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2017 DIGILAW 7 (KER)

SUDHAKARAN v. RAGINI

2017-01-04

B.KEMAL PASHA

body2017
JUDGMENT : Challenging the concurrent findings entered by the Additional Sub Court, North Paravur in O.S.No.378/2007 and the Additional Sessions Court, North Paravur in A.S.No.35/2011, the plaintiff in O.S.No.378/2007 of the Additional Sub Court, North Paravur has come up with this second appeal. 2. The suit is one for partition. The properties involved were allotted to late Gopalakrishnan, through Ext.A1 partition deed, and another sale deed. Plaintiff Sudhakaran is the elder brother of late Gopalakrishnan. The 2nd respondent is the son of the plaintiff. Respondents 3 and 4 are the sisters of the plaintiff and late Gopalakrishnan. Gopalakrishnan died on 9.12.2006. He had married the first respondent herein Ragini just three years prior to his death, at the age of forty. No children were born in their wedlock. It has come out that almost three years of their marital life, all along, Gopalakrishnan continued be a cancer patient, and finally he succumbed to his illness. 3. An extent of 21 cents of property and the family house situated thereon was allotted to Gopalakrishnan through Ext.A1 Partition deed. The case of the plaintiff is that Gopalakrishnan had executed Ext.A2 unregistered Will on 29.09.2006 thereby bequeathing 8 cents of property out of the said 21 cents of property to the plaintiff, 2¾ cents of property from one survey number and another two cents of property from another survey number to the 2nd respondent, and eight cents of property to the first respondent herein. Another 14 cents of property had also devolved on late Gopalakrishnan through a sale deed. Through the said Will, it is alleged that late Gopalakrishnan has bequeathed that 14 cents of property to respondents 3 and 4 in equal shares. According to the plaintiff, even though he had requested for a partition and separate possession of the properties, the first respondent was not willing to have a partition and hence the suit. 4. The first respondent contended that Ext.A2 Will is nothing but an outcome of forgery, and the same was not executed by late Gopalakrishnan. According to the first respondent, she was looking after all the affairs of Gopalakrishnan till his death and all along she was present with Gopalakrishnan when he was hospitalised. All the hospital expenses were met by her. The first respondent contended that Ext.A2 Will is nothing but an outcome of forgery, and the same was not executed by late Gopalakrishnan. According to the first respondent, she was looking after all the affairs of Gopalakrishnan till his death and all along she was present with Gopalakrishnan when he was hospitalised. All the hospital expenses were met by her. Further, according to her, even after the death of Gopalakrishnan, the plaint schedule properties and the house thereon was under her possession, and while so, the plaintiff forcibly occupied one of the rooms in the said house on 05.02.2007. It is also contended that the suit is not maintainable. 5. On the side of the plaintiff, PW1 and PW2 were examined and Exts.A1 and A2 were marked. On the side of the first respondent, she was examined as DW1 and Exts.B1 to B3 were marked. The trial court has totally disbelieved Ext.A2 Will and consequently dismissed the suit. The matter was taken up in appeal before the first appellate court. The first appellate court also concurred with the findings entered by the trial court and dismissed the appeal. 6. Even though a contention that the suit is not maintainable has been taken up in the written statement, it seems that the said issue has not been properly considered by both the courts below. Even if the case of the plaintiff is believed, a suit for partition is not at all maintainable. The plaintiff has no case that any divisible interest which has not been partitioned is in existence in the properties in question. At the most, the plaintiff could have preferred a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession in case his possession was obstructed or the first respondent has been in unlawful possession of the property. The learned counsel for the first respondent has rightly pointed out that it is in order to escape from the payment of court fee for filing an experimental suit, that the present method has been adopted by the plaintiff by filing a suit for partition. The said contention seems to be correct. When separate shares have been allotted by prescribing separate extents of properties by denoting its survey numbers in Ext. A2 Will, there is nothing to be partitioned at all. On that simple score itself, the suit is not maintainable. 7. The said contention seems to be correct. When separate shares have been allotted by prescribing separate extents of properties by denoting its survey numbers in Ext. A2 Will, there is nothing to be partitioned at all. On that simple score itself, the suit is not maintainable. 7. Regarding the execution of Ext.A2 Will, both the courts below have concluded that suspicious circumstances exist in the execution of Ext.A2. Ext.A2 is an unregistered one. The plaintiff, who was examined as PW1 has admittedly no direct knowledge with regard to the execution of Ext.A2. PW2 is shown as the second attester in Ext.A2. He was examined by the plaintiff to prove the execution of Ext.A2. It is true that in the affidavit in lieu of chief examination, he has narrated that he saw the executant affixing his signature in the Will and that the executant saw PW2 affixing his signature in the Will. True that in the literal sense of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Indian evidence Act, he has made an attempt to prove the execution. At the same time, it is trite law that it is the duty of the propounder to dispel all the suspicious circumstances in the execution of the Will. When PW1 has propounded the Will, it is for him to dispel all the suspicious circumstances. 