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2017 DIGILAW 715 (HP)

Raghubeer Singh v. Hargopal Sood

2017-06-23

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2017
JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, Shimla on 21.11.2015, whereby, he allowed the application of the respondents No. 5 and 6 for impleading them as parties to the case. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the eviction proceedings against the petitioner is pending before the Court of learned Rent Controller, Shimla. It was respondents No. 1 to 4, who had initiated eviction proceedings against the petitioner on the grounds of arrears of rent and further fixation of fair rent as per law. 3. Thereafter, an application was moved by respondents No. 5 and 6 under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC for the impleadment in these proceedings on the allegations that they were subsequent purchasers of the premises in question. Though this application was resisted by the petitioner, however, the same came to be allowed as aforesaid. 4. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has filed instant petition mainly on the ground that there was no due assignment of the alleged arrears of rent in favour of the subsequent purchasers, therefore, there was no question of their being impleaded as party. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material placed on record. 5. At the outset, it would be noticed that though transferee landlords sought impleadment under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC, however, this Court is of the view that the application ought to have been moved under Section 146 or under Order 22, Rule 10 CPC. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, I deem it proper to treat this application as having been moved under Section 146 read with Order 22 CPC. 6. The issue whether a transferee landlord can be impleaded as a party came up for consideration before a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Brijesh Kumar Sood and Anr. v. Brig. K.K. Sood (Retd.) and Anr, Latest HLJ 2012 (HP) 507 , wherein it was observed as under:- 2. 6. The issue whether a transferee landlord can be impleaded as a party came up for consideration before a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Brijesh Kumar Sood and Anr. v. Brig. K.K. Sood (Retd.) and Anr, Latest HLJ 2012 (HP) 507 , wherein it was observed as under:- 2. Material facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as transferor landlord) filed petition under section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'' for brevity sake) against the petitioners/tenants (hereinafter referred to as ''tenants'' for convenience sake) on the grounds of non-payment of arrears of rent, tenant has acquired premises which are reasonably sufficient for him and his family requirement, subletting and lastly on the ground that premises under the occupation of tenant No. 1, namely, Brijesh Kumar Sood are bona fide required for carrying out construction of the building and rebuilding. Respondent No. 2 (hereinafter referred to as ''transferee landlord'') moved an application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for impleading him as party in the main petition, i.e. 51/2 of 2001. According to the averments contained in the application preferred by transferee landlord, he has purchased the premises in question vide sale deed dated 25.9.2004. According to him, he has stepped into the shoes of transferor landlord. The tenant filed reply to the same. The Rent Controller vide order dated 9.8.2005, allowed the application preferred under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The tenants preferred an appeal before the learned Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on 8.5.2007. Thereafter, tenants approached this Court. This Court dismissed the petition vide order dated 19.10.2010. However, while dismissing the petition, the Court had observed that the tenants had right to file revision against the impugned order dated 9.8.2005. It is in these circumstances, the present petition has been preferred against the order dated 9.8.2005. 6. In the instant case, the transferee landlord has moved an application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court is of the view that the transferee landlord should have moved application under section 146 or under Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. In the instant case, the transferee landlord has moved an application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court is of the view that the transferee landlord should have moved application under section 146 or under Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, in the interest of justice, an application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure preferred by transferee landlord will be deemed to have been moved under section 146 or under Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and others, (2001) 6 SCC 534 have held that seeking leave to continue suit after devolution of any interest during pendency of a suit is not obligatory. Their Lordships have further held that Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is based on principle that trial of a suit cannot be brought to an end merely because the interest of a party in the subject matter of the suit has devolved upon some other person or entity. Their Lordships have held as under: "6. In order to appreciate the points involved, it would be necessary to refer to the provisions of Order 22 of the Code, Rules 3 and 4 where of prescribe procedure in case of devolution of interest on the death of a party to a suit. Under these Rules, if a party dies and right to sue survives, the Court on an application made in that behalf