JUDGMENT : ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J. 1. In these two appeals, the appellants, Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (in F.M.A. No. 4805 of 2015) and the State of West Bengal in (M.A.T. No. 347 of 2016) are seeking to invalidate the judgment and order of the learned First Court directing the State Authorities to acquire a property comprising of an area of 2 Bighas 8 Cottas 3 Chittacks and 38 Sq. ft. situated in Mouza Kasba, Holding No. 333, under Sub-Division Block ‘K’, Division-V, Police Station Kasba, in the District of South 24 Parganas, upon notice to the writ petitioners and pass award accordingly. The judgment and order of the learned First Court delivered on 2nd June 2015 further directs award compensation thereof to the legitimate owners of the said land, being the writ petitioners, who are the respondents before us. This direction was issued by the learned First Court after the Court found the said land stood appropriated by the State and its agency, KMDA, without taking recourse to any legal proceeding and a housing complex had been allowed to come up there, in spite of a status quo order passed by the Trial Court in a suit brought by the writ petitioners. During pendency of this appeal, the second writ petitioner passed away and her legal heirs have been brought on record. The entire proceeding was directed to be completed within a period of six months from the date of communication of the order and acquisition was directed to be made following the relevant provisions of law applicable at the time of delivery of the judgment. The judgment was delivered on 2nd June, 2015. The aforesaid judgment and order was passed in W.P. No. 21429(W) of 2014. 2. The land admittedly belonged to one Sumohan Chatterjee (since deceased). The respondents/writ petitioners are his legal heirs. Said Sumohan Chatterjee had purchased the land on 29th July, 1942 and obtained certificate of sale as well as delivery of possession thereof. Sumohan Chatterjee passed away on 27th September, 1983. The land, which is subject-matter of this proceeding is comprised in portions of seven plots being Plot Nos. 4219, 4220, 4238, 4239, 4240, 4241 and 4242. It appears that rent was last paid in respect of the land involved in the year 1972. Sumohan Chatterjee passed away on 27th September, 1983. The land, which is subject-matter of this proceeding is comprised in portions of seven plots being Plot Nos. 4219, 4220, 4238, 4239, 4240, 4241 and 4242. It appears that rent was last paid in respect of the land involved in the year 1972. The appellants, and in particular KMDA’s case is that though the revenue sale in favour of Sumohan Chatterjee was recorded in the Rent Roll Register No. 1, no step was taken by the owner thereof to record his name in the record-of-rights. In relation to the said land, initially a suit was instituted in the 5th Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Alipore, which was registered as T.S. No. 142 of 1999, and subsequently renumbered T.S. No. 117 of 2005. The plaintiffs in that suit were the writ petitioners/respondents and their predecessor. In that suit, stand of the State and its agencies and officers was that the subject-land was acquired under the provisions of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 for pubic purpose and possession thereof was handed over to the KMDA and award was also made by the collector to the recorded owners thereof. KMDA claims to have come into possession of the subject-land on 8th January 1976 and acquisition thereof was made in stages, on different dates in 1981 and 1983. 3. Dispute over the land originally arose when legal heirs of said Sumohan Chatterjee sought to tender rent in respect thereof, which was refused by the authorities. In response to an application made on behalf of the writ petitioners, the land authorities informed them that rent could not be accepted as the land stood acquired. The writ petitioners could not get any information from the office of the land acquisition collector as regards the acquisition proceeding and this prompted them to institute a writ petition for appropriate relief. That writ petition was registered as W.P. No. 10184(W) of 1998, and was disposed of with a direction upon the authorities to dispose of the representation of the writ petitioners in that regard within a period of eight weeks. This order was passed on 9th June 1998 and it was stipulated in the order that status quo as on the date of passing of the order was to be maintained till such disposal provided communication was made within the prescribed timeframe. This order was passed on 9th June 1998 and it was stipulated in the order that status quo as on the date of passing of the order was to be maintained till such disposal provided communication was made within the prescribed timeframe. The land acquisition collector by an order dated 6th April 1999 gave an inconclusive finding on the issue referring to record-of-rights, which did not reflect the name of the writ petitioners or their predecessors. In that order of 6th April, 1999, it was, inter alia, observed by the Land Acquisition Collector:- “The presumption of land in favour of accuracy of the entry in the R.o.R. follows from the fact that such record is prepared after due publicity and notifications and upon hearing objections and interested parties. The entry in the R.o.Rs made after such procedure, is therefore, presumed to be correct until contrary is proved by evidence. In addition, R.o.R. is a document of possession which is prime factor of holding land either exercising possession directly or otherwise through others. L.R. Act also has laid stress on possession. The petitioners, as there is reason to believe, never exercised possession over the land and so did not approach settlement authority to get their names recorded in R.o.Rs. even after that they did not file any suit for correction of records in Civil Court which is the only forum which can pronounce judgment on the correctness or otherwise of the entry in R.o.Rs, title can be declared by the Civil Court. As no challenge has since been made in legal forum by the petitioner against the recorded persons, the rights of persons who have not been made parties will not be affected and the R.o.Rs will be presumed to be correct in the favour of recorded person.” 