JUDGMENT : DIPANKAR DATTA, J. 1. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nadia was approached by the minor claimant (hereafter the claimant), represented by his father, with a claim application under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereafter the Act). It was registered as MAC Case No. 391 of 2011. The pleadings therein reveal that consequent to the claimant (aged about 2 years 3 months) being dashed on August 28, 2011 by a truck bearing registration no.WB-53A/1304 (hereafter the said truck), which was being driven rashly and negligently, he sustained severe injury on his right leg and ultimately, to his utter misfortune, had to suffer an amputation at such a tender age. Compensation in a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- was claimed. By its award dated August 27, 2014, the tribunal decided such application by awarding compensation of Rs. 5,85,000/- to the claimant, to be paid by the insurer of the offending truck being the respondent No. 2 before it (hereafter the insurer) within a month from date failing which such amount would carry interest @ 8% per annum till realization. The claimant, aggrieved by quantification of compensation payable to him, is in appeal before us under section 173 of the Act. The insurer after service of notice objected to the award by filing a cross-objection in the appeal, exercising its right in terms of Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the insurer, it is not liable to pay compensation at all since it was not proved that the said truck was being driven in a rash and negligent manner. 2. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and on perusal of the materials before us, we propose to dispose of the appeal and the cross-objection by this common judgment and order. 3. There can be no doubt that determination of damages for loss of human life or sufferance of physical disablement by a victim of a road accident involving use of a motor vehicle is indeed a difficult task. Such task becomes all the more onerous if the victim is of such a tender age as the claimant, who has suffered amputation of his right leg. 4. The father of the claimant deposed as PW-1. He did not say that he was an eyewitness to the accident. He, however, described the incidents post-accident. Such task becomes all the more onerous if the victim is of such a tender age as the claimant, who has suffered amputation of his right leg. 4. The father of the claimant deposed as PW-1. He did not say that he was an eyewitness to the accident. He, however, described the incidents post-accident. The claimant was taken to various hospitals and ultimately at Daffodil Nursing Home, Kolkata, where the right leg of the claimant had to be amputated. An artificial limb was necessary for the claimant's rehabilitation but due to financial stringency the same could not be arranged. An amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- had already been spent for treatment of the claimant and such treatment was continuing on the date of his deposition. The board of doctors of Nadia District Hospital declared the claimant as 60% orthopaedically handicapped, permanent in nature. He proved all the necessary documents including the police documents as well as medical documents and bills. 5. In course of cross-examination, however, PW-1 said that he "saw the accident" with his own eyes but did not lodge any complaint with the police on the fateful day. The suggestions that he noted the registration number of the said truck subsequently or that no accident took place owing to the fault of the driver of the said truck were denied. 6. The orthopaedic surgeon who was a signatory to the "Disability Certificate" issued in favour of the claimant was PW-2. Such certificate was proved by him and marked "Ext.7". He adduced evidence that he had medically examined the claimant on June 27, 2012 and since it was an amputation case of a young patient he required artificial limb for rehabilitation in normal life. 7. PW-2 categorically denied in cross-examination that he had opined 60% "disablement on the basis of statement of patient and patient party" or that he gave his opinion without consulting "test report". According to him, "I have written 60% disability which is all over the body of the patient". 8. PW-3 was the doctor of the primary health centre where the claimant was initially taken immediately after the accident. He proved the claim case of admission of the claimant there, by adducing documentary evidence. 9. The Chief Executive Officer of Daffodil Nursing Home, Kolkata, as PW-4, proved the expenses that PW-1 had to incur for treatment of his son. 10. PW-3 was the doctor of the primary health centre where the claimant was initially taken immediately after the accident. He proved the claim case of admission of the claimant there, by adducing documentary evidence. 