JUDGMENT : Mir Dara Sheko, J. 1. This appeal is at the instance of the National Insurance Co. Ltd. appellant/opposite party, referred to hereinafter as the appellant, assailing the judgment of award passed on 31st January, 2015 by learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal City Civil Judge, 3rd Court, Calcutta in MAC case no.96 of 2013 under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 2. Malati Ghosh, mother of respondent no.1 and wife of respondent no.2, was a clerk of Vidyasagar Engineering College, she died in a road accident allegedly caused by negligent driving of the private bus no.- W.B. 19E2199. Respondents nos. 1 and 2 prayed for compensation before the Tribunal of Rs.23,00,000/-under Section 166 of the Act. 3. Taking monthly salary of the victim @Rs.25852/-, applying multiplier of ‘11’ in view of age of the deceased, deducting 1/3rd amount therefrom for personal expenses, and, making addition thereto an amount of Rs.2000/- towards funeral expenses as well as Rs.5000/-towards loss of consortium, learned Tribunal by the impugned judgment directed the appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle, to deposit the awarded amount of Rs.22,81,976/- with interest of 8%. 4. Being dissatisfied with the award the National Insurance Co. Ltd. has come up with the present appeal. 5. Amongst the grounds raised in this appeal first one of those is with regard to the multiplier applied by the Tribunal. According to the appellant, the Tribunal ought to have adopted multiplier of “7” instead of ‘11’, since at the time of her death the deceased was left with only 6 years 6 months remaining period of service before his superannuation. That apart, the appellant also disowned his liability under the award since the vehicle-in-question had no permit and was not claimed to be involved in the said accident. 6. To justify the grounds in appeal Mr. Das relied on the following decisions:- (a) Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation V. Padma and Ors., 2009 A.C.J. 1336 : 2009 (2) T.A.C. 756, (b) Sankari Bank and Ors. V. National Insurance Co; Ltd. and Anr., 2009(4) T.A.C. 446 (Cal.), (c) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sajeda Begum and Ors., 2010 (20) T.A.C. 840 (Cal.), (d) Rita Ghosh and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr., 2010(3) T.A.C. 21 (Cal.), (e) Namita Mishra@ Misra and Ors. V. New India Assurance Co. V. National Insurance Co; Ltd. and Anr., 2009(4) T.A.C. 446 (Cal.), (c) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sajeda Begum and Ors., 2010 (20) T.A.C. 840 (Cal.), (d) Rita Ghosh and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr., 2010(3) T.A.C. 21 (Cal.), (e) Namita Mishra@ Misra and Ors. V. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Anr., 2012 (3) T.A.C. 77(Cal.), and two unreported decisions viz., (i) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. Anu Rani Bakshi and Ors., F.M.A. 497 of 2007 with CAN 7589 of 2011 with FMA 689 of 2004 and (ii) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Niyati Rooj and Anr., F.M.A. 87 of 2011 with CAN 10806 of 2010. 7. The respondents/claimants though did not file any cross objection or independent appeal challenging the award, but Mr. Roy argued that Learned Tribunal ought to have awarded enhanced rate under the heads of funeral expenses, loss of consortium and to provide the sum under loss of estate by making further addition of amount under the head of future prospect as formulated by the Supreme Court in case of a permanent employee, whose case is to be treated also differently than a victim having no fixed regular income. Therefore submits that the award requires modification by way of enhancement of award as fair and just compensation as is required to be settled under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Mr. Roy in support of his submissions relied upon the following decisions:- 1. Jyoti Kaul & Ors. Vs. State of M.P & Ors., A.I.R. 2000 SC 3582 2. Sarla Verma (Smt) & Ans. Vs. Delhi Trans. Cor., (2009) 6 SCC 121 3. Sri K.R. Madhusuan Vs. The Administrative Officer, (2011) 2 WBLR (SC) 705 4. Reshma Kumari & Ors. Vs. Madan Mohan & Ors., 2013 SAR (Civil) 525 5. Saraladevi & Ors. Vs. Div. Manager Royal Sundaram Alli. Insurance. Co. Ltd., 2014 ACJ 2391 SC 6. Puttamma & Ors. Vs. K.L. Narayan Reddy, 2014 SAR (Civil) 276 7. Smt. Phulmaya Tamang & Anr. Vs. The general Insurance. Co. Ltd., (2015) WBLR 674 (F.B) 8. Smt. Phulmaya Tamang & Anr. Vs. The Oriental Insurance. Co. Ltd., FMA 923 of 2005 9. Ummhani Bewa Ors. Vs. Reliance General Insurance. Co., 2016(4) TAC 104 (Cal) 8. Puttamma & Ors. Vs. K.L. Narayan Reddy, 2014 SAR (Civil) 276 7. Smt. Phulmaya Tamang & Anr. Vs. The general Insurance. Co. Ltd., (2015) WBLR 674 (F.B) 8. Smt. Phulmaya Tamang & Anr. Vs. The Oriental Insurance. Co. Ltd., FMA 923 of 2005 9. Ummhani Bewa Ors. Vs. Reliance General Insurance. Co., 2016(4) TAC 104 (Cal) 8. There is no doubt however, that the Appellate Court, under Order 41 Rule 33 read with Rule 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is empowered not only to examine propriety and legality of the award under challenge, but also may pass necessary order which ought to have been passed by the learned Tribunal despite absence of cross-objection, or, cross-appeal filed by the respondents. However, in view of arguments advanced by the parties the lis before the appellate Court becomes wide and open viz. (i) Whether multiplier unit ought to have been adopted in view of years of service left by the deceased aged beyond 50 years? (ii) Whether the amount under heads of funeral expenses, loss of consortium, loss of estate ought to have been added at any enhanced rate and not as per the rate prescribed in the second schedule? (iii) Whether there should have been further addition of amount under the head of future prospect, if any, of the deceased? (iv) Whether the award suffers from any illegality, or, it requires interference in appeal? 9. There is no dispute that the victim was an employee of Vidyasagar Engineering College and died at the age of about 53 years as a result of road accident on 18.02.2013 caused by a bus no. WB 19-E-2199 and respondent nos. 1 and 2 are her son and husband respectively. 