is required to substitute legal representatives of the deceased party for proceeding with a suit but if such an application is not filed within the time prescribed by law, the suit shall abate so far as the deceased party is concerned. Rule 7 deals with the case of creation of an interest in a husband on marriage and Rule 8 deals with the case of assignment on the insolvency of a plaintiff. Rule 7 deals with the case of creation of an interest in a husband on marriage and Rule 8 deals with the case of assignment on the insolvency of a plaintiff. Rule 10 provides for cases of assignment, creation and devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit other than those referred to in the foregoing Rules and is based on the principle that the trial of a suit cannot be brought to an end merely because the interest of a party in the subject matter of suit is devolved upon another during its pendency but such a suit may be continued with the leave of the Court by or against the person upon whom such interest has devolved. But, if no such a step is taken, the suit may be continued with the original party and the person upon whom the interest has devolved will be bound by and can have the benefit of the decree, as the case may be, unless it is shown in a properly constituted proceeding that the original party being no longer interested in the proceeding did not vigorously prosecute or colluded with the adversary resulting in decision adverse to the party upon whom interest had devolved. The legislature while enacting Rules 3, 4 and 10 has made clear cut distinction. In cases covered by Rules 3 and 4, if right to sue survives and no application for bringing legal representatives of a deceased party is filed within the time prescribed, there is automatic abatement of the suit and procedure has been prescribed for setting aside abatement under Rule 9 on the grounds postulated therein. In cases covered by Rule 10, the legislature has not prescribed any such procedure in the event of failure to apply for leave of the Court to continue the proceeding by or against the person upon whom interest has devolved during the pendency of a suit which shows that the legislature was conscious of this eventuality and yet has not prescribed that failure would entail dismissal of the suit as it was intended that the proceeding would continue by or against the original party although he ceased to have any interest in the subject of dispute in the event of failure to apply for leave to continue by or against the person upon whom the interest has devolved for bringing him on the record. 7. 7. Under Rule 10, Order 22 of the Code, when there has been a devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against persons upon whom such interest has devolved and this entitles, the person who has acquired an interest in the subject matter of the litigation by an assignment or creation or devolution of interest pendente lite or suitor or any other person interested, to apply to the Court for leave to continue the suit. But it does not follow that it is obligatory upon them to do so. If a party does not ask for leave, he takes the obvious risk that the suit may not be properly conducted by the plaintiff on record, and yet, as pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Moti Lal v. Karab-ud-Din, (1898) ILR 25 Cal 179 , he will be bound by the result of the litigation even though he is not represented at the hearing unless it is shown that the litigation was not properly conducted by the original party or he colluded with the adversary. It is also plain that if the person who has acquired an interest by devolution, obtains leave to carry on the suit, the suit in his hands is not a new suit, for, as Lord Kingsdown of the Judicial Committee said in Prannath v. Rookea Begum, (1851-59) 7 Moo Ind App 323 , a cause of action is not prolonged by mere transfer of the title. It is the old suit carried on at his instance and he is bound by all proceedings up to the stage when he obtains leave to carry on the proceedings." 8. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal and others, (2004) 2 SCC 601 , have held that who is entitled to be but has not been brought on record under Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure in a pending suit or proceeding, would be entitled to prefer an appeal against the decree or order passed. Their Lordships have further held that an application not filed under Order 22, Rule 10 CPC stricto sensu could yet be held to be maintainable by having recourse to section 146 CPC. Their Lordships have held as under: "10. Their Lordships have further held that an application not filed under Order 22, Rule 10 CPC stricto sensu could yet be held to be maintainable by having recourse to section 146 CPC. Their Lordships have held as under: "10. The law laid down by a four-Judges Bench of this Court in Smt. Sajla Bala Dassi v. Sm. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and anr., 1958 SCR 1287 , is apt for resolving the issue arising for decision herein. A transferee of property from defendant during the pendency of the suit sought himself to be brought on record at the stage of appeal. The High Court dismissed the application as it was pressed only by reference to Order 22, Rule 10 of the CPC and it was conceded by the applicant that, not being a person who had obtained a transfer pending appeal, he was not covered within the scope of Order 22, Rule 10. In an appeal preferred by such transferee this Court upheld the view of the High Court that a transferee prior to the filing of the appeal could not be brought on record in appeal by reference to Order 22, Rule 10 of the CPC. However, the Court held that an appeal is a proceeding for the purposes of Section 146 and further the expression "claiming under" is wide enough to include cases of devolution and assignment mentioned in Order 22, Rule 10. Whoever is entitled to be but has not been brought on record under Order 22, Rule 10 in a pending suit or proceeding would be entitled to prefer an appeal against the decree or order passed therein if his assignor could have filed such an appeal, there being no prohibition against it in the Code. A person having acquired an interest in suit property during the pendency of the suit and seeking to be brought on record at the stage of the appeal can do so by reference to section 146 of the CPC which provision being a beneficent provision should be construed liberally and so as to advance justice and not in a restricted or technical sense. Their Lordships held that being a purchaser pendente lite, a person will be bound by the proceedings taken by the successful party in execution of decree and justice requires that such purchaser should be given an opportunity to protect his rights. 12. In Sardar Govindrao Mahadik and anr. Their Lordships held that being a purchaser pendente lite, a person will be bound by the proceedings taken by the successful party in execution of decree and justice requires that such purchaser should be given an opportunity to protect his rights. 12. In Sardar Govindrao Mahadik and anr. v. Devi Sahai and others, 1982(1) SCC 237 , this Court held that an application not falling under Order 22, Rule 10 of the CPC stricto sensu could yet be held to be maintainable by having recourse to section 146 of the CPC." 9. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Amit Kumar Shaw and another v. Farida Khatoon and another, (2005) 11 SCC 403 have held that transferee can be joined both under Order 22, Rule 10 or Order 1, Rule 10 and section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships have explained the entire gamut of Order 22, Rule 10 or Order 1, Rule 10 and section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure as under: "11. The application under Order 22, Rule 10 can be made to the appellate Court even though the devolution of interest occurred when the case was pending in the trial Court. In the instant case, the suit was decreed in favour of Fakir Mohammad by judgment and decree dated 03.11.1989. The suit was contested by two sets of defendants, one set of defendants was Birendra Nath Dey and Kalyani Dey and other set of defendants was Jagat Mohan Das alone. The appeals were preferred by the parties. Both the appeals were heard and by a common judgment and order dated 25.6.1992, the said appeals were allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the Munsif was set aside. By a deed of Assignment dated 15.12.1995, the said Birendra Nath Dey assigned his leasehold right in respect of 132 A Circular Garden Reach Road, presently known as 132 A, Karl Marx Sarani), Kolkata in favour of the appellants. By a deed of sale executed on 15.12.1995, duly registered with the Additional Registrar of Assurances, Calcutta, Kalyani Dey Sold the property being 132 B of the above address to the other appellant. The second appeals filed by the parties were pending on the file of the High Court at Calcutta. The appellants had no knowledge of the second appeals. By a deed of sale executed on 15.12.1995, duly registered with the Additional Registrar of Assurances, Calcutta, Kalyani Dey Sold the property being 132 B of the above address to the other appellant. The second appeals filed by the parties were pending on the file of the High Court at Calcutta. The appellants had no knowledge of the second appeals. Thereafter on verification, the appellants came to know about the pendency of the appeals which necessitated them to file the applications for substitution in the second appeals. In the meanwhile, the appellants filed the applications before the Municipal authorities for mutation of their names in respect of the property on 24.12.2002 and the Municipal authority informed the appellants that they are not in a position to mutate the names of the appellants of the property in question because of the pendency of the two second appeals before the High Court at Calcutta. Thereafter the appellants engaged an advocate to find out whether any such appeals have been filed by the parties. The advocate so engaged informed the appellants that two appeals being S.A.Nos. 631 and 632 of 1993 were filed by Fakir Mohammad, Farida Khatoon & Ors. Respondent Nos. herein. It was also informed that the said appeals were admitted by the High Court but the impugned judgment and order was neither prayed for stay nor stayed. Therefore, it was also submitted by the appellants that since the appellants have become the absolute owners of the property, their interest will be highly prejudiced and they will be vitally affected, if any order is passed by the High Court without hearing the appellants in the matter. Therefore, they prayed that the appellants are to be substituted in place and stead of the present respondents, since they have no existing and subsisting right, title or interest in the property. 