JUDGMENT : 1. An application under Section 31 of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 (“the Act of 1966”), registered as Case No.B.C.W.A./Section 31/1998, has been allowed by the respondent No.3 appellate authority on 17-3-2009. The petitioner is directed to supply tobacco and leaves to the respondent No.1 and to pay wages to him. The petitioner is also directed to reinstate the respondent No.1 in service with continuity and back wages. Hence, the employer is before this Court in this writ petition. 2. Notice for final disposal of the matter was issued on 24-6-2009. Thereafter, the matter was admitted on 15-9-2009. All the respondents are served. No one appears for them. The respondent No.3 is the appellate authority, for which the learned Assistant Government Pleader appears. 3. The question involved is whether the provisions of the Act of 1966 are applicable in the present case. The petitioner claims to be engaged in the activities of sale of beedis only and it was the stand taken that it is not an establishment carrying out the “manufacturing process”, as defined under Section 2(k) of the Act of 1966. Reading the said definition along with the definitions of “employee” under Section 2(f), “establishment” under Section 2(h), and “industrial premises” under Section 2(i), it is held in the judgment in appeal, impugned in this petition that the sale of beedis is also covered by the definition of “manufacturing process”. 4. The respondent No.1, in the present case, approached the respondent No.3appellate authority for redressal of his grievances. It was for him to establish that the petitioner is engaged in the “manufacturing process”, as defined under Section 2(k) of the Act of 1966. Section 2(k) defines “manufacturing process” to mean any process for, or incidental to, making, finishing or packing or otherwise treating any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal as beedi or cigar or both. Merely because the petitioner is an establishment engaged in the sale of beedis, it does not follow that it is engaged in the manufacturing process. It has to be established that the petitioner is carrying out manufacturing process in the “industrial premises” of its “establishment”, as defined under Sections 2(i) and 2(h) of the Act of 1966 respectively. There is absolutely no evidence on record to establish the aforesaid facts. It has to be established that the petitioner is carrying out manufacturing process in the “industrial premises” of its “establishment”, as defined under Sections 2(i) and 2(h) of the Act of 1966 respectively. There is absolutely no evidence on record to establish the aforesaid facts. I have seen the report of Annexure-D to the petition, which does not indicate that the respondent Nos.1 and 2 were engaged by the petitioner for rolling beedis. I do not find from the said report that the respondent Nos.1 and 2 were employed for rolling the beedis by any contractor, muchless the contractor-Pundlik Wasnik by the petitioner. Thus, the applicability of Section 31 of the Act of 1966 is ruled out. Therefore, the impugned order has to be set aside for want of jurisdiction. 5. In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 17-3-2009 passed by the respondent No.3 appellate authority in Case No.B.C.W.A./Section 31/1998, is hereby quashed and set aside. The application filed by the respondent No.1 under Section 31 of the Act of 1966 is dismissed. 6. Rule is made absolute in above terms. No order as to costs.