JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. P. Gautam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. S. Das, learned counsel appearing for the claimant-respondents. None appears for the other respondents when the matter is called out. 2. This is an appeal by the Insurer, IFFCO TOKIO General Insurance Company Limited from the judgment and award dated 03.02.2016 delivered in T.S.(MAC) 457 of 2016 by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, West Tripura, No.2, Agartala. 3. Mr. P. Gautam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has fairly submitted that the facts relating to the accident, death of one Rahul Baruah in the said accident which occurred on 17.08.2013 at about 1.40 hours at a place called Bhuiyar Matha at Bishalgarh Police Station and the accident occurred for the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle bearing No. UP-83T-5187(Truck) which was under valid insurance coverage by the appellant are not questioned in the appeal. The claimant-respondents had stake for a sum of Rs. 51,81,000/- as the compensation for the damage they have suffered from death of said Rahul Baruah. Mr. Gautam, learned counsel has submitted that by the impugned judgment and award even the father of the deceased has been treated as the dependent. 4. In Sarla Verma (Smt) and Others versus Delhi Transport Corporation and Another reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 , the apex court has enunciated that ordinarily the father would not be treated as the defendant of a son but if it can be proved that father was really dependant on the son, in that event the father can be treated as the dependent for all purposes. The objection that has been raised by Mr. Gautam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that there is no such evidence to show that the father was dependant on the deceased and as such treating the father as the dependent of the deceased is a serious infirmity in the process of assessing the compensation. 5. From the other side, Mr. S. Das, learned counsel appearing for the claimant-respondents has resisted such plea by stating that the appellant shall not be permitted to raise this issue inasmuch as the appellant was not a party in the proceeding being T.S.(MAC) 457 of 2013. The appellant was a mere noticee. 5. From the other side, Mr. S. Das, learned counsel appearing for the claimant-respondents has resisted such plea by stating that the appellant shall not be permitted to raise this issue inasmuch as the appellant was not a party in the proceeding being T.S.(MAC) 457 of 2013. The appellant was a mere noticee. It has been clearly laid down by the apex court that the noticee does not have any right to challenge any finding of the tribunal on such fact as the noticee was not allowed to be impleaded as the party for taking all defences available to the owner by granting leave as provided under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 6. Mr. Das, learned counsel has relied a decision of this court in New India Assurance Company Limited versus Bishaka Rudra Paul and Another reported in (2014) 1 TLR 497, where this court has clearly held that : “The insurer as the noticee has no locus standi to challenge the award passed by the tribunal on questioning its legality inasmuch as the notice does not have that status to carry out an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act beyond the grounds those would flow from Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Apart that, if on the premises as provided under Section 170(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the insurer is not provided with leave by the tribunal for resorting to all the defences as available to the owner of the vehicle or the driver, the insurer even as the party cannot resort to all such defences available to the owner/driver.” 7. In Rekha Jain versus National Insurance Company Limited reported in AIR 2013 SC 3429 the apex court has unambiguously held as under : “This evidence is not challenged though the appellant was cross-examined by the counsel for the respondent Insurance Company extensively without obtaining the permission for the Tribunal as required under Section 170(b) to contest in the proceeding. In the absence of such permission, the Insurance Company has got limited defence as provided under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which provides for the conditions which determines breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy.” 8. In the absence of such permission, the Insurance Company has got limited defence as provided under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which provides for the conditions which determines breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy.” 8. In view of the said legal position and also having scrutinized the grounds of objection, this court is constrained to hold that the appellant being a noticee does not have legal right to raise the objection as has been raised in this appeal and accordingly, this appeal being bereft of merit stands dismissed. 9. The sum as awarded by the tribunal if not paid by now by the appellant-Insurance Company, that shall be paid within 2 (two) months from today. 10. Mr. Gautam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the appellant has paid the entire amount with interest in terms of the order dated 06.05.2016 as delivered in IA No. 573 of 2016 [from MAC App. No. 26 of 2016]. 11. Be that as it may, if any amount is found payable to the claimant-respondents that shall be paid within the time as stipulated above in the tribunal with interest. There shall be no order as to costs. Send down the LCRS forthwith.