JUDGMENT : K.N. Suryanarayan, the petitioner, owned a building with ten tenements (shops), leased out to various tenants, within the jurisdiction of the Kerala Water Authority. He purchased the tenement building in 1988 through a registered deed of conveyance. By then, Suryanarayan’s predecessor had let out all the ten shop rooms to various tenants. Suryanarayan had to wage a protracted legal battle against those tenants, going up to the Supreme Court, to have them vacated. 2. All the ten shop rooms have door numbers assigned by the Cochin Corporation. As seen from the table incorporated in the additional affidavit filed by Suryanarayan, the shop we are concerned with bears a new door number—40/5918—initially in the occupation of one M/s. Marikkar Motors Ltd., which also had another shop as a tenant. But that is of no concern. 3. Initially, the Water Authority raised a bill in the name of one Mr. Seetha Rama Iyer, the original owner, and served it on the tenant demanding payment of water charges. But the tenant, through Ext.P1, replied that the shop room never had any water connection. At any rate, he informed the Water Authority that the notice could be served on the present owner, i.e., Suryanarayan. The tenant, in fact, took care of providing the owner’s address, too. But, it seems, the Water Authority did not immediately act. 4. On 12.11.2008, the Water Authority served Ext.P2 disconnection notice in the name of the original owner, Suryanarayan’s vendor. But Suryanarayan received it because, by then, the tenant, having lost his case before the Supreme Court, vacated the room. After receiving the disconnection notice, Suryanarayan submitted Ext.P3 reply on 28.11.2008. He had, in detail, explained his position, besides asserting that the shop room—for that matter, the entire building—never had any water connection. Still, the Water Authority persisted with its demand and issued Ext.P4 notice insisting that their record revealed that the shop room had water connection and the owner should pay. 5. Aggrieved, Suryanarayan filed this writ petition in 2008. This Court, at the inception, on 19.12.2008, issued an interim direction staying the recovery of the impugned Ext.P2 demand by the Water Authority on condition that Suryanarayan should pay Rs.40,000/- to the Water Authority within two weeks. Suryanarayan complied. 6. 5. Aggrieved, Suryanarayan filed this writ petition in 2008. This Court, at the inception, on 19.12.2008, issued an interim direction staying the recovery of the impugned Ext.P2 demand by the Water Authority on condition that Suryanarayan should pay Rs.40,000/- to the Water Authority within two weeks. Suryanarayan complied. 6. As further seen from the record, the matter was referred to the Mega Lok Adalat, before which Suryanarayan expressed his willingness to have the matter settled amicably by forgoing Rs.40,000/- he had already deposited. This was besides his consistent plea that the shop room had no water connection. The counsel representing the Water Authority, then, took time to get instructions. Nothing happened thereafter. At least, the record discloses no further developments. 7. Now, when the matter was taken up for hearing, Smt. R. Ranjini, Suryanarayan’s counsel, has submitted that it has been Suryanarayan’s consistent plea that not only the shop room but also the entire building had no water connection. In this regard, she has drawn my attention to the reply issued by the tenant, which had, in fact, been inimically disposed of towards Suryanarayan, for he had initiated eviction proceedings against it. But even the tenant had asserted that it had received the bill only for the first time in its long occupation of the building and that the shop never had any water connection. That apart, it asked the Water Authority to serve the bill on Suryanarayan, the owner. 8. Smt. Ranjini has further submitted that the respondent authorities only went on persisting with the demand for payment but never cared to inspect the building to ascertain whether it had a water connection. 9. As to the further developments, Smt. Ranjini submits that Suryanarayan, in course of time, dismantled the old, dilapidated building, and constructed a hotel, in partnership. According to her, now the respondent authorities refuse to entertain Suryanarayan’s request to provide water connection unless he clears the alleged dues. She has submitted that Suryanarayan has obtained all other necessary statutory permissions, but he could not commence the business because of the Water Authority’s stand. 10. The learned Standing Counsel for the Water Authority, on the other hand, submits that the Water Authority came into existence on 01.03.1991. It had all the records handed over by the Public Health and Engineering Department, its predecessor. 10. The learned Standing Counsel for the Water Authority, on the other hand, submits that the Water Authority came into existence on 01.03.1991. It had all the records handed over by the Public Health and Engineering Department, its predecessor. According to him, the records would amply demonstrate that Suryanarayan’s building had water connection and he is bound to pay the charges demanded. 11. Heard Smt. Ranjini, the learned counsel for Suryanarayan, and the learned Standing Counsel for the Water Authority, besides perusing the record. 