JUDGMENT : Mir Dara Sheko, J. 1. All the above appeals with connected applications are taken up together for order since those were heard analogously on consent at the instance of the learned Counsels representing the parties thereof. 2. The cause of action as asserted by the appellants, is attributable to the eligibility clauses published in the advertisement notice by the respondent University of Calcutta for admission to 1st semester of 5th year B.A. LL.B course for the academic session 2017-2018. The impugned eligibility clause reads:- “Eligibility: 1. Passed 10+2 or its equivalent from the Board recognized by the University of Calcutta in the year 2015-2017(for General); 2013-2017 (for SC/ST) and 2010-2017(for PWD) only.” 3. Learned Counsel for the appellants relying upon judgment of Single Bench of this Court delivered on 15.07.2015 in W.P. 15582(W) of 2015, (Aishwarya Pratihar Vs. University of Calcutta), and Division Bench judgment of this Court delivered analogously on December 21, 2015 dismissing as many as five appeals, argued that the age restriction in the matter of admission for the five years B.A. LL.B students having been scraped following the guidelines of the Bar Council of India, the respondent University imposed the above eligibility restriction indirectly in a round about way which according to them was detrimental to the interest of the students and natural justice. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellants thereby submitted by interim order of this Court as the appellants were allowed to fill up forms to sit in the selection test now direction should be given to publish their result. 5. Dr. Bandhopadhyay learned Counsel for the respondent/University per contra replied that the entire admission process of the University for admitting students in the 5 years B.A LL.B course of the impugned Academic Session was complete. Therefore, there was no scope of admission. On merit, he argued that the University being an autonomous body guided by its own Act and bye-laws, and Section 54(c) of the Calcutta University Act, 1979 having empowered it to impose necessary conditions for admission in different courses the writ petitions were not maintainable. He further submitted that, without challenging the provision of law, challenge the writ petitioner’s only was against the notice of advertisement by way of a misconceived writ of mandamus which was itself not maintainable. In support of his submissions, Mr. Bandopadhyay relied on the following cases:- “1. Baddula Lakshmaiah and Ors. Vs. He further submitted that, without challenging the provision of law, challenge the writ petitioner’s only was against the notice of advertisement by way of a misconceived writ of mandamus which was itself not maintainable. In support of his submissions, Mr. Bandopadhyay relied on the following cases:- “1. Baddula Lakshmaiah and Ors. Vs. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple and Ors. reported in (1996) 3 SCC 52 . 2. Wander Ltd. and Another Vs. Antox India P. Ltd. reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 3. The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. Vs. Pothan Joseph reported in 1960 AIR 1156, 1960 SCR(3) 713.” 6. In the impugned order dated June 13, 2017 in AST 109 of 2017 learned writ court took note of the admission notice from the B.A LL.B course, 2017-2018 to appreciate the arguments advanced by the appellants writ petitioners that earlier admission notice fixing cut-off age by the University stood quashed in an earlier proceeding by learned Single Judge, which judgment was upheld in appeal and the matter is now sub-judice before the Supreme Court, wherein no interim relief to the appellants was granted even after exchange of affidavits rather the Court made following observations:- This Court is satisfied that the interim restraint of the Hon’ble Division Bench dated 24th June, 2016 also applies to the pari material facts of the present writ petitions, connected to the identity of reliefs claimed in respect of consecutive academic sessions. Accordingly, no interim relief can be extended to the petitioners. 7. On being moved this Court however pending appeals and applications for final disposal on merit, taking June 25, 2017 as the scheduled date of admission test permitted the appellants to fill up the form for admission into B.A. LL.B and to sit in the test but result of their test would not be permitted to declare without order of this Court. Now the appellant are seeking order to get result of their admission test published so that the successful intending candidates may take admission in that academic session. 8. The appeals and connected applications accordingly are taken up for disposal on merit for the following considerations:- (i) Whether the admission notice with the condition of eligibility, quoted above, is liable to be quashed. (ii) Whether the University acted illegally in imposing the said condition. (iii) Whether the appeals and applications should be allowed. 9. 