4. The suit, to which we have already referred to, was for declaration of the plaintiffs’ right and title in respect of the subject-land and for other ancillary reliefs. In connection with the suit, an application for local investigation by commission under Order 26 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure was taken out. The Commissioner held sittings on different dates between the years 2000 and 2004. In his report, filed on 7th February 2005, the Commissioner recorded that the entire land within the boundary wall was vacant when he had first visited the suit-land. The Commissioner held sittings on different dates between the years 2000 and 2004. In his report, filed on 7th February 2005, the Commissioner recorded that the entire land within the boundary wall was vacant when he had first visited the suit-land. It is also recorded in his report that when he held sittings in 2004 he found buildings were being constructed on the land. Prior to that, in an application taken out in connection with the suit, the Trial Court had passed an order directing maintaining status quo as regards the suit property on 20th July, 1999. Admitted position is that the order of status quo had continued during the entire career of the suit. 5. Initially, the plaint in T.S. No. 117 of 2005 did not contain recovery of possession of land as part of the reliefs claimed. This relief was introduced later, by way of amendment of plaint on the plea that during pendency of the suit the State had trespassed into the property and started construction thereon. It appears that on the subject-land, KMDA has permitted a housing complex to come up, which has been described by the writ petitioners as Meghnad Saha Abasan II. Mr. Basu, appearing for the writ petitioners has apprised us that the said housing complex at present is occupied by staffs and associates of Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, who have been impleaded as respondent no. 5 in the writ petition. Meghnad Saha Abasan Block II has also been impleaded as respondent no. 6 in the writ petition. Neither of these two entities appeared before the First Court. Nor are they before us. 6. Before the Trial Court (in T.S. 117 of 2005), defence was taken that the land was permanently acquired under the Act II of 1948. The Trial Court had dismissed the suit by a judgment and decree passed on 30th July 2011 accepting that the land was acquired by the State, relying on certain official communication from the Collector which disclosed of such acquisition. 7. The First Appellate Court, however, allowed the appeal of the writ petitioners setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court in Title Appeal No. 235/11. The judgment of the Appellate Court was delivered on 29th June, 2013. It was, inter alia, observed by the First Appellate Court:- “If the plea of defendant no. 7. The First Appellate Court, however, allowed the appeal of the writ petitioners setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court in Title Appeal No. 235/11. The judgment of the Appellate Court was delivered on 29th June, 2013. It was, inter alia, observed by the First Appellate Court:- “If the plea of defendant no. 9 is accepted then we will find that their plea is being contradicted by the Letter dated 20.1.2000 (Exbt. 10) because in that letter it has been mentioned that only part of plot no. 4219 was involved in the L.A. proceeding relating to acquisition of land. The said Exbt. 10 which has been relied mostly by the Ld. Court below does not also speak about the name of the riot or tenant in respect of the said portion of plot no. 4219. So practically the defendants could not establish as to which land has been acquired by the Government and whether the plaintiffs’ portion i.e. the suit property has been actually acquired or not. As per Commissioner’s report each plot has two parts, one part is included in Holding No. 333 and owned by the plaintiffs and the other parts on each of the Dags is not included in Holding No. 333 and as such plaintiffs are not related or concerned with the said portion of land which is outside the periphery or boundary of Holding No. K-333 and if the said portions were recorded in the names of the other persons and compensation has been given to them from the side of the Government then also the plaintiffs’ title in the suit property cannot be evaporated. Practically the defence of both the defendants is misleading and confusing. The State of West Bengal is no doubt the custodian of the records of all the lands and they are the authority for acquisition and requisition of any land of the public. So, it is expected that being the welfare State or Democratic State the activities of the State should be fair and transparent and there should not be any lacuna on transparency in the activities of the State in any manner and it is not open to the State or its instrumentalities, who are suppose to be the embodiment of justice and reasonableness to be unjust, unfair and unreasonable even if an adversial litigation. In this case I should rely on the decision reported in 1973(3) SCC 489 at page 599 (Ramana Vs. International Airforce Authority). Thus being a welfare State the Government cannot take away the right of the people by hook or by crook, it must be done through legal process and State has the duty to give guarantee to the right of the citizen. A democratic Government means Government of the people, for the people and by the people. It does not mean the anarchy of the masses. So it is expected that the right of the citizens of India guaranteed by the Constitution of India should be protected by the State otherwise there would be violation of Article 14 as well as Article 300A of Constitution of India which is not at all expected from the Government. Initially the plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration and injunction and during pendency of the suit when the Investigation Commission was started it was detected that the vacant land was being covered by boundary wall and the Ld. Commissioner, as it appears from the Commissioner’s report mentioned in his report that during his second visit he found that some construction was made though on earlier occasion he found the land in vacant position. However, the defendants denied everything. On the other hand, the plaintiffs that during pendency of the suit the defendant no. 9 has taken forcible possession violating the order of status quo and as such the plaintiffs are entitled to get the relief for recovery of possession also. In view of the above discussion in respect of the materials on record, I come to the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiffs should be decreed and the appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the Ld. Court below challenged in this appeal should be set aside entirely. In the result, the appeal succeeds. Memo of appeal has been sufficiently stamped. Hence, ORDERED