10. We have gone through the cases cited at the Bar, Principles of which will be discussed hereafter at appropriate places. It appears from the trend of arguments at the bar that law is still unsettled as to how treatment in a claim case is to be made in case of a permanent employee and a person having no regularly fixed income. Therefore, the Bar has been persuading to hunt up benefit in favour of their clients as far as it can, taking assistance sometimes of the structured formula i.e., the second schedule as inserted by the Act 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994 and sometimes on the basis of several judicial pronouncements. 11. Therefore, the Bar has been persuading to hunt up benefit in favour of their clients as far as it can, taking assistance sometimes of the structured formula i.e., the second schedule as inserted by the Act 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994 and sometimes on the basis of several judicial pronouncements. 11. The case of Jyoti Kaul and Ors. (supra) cited by Mr. Roy was on life expectancy of the deceased, assessed on taking available unrebutted evidence regarding general health of the deceased who was Executive Engineer and average age of long life of the deceased’s predecessors including his mother, and thereby allowed expected service benefits to the claimants of said case depending on the fallacy i.e. ‘had there been no death on road accident’. The fact and circumstance of the case in hand have no similarity with the case of Joyti Kaul (supra) and evidence as was available in said case is also absolutely lacking in this case. Amongst the rest decisions cited by Mr. Roy, the cases of Reshma Kumari & Ors. Vs. Madan Mohan & Ors. (supra) and Puttamma & Ors. vs. K.L. Narayana Reddy (supra) are of three Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court, and those cases along with the remaining under serial Nos. 3,5 & 7 to 9 have accepted the principles enunciated in the case of Sarla Verma (Smt) and Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation (Supra) as the foundation. But we feel disturbed when we come across arguments at the Bar persuading the Court in providing amount of compensation award in the name of future prospect, love & affection, children’s welfare and, different quantum of amount under the heads of funeral expenses, loss of consortium or loss of estate etc. by showing different citations which were pronounced on different facts and circumstances. 12. In the well-known case of Kerala SRTC Vs. Susamma Thomas reported in 1994(2) SCC 176 : 1994(1) T.A.C. 321 in paragraph 16 it has been held,- “…….. The proper method of computation is the multiplier method. Any departure, except in exceptional and extraordinary cases, would introduce inconsistency of principle, lack of uniformity and on element of impredictability for the assessment of compensation.” Therefore to keep uniformity and to avoid inconsistency in assessing compensation in case of death of road traffic accidental victim requirements of proof mentioned in paragraph 18 in the case of Sarla Verma (supra) is set out:- Paragraph- “18. Basically only three facts need to be established by the claimants for assessing compensation in case of death: (a) Age of the deceased; (b) Income of the deceased; and (c) The number of dependants. The issues to be determined by the Tribunal to arrive at the loss of dependency are: (i) additions/deductions to be made for arriving at the income; (ii) the deduction to be made towards the personal living expenses of the deceased; and (iii) the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of the deceased. If these determinants are standardized, there will be uniformity and consistency in the decisions. There will be lesser need for detailed evidence. It will also be easier for the insurance companies to settle accident claims without delay.” 13. In the case of Sarla Varma (supra) the Supreme Court with a view to remove “imponderables and uncertainties as far as practicable”, formulated the law “adopting as a rule of thumb” and some relevant portions of paragraph 24 therefrom is set out:- “24…..... where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary (without provision for annual increments etc.) the courts will usually take on the actual income at the time of death. A departure therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances.” 14. Further, in the case of Sarla Verma (supra) in paragraphs 34 and 35 it is held that several principles of tortuous liability are excluded when a claim is adjudicated under Section 163A of the Act, and also took note that the table of second Schedule, “starts with a multiplier of 15 goes up to 18 and then steadily comes down to 5”. Accordingly inferring clerical error or wrong typing in the second schedule, it is observed in paragraph 35 which is set out hereunder:- Paragraph-“35 ………………… From the quantum of compensation specified in the table, it is possible to infer that a clerical error has crept in the Schedule and the “multiplier” figures got wrongly typed as 15, 16, 17, 18, 17, 16, 15, 13, 11, 8, 5, and 5 instead of 20, 19, 18, 17, 16, 15, 14, 12, 10, 8, 6 and 5.” 15. Further in paragraph 41 taking note of divergent operative multipliers in the field with reference to the cases of Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra, Charlie, structural formula appended with the second schedule, and even applying unexpired years of service period in case of the victim being a permanent employee, the court observed, “Some tribunals, as in this case, apply the multiplier of 22 by taking the balance years of service with reference to retiring age. It is necessary to avoid this kind of inconsistency. We are concerned with cases falling under Section 166 and not under Section 163-A of the MV Act.” 16. We find that in the case of Reshma Kumari & Others Vs. Madan Mohan & another (supra) the Special Bench of Supreme Court taking note of Sarla Verma has summed up the conclusion in paragraph 40 which is set out:- Paragraph- “40…………………………………………………………………….. (i) In the applications for compensation made under Section 166 of the 1988 Act in death cases where the age of the deceased is 15 years and above, the Claims Tribunals shall select the multiplier