ORDER : Ms. Nirmaljit Kaur, J. 1. The prayer in the present petition is to set aside the order dated 29.07.2015 vide which the candidature of the petitioner was rejected on the ground that the petitioner did not have the requisite qualification on the date of the examination. 2. The petitioner applied in pursuance to the advertisement dated 02.08.2013 for the post of School Lecturer in the subject of Commerce being allegedly eligible for the post under the respective category. 3. As per the advertisement dated 02.08.2013, the candidates who were studying in the final year examination of required qualification for direct recruitment could also apply but such applicant should have cleared the said examination before the commencement of the competitive examination. The first paper of the Combined competitive examination was on 12.07.2014 and the second paper was on 27.09.2014. Whereas, the result of the petitioner with respect to the requisite qualification of M. Com Post Graduation was declared on 17.07.2014. The candidature of the petitioner was rejected on the ground that he did not have the requisite qualification of M.Com Post Graduation on the date of the commencement of the Competitive examination. 4. While praying for the relief learned counsel for the petitioner contended that examination was still going on when the result of his requisite qualifying examination was declared. Hence, he should be considered eligible as per the terms of the advertisement. It is further contended that his case is squarely covered by the ratio of the judgment rendered in the case of Manju Chaba v. R.P.S.C. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.35/2015). 5. Heard. 6. It is not disputed that the case of the petitioner is covered by the ratio of the said judgment in the case of Manju Chaba (supra) but the petitioner cannot be granted the same relief in view of the delay and laches in the facts of the present case. As per the reply, the petitioner was informed about the cancellation of his candidature on 29.07.2105. He did not approach to the Court till June,2016 and that too only after the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Manju Chaba (supra). Thus, the petitioner cannot seek the same treatment as Manju Chaba (supra) as she had come well in time and the protection by way of interim relief was also granted to her. He did not approach to the Court till June,2016 and that too only after the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Manju Chaba (supra). Thus, the petitioner cannot seek the same treatment as Manju Chaba (supra) as she had come well in time and the protection by way of interim relief was also granted to her. However, the petitioner has come after almost 10 months of the order rejecting his candidature and nor any interim order was passed in his favour. Meanwhile, the selection has been finalized. 7. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that 05 seats are lying vacant. However, the same does not help inasmuch as learned counsel for the respondents has pointed out that 06 candidates have to be adjusted against these 05 seats as per the orders passed by the various Courts qua these 06 candidates. These candidates had come well in time and hence were also granted protection vide interim orders. 8. The Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & ors. (Civil Appeal No. 9849 of 2014) decided on 17.10.2014 while dealing with the question of delay and latches held that in such like cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent specially when the claimants lost time and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions by holding that :- “(23) The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under: (1) Normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. (2) However, this principle is subject to well recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.” 9. Similarly, the observations of the Single Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Mithi Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal and ors. (W.P. No. 14028 of 2013) and other connected petitions decided on 20.01.2014 are most relevant :- “The inviolable conclusion deducible from the above noted decisions are that the stale and dead claims should not be encouraged in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A line of distinction is to be drawn between a vigilant and a non-vigilant litigant and they cannot be equated on the same footing. A litigant who was sitting on a fence and waiting for the result of the litigation initiated by other litigant promptly and after the favourable result approaches the Court to seek equality, should not be encouraged. Delay and latches is one of the important factor to push away the recalcitrant or invoible litigant who was watching the proceeding of the other and ventilated the grievance only after a favourable decision is obtained by the other litigant. The plea of inordinate delay is not applicable in case of an infringement of the fundamental rights. The proceeding may attract dismissal, more so, when a third parties’ right are created in interregnum. It is not an inflexible rule but depends upon the rational and satisfactory explanation and, therefore, varies from case to case.” 10. The plea of inordinate delay is not applicable in case of an infringement of the fundamental rights. The proceeding may attract dismissal, more so, when a third parties’ right are created in interregnum. It is not an inflexible rule but depends upon the rational and satisfactory explanation and, therefore, varies from case to case.” 10. While dealing with the question of delay in filing the writ petition, the Apex Court in the case of Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India reported in 1994 SCC, Supl. (2) 195 in para 8 held that : “8. The petitioner sought to contend that because of laches on his part, no third party rights have intervened and that by granting relief to the petitioner no other person’s rights are going to be affected. He also cited certain decisions to that effect. This plea ignores the fact that the said consideration is only one of the considerations which the court will take into account while determining whether a writ petition suffers from laches. It is not the only consideration. It is a well-settled policy of law that the parties should pursue their rights and remedies promptly and not sleep over their rights. That is the whole policy behind the Limitation Act and other rules of limitation. If they choose to sleep over their rights and remedies for an inordinately long time, the court may well choose to decline to interfere in its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that is what precisely the Delhi High Court has done. We cannot say that the High Court was not entitled to say so in its discretion.” 11. In the present case also, the petitioner waited till the decision of Manju Chaba’s case for almost 10 months. The petitioner has not only come after almost 10 months of the cause of action having arisen to him but even the selection in pursuance to the subsequent advertisement of the year 2012 has been finalised which is fatal in the facts of the present case. Now, we are in the year 2017. 12. In view of the above discussion, the present writ petition is also dismissed on account of delay and laches.