that the appeal be and the same is hereby allowed on contest with cost. The judgment and decree dated 30.06.2011 passed by Ld. 4th Court, Civil Judge Senior Division, Alipore in Title Suit No. 117/05 is hereby set aside. The suit is decreed. The plaintiffs/appellants do get a decree of declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of the suit land. The judgment and decree dated 30.06.2011 passed by Ld. 4th Court, Civil Judge Senior Division, Alipore in Title Suit No. 117/05 is hereby set aside. The suit is decreed. The plaintiffs/appellants do get a decree of declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of the suit land. The plaintiffs are also entitled to get the decree of mandatory injunction as prayed for. The defendants are permanently restrained from making any further construction on the suit land. The defendants are directed to vacate the suit land and to give khash possession to the plaintiffs within two months from this date, failing which the plaintiffs will have the liberty to execute the order in accordance with law. The appeal is thus disposed of.” 8. It was at that stage the writ petition was instituted, on 22nd July 2014, out of which these two appeals arise. An execution case was also initiated by the writ petitioners. In the writ petition, the petitioners had taken the following plea for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India:- “The Defendants of the Suit/Respondents in the present Writ Application during the pendency of the Suit and Appeal have created a situation which makes it impossible for them to restore possession of the land to the petitioners. During the pendency of the proceeding they have made construction in violation of the injunction order, and the construction are such that it is not possible for them to restore possession. The petitioners as Decree holders consider it difficult if not impossible to execute the Decree and get back the possession of the Suit land. After disposal of the aforementioned Appeal and upon enquiry the petitioners have come to learn that the property involved has been allotted to Saha Institute of Nuclear Physic and there is a residential Complex known as Meghath Saha Abasan Prakalpa- II. Inspite of best endeavour the petitioners could not ascertain whether or not Abasan Prakalpa has a separate legal entity. The petitioners are impleading the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics as Respondent No. 5 and separately Meghnath Saha Abasan Prakalpa as Respondent No. 6 by way of abundant caution. They are being impleaded because they are at present in occupation and are using the property involved in the present proceeding. The petitioners are impleading the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics as Respondent No. 5 and separately Meghnath Saha Abasan Prakalpa as Respondent No. 6 by way of abundant caution. They are being impleaded because they are at present in occupation and are using the property involved in the present proceeding. The petitioners have caused several photographs to be taken of the property as it now stands to demonstrate the present condition of the same and such photographs are being annexed hereto and collectively marked as Annexure “p-3”. The petitioners state that in view of the admitted title of the petitioners and the failure of the Respondents/Defendants to substantiate their plea of acquisition the Respondents are obliged to acquire the land by taking appropriate steps under the law. The Respondents cannot deprive the petitioners of their property save in accordance with law. The petitioners undertake before this Hon’ble Court that that they will withdraw the pending Execution Case in the event of this Hon’ble Court entertaining the Writ petition. The petitioners state that they are being deprived of their constitutional rights under Article 300A of the Constitution and the necessity moving the present Writ Application has arisen in view of the clear announcement of the Learned Additional District Judge in Title Appeal No. 285 of 2011.” 9. An appeal was filed by the KMDA against the judgment of the First Appellate Court. Subsequent to filing of the writ petition, the appeal of the KMDA which was registered as SAT 280 of 2014, was heard by a Division Bench of this Court. That appeal was disposed of on 4th August 2015, in substance sustaining the First Appellate Court’s judgment. The decree of the First Appellate Court, however, was modified by the Coordinate Bench directing the report of the investigating commissioner including the map which was part of the commissioner’s report to be part of the decree. In this judgment delivered on 4th August, 2015 by the Coordinate Bench of this Court, it was observed and held:- “As a matter of fact both the Courts below concurrently held that the plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-interest became the owner of the suit holding by purchase in the auction sale and the plaintiffs inherited the same from their predecessor, after his death, but the Courts below could not agree with each other regarding the onus of proof of acquisition. The Learned Trial Judge held that onus of proof that land was not acquired is upon the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs have failed to discharge the same. As such, the Learned Trial Judge dismissed the suit. The Learned Appeal Court held that since the Government is the custodian of the land acquisition proceeding, the onus to prove acquisition lies with the Government and Government having failed to discharge its duty in this regard, the Learned Court below, in our considered view, did not commit any illegality in declaring that the plaintiffs’ title in the suit property remains unaffected by acquisition. We agree with such finding of the Learned First Appellate Court. But at the same time, we find some substance in the contention of Mr. Basu, learned advocate that the suit property has not been properly described by boundaries in the schedule of the original plaint but we hold that such confusion was removed by amendment of the plaint wherein the plaintiffs identified the suit property with reference to the Commissioner’s report. In this background, we hold that confusion may subsequently be created in execution of the decree passed by the Learned Court below, unless we modify the decree clarifying the identity of the suit property. As such, for removing such confusion and for better identification of the suit property, we modify the decree of the Learned First Appellate Court only to this extent that the report of the Investigating Commissioner including the map which was a part of the commissioner’s report, will be a part of the decree. The appeal is thus, disposed of with the above modification of the First Appellate Court’s decree.” 