as indicated in Column (4) of the table prepared in Sarla Verma read with para 42 of that judgment. (ii) In cases where the age of the deceased is upto 15 years, irrespective of the Section 166 or Section 163A under which the claim for compensation has been made, multiplier of 15 and the assessment as indicated in the Second Schedule subject to correction as pointed out in Column (6) of the table in Sarla Verma should be followed. (iii) As a result of the above, while considering the claim applications made under Section 166 in death cases where the age of the deceased is above 15 years, there is no necessity for the Claims Tribunals to seek guidance or for placing reliance on the Second Schedule in the 1988 Act. (iv) The Claims Tribunals shall follow the steps and guidelines stated in para 19 of Sarla Verma for determination of compensation in cases of death. (v) While making addition to income for future prospects, the Tribunals shall follow paragraph 24 of the Judgment in Sarla Verma. (iv) The Claims Tribunals shall follow the steps and guidelines stated in para 19 of Sarla Verma for determination of compensation in cases of death. (v) While making addition to income for future prospects, the Tribunals shall follow paragraph 24 of the Judgment in Sarla Verma. (vi) Insofar as deduction for personal and living expenses is concerned, it is directed that the Tribunals shall ordinarily follow the standards prescribed in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of the judgment in Sarla Verma subject to the observations made by us in para 38 above. (vii) The above propositions mutatis mutandis shall apply to all pending matters where above aspects are under consideration.” 17. Taking note of the case of Sarla Verma, affirmed in the case of Reshma Kumari (supra), again another Special Bench in the case of Puttamma & Others Vs. K.L. Narayana Reddy & Another summed up in paragraph 31 which is also on acceptance of multiplier formulated in paragraph 42 in the case of Sarla Verma (supra) and appreciation of the multiplier theory held in the case of Reshma Kumari & Ors. Vs. Madan Mohan & Another (supra). The moto of formulation of those guidelines is one and only, so that, uniformity and consistency in the selection of multiplier can be ensured while awarding compensation under Section 166 of the Act. 18. Thus due to the guidelines formulated by the Supreme Court with direction to the Tribunals to follow the multiplier units with reference to the respective age group in descending order from the young aged victim to the old aged victim in assessing compensation award under Section 166 of the M.V. Act the multiplier units also are adopted by this Court in the case of Ummhami Bewa & Others Vs. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) following Sarla Verma (supra), which is set out hereunder:- Paragraph “15………………………………………………… Age group of – 15 to 20 years -18 21 to 25 years -18 26 to 30 years - 17 31 to 35 years - 15 36 to 40 years -15 41 to 45 years -14 46 to 50 years -13 51 to 55 years -11 56 to 60 years - 9 61 to 65 years - 7 Above 65 years - 5” 19. Eventually in the cases cited by Mr. Eventually in the cases cited by Mr. Roy multiplier was adopted not on the basis of years of service left by a permanent employee, but on taking the multiplier with reference to age of the victim as formulated in the case of Sarla Verma (supra) coupled with the deduction method for personal living expenses where the victim was married. It has also been established as the logical rule of law that the ratio of deduction towards personal living expenses would be 1/3rd where dependents are 2 to 3 in numbers, 1/4th where they are 4 to 6, and, 1/5th where they exceed 6 in number. The method has been approved by the Special Bench of the Supreme Court once in the case of Reshma Kumari (supra) and then again by another Special Bench in the case of Puttmma & Others Vs. K.K. Narayana Reddy & another with direction on one hand to apply all those propositions mutatis mutandis to all pending cases so long the chart of second schedule would not be amended, and, on the other hand putting directions in the following manner upon the Central Government for amending the schedule. Relevant portion from paragraph 56 from the case of Puttmma & Ors. (supra) is set out:- Paragraph- “56. ………………..... The Central Government was bestowed with duties to amend the Second Schedule in view of Section 163-A(3), but it failed to do so for 19 years in spite of repeated observations of this Court. For the reasons recorded above, we deem it proper to issue specific direction to the Central Government through the Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport & Highways to make the proper amendments to the Second Schedule table keeping in view the present cost of living, subject to amendment of Second Schedule as proposed or may be made by the Parliament. Accordingly, we direct the Central Government to do so immediately.” 20. Thus we have already noticed that in the case of Sarla Verma (supra), the Supreme Court, inferring about clerical mistake and wrong typing in the 2nd Schedule, has arranged the multiplier units in descending order from the youngest age to the oldest age of the victim, and this formulation has been kept as the same and one upto the case of Puttamma & Others and some other decisions, which came in the field though with different facts and circumstances. 21. 