9. The Chief Executive Officer of Daffodil Nursing Home, Kolkata, as PW-4, proved the expenses that PW-1 had to incur for treatment of his son. 10. It is noted that the insurer did not adduce any evidence before the tribunal. The certificate of insurance issued by the insurer in respect of the said truck was an exhibit before the tribunal from the side of the claimant. There is no dispute that the said truck on the material date was covered by a policy issued by the insurer. 11. The tribunal proceeded to hold, on the basis of evidence adduced before it, that the said truck was insured by the insurer, that rash and negligent driving of the said truck was the root cause of the claimant suffering 60% permanent disablement in course of the accident in question witnessed by PW-1, and that the insurer was liable to pay compensation. 12. At this stage, we may note the objection of Mr. Paul, learned advocate for the insurer. According to him, there is no pleading in the claim application that PW-1 was an eye-witness; on the contrary, it is revealed therefrom that the claimant was standing in front of his house with his uncle when the accident allegedly occurred. It was contended that neither did PW-1 depose in course of examination-in-chief that he had witnessed the accident nor did the uncle of the claimant step into the witness box to support the claim case. It was also his contention that the tribunal did not record any specific finding of the said truck being driven rashly and negligently by its driver, leading to the accident in question. 13. We are afraid, the contentions of Mr. Paul have not impressed us. 14. True it is that the uncle of the claimant who was allegedly with the claimant at the time the accident occurred, did not adduce evidence. However, there is no evidence from the side of the insurer that PW-1 was not within visible range of the accident. On the contrary, PW-1 was firm in his stand in course of cross-examination that he had witnessed the accident. However, there is no evidence from the side of the insurer that PW-1 was not within visible range of the accident. On the contrary, PW-1 was firm in his stand in course of cross-examination that he had witnessed the accident. The issue that fell for consideration before the tribunal was whether the claimant was a victim of the road accident involving the use of a motor vehicle (read: the said truck) or not. Such issue was duly proved by the oral evidence of PW-1. If indeed the insurer wished to disprove the claim case, it ought to have produced the driver of the said truck to say that either the said truck was not involved in the accident or that he was not guilty of rash and negligent driving. After all, it was the driver who could have adduced the best evidence. Hence, mere non-production of the uncle of the claimant cannot be held to be fatal to the claim case. In our considered opinion, the insurer was not successful in disproving the claim of PW- 1 and the tribunal did not commit any error to hold, relying on the evidence of PW-1, that the said truck was indeed involved in the accident in question. 15. Insofar as the other contention of Mr. Paul is concerned, we find that the tribunal framed issue no. 3 reading 'was the driver rash and negligent in driving the vehicle?' and answered it in favour of the claimant. Although the award of the tribunal lacks clarity in certain respects, on the whole, the approach, the finding and the conclusions are not perverse so as to warrant interference. On the basis of our own appreciation of the evidence before the tribunal, we are of the clear view that the tribunal was right in answering issue no. 3 in the affirmative. 16. For the foregoing reasons, we find no reason to entertain the cross-objection. C.O.T. 31 of 2017, accordingly, stands rejected. 17. We would now advert to the issue of quantification of compensation by the tribunal. It is found that the tribunal arrived at the figure of Rs. 1,35,000/- towards loss of future income of the claimant upon consideration of Rs. 15,000/- p.a. (as specified in the Second Schedule of the Act for non-earning persons) after selecting 15 as the multiplier and bearing in mind 60% permanent disability of the claimant. It further awarded Rs. It is found that the tribunal arrived at the figure of Rs. 1,35,000/- towards loss of future income of the claimant upon consideration of Rs. 15,000/- p.a. (as specified in the Second Schedule of the Act for non-earning persons) after selecting 15 as the multiplier and bearing in mind 60% permanent disability of the claimant. It further awarded Rs. 1,00,000/- each for 'pecuniary loss' and 'non-pecuniary loss' for pain and sufferings. In addition, Rs. 2,00,000/- was awarded for future treatment and Rs. 50,000/- towards expenses already incurred, totalling to Rs. 5,85,000/-. 18. Reacting to our observation that the quantum of compensation could increase in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2011) 10 SCC 683 (Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd.), Mr. Paul cited several decisions, without prejudice to his contentions that the insurer was not liable to pay compensation, to support the argument that the claimant is not entitled to anything more than what has been awarded by the tribunal. 