10. The title of the writ petitioners thus stood established in Title Appeal No. 235 of 2011 and confirmed by the Coordinate Bench. We have been apprised by the counsel for the writ petitioners that the petition of KMDA for special leave to appeal (CC No. 19300/2016) against the judgment and decree of the Coordinate Bench in S.A.T. 280 of 2014 was dismissed as withdrawn by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 11th November, 2016 reserving liberty for the petitioner therein, being KMDA to file review application. Mr. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for KMDA informs us that both KMDA and the State have also preferred a petition for Review of the judgment of the Coordinate Bench, but there has been no order in that Review petition. Mr. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for KMDA informs us that both KMDA and the State have also preferred a petition for Review of the judgment of the Coordinate Bench, but there has been no order in that Review petition. Learned counsel for KMDA has submitted that the Review petition along with an application for condonation of delay was filed on 7th December 2016, and 19th December 2016 respectively, we are also informed by learned counsel for the Sate that on 6th October 2016 the State has preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree in S.A.T. No. 235/11, along with an application for condonation of delay. All these proceedings were instituted much after the writ petition was allowed on 2nd June 2015 and during pendency of the appeal instituted by KMDA. Delay, however, is yet to be condoned in that appeal. The appeal is yet to be admitted. Thus, that appeal is yet to come into life. So are the fate of the Review petitions filed by these appellants only. Counsel representing the State and KMDA have also not sought to draw any strength from those proceedings in assailing the judgment under appeal. On the other hand, they have argued on legality of the judgment under appeal. 11. On behalf of the appellants, the judgment of the First Court has been assailed on diverse grounds. Though the counsel for the KMDA and the State argued for their clients’ independently, in this judgment we shall deal with their submissions in a composite manner, as submissions have been advanced on overlapping areas of law. Main appellant is the State, as the directives of the First Court are to be carried out by them. So far as KMDA is concerned, its grievance is that they being the requiring body, they would have to ultimately bear the cost of acquisition, as per direction of the First Court. 12. Both the appellants have argued that the First Court ought to have dismissed the writ petition. This argument is anchored mainly on procedural grounds. It has been contended that the writ petition suffers from inordinate delay and the judgment relied upon on this point is the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar [ (1995)4 SCC 683 ]. On the same point, Mutha Associates Vs. State of Maharashtra [ (2013)14 SCC 304 ], has been cited. This argument is anchored mainly on procedural grounds. It has been contended that the writ petition suffers from inordinate delay and the judgment relied upon on this point is the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar [ (1995)4 SCC 683 ]. On the same point, Mutha Associates Vs. State of Maharashtra [ (2013)14 SCC 304 ], has been cited. In this judgment, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that to challenge a land acquisition proceeding, interested parties must remain vigilant and watchful. It has also been pointed out on behalf of the appellants that in spite of indication to the Court that the writ petitioners would withdraw the execution proceeding, they have not done so and for this reason the writ petitioners have disentitled themselves from getting any discretionary relief. On the point of alternative remedy, our attention has been drawn to the execution proceeding and it has been urged on behalf of the appellants that the Code of Civil Procedure ought to be adhered to by the writ petitioners and the writ petition would not be maintainable. Authorities cited on this point are Ghan Shyam Dasgupta Vs. Anant Kumar Sinha ( AIR 1991 SC 2251 ) and State of Kerala Vs. M.K. Jose [ (2015)9 SCC 433 ]. 13. Main thrust of the appellants’ submission has been that the writ petitioners having elected to pursue their remedy in Civil Court, they cannot be permitted to change track midway keeping the execution proceeding alive, simultaneously seeking relief from the Writ Court. Appellants want us to non-suit the writ petitioners by applying principle akin to doctrine of election, under which a party having chosen to pursue a particular legal remedy abandoning the other course available would be estopped from seeking relief again following the course already abandoned. It is also the appellants’ case that pursuing two remedies simultaneously constitute abuse of process of Court. Orissa Power Transmission Corpon. Ltd. Vs. Asian School of Business Management Trust [ (2013)8 SCC 738 ], Neon Laboratories Ltd. Vs. Medical Technologies Ltd and Others [ (2016)2 SCC 672 ] and State of Punjab and Others Vs. Punjab Fibres Ltd. [ (2005)1 SCC 604 ] have been cited in support of this point. The appellants have also placed reliance on Rule 2 of Order II of the Code as well as the principles of constructive res judicata to non-suit the writ petitioners. Punjab Fibres Ltd. [ (2005)1 SCC 604 ] have been cited in support of this point. The appellants have also placed reliance on Rule 2 of Order II of the Code as well as the principles of constructive res judicata to non-suit the writ petitioners. It is the appellants’ case that the reliefs claimed in the writ petition ought to have been incorporated in the suit itself. On applicability of the principles of constructive res judicata to writ proceeding, judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Chandra More Vs. Lt. Governor [ (2014)11 SCC 744 ] and S. Nagraj Vs. B. R. Vasudeva Murthy & Ors. [ (2010)3 SCC 353 ] have been referred to by the appellants. Similarly, on applicability of Rule 2 Order II of the Code, decisions cited are Sri Gangai Vinayagar Temple Vs. Meenakshi Ammal [ (2015)3 SCC 624 ] and State Bank of India Vs. Gracure Pharmaceuticals Ltd. [ (2014)3 SCC 595 ]. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam and Another Vs. Chhabi Nath and Others [ (2015)5 SCC 423 ] has also been relied upon on behalf of the KMDA to negate the writ petitioners’ case. In this judgment, it has been held that judicial orders of the Civil Court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Reference to this decision has been made to sustain the appellants’ contention that as a corollary, the writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked in aid of a Civil Court order. 14. On merit, appellants have questioned the jurisdiction of the First Court to grant the relief in the form of direction upon the State respondents to acquire the subject-land and award compensation. KMDA has also sought to defend the acquisition of the subject-land and their stand on this point is that non-service of notice on the writ petitioners cannot render an acquisition proceeding invalid. On this point, reliance has been placed on W.B. Housing Board Vs. Brijendra Prasad Gupta [ (1997)6 SCC 207 ]. This issue, however, in our opinion is no more res integra. On this point, reliance has been placed on W.B. Housing Board Vs. Brijendra Prasad Gupta [ (1997)6 SCC 207 ]. This issue, however, in our opinion is no more res integra. The Coordinate Bench in S.A.T. 280 of 2014 has held:- “When the State Government has failed to produce any document to show that the plaintiffs’ land was acquired by the State Government and possession thereof was taken over by them and compensation was paid to the plaintiffs, we hold that the Learned Court below did not commit any illegality in passing a decree in favour of the plaintiffs by declaring the plaintiffs’ title in respect of the suit property and by granting incidental reliefs by way of recovery of possession and mandatory and/or permanent injunction.” Having failed in the lower Appellate Court and before the Coordinate Bench of this Court in S.A.T. 280 of 2014 to sustain their case that the subject-land was acquired, it is no more open to the appellants to resurrect the argument that it was a valid case of acquisition. 15. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R.N. Jeevraj Vs. State of Karnataka [ (2016)2 SCC 653 ] has been relied upon in support of the appellants’ submission that writ of mandamus cannot be issued to require a statutory authority to take a particular course on a matter in respect of which the decision making process is within the domain of the statutory body. Same principle of law, with specific reference to land acquisition matter has been enunciated by the Supreme Court in Jayamma Vs. Deputy Commissioner, Hassan District [ (2013)7 SCC 554 ]. 16. Mr. Malay Basu and Mr. Partha Sarathi Sen Gupta, senior Advocates appearing for the writ petitioners and defended the judgment under appeal. It has been argued by them that alternative remedy do not altogether operate as a bar on invoking the writ jurisdiction and on this point they have referred to the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Cases of Union Of India Vs. T.R.Verma [AIR (1957) SC 882] and Thansingh Vs. Superintendent of Taxes [AIR (1964) SC 1419]. It has been argued by them that alternative remedy do not altogether operate as a bar on invoking the writ jurisdiction and on this point they have referred to the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Cases of Union Of India Vs. T.R.Verma [AIR (1957) SC 882] and Thansingh Vs. Superintendent of Taxes [AIR (1964) SC 1419]. It has been urged before us that construction was allowed to be made on the subject-land by the State and its agencies during pendency of the proceeding in the Suit Court in spite an order of status quo and this illegal act on the part of the State appellants and KMDA rendered the decree unimplementable. In such circumstances, according to them, the writ petition with the prayer for acquisition of land was maintainable. On this point a judgment of the Supreme Court in the Case of State of West Bengal Vs. Kamala Prasad [ (2010) 4 SCC 568 ] has been relied upon to demonstrate the wide amplitude of the jurisdiction of the Writ Court. The other judgments of the Supreme Court cited on this point are cases of The Comptroller & Auditor General Vs. K.S. Jaganathan [AIR (1987) SC 537] and Sangrila Food Products Vs. L.I.C [ (1996) 5 SCC 54 ]. 17. On jurisdiction of the Writ Court to direct the land acquisition authority to exercise their executive power for acquisition of land, argument of the writ petitioners is anchored on two authorities, Tukaram Vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation [(2013) 1 SCC 583] and Laxmi Devi Vs. State of Bihar [ (2015) 10 SCC 241 ]. In the former judgment, the Supreme Court held that deprivation of property violates the constitutional right, as also Fundamental right of the deprived persons under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the latter case, there was partial compliance of an acquisition proceeding but compensation had remained unpaid. The acquisition proceeding was set aside but the respondent State was directed to issue a fresh notification Under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 within a timeframe prescribed in the judgment. It is the ratio of these two authorities which formed the foundation of the First Court’s judgment. On a similar point the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Case of Soorajmull Nagarmal Vs. It is the ratio of these two authorities which formed the foundation of the First Court’s judgment. On a similar point the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Case of Soorajmull Nagarmal Vs. State of Bihar [ (2015) 10 SCC 270 ] was cited on behalf of the writ petitioners. 18. We shall first examine the question of delay on the part of the writ petitioners in bringing the action. In the case of Digambar (supra), land of the writ petitioner therein had been utilized by the State for construction of public road in the year 1971-72. This was done without the writ petitioners’ consent and also without taking recourse to any acquisition proceeding. The writ petitioner approached the Court in the year 1991 only seeking compensation. The High Court had allowed the writ petition without accepting the State’s objection on the ground of delay or laches. In opinion of the High Court, that could not be a factor for disentitling the writ petitioner from claiming relief when complaint was taking away of land by State agencies without following the legal process. Such view of the High Court was overruled by the Supreme Court, and writ petitioner’s claim for compensation was rejected on the ground of delay and laches. In Mutha (supra), subject of controversy was acquisition proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the writ petitioners therein sought invalidation of the proceeding by instituting a writ petition without raising any objection on such acquisition in the manner provided under the statute. The Supreme Court repelled the petitioners’ legal assault on the acquisition proceeding, inter alia, for not approaching the statutory forum with their grievance. 