JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner is the defendant in a claim for price of goods sold and delivered. According to the petitioner, there was no agreement for sale of any goods nor has the petitioner received any goods for which the petitioner is liable to make any payment to the opposite party no. 1. 2. It appears that the defence of the petitioner to the claim of the opposite party no. 1 is that some employee of the petitioner may have fraudulently placed orders on the opposite party no. 1 giving an impression that such orders were placed on behalf of the petitioner. The petitioner even denies the part payments attributed to the petitioner. Towards such end, the petitioner caused summons to be issued to branches of several banks in Mumbai for the banks to indicate to the trial court that the accounts from which monies were received by the opposite party no. 1 were not accounts opened by or in the name of the petitioner herein. 3. These two petitions have been filed against the orders passed on July 20, 2017. An order was first passed declining an application under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code. The second order refused to issue any proclamation to the banks who had earlier been issued the summons. 4. As far as the application under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code is concerned, it is evident that the petitioner herein had called its Associate Vice President – Corporate Legal as DW-3. In his affidavit of evidence, DW-3 claimed to be an attorney appointed by the petitioner herein under a particular document. However, in course of the cross-examination of DW-3, it came out that he had not accepted in writing the power of attorney granted by the employer in his favour. 5. The evidence of DW-3 was closed on July 6, 2017. On the very next day an application was filed for DW-3 to be recalled for reexamination. An attempt was also made by the petitioner herein to file a fresh power of attorney executed by the petitioner in favour of such Associate Vice President – Corporate Legal which the said employee accepted in writing. The previous acts of the attorney were also sought to be ratified by the subsequent power of attorney. 6. The trial court ruled that a lacuna in the evidence could not be cured by recalling a witness. The previous acts of the attorney were also sought to be ratified by the subsequent power of attorney. 6. The trial court ruled that a lacuna in the evidence could not be cured by recalling a witness. It appears from the order passed on the relevant application that the trial court may not accept the oral evidence of DW-3. 7. The matter is a complete waste of time. DW-3, as it appears from his designation, has to be regarded as a principal officer of the petitioner company and, as such, authorised to represent the petitioner company. In any event, when the witness took the box, his evidence was not as attorney of the petitioner herein but as an employee of the petitioner herein and to the extent of his knowledge of the relevant facts. It was completely unnecessary for his affidavit of evidence to carry a reference to the power of attorney. It was equally irrelevant as to whether he had signed the power of attorney or not. In any event, once a subsequent power of attorney was produced by which the acts done by the attorney earlier were ratified, the trial court ought to have taken the same on record; even if the trial court had chosen not to allow DW-3 to be recalled for re-examination. 8. A judgment reported at (2011) 11 SCC 275 (K. K. Velusamy vs. N. Palanisamy) has been cited on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 as to the scope of Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code. Paragraph 9 of the report exhorts that the power under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code should be used sparingly in appropriate cases “to enable the court to clarify any doubts it may have in regard to the evidence led by the parties.” There is also an observation that the power under such provision is not intended to be used to fill up omissions in the evidence of a witness who had already been examined. 9. This was not any act of omission that was attempted to be filled up by seeking to recall the relevant witness. A power of attorney had been filed by such witness evidencing his authority on behalf of the petitioner herein. 9. This was not any act of omission that was attempted to be filled up by seeking to recall the relevant witness. A power of attorney had been filed by such witness evidencing his authority on behalf of the petitioner herein. Since the acceptance of the attorney was not acknowledged in writing on the document itself, an attempt was made for the relevant witness to furnish a subsequent power of attorney executed by the petitioner and for the witness to clarify his position as to his authority. 10. Since it appears that both the court and the parties went on a wild goose chase in respect of a matter that was not worthy of the kind of attention that it got, the order impugned dated July 20, 2017 in so far as it rejects the petitioner’s request for DW-3 to be recalled and re-examined is not interfered with; but the subsequent power of attorney of DW-3 that was sought to be relied upon by the petitioner herein is permitted to be filed for the trial court to take due cognizance thereof. 11. As far as the other aspect of the matter is concerned, it is evident that summons were issued to nine banks and the summons may also have been delivered to such banks. In response to the summons, three of the banks were represented and time may have been sought on behalf of such banks to produce certain documents. Since the petitioner herein had no control over the banks, the petitioner could not ensure that all nine banks were represented before the trial court or even the three banks which were represented, carried the appropriate papers within reasonable time to the trial court. 12. In such circumstances, the petitioner applied for the issuance of a proclamation or to compel each of the nine banks to send the relevant documents and representatives for the petitioner to demonstrate that the relevant accounts in such banks from which monies that may have been received by opposite party no. 1 may not have been accounts in which any money had been deposited by the petitioner herein or accounts which had been opened by the petitioner at all. 13. 1 may not have been accounts in which any money had been deposited by the petitioner herein or accounts which had been opened by the petitioner at all. 13. It is true that upon the petitioner’s defence being that the petitioner did not order for any of the goods or received any supply thereof, the opposite party No. 1 as the plaintiff had to discharge the burden of proving that the agreement was entered into with the petitioner herein and that part payments had been made by the petitioner. But there was no harm in the petitioner attempting to demonstrate, if not through all, but through some of the bankers, that the accounts and the monies therein were not the petitioner’s. Since any evidence in such regard may possibly help the defence, subject to reasonableness as to time, the trial court should have aided in the petitioner’s attempt. Simply because directions had been issued by this court for the expeditious disposal of the suit would not imply that the suit had to be disposed of without affording a party a reasonable opportunity of establishing its claim or another a reasonable opportunity of defending the same. 14. The order impugned dated July 29, 2017 by which the petitioner’s application for issuing a proclamation to the nine banks that had been previously issued summons in the matter is set aside and the trial court is requested to issue such proclamation in accordance with law. 15. CO 2681 of 2017 and CO 2682 of 2017 are disposed of as above and by requesting the trial court to ensure that the suit is not unduly delayed and is disposed of within reasonable time. 16. There will be no order as to costs.