8. The appeals and connected applications accordingly are taken up for disposal on merit for the following considerations:- (i) Whether the admission notice with the condition of eligibility, quoted above, is liable to be quashed. (ii) Whether the University acted illegally in imposing the said condition. (iii) Whether the appeals and applications should be allowed. 9. In the earlier W.P. 19490 (W) of 2015 (Aishwarya Pratihar & Ors. Vs. the University of Calcutta) the Regulation 4 though was not under challenge but it was held as not binding in view of withdrawal of age restriction by the Bar Council of India, shortly to call as BCI. Said Regulation 4 framed by the University of Calcutta is set out:- “Regulation 4:- Age of Candidate: the maximum age for seeking admission to 5-Year B.A.L.L. B. Course is 20(twenty) years as on 1stJune of the respective year in case of General Category candidates and 22(twenty two) years in case of applicants from S.C./S.T. Category.” 10. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court on December 24, 2015 upheld the observation of learned Single Bench laying same view that it would not be binding upon the writ petitioners of those cases. 11. For appreciating the lis of the instant appeals let us set out the revival of age restriction under Clause 28 of Legal Education Rules 2008 circulated by the BCI to all the Universities and Law College with regard to integrated five years course of B.A. LL.B and three years course of LL.B which are as follows:- “(a) Subject to the condition stipulated by a University on this behalf and the high degree of professional commitment required, the maximum age for seeking admission into a stream of integrated Bachelor of law degree program, is limited to twenty years in case of general category or applicants and to twenty two years in case of applicants from SC, ST and other Backward communities. (b) Subject to the condition stipulated by a University, and the general social condition of the applicants seeking legal education belatedly, the maximum age for seeking admission into a stream of Three Year Bachelor Degree Course in law, is limited to thirty years with right of the University to give concession of five further years for the applicant belonging to SC or ST or any other Backward Community.” 12. The above circular of BCI it reveals that the BCI virutually did not encroach upon the autonomous administrative jurisdiction of the University. It is for the reason that in both the occasions the texts have been preceded by the words “subject to the condition stipulated by a University on this behalf.” 13. Therefore imposing condition, provided it is not detrimental or opposed to public policy, falls within the domain and jurisdiction of the University particularly for larger interest of the student-hood who would be aspirants to build up their career after crossing the hurdle of examinations of class 10 +2. 14. Earlier, as quoted by learned Single Bench in the impugned judgment, holding the restriction on age as per Regulation 4 as not binding the University authorities were directed to ensure that the persons passed 10+2 or equivalent for any academic year be allowed to fill up form for the B.A LL.B course. 15. This is an underlying fact that the University of Calcutta being autonomous body is guided by its own Act namely Calcutta University Act, 1979 of which Section 54 (c) provides:- “Subject to the provisions of this Act and its statutes, and the ordinances, regulations may be made on the following matters:- (c) The conditions for admission to the different courses of study and examinations of students. To appreciate the statute viz The University of Calcutta 1979, its preamble may be reproduced:- “Whereas it is expedient to reconstitute the University of Calcutta to enable it to function more efficiently as a University encouraging and providing for instruction, teaching, training and research in various branches of learning and courses of study, promoting advancement and dissemination of knowledge and learning, and extending higher education, to meet the growing needs of society and to make the constitution of various authorities or bodies of the University more democratic.” 16. The co-ordinate Bench on the earlier occasion also correctly observed that since the recent past years course of LL.B has become lucrative and the students at large with ambition are being attracted. The role of the University thereby is to enable promoting advancement and dissemining knowledge amongst the students to build up their career in extending high standard education. The co-ordinate Bench on the earlier occasion also correctly observed that since the recent past years course of LL.B has become lucrative and the students at large with ambition are being attracted. The role of the University thereby is to enable promoting advancement and dissemining knowledge amongst the students to build up their career in extending high standard education. To achieve this goal, and in keeping the very object of preamble into consideration would it be