19. We have narrated in detail earlier in this judgment the factual background of the proceedings forming foundation of these two appeals. The decision of Mutha (supra) does not apply in this case, as the State or its agencies have failed to demonstrate subsistence of any valid acquisition proceeding in respect of the subject-land. So far as the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Digambar (supra) is concerned, we find the present case has several distinguishing features. In Digambar (supra), there was an overt act on the part of State in taking possession of land. So far as the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Digambar (supra) is concerned, we find the present case has several distinguishing features. In Digambar (supra), there was an overt act on the part of State in taking possession of land. In respect of subject-land, no material has been produced to establish and pinpoint the date on which possession of land was taken, which fact would have had alerted the owners – being the writ petitioners or their predecessors. Reference on the part of appellants was made to possession being given to KMDA on the basis of acquisition proceeding. But plea of acquisition has failed in the Suit Court uptil the stage of Second Appeal. Thus no reliance to could be placed to those dates which relate to acquisition proceeding. Actual construction came up after the suit was filed and that too in defiance of the status quo order. The appellants have highlighted that the names of the writ petitioners or their predecessors did not appear in the record of rights. But this factor does not result in lapse of title of the writ petitioners in the subject-land. The writ petitioners have been pursuing their claim from 1997, and prior to that no overt act on the part of State has been brought to our notice which could have had acted as warning to the writ petitioners about potential threat to their title. We accordingly hold that there was no fatal delay or laches on the part of the writ petitioners in bringing the action. 20. We shall now turn to the points raised by the appellants for non-suiting the writ petitioners under the principles of constructive res judicata and the provisions of Rule 2 of Order II of the Code. We accept the applicability of these principles or provisions to writ jurisdiction and do not consider it necessary to deal with all the authorities cited on behalf of the appellants in support of this submission. The appellants’ stand is that the decree being still in place and the execution proceeding subsisting, the said proceeding would constitute alternative remedy and for existence of which the First Court ought to have dismissed the writ petition. Relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. Vs. The appellants’ stand is that the decree being still in place and the execution proceeding subsisting, the said proceeding would constitute alternative remedy and for existence of which the First Court ought to have dismissed the writ petition. Relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. Vs. V.C.K.Share and Stock Broking Services Ltd. [ (2015) 13 SCC 635 ] it has been contended on behalf of the appellants that decision of a Coordinate Bench is binding on us. That proposition of law is well established and we accept the judgment of the Division Bench in S.A.T. 280 of 2014. But the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition out of which these two appeal proceedings arise were not the reliefs which were claimed in the Suit Court. The ratio of the decision in the case Ghana Shyam Das Gupta and Another Vs. Anant Kumar Sinha and Others (supra) do not apply in the facts of this case. In the decision of Ghan Shyam Das Gupta (supra) it was inter alia observed:- “The numerous rules of O.XXI of the Code take care of different situations, providing effective remedies not only to judgment-debtors and decree-holders but also to claimant objectors as the case may be. In an exceptional case, where provisions are rendered incapable of giving relief to an aggrieved party in adequate measure and appropriate time, the answer is a regular suit in the Civil Court. The remedy under the Civil Procedure Code is of superior judicial quality than what is generally available under other statutes, and the Judge being entrusted exclusively with administration of justice, is expected to do better. It will be, therefore, difficult to find a case where interference in writ jurisdiction for granting (relief) to a judgment-debtor or a claimant-objector can be justified. The Rr.97 to 106 of O.XXI envisage questions as in the present appeal to be determined on the basis of evidence to be led by the parties and after the 1976 Amendment, the decision has been made appealable like a decree.” 21. In that case, however, question arose as to whether a decree passed in a civil suit was binding on the writ petitioners or not. In that case, however, question arose as to whether a decree passed in a civil suit was binding on the writ petitioners or not. In that context, writ petition was filed and the petitioners obtained direction to the effect that they shall not be evicted from the suit premises in pursuance of a decree of the Civil Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court found the issue involved was disputed and decision on the issue was dependant on consideration of evidence. In the cited case writ jurisdiction was invoked to defeat a decree but in the matter under our consideration writ jurisdiction has been invoked for an independent relief. 