ORDER : M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J. 1. Heard Sri Y.V. Ravi Prasad, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Dharmesh D.K. Jaiswal, Counsel for petitioners, and the learned Advocate-General for the State of Telangana, for respondents. The petitioners in this writ petition have questioned the action of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in unilaterally cancelling two registered sale deeds being document bearing Nos. 11887/2007 dated 23.5.2007 and 11887/2007 dated 23.5.2007 in respect of lands in Kandi Chimnapur Village, Sanga Reddy Mandal, (now Kandi Mandal), Sanga Reddy District. 2. The learned Senior Counsel, appearing for petitioners, contended that the power to cancel documents is a power vested in the civil Court under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; such power, which is judicial in nature, cannot be conferred on an Executive Authority like the 3rd respondent, and this violates the doctrine of 'Separation of Powers'; and Rule 26(k), introduced in the State of Telangana vide G.O. Ms. No. 121 Revenue (Registration-I) Department dated 1.6.2016 with retrospective effect from 2.6.2014, and Rule 243 thereof which authorizes an Executive Authority like the Tahsildar to execute a document cancelling a previously registered document effecting interest in immoveable properties listed in Section 22-A by unauthorized persons and directing the registering officers to register it, also suffers from the same vice. 3. He contended that even if the said Rules are valid, under Rule 243, only a competent authority or officer can execute the deeds of cancellation of previously registered documents, and there is no notification authorizing the 2nd respondent to execute documents cancelling such previously registered documents; and in the absence of such notification, the 2nd respondent had no jurisdiction to present the cancellation deeds before the 3rd respondent, and the 3rd respondent therefore could not have registered the said documents. 4. He contended that it is dangerous to confer power on Executive Authorities to adjudicate issues of title, and in particular, Officials of the State Government to adjudicate title of the State Government; and that in the hands of what he called "unscrupulous" Government Officials the citizen's property and life would be in peril. 5. 4. He contended that it is dangerous to confer power on Executive Authorities to adjudicate issues of title, and in particular, Officials of the State Government to adjudicate title of the State Government; and that in the hands of what he called "unscrupulous" Government Officials the citizen's property and life would be in peril. 5. He also pointed out that if the State is the owner of property as alleged by it, the common principle that 'no third-party can convey title to such property', would apply, and the State can also protect its properties in judicial forums, but it cannot confer judicial powers on Revenue Officials and make them adjudicate title to land. 6. The Counsel for petitioners relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat and another v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association and another, (2012) 10 SCC 353 , wherein the Supreme Court had upheld the decision of High Court of Gujarat which had set aside Rules framed by the State of Gujarat conferring adjudicatory powers on the President of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, constituted under the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Rules, 1982, permitting appointment of even a Secretary to the Government as President of the Revenue Tribunal under the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957. 7. On the other hand, the learned Advocate-General (Telangana), appearing on behalf of respondents, relied on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Smt. Vatumalli Laxmi Prasanna v. The State of Telangana and others, WP No. 30891 of 2017 and Batch, dated 21.9.2017, and also the judgment of another learned Single Judge of this Court in P. Veda Kumar and others v. The Sub-Registrar, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad and others, 2017 SCC Online Hyderabad 272, which is followed in Smt. Vatumalli Laxmi Prasanna's case (supra). He also placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in Satya Pal Anand v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, 2017 (2) ALD 144 (SC) : (2016) 10 SCC 767 and contended that unilateral registration of an extinguishment deed cannot be faulted. 8. I have noted the submissions of both sides. 9. It is pertinent to note that Rule 26(1)(k)(i) was introduced in the Andhra Pradesh Rules under the Registration Act, 1908 (for short, 'the Act') by way of amendment in 2006. 8. I have noted the submissions of both sides. 9. It is pertinent to note that Rule 26(1)(k)(i) was introduced in the Andhra Pradesh Rules under the Registration Act, 1908 (for short, 'the Act') by way of amendment in 2006. It states as under : "Rule 26(k)(i) : The registering officer shall ensure at the time of presentation for registration of cancellation deeds of previously registered deed of conveyances on sale before him that such cancellation deeds are executed by all the executant and claimant parties to the previously registered conveyance on sale and that such cancellation deed is accompanied by a declaration showing mutual consent or orders of a competent civil or high Court or State or Central Government annulling the transaction contained in the previously registered deed of conveyance on sale;" Provided that the registering officer shall dispense with the execution of cancellation deeds by executant and claimant parties to the previously registered deeds of conveyances on sale before him if the cancellation deed is executed by a Civil Judge or a Government Officer competent to execute Government Orders declaring the properties contained in the previously registered conveyance on sale to be Government or Assigned or Endowment lands or properties not registrable by any provision of law. 10. This was, however, amended by the State of Telangana after its formation vide G.O. Ms. No. 121 Revenue (Registration.1) Department dated 1.6.2016, with retrospective effect from 2.6.2014; and the amended provision of Rule 26(k) is as under: "For Clause (k), the following, clause shall be substituted namely,- "(k) That the Cancellation Deed of the previously registered deed of conveyance on sale of immovable property is executed by both the executing and the claiming parties thereof unless such Cancellation Deed is executed under the orders of a competent Court or under Rule 243." (Vide G.O. Ms. No. 121, Rev. (Reg.I) Department dated 1.6.2016, w.e.f., 2.6.2014)" 11. Rule 243 referred therein was also introduced by the same G.O. and it states as under : "243. The Authority/Officer competent may execute a document cancelling any previously registered document executed by unauthorized persons affecting the interest in immovable properties listed in Section 22-A; and notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or these Rules, the Registering Officer shall register it." (Vide G.O. Ms. No. 121. Rev. (Regn.I) Department dated 1.6.2016, w.e.f., 2.6.2014)." 