12. As has been rightly contended by Suryanarayan, first the tenant in occupation of the shop room denied its having the water connection at any point. But it, nevertheless, suggested that the authority might serve the bill on the owner. The Water Authority did not. At any rate, two years later, it issued a disconnection notice. Then, Suryanarayan came to know about the demand and issued the Ext.P3 reply. Given the contradictory stand taken by both the tenant and, two years later, by the owner, the authorities could have physically inspected the building to ascertain the fact. Again, they did not. On the other hand, the Water Authority’s Assistant Executive Engineer issued Ext.P4 reiterating the demand. He has, in fact, asserted that the record reveals that Suryanarayan’s shop had water connection. 13. This Court initially referred the matter to the “Mega Lok Adalat”, Suryanarayan agreed to forego Rs.40,000/- he paid initially to comply with the interim direction. According to the learned counsel, Suryanarayan wanted to buy peace and further develop his property. The authorities then took time. But they did not report to the Court the Water Authority’s stand. 14. Though it was not borne out by record, Suryanarayan’s counsel, in fact, submitted that there was another adalat held by the Water Authority itself, and in that, too, Suryanarayan repeated his request to have the matter settled amicably. Now, across the Bar, Suryanarayan’s counsel has produced a copy of the Water Authority Adalat’s proceedings. The authority recorded that since the matter had been pending before this Court, it would not be proper for them to settle the matter. Strange is the logic. 15. Regardless, because of the persistent denial both by the tenant and, later, by the owner, the authorities could have physically inspected the building to ascertain whether the shop room had any water connection. Strange is the logic. 15. Regardless, because of the persistent denial both by the tenant and, later, by the owner, the authorities could have physically inspected the building to ascertain whether the shop room had any water connection. I fail to understand why they did not undertake that exercise. As to the Adalat, true, this Court could not hold that the authorities should force themselves into a compromise. If the Water Authority has a legitimate demand, it can persist with that one and realize the amount, for it is public money. 16. Though the matter has been pending for the past nine years, the authorities have not deemed it proper to file their counter affidavit— leave alone place any records to support their contentions. On 07.04.2017 Suryanarayan filed an additional affidavit placing on record the later developments and also urging this Court to have the matter heard expeditiously. At least then, the Water Authority could have woken up from its slumber. But it did not. 17. Today, the learned Standing Counsel asserts that the authorities had acted only going by the records, which amply, according to him, established that there was water connection. Absent pleadings and absent records, this Court is handicapped to examine that counter contention. It is trite to observe that any plea uncontroverted or non-traversed either for lack of pleadings of denial or for lack of countervailing evidence, the Court would be compelled to draw an adverse inference against the party that remained silent, despite an accusing finger pointing towards it. The courts have consistently held that once there is an allegation or an assertion about the existence of a fact, it is the bounden duty of the adversary to place before the court the countervailing evidence or, at least, a pleading of denial. Indisputably, no burden is cast on the respondent to disprove Suryanarayan’s case. But once Suryanarayan establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts. Unless the dispute involves a pure question of law, neither of the parties can advance arguments without pleadings or supporting materials. 18. Here, despite having spent—nay, wasted—a decade’s time, the respondent authorities are grossly negligent in defending a public cause, namely recovering money from a party, if there be truth in their assertion. 19. Unless the dispute involves a pure question of law, neither of the parties can advance arguments without pleadings or supporting materials. 18. Here, despite having spent—nay, wasted—a decade’s time, the respondent authorities are grossly negligent in defending a public cause, namely recovering money from a party, if there be truth in their assertion. 19. I cannot but uphold Suryanarayan’s contention that the Water Authority could not sustain its demand for recovering water charges without, in the first place, establishing that the building or the shop room had a water connection. A disputed question it may be, but the Water Authority has not even taken that plea. Nor could it rebut the allegation. I, therefore, quash Exts.P2 and P4. So the Water Authority is directed to refund Rs.40,000/- initially deposited by Suryanarayan in compliance with this Court’s interim direction, along with simple interest @6%. Given the gross negligence displayed by the Water Authority in defending itself before the Court of Law, I allow this writ petition with a cost of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) to be credited to the Kerala State Legal Services Authority. I, however, leave it open for the Water Authority to realize the amount from its erring officials.