21. It has also been set out that in cases where the age of thevictim at the time of death is upto 15 years, irrespective of claim made either under Section 166 or 163A of the Act, multiplier will be “15”. The Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma (supra) though inferred “clerical error” and “wrong typing” in the second schedule appended with Section 163A, but at that stage thought it fit to keep concerned only with the cases falling under Section 166 of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 and not under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Special Bench, however, in the case of Puttamma & Ors. Vs. K.L. Narayana Reddy & Another (supra) apart from issuance direction upon the Central Government virtually has scrapped the second schedule holding as follows in paragraphs 52 and 53:- “52. Keeping in view the cost of living, the Central Government is required amend the Second Schedule (See Section 163A (3)). The Second Schedule was enacted by Act 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14th November, 1994. Now more than 19 years has passed but no amendment has been made. Cost of living has gone up many fold.” “53. In view of finding recorded above, we hold that Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable, due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy.” 22. In view of above there is no scope of departure but to avoid the second schedule appended with Section 163A of the Act, when it bears clerical error and type mistake, and when, despite direction the Central Government could not yet bring fresh schedule by amendment in place of the existing one, and furthermore when, the Special Bench of the Supreme Court held such second schedule as “redundant, irrational and unworkable.” 23. Now looking into the cases of Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation Vs. Padma and Others (supra) followed in the case of Gita Mondal and Others Vs. Jagga Singh & another (supra) and in all other cases, cited by Mr. Das we find that in case of accidental death of a permanent employee aged above 50 years multiplier is adopted taking the number of unexpired period of service before superannuation, and not with reference to the age of the employee. 24. Jagga Singh & another (supra) and in all other cases, cited by Mr. Das we find that in case of accidental death of a permanent employee aged above 50 years multiplier is adopted taking the number of unexpired period of service before superannuation, and not with reference to the age of the employee. 24. There can be no doubt that the claimants either under Section 166 or under Section 163A of the Act are entitled to get fair and just compensation. Therefore, the Tribunal equally would be working as an watchdog so that in the name of such fair and just compensation the claimants are not made unduly enriched. The claim proceeding must not be treated as a profit bearing process, since by some way or other public money is involved therein to compensate the dependants of road traffic accidental victim, as reasonably as it is possible, of course, by remaining within the scheme, so that, the dependants of the victim be not suddenly deprived of source of their maintenance. For the reason, the exercise of keeping parity and uniformity in the matter of providing headwise similar compensation in the case, wherever it is applicable, by applying uniformed multiplier, unless there is very grave and extra-ordinary circumstance supported by sufficient legal evidence for special consideration, can ensure reaching at the “just” compensation to the claimants within a reasonable period with finality reducing also the scope of appeal against the award, if it is passed in favour of the claimants. 25. Apart from divergence on the issue as to whether multiplier should be adopted on the basis of unexpired period of service, where a permanent employee died on road accident at an age of beyond 50 years, or, whether usual multiplier would be applied with reference to the age of victim, we feel very much disturbed while we see also divergent observations made by the Tribunals sometimes on application of multiplier, sometimes on fixation of income, sometimes in respect of deduction of amount on personal and living expenses of the deceased, and sometimes on the grant of quantum respectively under the heads of funeral expenses, loss of consortium, loss of estate, and sometimes in the name of future prospects of the victim in case deceased would be a permanent employee. We observe that with a view to cut short scope of prolonging litigation in a claim case either under Section 166 or under Section 163A, requirement to revisit the above aspects on accepting reality of life in the mundane world has become very much necessary to avoid inconsistency and to maintain parity and uniformity in the matter of grant of “just” compensation, as indicated under Section 168 of the Act. 26. We feel also embarrassed while it comes to our notice that the claimants under Section 163-A of the Act are being treated differently than the claimants under Section 166 of the Act, either on the basis of submissions at the Bar, or, being persuaded by the items and headwise quantum mentioned in the second schedule in the matter of grant of amount of compensation, or, by placing different judicial pronouncements which would be befitting to each other’s contention. Although the second schedule appended to Section 163-A virtually has been scrapped by the Special Bench of the Supreme Court during consideration of the lis in the case of Puttamma & Ors. Vs. K.L. Narayana Reddy (supra) holding it as “redundant, irrational and unworkable…..” so long amendment is not effected by the Central Government, even then the second schedule is being maintained by the Tribunals in the matter of grant of compensation not only on a claim under Section 163-A, but also sometimes on a claim under Section 166 of the Act. 27. Learned Counsels at the Bar, specially representing the insurers of the offending vehicles sometimes remain also rigid to persuade the Tribunals or the courts to remain confined to apply the multiplier unit, and item wise amount as per second schedule, which, being declared by the Supreme Court as unworkable, is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. It is pertinent to mention that Sections 163-A and 163-B have been brought by amendment in the Act, 1988 by Act 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994. Since second schedule has been held as redundant, irrational and unworkable, so long it is not amended, we find only Section 168 of the Act as operative to provide “just” compensation, be it a claim under Section 166 or under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 28. Since second schedule has been held as redundant, irrational and unworkable, so long it is not amended, we find only Section 168 of the Act as operative to provide “just” compensation, be it a claim under Section 166 or under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 28. From the cases cited at the Bar we find that