19. The time is now ripe to consider such decisions. 20. Citing the decision reported in (2002) 4 SCC 337 (Kapil Kumar v. Kudrat Ali & ors.), it was submitted that the Court took the table in the Second Schedule as the guiding factor and, accordingly, worked out compensation payable to the victim. 21. The decision reported in (2008) 7 SCC 613 (Sapna v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.) was next cited for the principle that ought to govern a claim petition for assessing damages in case of bodily injury i.e. restitution in integrum. According to Mr. Paul, in this case too, the Supreme Court applied the Second Schedule and interfered with the decision of the High Court which worked out compensation payable to the victim treating Rs. 30,000/- p.a. as notional income. 22. Finally, the decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court reported in (2008) 2 WBLR (Cal) 329 (Smt. Pato Mondal v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd.) was cited where too the structured formula in the Second Schedule was followed in assessing compensation payable to the family members of the deceased victims. 23. Insofar as cases pertaining to bodily injury is concerned, the decision in Govind Yadav (supra) mandates that the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court reported in (2010) 10 SCC 254 (Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. 23. Insofar as cases pertaining to bodily injury is concerned, the decision in Govind Yadav (supra) mandates that the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court reported in (2010) 10 SCC 254 (Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.) and (2011) 1 SCC 343 (Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar) must be followed by each tribunal/court in determining the quantum of compensation payable to the victims of accident, who are disabled either permanently or temporarily. 24. Although Govind Yadav (supra) did not deal with a case arising out of bodily injury suffered by a minor, it would be worthwhile to note certain paragraphs therefrom, for, the same are useful for guiding any court/tribunal in assessing just compensation in a case of bodily injury. The relevant paragraphs read as under: "16. In Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. the Court considered the plea for enhancement of compensation made by the appellant, who was a student of final year of engineering and had suffered 70% disablement in a motor accident. After noticing the factual matrix of the case, the Court observed: (SCC p. 256, para 9) '9. We do not intend to review in detail state of authorities in relation to assessment of all damages for personal injury. Suffice it to say that the basis of assessment of all damages for personal injury is compensation. The whole idea is to put the claimant in the same position as he was insofar as money can. Perfect compensation is hardly possible but one has to keep in mind that the victim has done no wrong; he has suffered at the hands of the wrongdoer and the court must take care to give him full and fair compensation for what he had suffered.' (emphasis supplied in original) 17. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar the Court considered some of the precedents and held: (SCC pp. 347-48, paras 5-6) '5. The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('the Act', for short) makes it clear that the award must be just, which means that compensation should, to the extent possible, fully and adequately restore the claimant to the position prior to the accident. The object of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered as a result of wrong done as far as money can do so, in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. The object of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered as a result of wrong done as far as money can do so, in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. The court or the Tribunal shall have to assess the damages objectively and exclude from consideration any speculation or fancy, though some conjecture with reference to the nature of disability and its consequences, is inevitable. A person is not only to be compensated for the physical injury, but also for the loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. This means that he is to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned. ... 