12. Under Order 22, Rule 10, no detailed inquiry at the stage of granting leave is contemplated. The Court has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit by or against the person on whom the interest has devolved by assignment or devolution. The question about the existence and validity of the assignment or devolution can be considered at the final hearing of the proceedings. The Court has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit by or against the person on whom the interest has devolved by assignment or devolution. The question about the existence and validity of the assignment or devolution can be considered at the final hearing of the proceedings. The Court has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit. 17. In the instant case, the applications for substitution were filed by the respective appellants in the second appeals which are still pending on the file of the High Court though it was filed in the year 1993. The appellants have properly, sufficiently and satisfactorily explained the delay in approaching the Court. We see bona fide in their explanation in not coming to the Court at the earliest point of time. Therefore, the appellants who are transferees pendente lite should be made as parties to the pending second appeals as prayed for by them. In our opinion, the High court has committed serious error in not ordering the applications for substitution filed by the appellants. In our view, the presence of the appellants are absolutely necessary in order to decide the appeals on merits. Since the High Court has committed error by rejecting the appellants'' applications for substitution treating the same as additional parties and thereby rendering the appellants non-suited. We have no hesitation in setting aside the said orders and permit the appellants to come on record by way of substitution as prayed for. The High Court proceeded on a wrong premise that the appellants had made the application for addition of party whereas the application under consideration was for substitution as the owner had sold the suit property to the appellants and had no interest in the pending litigation. 18. In our opinion, the presence of the appellants was absolutely necessary since the appellants are the only persons who has got subsisting right, title and interest in the suit. The appellants are at liberty to contest the matter on merits." 10. 18. In our opinion, the presence of the appellants was absolutely necessary since the appellants are the only persons who has got subsisting right, title and interest in the suit. The appellants are at liberty to contest the matter on merits." 10. Learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in Roshan Lal Devi Dass and others v. Man Mohan Chopra, AIR 1971 Delhi 201 has held that the eviction proceeding does not become incompetent on transfer of property by landlord during its pendency and same can be maintained and continued by the landlord and the transferee. Learned Single Judge has held as under: "17. As regards the objection raised by Mr. Marwah to the application that applicants in C.M. No. 1408-J of 1970 be impleaded, I find that there is no force in it. If the contention of Mr. Marwah is that ...... because of conveyance the applicants alone are entitled to maintain the present revision petition, then no objection can be taken if permission is given to them to be impleaded to the present petition. If, on the other hand, as was contended by Mr. Marwah that the assignment had not taken place even then, the original petitioners are on record and are competent to maintain the petition. It is laid down in Sukhdip Singh v. Arjan Singh, AIR 1961 Punj 326 that the person acquiring the interest of a party to legal proceedings may continue the same but it does not by itself incapacitate the original party from continuing the proceedings and the former is bound and can benefit by the steps taken by the latter. Thus the original petitioners can maintain the present the present petition even if they had assigned their full rights to the applicants in C.M. No. 1408-J of 1970. 18. It has also been held by the Supreme Court in Ramchander Narsey and Co. v. Warmanrao V. Shenoy, 1969 Ren CR 398 : (AI 1969 NSC 72) that if a suit has been validly instituted the same cannot be dismissed on the sole ground that the original landlord had assigned his rights to a subsequent transferee. Their Lordships have held that once a suit has been validly instituted, a decree must necessarily follow unless the law prescribes otherwise. Their Lordships have held that once a suit has been validly instituted, a decree must necessarily follow unless the law prescribes otherwise. The argument that as arrears of rent were due to the previous landlord and by assigning they became mere debt and therefore would not furnish a cause of action subsequently was not accepted by their Lordships. In that case they distinguished the decision of AIR 1960 Calcutta 278 which was cited by Mr. Marwah. Mr. Marwah in this connection referred me to the authority of Madan Lal v. Harkishan Lal, (1966) 68 Pun L 14 and contended that after the transfer was made by the original landlord the eviction proceedings could not have been continued. Assuming that this authority lays down the law correctly, the present application in C.M. 1408-J of 1970 has been filed to serve this very purpose. In this very authority it has been observed that no application was made by the transferor landlord to implead the transferee or by the transferee to be impleaded as a party in these proceedings. In the absence of such an application, his Lordship held that the eviction proceedings could not be continued. In the present case, however C.M. 1408-J of 1970 has been filed with a specific request that the transferee of the original landlord be impleaded as parties to the petition. If that application is allowed, the objection that the original petitioners were landlords and had transferred their rights and that there was no landlord before the Court no longer survives. This is another good reason why the application of the applicants for being impleaded should be allowed. I may observe that the observations of the learned Judge in (1966) 68 Pun LR 14 that the moment the property was sold by the landlord, the eviction proceedings could not continue would seem to run counter to the AIR 1961 Punj 326 (to which Mahajan, J. was a party) wherein it