desirable that there would not have any control, or, the University would not be able to impose condition to regulate the admission process for such integrated course of B.A.LL.B., so that amongst the aspirants, eligible for admission to such course, the candidates chosen through selection test can be offered for admission. It is in order to regulate such admission procedure, the University in the advertisement notice included the eligibility condition in respect of entrance test for the academic session 2017-2018. Presumably as a result of earlier proceeding where this Court held that the age restriction as was imposed earlier would not be binding the impugned notice remained absolutely free of that clause. By such advertisement an aspirant to sit at the entrance test for admission into B.A. LL.B course of any age ought to be passed out 10+2 or equivalent during the year 2015-2017 if he is a general candidate. The same however is stretched from 2013 to 2017 in case of candidate belonging to schedule caste or tribe, and, 2010 to 2017 for PWD candidate. To our view, this much of restriction the University can be imposed by the University to regulate the admission procedure. Such admission procedure cannot be kept alive like open to all. If any aspirant aspires to adopt higher education in the chosen University then the aspirant is to fulfill the criteria, prescribed by such University. It shall be the autonomous institution to regulate the procedure of admission and other allied matters, and not the aspirants to divert such procedure to justify his/their own aspiration dehors the rule or regulation of the institution. The very preamble of the statute of the University will be frustrated, if the admission procedure for a particular academic session is kept open for any candidate who passed 10+2 or its equivalent in any academic year. The very preamble of the statute of the University will be frustrated, if the admission procedure for a particular academic session is kept open for any candidate who passed 10+2 or its equivalent in any academic year. If it is so done without keeping restriction at least with regard to inner and outer limit of year of passing out for the general, for the schedule caste/tribe or PWD candidates, then there will be simply unmanageable, chaotic insurgency in the educational administration. Amongst the regular students some, if not many of them, having no loss of academic year thereinbefore, despite timely passing out 10+2 or its equivalent, may not get chance for admission by combating with those who had passed out 10+2 or equivalent much earlier than them, or offered eligibility by passing out in any academic year. In that event merit of younger generation having no loss of year thereinbefore may suffer from injustice by being diverted from ambition of order generation ‘of any year’ who have already taken advantage of their past academic education and want to take up legal field at a late stage in their life. The selection test also then would not be amongst the equals. As a result of which the ambitious students aspiring to get admission in such integrated course may be defeated if there would remain no minimum restriction. These possibilities since are not ruled out as such the University cannot be blamed that they cannot regulate its admission procedure by putting restriction (supra) like the impugned one. The University has been enjoying power under Section 54(c) of the Act to translate the very object of its preamble into reality and to disseminate proper education, knowledge and learning by admiring the meritorious aspirant by keeping them free of invasion by any other unwanted by putting some restrictions. The impugned restrictions therefore cannot be construed within a meaning of putting embargo against right to education. Every citizen has such right to be educated. But when one specialized course is to be chosen for advancement with a career, and one is to be educated for the same through one recognized educational institution, then he is to bow down to its eligibility condition so that the other eligible candidates may not feel disturbed or deprived of. The rest would be on open competition amongst the equals designated at par according to the advertisement notice. 17. The rest would be on open competition amongst the equals designated at par according to the advertisement notice. 