6. The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following: Pecuniary damages (Special damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure. (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising: (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. Non-pecuniary damages (General damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries. (v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage). (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity). In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life." (emphasis supplied in original) 18. In our view, the principles laid down in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar must be followed by all the Tribunals and the High Courts in determining the quantum of compensation payable to the victims of accident, who are disabled either permanently or temporarily. In our view, the principles laid down in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar must be followed by all the Tribunals and the High Courts in determining the quantum of compensation payable to the victims of accident, who are disabled either permanently or temporarily. If the victim of the accident suffers permanent disability, then efforts should always be made to award adequate compensation not only for the physical injury and treatment, but also for the loss of earning and his inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the disability caused due to the accident. 19. We shall now consider whether the compensation awarded to the appellant is just and reasonable or he is entitled to enhanced compensation under any of the following heads: (i) Loss of earning and other gains due to the amputation of leg. (ii) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. (iv) Compensation for pain, suffering and trauma caused due to the amputation of leg. (v) Loss of amenities including loss of the prospects of marriage. (vi) Loss of expectation of life." 25. In a case of physical disability suffered by a road accident victim, factors such as loss of earnings, impairment of future earning capacity, medical expenses incurred and to be incurred in future, physical and psychological sufferings, lack of amenities, etc. have been evolved by the courts to assess compensation which, in its view, would be just. There can hardly be two opinions that compensatory damages cannot be assessed with mathematical accuracy, but an endeavour to make a realistic assessment should always be made so as to provide the victim with such amount of monetary support necessary to compensate for whatever he has lost. The aforesaid conclusions are drawn reading the decisions in Arvind Kumar Mishra (supra) and Raj Kumar (supra), since approved in Govind Yadav (supra). 26. The aforesaid conclusions are drawn reading the decisions in Arvind Kumar Mishra (supra) and Raj Kumar (supra), since approved in Govind Yadav (supra). 26. In its decision reported in (2001) 8 SCC 197 (Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar), the Supreme Court held that in case of death of an infant, there may have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by the parents during the child's lifetime but this will not necessarily bar the parents' claim and prospective loss will found a valid claim provided that the parents establish that they had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived. However, it may be noted that the decision did not arise out of a motor accident claim case. 27. Pertinently, the provisions of the Act do not provide any method or system to measure the damages caused in a situation like the present one where a three year old kid, who has practically lost every pleasure that life could offer him, is the victim. In the absence of a statutory formula, we found it difficult to assess just compensation. We felt that a three year old kid having no income could not be awarded compensation for loss of earnings, particularly when no evidence was led that the parents of the claimant had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit had he not suffered the disability. Although the decision in Sapna (supra) has binding effect, we were truly not persuaded to accept the same as laying down good law. In this hue of conundrum, we called upon Mr. Jayanta Mondal and Mr. Rajesh Singh, learned advocates who frequently appear in claim appeals under section 173 of the Act for the claimants and the insurers, respectively, to assist us. 28. Mr. Mondal cited the following decisions: (i) 2013 SAR (Civil) 365 [Kum Michael v. Regional Manager Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.]; (ii) 2013 SAR (Civil) 1088 [Master Mallikarjun v. Divnl. Mgr. National Ins. Co. Ltd. & Anr.]; (iii) 2014 SAR (Civil) 1188 [Kumari Kiran through her father Harinarayan v. Sajjan Singh & Ors.]; (iv) 2014 (3) T.A.C. 5 (S.C.) [V. Mekala v. M. Malathi & Anr.]; (v) 2009 (1) T.A.C. 417 (S.C.) [Asruf Alli v. M/s. Naveen Hotels Ltd. & Anr.]; and (vi) 2017 ACJ 701 [State of Himachal Pradesh v. Naval Kumar]. 29. According to Mr. 29. According to Mr. Mondal, the decisions in Master Mallikarjun (supra) and Kumari Kiran (supra) are extremely relevant for deciding the quantum of compensation payable to a child victim. It is submitted by him that the Supreme Court in such cases has avoided looking into the Second Schedule appended to the Act and observed that since a child victim has no earning, his notional income cannot be ascertained as per the figure given in the Second Schedule for non-earning persons. It is also submitted that the different heads under which compensation can be awarded have clearly been delineated therein and that the same may be followed by us for determining just compensation in terms of section 168 of the Act. 30. Reference was also made by Mr. Mondal to the decisions in V. Mekala (supra) and Naval Kumar (supra), where gigantic sums were awarded on account of compensation. 