining his legal rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed as under: It is pointed out that the subject matter in the suit is the notice issued by the Municipal Corporation to the appellant and the issue is whether it is justified or not. The Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited is interest in supporting the Municipal Corporation and sustaining the action taken against the appellant. But that does not amount to any legal interest in the subject matter in the sense that the order, if any, either in favour of the appellant or against the appellant would be binding on this respondent.
The Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited is interest in supporting the Municipal Corporation and sustaining the action taken against the appellant. But that does not amount to any legal interest in the subject matter in the sense that the order, if any, either in favour of the appellant or against the appellant would be binding on this respondent. It is true that being lessee of the premises, the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited has an answer for the action proposed by the Municipal Corporation against the appellant, but for the purpose of granting the relief sought for by the appellant by examining the justification of the notice issued by the Municipal Corporation, it is not necessary for the Court to consider that answer.’ The Apex Court, therefore, concluded as under: The courts below, therefore, failed to note that respondent 2 has no direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation and the addition of the respondent would result in causing serious prejudice to the appellant and the substitution or the addition of a new cause of action would only widen the issue which is required to be adjudicated and settled. The joining of the party would embarrass the plaintiff and issues not germane to the suit would be required to be raised. The mere fact that a fresh litigation can be avoided is no ground to invoke the power under the rule in such cases. 8. The principles annunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court can be summarized as under: 1. The question of impleadment of a party has to be decided on the anvil of Or. 1, Rule 10 CPC. 2. The question of impleadment would revolve around two issues, namely is the proposed impleader a necessary party? Or is the proposed impleader a proper party to the suit? 3. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. 4. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made, but whose presence is essential for the complete and final decision on the question involved in the suit. 5. What makes a person necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; it would make the party merely a witness in the case. 6.
5. What makes a person necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; it would make the party merely a witness in the case. 6. It is not only merely that the party has an interest in the correct solution of some questions involved and is in a position to advance relevant arguments. Even this would not make the party a necessary. 7. What makes a person a necessary party is that he would be bound by the result of the action. Therefore, the question to be settled must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. 8. Most importantly, the impleader must have a direct and legal interest in the action. The direct and legal interest would be if the order passed, either in favour or against the plaintiff, would be binding on the impleader. 9. Even if the impleader has a different cause of action against the plaintiff, the impleader cannot be impleaded in the suit. For, the controversy in the suit cannot be enlarged by introducing a different cause of action in which the impleader may be interested in. After all, the object of Or. 1, Rule 10(2) CPC is not to curtail multiplicity of litigation. Curtailing multiplicity of litigation is merely a consequence of impleading a third party to the suit, but is not the object of Or. 1, Rule 10 (2) CPC. 9. According to the Apex Court, what makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved in the dispute. For such a person would be merely a witness, but not necessary party. Moreover, it is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved in the lis, but he is in a position to submit the relevant arguments, which would make him a proper party. 10. Admittedly, a notice had been issued by the respondent No.2 respondent No.4. Admittedly, the respondent No.4 has challenged the legality of the notice issued by the respondent No.2. Thus, the dispute is strictly between respondent No.4, on the one hand, and respondent No.2, on the other hand.
10. Admittedly, a notice had been issued by the respondent No.2 respondent No.4. Admittedly, the respondent No.4 has challenged the legality of the notice issued by the respondent No.2. Thus, the dispute is strictly between respondent No.4, on the one hand, and respondent No.2, on the other hand. And undoubtedly, it is for the respondent No.2 to defend its position and to defend the issuance of the notice to respondent No.4. Thus, the controversy between the two respondent can be decided without the presence of the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner is clearly not a necessary party. Moreover, full and complete justice can be done to the cause of respondent No.4, and to the defence of respondent No.2, without any assistance of the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner Association is not even a proper party. Even if the petitioner Association has some evidence, up its sleeve, in favour of the respondent No.2, at best it is a witness, and not a necessary or proper party. Even if, the petitioner Association can raise certain pleas in favour of the respondent No.2, even then, the petitioner is not a necessary or proper party to the lis. 11. Furthermore, if the petitioner Association has a different cause of action against the respondent No.4, it is free to take recourse to the legal remedies available to it, instead of being impleaded as a party respondent before the learned Tribunal. 12. Similar issue, as the present one, was also raised before this court in the case of Sri. Chandrappa v. M/s. Garudachala Associates Private Ltd. and Others [(2015) 2 Kant LJ 483], and Malleshwaram Residents Welfare Association ® v. Smt. Kamlamma and Others [W.P.No.8563/2017 decided by this Court on 03.04.2017]. In both these cases this court has held the views as expressed above. 13. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order. The Writ Petition is devoid of merit. It is, hereby dismissed. 14. Mr. H. Devendrappa, the learned counsel for BBMP, is directed to file his vakalath within two weeks.