22. Orissa Power Transmission Corpn. Ltd. (supra), Neon Laboratories Ltd. (supra) and Punjab Fibres Ltd. (supra) have been cited by the learned counsel for the appellants to contend that pursuing parallel remedies in different judicial fora constitutes abuse of process of the Court. In our opinion, however, cause of action in the suit was different from the cause of action in the writ petition though certain common factual elements are there in both the suit and the writ petition. In the ultimate decision in the suit, right of the writ petitioners over the subject-land had crystallized with the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court, subsequently confirmed with minor modification by the Coordinate Bench. But construction on the said land made during pendency of the suit had changed the nature and character of the land as also complexion of the litigation, which factor made execution of the decree impossible. It is a fact that the Executing Court has not yet given a finding that the decree is incapable of being executed. But on the basis of materials disclosed, the First Court came to the finding that the petitioners could not get any relief before the Executing Court and proceeding of execution could not give any relief to the petitioners. We do not think such finding of the First Court is perverse. The remedy pursued by the writ petitioners before the Suit Court was different from that prayed for in the writ petition, and action of the State during pendency of the suit had given rise to a new cause of action. The writ petitioners cannot be said to have pursued parallel remedies in different judicial fora. 23. Next comes the question of applicability of the principle of constructive res judicata. The writ petitioners cannot be said to have pursued parallel remedies in different judicial fora. 23. Next comes the question of applicability of the principle of constructive res judicata. We have already held that the cause of action of the writ petition arose subsequent to institution of the suit, and the decree in the civil suit combined with construction on the subject-land crystallized the right of the writ petitioners to be compensated for unauthorized appropriation of their land. What the writ petitioners prayed for before the First Court in substance was compensation. The acquisition proceeding is the only valid made for regularizing the illegal act on the part of the State and its agencies by paying compensation in the manner provided by the applicable statute. This issue thus could not have been determined, and has not been determined in the suit. The principle of res judicata or constructive res judicata cannot apply to the petitioners’ case. The ratio of the judgments in the cases of Shiv Chandra More (supra) and S. Nagraj (supra) do not aid the appellants. 24. For the same reason, principles flowing from Rule 2 of Order II of the Code also cannot be made applicable to the writ petition out of which these two appeals arise. In Sri Gangai Vindayagar Temple, the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the plaintiff therein was desirous of assailing the transfer of land though in the suit, only injunction was claimed. Thus the relief subsequently claimed was capable of being claimed at the point of origin of suit. This is not the case here. In the case of Gracure Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra), it has been held that the aforesaid provision of the Code requires unity of all claims based on the same cause of action. But the said provision does not contemplate mandatorily uniting distinct and separate causes of action. So far as the present proceeding is concerned, there is no doubt on there being commonality of certain factual situations of the suit and the writ petition, but such common factors run upto a point only. After judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court was passed repelling the State’s defence that the land stood acquired and there was discovery of construction on the subject-land, a distinct and separate cause of action arose based on changed circumstances. After judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court was passed repelling the State’s defence that the land stood acquired and there was discovery of construction on the subject-land, a distinct and separate cause of action arose based on changed circumstances. The case of Radhey Shyam (supra) is an authority for the proposition that a Civil Court’s order cannot be challenged in a writ proceeding. This judgment does not support the appellants’ case. In the writ petition from which these two appeals originate, the writ petitioners have neither assailed the decree of the Suit Court nor have sought enforcement of the decree. A new relief has been asked for because of substantial change in the nature and character of the suit property brought by the State and its agencies during pendency of the suit. 25. We shall now address the arguments of the appellants that it is impermissible for the Writ Court to direct land acquisition authority to acquire specific plots of land. In Jayamma Vs. Commr [ (2013)7 SCC 554 ], which was cited by the appellants, acquisition proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was aborted after issuing Declaration under Section 6 of the said Act. Owner of the land applied to the High Court invoking the writ jurisdiction seeking direction for acquisition of the property. The writ petitioners, however, remained in possession of the land. Their complaint was that because of seepage from a reservoir close to the subject-land, damage was being caused to their houses. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, however, held that whether a particular property shall be acquired or not is within the domain of the Government and not for the Court to decide. In the case of D.N. Jeevraj Vs. State of Karnataka [ (2016)2 SCC 653 ], subject of dispute was breach of allotment condition in respect of certain land. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that discretionary power of the authority should be left to such authority only to exercise and Court ought not to direct the manner in which statutory authority shall exercise its power. 26. The nature of the direction given by the First Court, no doubt, is extraordinary. But is the Court altogether precluded from directing acquisition of certain land? We do not think so. 26. The nature of the direction given by the First Court, no doubt, is extraordinary. But is the Court altogether precluded from directing acquisition of certain land? We do not think so. We have already referred to two authorities, K.S. Jagannathan (supra) and Sangrila Food Products (supra) in which the extent of writ jurisdiction were discussed to give the parties complete and substantial justice. In Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra), it was held that depriving the appellants therein of their immovable property to be violative of Constitutional Right. In paragraph 17 of the Report, the opinion of the Hon’ble Court is reflected:- “17. Depriving the appellants of their immovable properties was a clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. In a welfare State, statutory authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The non-fulfilment of their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said uprooted persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national activities as such sentiments would be born in them on account of such ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not permissible for any welfare State to uproot a person and deprive him of his fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under the grab of industrial development.” 