31. On his part, Mr. Singh relied on the decision reported in AIR 2009 SC 2506 (R.K. Malik & anr. v. Kiran Pal & ors.). Referring to the decision in V. Mekala (supra), Mr. Singh contended that Rs. 10,000/- per month was considered to be the notional monthly income of a school going child bearing in mind her past school results. According to him, the decisions in V. Mekala (supra) and Kumari Kiran (supra) are authored by the self-same learned Judge but the approaches are completely different. He, thus, urged us to follow that decision which appears to us to be good in point of law. Regarding Naval Kumar (supra), it has been the submission of Mr. Singh that the same did not arise out of a motor accident and, therefore, would not be useful as a precedent. 32. The decisions of the Supreme Court that were cited in course of hearing of the appeal before us have evidently followed different approaches in assessing compensation to be paid to a child victim, having no earning. While the trend of judgments in the first decade of this century is to apply the Second Schedule and determine compensation looking at what is provided therein for a non-earning person, the decisions in the current decade have done away not only with the Second Schedule but in respect of a child victim has gone a step ahead and done away with his notional income and loss of earning. However, it is only in V. Mekala (supra) that notional income was applied despite the victim being 16 years old. One reason for such approach could be because of evidence adduced in that case that the child victim had been a brilliant student. We, however, do not wish to be guided by the decisions in Sapna (supra), Asraf Ali (supra) and R.K. Malik (supra) for reasons discussed above but would prefer to the guided by Govind Yadav (supra), Master Mallikarjun (supra) and Kumari Kiran (supra). 33. The decisions in Master Mallikarjun (supra) and Kumari Kiran (supra) provide support to our thought process that while considering a claim for compensation at the instance of a child victim, it would be unfair and improper to follow the structured formula as per the Second Schedule of the Act. 34. While reassessing compensation payable to the appellant, not only are we to be guided by the aforesaid decisions but we also propose not to be bound by the Second Schedule to the Act for more reasons than one. First, the Second Schedule is applicable only to claim applications covered by section 163-A of the Act and not section 166 thereof. It is settled principle of law that while considering a claim application under section 166 of the Act, the tribunal/court ought to award compensation that is just. That would be consistent with section 168 of the Act. Often, one tends to ignore that section 163-A of the Act and the Second Schedule appended thereto are for the purposes of compensating victims of road accidents involving use of motor vehicles on the principle of 'no-fault' liability, envisaged in section 163-A of the Act. Considerations which are germane for a claim to succeed under section 163-A of the Act are not quite the same under section 166 thereof. In fact, a claim under section 166 of the Act to succeed must necessarily require the tribunal to record a finding that the offending vehicle was being driven rashly and in a negligent manner, which is not the requirement under section 163-A. Secondly, sub-section (3) of section 163-A empowers the Central Government to amend the Second Schedule from time to time, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette. In excess of 20 (twenty) years have passed by since section 163-A and the Second Schedule were inserted in the Act, yet, the Central Government has not considered the time ripe to amend the Second Schedule although the cost of living has increased by leaps and bounds. Rightly so, the Supreme Court itself has observed in its decision reported in (2013) 15 SCC 45 (Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy) that the Second Schedule has become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy. Thirdly, we also wish to observe that a case like the present one needs to be examined with greater care, caution and circumspection compared to a case of death of a victim of road traffic accident. With death comes an end to life, while permanent disability brings about a scar which is rather difficult to remove from the victim's life. Where the victim of the accident is a little kid, whose future is shattered, we need to be more compassionate. 