8. According to DW1, deceased Gopalakrishnan and PW1 were not even in talking terms after the marriage of Gopalakrishnan till his death. According to her, she alone was residing with Gopalakrishnan at the house in question till his death. It is the further case of DW1 that during one night after three months from the death of Gopalakrishnan, the plaintiff and others have barged into the building, and in fact she was subsequently thrown out. 9. Even though PW1 has got a case that he was looking after all the affairs of the deceased and was incurring expenses for his treatment, the plaintiff could not produce even a scrap of paper to show that he had spent any amount towards the treatment of the deceased. At the same time, DW1 has produced and proved Ext.B2 medical bills in respect of the medical treatment of the deceased. PW1 has no case that the first respondent had at any time abandoned the deceased. At the same time, DW1 has produced and proved Ext.B2 medical bills in respect of the medical treatment of the deceased. PW1 has no case that the first respondent had at any time abandoned the deceased. He has no case that the first respondent was not looking after and maintaining the deceased. According to him, the first respondent was present along with the deceased till his death. In his cross-examination, PW1 has admitted that the first respondent was residing with Gopalakrishnan, after Gopalakrishnan was diagnosed as a cancer patient. Further, he has admitted that he has not enquired any of the details of Gopalakrishnan. The case of PW1 that he had spent amounts for the treatment of Gopalakrishnan is not believable. 10. PW2 is more loyal than the king. PW2 has gone to the extent of stating that the first respondent had virtually abandoned Gopalakrishnan and has not cared to look after his affairs when Gopalakrishnan fell ill. It has come out that PW2 is an accused in a criminal case involving serious offences including cheating. 11. Regarding the source from which PW1 acquired Ext.A2 Will itself is suspicious. According to PW1, he was unaware of the execution of the said Will. His case is that the first attester in the Will, who is his uncle, who is no more now, had never revealed anything regarding the execution of the Will to him, till the death of Gopalakrishnan. According to PW1, after the death of Gopalakrishnan when problems arose at the family house, his uncle interfered and divulged the information with regard to the Will and thereby PW1 searched the building and got Ext.A2 from the Almira kept in the family house. His further case is that Ext.B2 treatment records were secretly taken away from his possession by DW1. When DW1 could do that, DW1 could have removed Ext.A2 Will from the house wherein she was residing at that time, had such a Will been available. Therefore, there is no evidence in this case as such with regard to the fact as to how PW1 came in possession of Ext.A2 Will. He has not stated anything with regard to the said aspect in his affidavit filed in lieu of chief examination. 12. This Court has compared the signatures of deceased Gopalakrishnan in Ext.A1 partition deed and those signatures shown in Ext.A2 Will as those of Gopalakrishnan. He has not stated anything with regard to the said aspect in his affidavit filed in lieu of chief examination. 12. This Court has compared the signatures of deceased Gopalakrishnan in Ext.A1 partition deed and those signatures shown in Ext.A2 Will as those of Gopalakrishnan. The signature of Gopalakrishnan in Ext.A1 is his admitted signature. On a perusal of the signature in Ext.A1 and a comparison of the same with the signatures contained in Ext.A2, it has clearly come out that those signatures shown in Ext.A2 were not affixed by Gopalakrishnan. Even on a bird's eye view, it is evident that somebody has attempted to imitate the signature of Gopalakrishnan contained in Ext.A1. The three signatures found in Ext.A2 are three different signatures. There are no dots under the line in the signature in the first page; there are two dots under the line in the signature in the second page; there is one dot under the line in the signature in the 3rd page. No such dots are available in the admitted signature of Gopalakrishnan in Ext.A1. On a perusal of these signatures, it is evident that somebody had imitated and made an attempt to affix signatures in Ext.A2 as those of Gopalakrishnan's signature. That itself is sufficient to conclude that Ext.A2 Will is not genuine. 13. From a perusal of the deposition of PW1 in its entirety, it is evident that he was not in fact residing in the building in question on any date prior to the death of Gopalakrishnan. Towards the beginning of the cross-examination, he had gone to the extent of admitting that he came to that building after the death of Gopalakrishnan. But he made a somersault towards the fag end of the cross-examination and attempted to set up a case that he started residing in the building two months prior to the death of Gopalakrishnan. Even if the plaintiff has taken forcible possession of the house in question, it will not confer any right on him, and he is in the position of a rank trespasser, who cannot protect such possession in any manner. 