the word “just” compensation, as also equivalent to fair compensation amount, has been illustrated on the expression of ‘adequacy’, ‘equitable principle’, ‘hypothesis’, ‘assumption’, ‘inference’ and so on and so forth. Eventually the amount, so to be determined on either of such expressions particularly on the items of notional income and general damages is bound to differ if it does not maintain uniformity. Because the perception is dependent on individual “assumption”, or, “hypothesis” or, “inference” to arrive at the so called adequacy of compensation in the name of equitable principle. Therefore any topsy-turvy in the grant of amount under the heads of compensation available in the scheme is also not desirable. What we try to mean, as the colour of blood is red, so is the gravity of love and affection of the spouse if he/she is beneficiary. The same even of a rickshaw puller or a sweeper or a man of low profile cannot be or should not be minimized than that of a man of high status or even of an industrialist. If the victim is not salaried employee and had there been no satisfactory evidence on his/her monthly income then considering growing market price of essential commodities or price index, monthly income of such a victim must be fixed notionally at the rate of minimum wages per month fixed by the Government in unorganized sector as notional income and less than it is not judiciously practicable. It is to be noticed that in case of Laxmi Devi and Ors. Vs. Mohammad Tabbar and Another the accident had taken place on April 12, 2004 and since then there has been much hike in cost of living index in uniformed manner. Therefore in absence of legal and corroborative proof on income of a victim, working in any unorganized sector, or, working privately without proof of regular monthly income in average, monthly notional income is to be fixed uniformly in claim case of any nature to the tune of Rs. 3,000/- per month and not exceeding the same. Therefore in absence of legal and corroborative proof on income of a victim, working in any unorganized sector, or, working privately without proof of regular monthly income in average, monthly notional income is to be fixed uniformly in claim case of any nature to the tune of Rs. 3,000/- per month and not exceeding the same. Logic not to exceed such limit is again since there is involvement of public money, in some way or other, in the process. 29. Further, any divergence in the grant of amount on the loss of consortium certainly would hit the equitable principle which is also not permissible. It also must be made uniformed in all cases. Because loss of either of the life partners is very shocking to the other irrespective of status of the victim. 30. Similarly again under the head of funeral expenses there must not be any divergence. Can there be any logic to allow someone some excessive amount under the head of funeral expenses and to some other as per the second schedule? Therefore, to remain free of criticism and to keep uniformity the amount under this head also must be the same and one for all irrespective of the status of the person died on road accident. 31. Same is under the head of loss of estate. Accidental death either of the bread earner or anyone near or dear to the family itself is a loss of estate which is virtually irreparable. Nonetheless, by such beneficial enactment provision has been made to compensate the victim’s family with some amount under the head of loss of estate. In view of growing market price and to compensate the victim’s family in case of death on road accident, the amount under the head of loss of estate therefore must be consolidated one with some dignified quantum irrespective of status of the victim, since the amount under the heading of general damages, so provided can be designated as honorary sum payable within the beneficial scheme of the Act. 32. Another disturbing and divergent zone is about addition of amount in the award in the name of future prospect, specially in case of permanent employee, on the logic of having scope of enhancement in scale of pay by way of increments, promotion etc. had he/she would have been alive. 32. Another disturbing and divergent zone is about addition of amount in the award in the name of future prospect, specially in case of permanent employee, on the logic of having scope of enhancement in scale of pay by way of increments, promotion etc. had he/she would have been alive. Here, we could not prevent ourselves from offering our logical observations about the reality in life, which is to be confronted by every person of general health, who prior to the moment of his death would have no scope to know as to on which day, when, where, how and in which manner he/she would die. Because the moment of death to him/her may come on any day, at any moment, at any place, in any manner, either at home, or, at working place, or, on journey, noticingly or unnoticingly, and the same may take place as a natural death, or, unnaturally. Therefore, anybody may speculate about expectation of his/her life when he/she is well alive, but can never avoid its destiny which is always beyond his/her knowledge and control. The aspect in the name of future prospect of an accidental victim was so far considered hypothetically only on the logic, ‘had the victim been alive’, but the other side of the real life was nowhere and never taken into consideration before making any addition of amount in the name of ‘future prospect’. So long amendment by making revision in the second schedule is brought since it has been declared unworkable, any head or item of compensation in the name of “future prospect” is still unknown in the scheme of the Act. We must appreciate without any argument in opposition that effect or impact of accidental death of the bread earner of the family, or, of any near and dear one is the same upon the claimants of either under Section 166, or, Section 163-A of the Act. In case of death of any permanent employee, follow up processes are also taken up to give employment to someone in the family on compassionate ground subject to fulfillment of usual formalities, apart from providing all other pensionary benefits. Of course, those post death benefits for the dependents of