17. We have already indicated above that learned Single Judge weighing the submissions and documents directed only to conclude exchange of affidavits and in exercise of discretion declined to extend any interim relief. Now assessing the materials and relevant law as discussed above, whether in appeal we should exercise the discretion in a different manner. Answer will be certainly not, specially when the act of learned Single Judge did not give any exposure of perversity. A few lines from paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 from the case of Baddula Lakshmaiah & Ors (supra) are set out:- “Paragraph 2:- Against the orders of the trial court, first appeal lay before the High Court, both on facts as well as law. It is the internal working remains one. A letters patent appeal, as permitted under the Letters Patent, is normally an intra-court appeal whereunder the Letters Patent Bench, sitting as a Court of Correction, corrects its own orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as was vested in the Single Bench. Such is not an appeal against an order of a subordinate court. In such appellate jurisdiction the High Court exercises the powers of a Court of Error. So understood, the appellate power under the Letters Patent is quite distinct, in contrast to what is ordinarily understood in procedural language. That apart the construction of the aforementioned two documents involved, in the very nature of their import, a mixed question of law and fact, well within the powers of the Letters Patent Bench to decide. The Bench was not powerless in that regard. Paragraph 3:- We are therefore of the view that the Letters Patent Bench committed no error in redoing the exercise to reconcile those two questioned documents so as to get to the result in favour of the temple respondent. Except for the point afore dealt with, no other point has been raised by the learned counsel.” 18. Paragraph 3:- We are therefore of the view that the Letters Patent Bench committed no error in redoing the exercise to reconcile those two questioned documents so as to get to the result in favour of the temple respondent. Except for the point afore dealt with, no other point has been raised by the learned counsel.” 18. Therefore, the condition of eligibility-in question having been imposed by the University of Calcutta empowered under Section 54(c) of the University of Calcutta Act, 1979, we are of the considered view that for larger interest imposition of restriction like the present one is proper and desirable to make this professional course much more effective and lucrative to the new comer students having no loss of academic year, we find no perversity in the order or judgment impugned passed by the learned Single Judge who declined to grant any interim relief favouring the prayer of the appellants writ petitioners. 19. However, this Court during pendency of appeal granted limited interim order though the appeals itself were against refusal of interim relief. Paragraph 14 from the case of Wander Ltd. Vs. Antox India Private Ltd. (supra) is set out:- Paragraph 14:- The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trail stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trail stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court’s exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph : (SCR 721) “…These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton ‘… the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case’.” 20. We therefore conclude that the University did not act arbitrarily, rather notified the impugned advertisement in exercise of the power vested in it under Section 54(c), and since Section 54(c) of the University of Calcutta Act, 1979 has also not been challenged and said provision having not ever been declared as ultra vires the act and action of the University was within its jurisdiction, therefore, was not legal. Learned Single Judge in exercise of judicial discretion rightly declined to grant interim order, as sought for in respect of the advertisement notice in question with its eligibility condition. 21. Therefore, the appeals and applications of the writ petitioners preferred against judgment and order dated June 13, 2017 passed by learned Trial Judge in AST No. 109 of 2017 are liable to be dismissed since no more point, as urged in the writ petition is left for any further consideration before us. All the appeals and connected applications preferred by the writ petitioners are accordingly dismissed. As a consequence thereof the appeal of the University being MAT No. 1099 of 2016 with application being CAN No. 5875 of 2016 preferred against order dated June 14, 2016 passed by learned Trial Judge in W.P. No. 10222(W) of 2016 also is disposed of in view of observations and findings made above. As a consequence thereof the appeal of the University being MAT No. 1099 of 2016 with application being CAN No. 5875 of 2016 preferred against order dated June 14, 2016 passed by learned Trial Judge in W.P. No. 10222(W) of 2016 also is disposed of in view of observations and findings made above. The interim order, extended by this Court allowing some breathing space to the writ petitioners/appellants, having no more bearing, is hereby vacated since the appellants not being eligible candidates in terms of the admission notice are not entitled to get any relief. 22. As a consequence thereof, the stay order dated 24th June, 2016 passed by this Bench in the CAN application 5875 of 2016 in MAT 1099 of 2016, as was time to time extended is made absolute. Since the said MAT also is disposed of along with other appeals under reference. 23. No order as to costs. 24. Certified Photostat copy be supplied.