has been observed that the original party is not incapacitated from continuing the proceedings even if he has transferred rights during the pendency of the suit. Another Division Bench of Punjab High Court in Pritam Singh v. Raja Ram, AIR 1964 Punj 363 has also held that a transferee from a landlord can claim ejectment of the tenant on the ground of a subsisting sub-lease which was entered into during the time of his predecessor-in-interest so long as sublease took place after the commencement of the Act and without the written consent of the landlord. It was sought to be urged before the Bench that the word ''landlord'' must be restricted to the landlord during whose terms the sublease had taken place. This plea was negatived and it was held that a transferee from a landlord can maintain eviction petition and that right was not restricted to the original landlord. The observations of Mahajan, J. in (1960) 68 Pun LR 14 if meant to lay down that an application for eviction becomes incompetent if during its pendency the landlord transfers the property even though the transferee seeks to be impleaded would seem to run counter to 1969 Ren CR 398= (AIR 1969 NSC 72) where their Lordships did not accept the plea that the eviction application has to fail simply on the ground that there has been a transfer of interest by the landlord after the filing of an eviction application. It has been clearly laid down in that authority that a suit validly instituted will not be defeated by the mere fact of the transfer of the property, the eviction application which may have been properly filed could not be proceeded by the transferee. As a tenant can take benefit of a permission having been given by the original landlord and cannot be evicted because no permission was taken from the transferee of the landlord as was held in AIR 1964 Punj 363 similarly if a proper application had been filed by the original landlord the same can be maintained and continued by the transferee of the landlord and it will not be dismissed on the mere ground that the application is no longer maintainable. This argument restricts the meaning of the word ''landlord'' to the person who filed eviction application and seeks to bar the transferee or even the legal representatives from continuing the application. No justification in any principle can be spelled out for such an extreme proposition. This argument restricts the meaning of the word ''landlord'' to the person who filed eviction application and seeks to bar the transferee or even the legal representatives from continuing the application. No justification in any principle can be spelled out for such an extreme proposition. It would be seen that the judgment of Mahajan J. was based on the fact that before him there was no landlord because the transferee had not applied to be impleaded as a Lordship took the view that the original landlord had ceased to be landlord and the transferee was not before him and therefore eviction order could not be passed. This authority, therefore cannot support the contention that applicants in C.M. No. 1408-J of 1970 cannot be impleaded in the revision petition. I would, therefore direct that applicants in Civil Misc. No. 1408-J of 1970 be also impleaded as petitioners to the Civil Revision No. 450-D of 1963 and I order accordingly." 11. It is not in dispute that the transferee landlord has purchased the suit premises vide sale deed 25.9.2004. The transferor landlord has filed petition under section 14 of the Act on the grounds of non payment of arrears of rent, tenant has acquired premises, which are reasonably sufficient for him and his family members'' requirements, sub-letting and the suit premises were bona fide required by the transferor landlord for building and rebuilding. It is also pleaded that the transferor landlord has sufficient resources at his disposal for carrying out building and re-building. 12. The application has been preferred by the transferee landlord under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure after he purchased the property vide sale deed dated 25.9.2004. The Court is of the considered view that after the suit premises have been purchased by the transferee landlord, this subsequent development has to be taken into consideration by the Court. 7. Now, the question whether the transferee landlords, who have stepped into the shoes of landlords can lay claim to non payment of arrears of rent is concerned, this question too is no longer res intergra, and answered in Brijesh Kumar Sood''s case supra, and it was observed as under:- 15. Now, this Court will advert to the question: whether the transferee landlord will step into the shoes of transferor landlord as far as the non-payment of arrears of rent are concerned. Now, this Court will advert to the question: whether the transferee landlord will step into the shoes of transferor landlord as far as the non-payment of arrears of rent are concerned. This question is no more res integra in view of the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Jagannadhan and others, (1982) 3 SCC 365 . The Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that arrears of rent do not lose their character and become an actionable claim on assignment. It has further been held that eviction proceedings can be maintained by successor landlord on ground of arrears of rent. The Hon''ble Supreme Court has held as under: "1. This special leave petition is directed against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High court confirming an order of eviction passed against the petitioner. I do not see any reason to interfere With the Order passed by the High court, but there is one point to which I must refer) and that arises out of a decision of the Calcutta High court in