the employee are not any obstacle on the way of getting just compensation. The future prospect is taken into consideration on the logic, ‘had he/she been alive’. Of course, those post death benefits for the dependents of the employee are not any obstacle on the way of getting just compensation. The future prospect is taken into consideration on the logic, ‘had he/she been alive’. This logic, of course, has one positive side. But had he/she been alive the incumbent also might have some negative side, who for any misdeed in workplace might have been demoted, increment might have been stopped, departmental proceeding might have been started, even the incumbent might have been terminated from service. These aspects however have not ever taken into consideration before grant of any percentage of amount with the compensation award in the name of ‘future prospect’. Therefore, avoiding hypothetical speculation on the basis of any assumption or inference wherever it would be practicable in view of facts and circumstances of each case, we must accept and face reality of life and destiny of fate irrespective of caste, creed, age, or, status. Since any head in the name of “future prospect” is unknown in the scheme of the Act, rather it is to be accepted as an eternal truth that any such future prospect of an employee really gets an end with his death, be it natural or unnatural, which he/she suffers as his/her destiny. Therefore, we refrained from introducing any such foreign item to grant compensation by way of addition of amount of any proportion in the name of future prospect of an employee, died on road accident unless any special circumstance is pleaded and legal evidence is led for consideration of the Tribunal. Thus only keeping the ratio in deduction part, quoted above, intact, depending upon number of dependants as accepted to avoid any inconsistency under the head of personal and living expenses, had he/she been alive, the point no. (iii) is accordingly answered. 33. Although relying on the cases cited, Mr. Thus only keeping the ratio in deduction part, quoted above, intact, depending upon number of dependants as accepted to avoid any inconsistency under the head of personal and living expenses, had he/she been alive, the point no. (iii) is accordingly answered. 33. Although relying on the cases cited, Mr. K.K. Das, Learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that in case of accidental death of a permanent employee at the age of beyond 50 years multiplier unit should have been adopted on the period of service left, and not using as usual multiplier unit with reference to age of the victim, but we require to revisit the issue consciously without making any reference, so that, had there been any lapses in not following the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of Sarla Verma (supra), Reshma Kumari (supra), Puttamma & Ors. (supra) in true letter and spirit those lapses should not be repeated. That apart the cases cited by Mr. Das on the issue are well-distinguishable since all other aspects, discussed above, which also might have come to a life of an employee beyond 50 years were not taken into consideration because a person after 50 years may require much more financial assistance. Rather, in view of foregoing discussions since we are bound by the guidelines of the Supreme Court to direct also the Tribunals in the State to select the multiplier units only with reference to the age quoted above in paragraph 18 above, as held by this Court earlier quoting from the case of Sarla Verma (supra) which has been approved by the Special Bench in two cases in succession (supra). 34. The zone of consideration pertaining to the issue comes virtually for the victims within the age group of 51 to 60. Let us take it as granted that 60 years is the normal retiring age from service. 34. The zone of consideration pertaining to the issue comes virtually for the victims within the age group of 51 to 60. Let us take it as granted that 60 years is the normal retiring age from service. In view of foregoing observations since we hold that in any case the method of selection of multiplier is to be adopted only with reference to age of the victim falling within the age group as adumbrated in the case of Sarla Verma and approved thereafter by the Special Bench of the Supreme Court in the cases of Reshma Kumari (supra) and Puttamma & Ors.(supra) it has got an effect of binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India to follow in every claim case so long the legislature on its own wisdom is not enacting fresh provisions by amending the schedule, either by enhancing the respective amount against the items mentioned therein, or, by making addition of any further item defining any other tortuous liability. Rather, on re-looking we observed that it is natural, that support, be it financial, or, otherwise, is much more needed while a person, be he/she an employee or a privately earning person, enters into the age group of 50 years and starts ascending to his/her further old age. It can be taken as granted that he/she would be losing gradually physical capability on one hand and would have sufferance from various normal age old ailments apart from becoming financially looser by discharging several family obligations by that time viz., education of wards, their marriage, etc. This real aspect was also nowhere considered before restricting an employee’s dependants to have multiplier unit with reference to the unexpired period of service. Therefore any distinction is not desirable to select multiplier in case of a road traffic accidental victim within the age group of 50 to 60 years, be he/she would be a salaried employee, or, a privately earning person. Rather as per the established rule of law the multiplier in any case shall have to be adopted with reference to the age of the victim and not on the basis of unexpired period of service of the employee, except in any extra-ordinary circumstance if it is proved supported by legal and acceptable evidence for any special consideration of the tribunal or Court. These real & natural state of affairs having not been considered in the cases cited by Mr. Das those decisions are distinguished consciously without making any endeavour of making reference. It is pertinent to mention that had there been any lapses in taking different view than the above, the same are devoid of the law formulated by the Supreme Court and therefore would not be binding in view of this present pronouncement, specially when we have distinguished those cases to bring the scheme within a consistent and uniformed streamline. 