14. The contents of a Will have to be proved as contemplated under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act read with S.68 of the Indian Evidence Act. 14. The contents of a Will have to be proved as contemplated under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act read with S.68 of the Indian Evidence Act. In H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. Thimmajamma and others ( AIR 1959 S.C. 443 ), P.B. Gajendragadkar, J speaking for the three Judges Bench held: "The party propounding a will or otherwise making a claim under a will is no doubt seeking to prove a document and, in deciding how it is to be proved, we must inevitably refer to the statutory provisions which govern the proof of documents. Sections 67 and 68, Evidence Act are relevant for this purpose. Under S. 67, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such a handwriting under Ss. 45 and 47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. Section 68 deals with the proof of the execution of the document required by law to be attested; and it provides that such a document shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. These provisions prescribe the requirements and the nature of proof which must be satisfied by the party who relies on a document in a Court of law." 15. It was further held that in case of the existence of any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, the court naturally expects that all legitimate suspicion should be completely removed before that document is accepted as the last Will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus on the propounder very heavy; and, unless it is specifically discharged, the courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last Will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus on the propounder very heavy; and, unless it is specifically discharged, the courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last Will of the testator. It was also held that in case of a caveat alleging undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the Will propounded, is raised, it is for the caveator to prove such pleas; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting on his own free will in executing the Will and in such circumstances, it would be the initial onus on the part of the propounder to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter. 16. In the H. Venkatachala Iyengar (supra) it was further held in paragraph 22 as follows; "It may, however, be stated generally that a propounder of the will has to prove the due and valid execution of the will and that if there are any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will the propounder must remove the said suspicions from the mind of the Court by cogent and satisfactory evidence." 17. Relying on the decision in H. Venkatachala Iyengar 's case(supra), another three Judges Bench of the Apex court in Smt. Jaswant Kaur, v. Smt. Amrit Kaur [ (1977) 1 SCC 369 ] summarized the propositions laid down in H. Venkatachala Iyengar 's case(supra) as follows: "1. Stated generally, a will has to be proved like any other document, the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. As in the case of proof of other documents, so in the case of proof of wills, one cannot insist on proof with mathematical certainty. 2. Since Section 63 of the Succession Act required a will to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until, as required by Section 68 of the Evidence Act, one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. 3. 3. Unlike other documents, the will speaks from the death of the testator and therefore the maker of the will is never available for deposing as to the circumstances in which the will came to be executed. This aspect introduces an element of solemnity, in the decision of the question whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the testator. Normally, the onus which lies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of the will. 4. Cases in which the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. A shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit and such other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the will. That suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the propounder that the will bears the signature of the testator or that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind and memory at the time when the will was made, or that those like the wife and children of the testator who would normally receive their due share in his estate were disinherited because the testator might have had his own reasons for excluding them. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the will excite the suspicion of the Court, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last will of the testator. 5. It is in connection with wills, the execution of which is surrounded by suspicious circumstances that the test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience has been evolved. That test emphasises that in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is called upon to decide a solemn question and by reason of suspicious circumstances the court has to be satisfied fully that the will has been validly executed by the testator. 6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. 6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard to the execution of the will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. And then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter." 18. Another three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Rani Purnima Debi and another v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb and another ( AIR 1962 S.C. 567 ) had also relied on the aforesaid principles enunciated in H. Venkatachala Iyengar's case (supra). 19. Going by the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Venkatachala Iyengar's case (supra) which was followed by this Court in Vadakkayil Gopalan v. Vadakkayil Paru [2013 (2) KHC 902 = 2013 (3) KLT 69 = 2013 (3) KLJ 224 ], it can safely be concluded that the appellant has failed to prove the Will, since he has failed to dispel all the suspicious circumstances existed in the execution of Ext.A2 Will, especially when Ext.A2 is an unregistered Will. I do not find any reasons to interfere with the concurrent findings entered by both the courts below. The suit itself is not maintainable at all. Matters being so, this second appeal also is, therefore, not maintainable and is only to be dismissed with costs, and I do so. In the result, this RSA is dismissed with costs. All the interlocutory applications in this appeal are closed.