Daya Debi v. Chapala Debi . That decision has taken the view that when a claim for arrears of rent is assigned by A to B, it loses the character of a claim for rent as Soon as it is assigned and it becomes merely an actionable claim. This view is, of course, not shared by most of the other High courts and even the Calcutta High court itself in other decisions has not accepted this view. It does appear to me that this view is not correct because it is difficult to see how a claim for arrears of rent ceases to be such when it is assigned by the owner when he transfers his properties to another. So far as the tenant is concerned, the amount remains payable by him to the successor landlord as arrears of rent because that is his own liability and it does not acquire any other character. And so also when the successor landlord claims the amount assigned to him his cause of action against the tenant would be for arrears of rent because there is no other basis on which he found his cause of action against the tenant. And so also when the successor landlord claims the amount assigned to him his cause of action against the tenant would be for arrears of rent because there is no other basis on which he found his cause of action against the tenant. There is, therefore, no doubt that in the present case the 151 respondent who was the assignee of the claim for arrears of rent from the predecessor landlady was entitled to recover the arrears of rent from the petitioner and the arrears of rent were due from tile petitioner to the 1st respondent at the date when the application was made before the Rent Controller by the 1st respondent for an order of eviction against the petitioner. The special leave petition is accordingly rejected but in view of the fact that the petitioner has been in possession of the premises for a considerable time, I direct that the order for eviction passed against the petitioner shall not be executed against him until 30/05/1978 and on the petitioner filing an affidavit in this court on or before July 55, 1077 undertaking to thi9 court that he will hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the premises to the 1st respondent on or before that date. In case such affidavit is not filed by the petitioner, the order for eviction shall become executable forthwith." 13. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Girdhari Lal (dead) by legal representatives v. Hukam Singh and others, 1977 (1) R.C.J. 509 has held as under: "9. An objection based upon the proviso the section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act was, we think rightly, disposed of by the High Court as follows: "The next objection is that under the proviso to Section 109 of the Transfer, of Property Act the transferee is not entitled to arrears of rent due before the transfer. In our opinion he is ordinarily not so entitled unless there is a contract to the contrary. There was an express contract to the contrary contained in the compromise petition which was incorporated in the compromise decree passed by the Court." 14. Learned Single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shankar Sahai v. Kanmal and others, 1971 R.C.J. 826 has held that after the transfer of property, all rights are transferred, including right to recover rent. Learned Single Judge has held as under: "5. Learned Single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shankar Sahai v. Kanmal and others, 1971 R.C.J. 826 has held that after the transfer of property, all rights are transferred, including right to recover rent. Learned Single Judge has held as under: "5. It is an admitted fact that on June 4, 1957, Kanmal ceased to have any right, title or interest in the suit property and the same was relinquished in favour of Dashrathmal. That being so, the principle laid down in section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act will apply and Dashrathmal alone became the principle underlying section 109 of the Act is that the rights attached to property which arise out of possession and control of property will pass with the property. Qui in jus deminiunve alterius succeedit jure ejus uti debet. When Kanmal ceased to have any right, title interest in the suit property he ceased to be the defendant''s landlord and it is Dashrathmal who became the landlord and the right to recover rent vested in Dashrathmal with effect from June 4, 1957. 6. Shri Patankar''s contention is that attainment is automatic. A change of relationship of landlord and tenant will require an act of the lessee to so elect. The learned counsel reads the words "and, if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the owner of it" as to mean that a tenant of the transferee continues until the lessee so elects to become tenant of the transferee. In my opinion that is not a correct reading of the section. The words just now quoted relate to the liability of the lessor. The rule is that obligations without the consent of him to whom they are owed cannot be assigned. Therefore, if an obligation is transferred by the lessor, even so, the liabilities of the lessor continue until the lessee so elects that the transferee be subject to such liabilities. There is nothing in section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act which makes it dependent on the election of the lessee to continue to be the lessee of the transferor and not become the lessee of the transferee. This view was also taken in Pyarelalsa v. Garanchandsa (supra) and is supported by the decision in Jagannath v. Ramzan (supra)." 15. This view was also taken in Pyarelalsa v. Garanchandsa (supra) and is supported by the decision in Jagannath v. Ramzan (supra)." 