12. The Authority/Officer competent may execute a document cancelling any previously registered document executed by unauthorized persons affecting the interest in immovable properties listed in Section 22-A; and notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or these Rules, the Registering Officer shall register it." (Vide G.O. Ms. No. 121. Rev. (Regn.I) Department dated 1.6.2016, w.e.f., 2.6.2014)." 12. From a reading of the above provisions, it is clear that what was contained in Rule 26(1)(k)(i) earlier is now split up and put in Rule 26(1)(k) and in Rule 243, with a slight change in the language. 13. The Supreme Court had considered Rule 26(1)(k)(i), as it stood before its amendment in Thota Ganga Laxmi and another v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, 2012 (1) ALD 90 (SC) : (2010) 15 SCC 207 . After referring to Rule 26(1)(k)(i), it held that it is only when a sale deed is cancelled by a competent Court that cancellation deed can be registered by the Registrar, and that too after notice to the parties concerned; and that the Rule also makes it clear that both the cancellation deed as well as registration thereof shall be wholly void and non est and meaningless transactions in the absence of any declaration by a competent Court or notice to parties. However, the Court did not consider the proviso to Rule 26(1)(k)(i) since on facts of that case, the proviso was not attracted. 14. In Satya Pal Anand's case (supra), the decision in Thota Ganga Laxmi's case (supra), was considered by the Supreme Court and it clarified that in States where there is no provision akin to Rule 26(1)(k)(i), registration of extinguishment deed cannot be labeled as fraudulent or nullity in Law, that it is an error of procedure if such document is registered without notice to parties, and the validity of such a deed can always be challenged before the competent civil Court. It held: "43. No provision in the State of Madhya Pradesh enactment or the Rules framed under Section 69 of the 1908 Act has been brought to our notice which is similar to the provision in Rule 26(k)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Registration Rules framed in exercise of power under Section 69 of the 1908 Act. That being a procedural matter must be expressly provided in the Act or the Rules applicable to the State concerned. That being a procedural matter must be expressly provided in the Act or the Rules applicable to the State concerned. In absence of such an expression provision, the registration of extinguishment deed in question cannot be labeled as fraudulent or nullity in law....." 15. It is important to note that Satya Pal Anand's case (supra), was not a case where there was a unilateral cancellation by a revenue official of a previously registered document between two private parties. But the instant case is one such case. 16. In Smt. Vatumalli Laxmi Prasanna's case (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court however applied the decision in Satya Pal Anand's case (supra), though the case before the learned Judge arose in the State of Telangana where Rule 26(1)(k)(i) existed (in the form of amended Rule 26(k) and Rule 243). It was held that unilateral registration of extinguishment deeds by Sub-Registrars which were presented by Tahsildars, cannot be found fault with. It was also held that even writ petitions would not be maintainable challenging such action of Revenue officials. 17. I disagree with the view expressed by my learned Brother in Smt. Vatumalli Laxmi Prasanna's case (supra), because the principle in Satya Pal Anand's case (supra), cannot be applied in the State of Telangana in view of the fact that case dealt with a situation where there was no provision like Rule 26(1)(k)(i). In the State of Telangana, the amended Rule 26(k) and Rule 243 operate. 18. For the above reasons, Thota Ganga Laxmi's case (supra), interpreting the main part of Rule 26(1)(k)(i), as it stood before amendment made vide G.O. Ms. No. 121, Rev. (Regn.I) Department dated 1.6.2016, would therefore apply in the State of Telangana. 19. I am also of the opinion that the decision in Satya Pal Anand's case (supra), cannot be applied to cases where Revenue officials unilaterally cancel previously registered documents between private parties without notice to such parties. This is because of the following reason : 20. (Regn.I) Department dated 1.6.2016, would therefore apply in the State of Telangana. 19. I am also of the opinion that the decision in Satya Pal Anand's case (supra), cannot be applied to cases where Revenue officials unilaterally cancel previously registered documents between private parties without notice to such parties. This is because of the following reason : 20. In my opinion, conferring power on Revenue officials not only to decide title to property, but also enabling them to execute cancellation deeds annulling previously registered documents between private parties invoking Rule 243 (by approaching Sub-Registrars taking the plea that such previously registered documents affect interest in immovable properties listed in Section 22-A), would amount to transfer judicial functions entrusted to Courts to cancel registered conveyances/deeds (transferring interest in the immovable property invoking power under the Specific Relief Act, 1963) and this violates the doctrine of separation of powers. The said doctrine states that executive authorities of the State cannot be entrusted with power to adjudicate title or exercise judicial power. 21. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975) Supp SCC 1, the Supreme Court held that the Indian Constitution recognizes separation of powers in a broad sense and declared: "60. It is true that no express mention is made in our Constitution of vesting the judiciary the judicial power as is to be found in the American Constitution. But a division of the three main functions of Government is recognised in our Constitution. Judicial power in the sense of the judicial power of the State is vested in the judiciary. Similarly, the executive and the Legislature are vested with powers in their spheres. Judicial power has lain in the hands of the judiciary prior to the Constitution and also since the Constitution. It is not the intention that the powers of the judiciary should be passed to or be shared by the executive or the Legislature or that the power of the Legislature or the executive should pass to or be shared by the judiciary. (SCC Pp.44-45, Para 60) xxxxx 555.... '(The) Constitution' has a basic structure comprising the three organs of the Republic: the executive, the Legislature, and the judiciary. It is through each of these organs that the sovereign will of the people has to operate and manifest itself and not through only one of them. (SCC Pp.44-45, Para 60) xxxxx 555.... '(The) Constitution' has a basic structure comprising the three organs of the Republic: the executive, the Legislature, and the judiciary. It is through each of these organs that the sovereign will of the people has to operate and manifest itself and not through only one of them. Neither of these three separate organs of the Republic can take over the function assigned to the other. This is the basic structure or scheme of the system of Government of the Republic.... (SCC P.210, Para 555) 688.... But no Constitution can survive without a conscious adherence to its fine checks and balances. Just as Courts ought not to enter into problems entwined in the 'political thicket', Parliament must also respect the preserve of the Courts. The principle of separation of powers is principle of restraint...." (Emphasis supplied) 22. This principle has been subsequently reiterated in several decisions of the Supreme Court such as L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 and Union of India v. Madras Bar Association, (2010) 11 SCC 1 . 23. In fact, the Supreme Court in Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association's case (supra), approved the decision of High Court of Gujarat in holding as illegal the power to appoint a Secretary to Government as Head of a Revenue Tribunal under the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 and Rule 3(1)(iii)(a) of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Rules, 1982, after holding that such Tribunal performs judicial functions and that such functions could only be performed by a Judicial Officer and he can only be appointed with the concurrence of the High Court. 24. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Kutchi Lal Rameswar Ashram Trust v. Collector, Haridwar and others, Order dated 22.9.2017 in CA No. 3878 of 2009, the Supreme Court considered the question whether a District Collector can assume power of a civil Court and adjudicate title to property i.e., vesting of property in the State by escheat under Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and held: "21.... To allow administrative authorities of the State - including the Collector, as in the present case - to adjudicate upon matters of title involving civil disputes would be destructive of the rule of law. The Collector is an officer of the state. To allow administrative authorities of the State - including the Collector, as in the present case - to adjudicate upon matters of title involving civil disputes would be destructive of the rule of law. The Collector is an officer of the state. He can exercise only such powers as the law specifically confers upon him to enter upon private disputes. In contrast, a civil Court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all matters involving civil disputes except where the jurisdiction of the Court is taken away, either expressly or by necessary implication, by statute. In holding that the Collector acted without jurisdiction in the present case, it is not necessary for the Court to go as far as to validate the title which is claimed by the petitioner to the property. The Court is not called upon to decide whether the possession claimed by the trust of over forty-five years is backed by a credible title. The essential point is that such an adjudicatory function could not have been arrogated to himself by the Collector. Adjudication on titles must follow recourse to the ordinary civil jurisdiction of a Court of competent jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." 25. Also it is settled law that a person who is not eo-nominee a party to a document is not bound to sue for its cancellation and he can always ignore it. (See Ramaswamy Ayyangar v. Rangachariar, AIR 1940 Mad. 113 (FB), which was approved in Nagappan v. Ammasai, (2004) 13 SCC 480 ). The State can always take a stand that the sale deeds executed in favour of petitioners do not bind it since it is not a party to them and act accordingly. 26. All these aspects which had led me to take a different view from Smt. Vatumalli Laxmi Prasanna's case (supra), were put to the learned Advocate-General for the State of Telangana during the arguments. 27. Yesterday, when the matter was listed, the Court asked the Government Pleader for Revenue to also produce any notification issued by the State designating the 2nd respondent as the Officer competent to execute documents cancelling previously registered documents under Rule 243. He could not produce any such notification even today. 27. Yesterday, when the matter was listed, the Court asked the Government Pleader for Revenue to also produce any notification issued by the State designating the 2nd respondent as the Officer competent to execute documents cancelling previously registered documents under Rule 243. He could not produce any such notification even today. Without any valid authorisation, even assuming that Rule 243 is valid for the sake argument, the 2nd respondent cannot arrogate to himself the power to execute document cancelling previously registered documents and get them registered through 3rd respondent. For all these reasons, there shall be interim suspension as prayed for. However, this Court is making it clear that it is not expressing any opinion on the title of either the petitioners or the respondents.