35. Thus in view of the arguments made at the Bar before usexpanding the lis for consideration on which we have discussed in details taking the available law in the field, we conclude and lay down the law not only in case of an working employee of any organization, be it of the Government, or, Government undertaking, or, private, within the age group from 50 to 60 years, but also within the age group of prior to 50 years, multiplier shall be adopted with reference to the age as mentioned in Paragraph 18 above which is in conformity with the formulation made in paragraph 42 of the case of Sarla Verma Vs. DTC(supra) above and not on the basis of the years of service left by the deceased in any case. 36. DTC(supra) above and not on the basis of the years of service left by the deceased in any case. 36. In effect, so long amended schedule is not coming, and since the amount of compensation corresponding to the items appearing in the Second Schedule having been declared as redundant and unworkable in the present scenario of growing market price in all respects, and since, we have also noticed divergence in granting compensation by adding different amount of sum under heads of funeral expenses, loss of consortium (in the event of loss of spouse) and loss of estate, and therefore to keep uniformity in the matter of addition of amount under those heads we incline to lay down the law that irrespective of caste, creed, status, or, age of the victim, the claimants shall be entitled to the same and identical amount without making any departure, and the Tribunal in its turn shall be on obligation to add those identical amount in all claim cases in case of death, along with the compensation award keeping parity everywhere, unless there is a very exceptional and extra-ordinary circumstance pleaded and proved by legal and acceptable evidence for any special consideration of the Tribunal. By revisiting the entire scenario and taking notice of huge number of pendency of claim cases and appeals preferred therefrom we incline to lay down the law on attending every possible aspects available in the scheme, so that, the claimants, being driven out by their improvised brain, cannot persuade the system to take any divergent view in utilizing the process to use as any profit bearing unit, and, on the other hand, the insurance fund can be utilized by maintaining a balance everywhere promptly, beneficially in uniformed manner curtailing the scope of appeal from the award. Therefore, keeping a balance in respect of the heads under general damages in case of accidental death the quantum is formulated below:- (i) Funeral expenses -10,000/- (ii) Lost of consortium -20,000/-. (iii) Loss of estate - 10,000/-. (iv) Actual medical expenses (subject to proof by medical documents and not medical certificate only) if any incurred for treatment of the victim from the date of accident till death, and, there shall be no further addition in the name of any perquisite, whatsoever. (iii) Loss of estate - 10,000/-. (iv) Actual medical expenses (subject to proof by medical documents and not medical certificate only) if any incurred for treatment of the victim from the date of accident till death, and, there shall be no further addition in the name of any perquisite, whatsoever. But every Tribunal where passing the award of compensation shall record order of interest payable from the date of filing claim application till the date of deposit of award as provided under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, instead of awarding interest as a failing clause, and the rate of interest may be fixed by the Tribunal judiciously depending upon circumstances and conduct of the parties to the cases. 37. So far as the deduction under the head of personal expenses which the victim would have to incur towards maintaining himself, had he/she been alive, the tribunal shall follow the guidelines provided in Paragraph 19 above, be it a claim case under Section 166 or under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 38. It is pertinent to mention that there was divergent opinion in the matter of providing additional compensation in the name of ‘future prospect’ not only its concept but also on the quantum of sum. We have already discussed that the second schedule has been declared as redundant and unworkable. The reality of life which is bound to come inevitably beyond anybody’s control, was not dealt with anywhere during consideration for addition of amount in the name of ‘future prospect’. As we cannot subtract or delete any of the items of compensation available in the scheme of the statue, so we cannot supply also anything new which is not in the scheme. 39. In the present case since “11” has been adopted by the Tribunal as multiplier in view of age of the victim in assessing the compensation award there is no illegality. Since the grievance of the respondents is for addition of amount in the name of ‘future prospect’ we reject it. Similarly there is no question of reducement in the compensation amount as urged by Mr. Das applying multiplier unit on the basis of unexpired period of service left by the deceased before superannuation. Thus taking assistance from the cases cited by Mr. Similarly there is no question of reducement in the compensation amount as urged by Mr. Das applying multiplier unit on the basis of unexpired period of service left by the deceased before superannuation. Thus taking assistance from the cases cited by Mr. Roy, mostly of which are of the Supreme Court, and the pronouncements having become binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India on the point of selection of multiplier, ratio of deduction method on account of personal living expenses, utilizing of multiplier method even in case of an employee above 50 years, and non-workability of the 2nd schedule of Section 163-A of the Act, and, the same thereby having well-overriding effect upon the decisions cited by Mr. Das, we do not find any illegality caused by learned Tribunal in assessing the award on the basis of income of the victim. Issue nos. (i) and (ii) are also accordingly answered. 