15. The Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Pallapothu Narasimha Rao and another v. Kidanbi Radha Krishnamacharyulu, AIR 1978 AP 319 has held that the definition of ''landlord'' would include not only the original owner but every person who becomes the owner of the building by reason of transfer or otherwise. The Full Bench has further held that the transferee would be also a landlord within the meaning of section 2(6) and would be entitled to continue the proceedings initiated by the original owner. The Full Bench has further held that the provisions of Order 22, Rule 10 C.P.C. in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act may be applied to the proceedings under the Act. The Full Bench has held as under: "22. In that case the landlord filed a petition for eviction which was ordered by the Rent Controller. The tenant preferred an appeal to the learned Subordinate Judge. During the pendency of the appeal, the landlord sold the premises to the petitioner herein and the petitioner was added as the second respondent in the appeal before the Sub Court on 9.7.1974 in I.A. No. 1713/72. The appeal was allowed and the petitioner (Purchaser of the property) has preferred this revision. It is contended by Sri Suryanarayanamurthy that the revision petition is not maintainable at the instance of the petitioner who is the purchaser of the property. He submitted that the lower appellate court erred in adding the petition as second respondent in the appeal before it under Order 22, Rule 10 CPC. His case is that Order 22, Rule 10 CPC is not applicable to proceedings under the Rent Control Act and it is the original owner alone that has to continue the proceedings and file a revision petition. We regret we are unable to accept this contention. Section 2 (6) defines ''landlord'' meaning the owner of a building and includes a person who is receiving and who is entitled to receive rent of a building. It is clear therefore that the definition of ''landlord'' would include not only the original owner but every person who becomes the owner of the building by reason of transfer or otherwise. Section 2 (6) defines ''landlord'' meaning the owner of a building and includes a person who is receiving and who is entitled to receive rent of a building. It is clear therefore that the definition of ''landlord'' would include not only the original owner but every person who becomes the owner of the building by reason of transfer or otherwise. The transferee would therefore be also a landlord within the meaning of section 2 (6) and would be entitled to continue the proceedings initiated by the original owner. As a matter of fact he could have come on record in the place of the original owner in the appeal by virtue of this definition alone without having regard to Order 22, Rule 10 CPC and the order of the court below impleading him as the respondent could be justified even without referring to order rule 10 CPC. Further we are of the view that the provisions of CPC in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act may be applied to the proceedings under the Act. Vide Hari Kishan Singh v. B. Narayana (1969 (2) APLJ 290) . Further even if the provisions of CPC are strictly not applicable, the principles underlying them can be applied to proceedings under the Rent Control Act so long as they are not inconsistent with the provision of the Act or the rules made thereunder. Reliance was placed upon the decision of this court in Seetharama Murthy Raju v. Rama Raju (1964 (1) And WR 213) . We do not think it has any application to the facts of the case. In that case the landlord filed a petition for eviction and during the pendency of the proceedings sold the property under a sale deed, one of the conditions of which was that the vendor will take all proceedings at his own coast to get the tenants evicted from the land and deliver possession of the same. The original owner therefore preferred an appeal. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that as the landlord had parted with his right he could not prefer the appeal. This court held that the landlord could continue the proceedings. The original owner therefore preferred an appeal. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that as the landlord had parted with his right he could not prefer the appeal. This court held that the landlord could continue the proceedings. It is therefore seen that this court was concerned with a converse case, namely, whether the landlord who had parted with the property could continue the proceedings or whether it was necessary for the transferee to come on record and continue the proceedings. The decision is not an authority for the proposition that the transferee is not entitled to step into the shoes of the original owner and continue the proceedings. It is to be noted that this decision related to Andhra Tenancy Act which is not in pari materia with the Rent Control Act. Further it is also to be noticed that the transferee was added as second respondent in the appeal in the lower court. No objection was taken by the tenant to the present petitioner being added as second respondent. We do not think this is a proper case to permit the respondent to raise a contention that the petitioner cannot continue the proceedings and file a revision petition as he had not questioned the order of the court below permitting him to come on record as second respondent." 