35. Paragraph 8 of the decision in Master Mallikarjun (supra) was quoted in paragraph 12 of the decision in Kumari Kiran (supra). Both the Benches of the Supreme Court were ad idem that a child victim can have no income and, therefore, he cannot be equated with a non-earning person, for whom a notional income of Rs. 15,000/- per year is indicated in the Second Schedule; therefore, compensation is to be worked out under the non-pecuniary heads in addition to the actual amounts incurred for treatment (past and future), transportation costs, assistance of attendant, etc. and that the main elements of damage in the case of child victims are pain, shock, frustration, deprivation and ordinary pleasure and enjoyment associated with healthy and mobile limbs. The compensation awarded should enable the child victim to acquire something or to develop a life style which will offset to some extent the inconvenience or discomfort arising out of the disability. The compensation awarded should enable the child victim to acquire something or to develop a life style which will offset to some extent the inconvenience or discomfort arising out of the disability. We also find from paragraph 12 of the decision in Master Mallikarjun (supra) as follows: "Though it is difficult to have an accurate assessment of the compensation in the case of children suffering disability on account of a motor vehicle accident, having regard to the relevant factors, precedents and the approach of various High Courts we are of the view that the appropriate compensation on all other heads in addition to the actual expenditure for treatment, attendant, etc, should be, if the disability is above 10% and upto 30% to the while body, Rs. 3 lakhs; upto 60%, Rs. 4 lakhs: upto 90%, Rs. 5 lakhs and above 90%, it should be Rs. 6 lakhs. For permanent disability upto 10%, it should be Rs. 1 lakh, unless there are exceptional circumstances to take different yardstick." 36. It is evident from the deposition of P.W.2, a doctor, that for rehabilitation of the appellant, an artificial limb would be essential. That apart, there is good enough proof of the appellant having suffered 60% permanent disability. Also, there is documentary evidence on record to prove expenses incurred in his treatment as well as surgery. Unfortunately, in this case, no evidence has been adduced to establish the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit. 37. Taking an overall view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that interest of justice would be best served if in modification of the award of the tribunal, compensation is awarded to the appellant (bearing in mind his tender age) under the following heads: (i) Compensation for pain, suffering and trauma caused due to the amputation of the leg; (ii) Loss of amenities including prospect of marriage and enjoyment of life; (iii) Medical expenses already incurred; (iv) Future medical expenses; and (v) Transportation and litigation costs. 38. In such view of the matter, the amount of compensation payable to the appellant is reassessed in the manner as follows : Sl. No. Heads Calculation (i) Pain, sufferings and trauma Rs.4,00,000/- (ii) Loss of amenities including prospect of marriage and enjoyment of life Rs.3,00,000/- (iii) Medical expenses, already incurred Rs.50,000/- (iv) Future treatment Rs.3,25,000/- (v) Transportation and litigation costs Rs.25,000/- Total Compensation Rs.11,00,000/- 39. No. Heads Calculation (i) Pain, sufferings and trauma Rs.4,00,000/- (ii) Loss of amenities including prospect of marriage and enjoyment of life Rs.3,00,000/- (iii) Medical expenses, already incurred Rs.50,000/- (iv) Future treatment Rs.3,25,000/- (v) Transportation and litigation costs Rs.25,000/- Total Compensation Rs.11,00,000/- 39. Finally, we find that the tribunal was not right in not awarding interest. Keeping an eye on section 171 of the Act, it was the duty of the tribunal to award interest but for exceptional circumstances justifying its denial. The tribunal has not referred to any factor that could disable the appellant from claiming interest. Moreover, it does not appear from the records that delay in disposal of the claim application was attributable to the appellant. In that view of the matter, we direct that the appellant shall be entitled to interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim application till realization. 40. Let a cheque for the said amount, minus whatever has been paid to the appellants, be drawn by the insurer in favour of the appellant No. 2 and submitted before the office of the tribunal within a month from date of communication of this judgment and order, whereupon the appellant no. 2 shall be entitled to collect it from such office upon proving his identity and in accordance with law. 41. With the aforesaid modification of the impugned award, the appeal stands allowed. Parties shall bear their own costs. 42. Before parting, we record our appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Mondal and Mr. Singh to us in deciding the appeal. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date.