27. In the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Kamala Prasad (supra), granting of relief by the Writ Court in a case where decree was found to be non-executable was held to be a permissible course. In Laxmi Devi (supra), specific direction was given to acquire land by issuing notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act in connection with a proceeding which was invalidated for certain procedural flaws. 28. The relief sought for by the writ petitioners and grant of such relief by the First Court thus is within the jurisdiction of the Writ court to grant. But such relief can be granted only in exceptional cases, and in our opinion this is a case of that genre. State and its agencies here have taken possession of land of the writ petitioners without the authority of law, defended such taking on the basis of unsustainable plea that the land stood acquired. During pendency of the suit instituted by the writ petitioners, they have given away the land to third party and allowed change of nature of land in breach of Suit Court’s order. During pendency of the suit instituted by the writ petitioners, they have given away the land to third party and allowed change of nature of land in breach of Suit Court’s order. Instead of offering solutions, they have contested the proceeding purely on technical grounds, without any argument on merit. Their last plea for denial of relief to the writ petitioners is that the writ petitioners have not withdrawn the execution proceeding. But before us, Mr. Basu, had submitted at the initial stage of hearing of this appeal that the writ petitioners would not prosecute the execution case and they have not taken any step to carry forward the execution proceedings. The appellants being the State and its agency, their adherence to law has to be of the highest degree but the appellants have taken technical pleas like any private litigant to defeat the writ petitioners’ legitimate right over the subject-land. The appellants’ case to justify their unauthorized act is wholly untenable and in our opinion the learned First Court has exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in proper manner in granting relief to the writ petitioners. 29. There is one factor, however, we need to consider in relation to the direction issued by the First Court. It was contended on behalf of the State that since acquisition of land involves different stages, the First Court ought not to have given a timeframe for conclusion of the proceeding. To this argument, our attention has been brought by Mr. Basu to an affidavit affirmed by one Pullichalil Bava Salim, District Magistrate of 24-Parganas (South) on 7th June 2016 in which he has given an undertaking that he would comply with the order of the learned First Court within two months in accordance with law. This undertaking was given in a contempt proceeding brought by the writ petitioners, which was registered as W.P.C.R.C. No. 2(W) of 2016. The undertaking, however, was given without prejudice to the rights and contentions in the pending appeal, being M.A.T.347 of 2016. Considering this argument on behalf of the appellants, we extend the time for initiation of proceeding for acquisition of the subject-land till 21st September 2017. Endeavour should be taken by the State to conclude the proceeding and award compensation within 31st December 2017. Considering this argument on behalf of the appellants, we extend the time for initiation of proceeding for acquisition of the subject-land till 21st September 2017. Endeavour should be taken by the State to conclude the proceeding and award compensation within 31st December 2017. In the event for any compelling reason this process cannot be completed within 31st December, 2017, for each day beyond that date the respondents/writ petitioners shall pay compensation of Rs.50,000/- in the event such delay is not caused by the writ petitioners directly or indirectly. Direction for payment of such compensation comes within the realm of Constitutional Tort. Such payment shall be continued to be made till compensation is given to the writ petitioners. The appellants, for all practical purposes are trespassers over the subject-land and their act of trespass has resulted in deprivation of Constitutional Right of the writ petitioners for which they are entitled to be compensated. Barring this limited modification of the order of First Court, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the First Court. 30. We are also informed by Mr. Basu that in W.P.C.R.C. No. 169(W) of 2016 taken out in connection with W.P. No. 21429(W) of 2014, a sum of Rs.1 Crore along with accumulated interest have been deposited with the Court Registry by Land and Acquisition Collectors, 24 Parganas, South in terms of the order of the First Court. In view of our finding in this judgment, we direct the Registrar General of this Court to pay the said sum to the learned Advocate on Record of the writ petitioners/respondents within a period of three weeks from the date of communication of this order. The Advocate-on-Record of the writ petitioners shall transmit the said sum to the writ petitioner within seven days and give an intimation of such disbursement to the Registrar General. The said sum shall be adjusted against future compensation which may be awarded in the acquisition proceeding directed to be taken in pursuance of this judgment. 31. The two appeals along with the application being C.A.N 11374 of 2015 shall stand disposed of in the above terms, without any order as to costs. 32. Urgent certified photocopy of this order be made forthwith available to the parties if applied for, subject to compliance with all necessary requisite formalities. 31. The two appeals along with the application being C.A.N 11374 of 2015 shall stand disposed of in the above terms, without any order as to costs. 32. Urgent certified photocopy of this order be made forthwith available to the parties if applied for, subject to compliance with all necessary requisite formalities. Later:- The prayer is made on behalf of the State of West Bengal for stay of operation of this judgment and order. We have considered such prayer and refuse the prayer for stay because in this judgment we have in substance dismissed the appeal of the State and KMDA and have sustained the order of the First Court.