16. Learned Single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ashok Kumar Kailashchand v. Ram Charan Mool Chand and others, 1979 (1) R.C.J 100. has held that the transferee is entitled to continue with the proceedings and to obtain decree of eviction if there is default in payment of arrears of rent by the tenant. Learned Single Judge has held as under: "3. Seeming ingenuity does not pay in the Court of law as elsewhere. The argument put forth by the respondent No. 1 is absolutely misconceived as demonstrated hereinafter. The original landlord had the right to claim eviction on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent despite service of notice of demand. He himself had actually instituted the suit on the said ground. The effect of assignment of the suit house during the pendency of the suit naturally was that the assignee got all the rights of the lessor including the right to enforce the claim in suit for eviction of the tenant. He himself had actually instituted the suit on the said ground. The effect of assignment of the suit house during the pendency of the suit naturally was that the assignee got all the rights of the lessor including the right to enforce the claim in suit for eviction of the tenant. The right to evict the defendant/tenant also passed with the transfer of the demised premises. This is the effect of section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. All the rights including the right to enforce the claim in suit for eviction automatically reverted to the assignee. Even otherwise, there remains no doubt in this position because the wide definition of the terms ''landlord'' as given in section 2 (1) of the Act covers an assignee of the landlord also. The definition is in consonance with the provisions of section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. One, therefore, cannot say that after obtaining the suit house on transfer from the original landlord, the transferee could not prosecute the suit for eviction on the ground under section 12 (1)(a) of the Act. 4. It is true that in cases where eviction is sought on grounds, which are personal to the particular landlord there may be scope to contend that the particular need cases to exists, but, where eviction is sought not on such personal grounds like that of bona fide genuine need of the landlord but is on such grounds like default in payment of rent which had given rise to a right in favour of the landlord to evict the tenant, the said right definitely passed to the transferee and the suit on such a ground can be continued and decreed. The argument put forth by the landlord counsel for the respondent No. 1 could have been sustained if the original landlord might not have instituted the suit on the ground under section 12 (1)(a) of the Act after making the demand of arrears of rent before, transferring the suit house. In that case, the amount of arrears of rent, even if assigned to the transferee, could have been in the nature of a debt and could not be demanded and recovered as arrears of rent by the assignee. In that case, the amount of arrears of rent, even if assigned to the transferee, could have been in the nature of a debt and could not be demanded and recovered as arrears of rent by the assignee. But in the present case, the position is not so and this is the distinguishing feature of the present case with that of the decision in N.K. Kame v. Biharilal (1969 R.C.J. 307) . In that case, the suit was instituted by the transferee landlord by contending that the amount of arrears of rent which had been assigned to him while selling the house was not paid by the tenant on demand. In that case it was held that on assignment of the amount due towards arrears of rent, the same became a debut and, therefore, could not be made the basis for claiming eviction under section 12 (1)(a) read with section 13 of the Act. In the present case, the suit having been already instituted after making a demand of arrears of rent and the defendant-tenant having failed to comply with the same within the prescribed period of two months, the original plaintiff did acquire a rightly to evict the tenant under section 12 (1)(a) of the Act. It was the said right which he enforced by filing the present suit. With the assignment of the demised premises those rights passed over to the transferee, i.e., the present appellant and, if the trial court decreed the claim for eviction in the context of the undisputed circumstances, as stated earlier, there was no error of law or of fact in the judgment and decree of said court. Similar was the view taken in the case of Chandmal v. Inayat Khan and others ( 1972 J.L.J. Note 23.) . The lower appellate Court, therefore, committed an error of law in setting aside the judgment and decree of trial court." 20. It is evident in view of the definitive law laid down in the above cited judgments that the transferee landlord can continue proceedings seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent. 8. The lower appellate Court, therefore, committed an error of law in setting aside the judgment and decree of trial court." 20. It is evident in view of the definitive law laid down in the above cited judgments that the transferee landlord can continue proceedings seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent. 8. Apart from the legal position set out above, it would be noticed that the sale deed executed by respondents No. 1 to 4 in favour of respondents No. 5 and 6 vide sale deed dated 26.6.2013, the purchasers i.e. respondents No. 5 and 6 have been specifically conferred with the right to pursue any case or continue with any court case already filed against any person including the tenants pertaining to the said property as would be evident from clause 13 of the sale deed which reads thus:- "13. That the purchasers shall have the right to pursue any case or continue with any court case already filed against any person including tenants pertaining to the said property & the sellers shall have no objection regarding the same in any manner in future." 17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed accordingly, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.