40. Therefore, in the case under general damages respondent no.2 being husband of the victim shall get further sum of Rs. 15,000/- under the head of loss of consortium, and the respondent nos. 1 and 2 are entitled to further sum of Rs. 8,000/- under the head of funeral expenses and Rs. 10,000/-under the head of loss of estate since as per the unworkable schedule Rs. 2,000/- was granted for funeral expenses and Rs. 5,000/- for loss of consortium and no amount was allowed under loss of estate. 41. In view of above the appeal being FMA No. 1242 of 2016 filed by the Insurance Company is liable to be dismissed since the other grounds taken in appeal are devoid of any further consideration for want of evidence in support of any specific defence, and the compensation award under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 delivered on 31st January, 2015 in Motor Accident Claims Case No. 96 of 2013 by Learned 3rd Judge of City Civil Court, Calcutta is liable to be modified accordingly being led by Order 41 Rule 33 read with Rule 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure by enhancing and providing the amount under the heads of general damages. 42. 42. Before departure we also incline to guide the tribunal that in absence of valid insurance policy, or, the offending driver having no valid driving license, or, the offending vehicle having no valid route permit on the date of accident, or, in absence of specific terms of the insurance policy where the owner of offending vehicle is held liable to pay the award, in that case also the same ratio of this decision in every part of consideration shall be applicable as far as it would be practicable in view of facts and circumstances to be established therein. 43. The respondent nos. 1 and 2 were allowed award by thetribunal to the tune of Rs.22,74,976/- by using correct multiplier with the income of the deceased and also correctly deducting 1/3rd amount therefrom. In view of modification in the award, under head of loss of consortium balance sum of Rs. 15,000/-, balance sum of Rs. 8,000/- towards funeral expenses and Rs. 10,000/- toward loss of estate, the total award money comes to Rs. 23,07,976/- (twenty three lacs seven thousand nine hundred seventy six only). Thus, the appellant is liable to pay a further sum of Rs. 33,000/- (Thirty Three Thousand) with interest @ 8% p.a. to be calculated from April 25, 2013 till deposit. 44. From record it appears that by order dated 25.11.2016 the National Insurance Company Limited was directed to deposit the whole of the amount of award passed by the Learned Tribunal in the MAC case No. 96 of 2013 by learned 3rd Court of City Civil Court at Calcutta, less statutory deposit. But from record it is not appearing that the appellant deposited the sum in terms of the order dated 25.11.2016. Therefore, in view of modification in the award the appellant is directed to deposit the whole sum of award to the tune of Rs. 23,07,976/- (Twenty Three Lacs Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy Six Only) with interest @ 8% per annum to be calculated from April 25, 2013 within one month from this date of judgment before the Learned Registrar General of this Court less the statutory deposit, failing which rate of interest over the entire award including modified amount shall be 12% to be calculated from the date of filing of the claim case till the date of realization and the respondents/claimants may be at liberty to put such modified award into execution. 45. 45. In the event of deposit of such entire award money, as directed, the claimants/respondents will be at liberty to submit appropriate application before Learned Registrar General for its withdrawal and Learned Registrar General shall disburse such award money amongst the respondents/claimants proportionately where the respondent No. 2 only shall get Rs. 20,000/- in excess of the amount to be received by respondent No. 1. 46. In view of above the appeal being FMA No. 1242 of 2016 preferred by the National Insurance Company Limited is dismissed and the award dated 31st January, 2015 delivered by Learned Tribunal 3rd Court, City Civil Court at Calcutta in MAC Case No. 96 of 2013 is modified to the extent mentioned above. As a consequence thereof, the stay application being CAN 7286 of 2016 is rejected, and, the application being CAN 7727 of 2016 bearing prayer of withdrawal of the award is allowed. 47. No order as to costs. 48. Since this judgment has been pronounced not only for the sake of disposal of the appeal but also to lay down the guidance to the Tribunals to follow the respective relevant aspects including awarding interest from the date of claim application as a mandate of Section 171 of the Act, for the purpose of deciding each and every claim case under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in uniformed manner, as far as practicable with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case, learned Registrar General, High Court, Calcutta is directed to communicate a line to each and every learned Judge in the rank of District Judge working in the Districts of the State directing to download the copy of this judgment of appeal and to apply the guidelines in deciding all claim cases pending before them in a consistent and uniformed manner, wherever it will apply, so that, throughout the State parity is maintained in the matter of awarding compensation which eventually will reduce scope of appeal and the worst sufferers being the claimants may get the sum of award in hand within a reasonable time, instead of knocking from one court to the other for years together, that too, presumably spending a portion of the award without having any scope of knowledge about fate of any further proceeding. 49. Urgent certified copy be supplied on priority basis if applied for. 50. 49. Urgent certified copy be supplied on priority basis if applied for. 50. Department is also directed to communicate a copy of this judgment to Learned Tribunal for information.