JUDGMENT : Introduction: A contract-employee claims pay parity. For the regular employees, the employer revised the pay, retrospectively. It has, in fact, applied the pay revision to the contract-employee, too, but prospectively. Is the contract-employee entitled to pay parity retrospectively? Facts: 2. Joseph Didakose K.G., an engineering graduate, joined the Cochin Port Trust as an Engineer-in-Charge on a contract basis. The Port Trust, the employer, issued the appointment proceedings on 02.09.2008 through Ext.P1. Joseph actually joined the service on 09.09.2008. As his appointment was contractual and on a consolidated pay of Rs.27,000/-, he had his contract renewed yearly until he resigned on 17.03.2012. 3. While Joseph was in service, the Port Trust had Ext.P5 pay revision dated 26.07.2010, which was, however, made applicable retrospectively from 01.01.2007. Indeed, the revision of pay concerns the regular employees. 4. As seen from the record, with effect from 01.05.2011, Joseph was given the benefit of the pay revision. Later, Joseph, after ceasing to be an employee, claimed that he ought to have been extended the benefit of the pay revision from the date he had joined the services because the pay revision was retrospectively implemented from the date beyond his joining the Port Trust. His claim rejected, Joseph has filed this writ petition. Submissions: Petitioner's: 5. Smt. Sreekala T.N., the learned counsel for Joseph, has straight away drawn my attention to Ext.P1 appointment order, which contains Joseph's service conditions. Though it specifically fixes the consolidated pay, Clause 55 of the order, according to her, specifies that the other terms will be as per BR. No. 17 dated 09.06.2006. In that context, she has drawn my attention to Ext.P8, the agenda, dated 09.06.2006, of the Board of Trustees of the Port Trust. It records that "the terms and conditions are being fixed for remunerating the Engineers appointed on a contract basis on the principle that people doing the same work with the same responsibilities must be given equal remuneration." 6. Smt. Sreekala, then, has drawn my attention to Ext.P7, which contains the terms for engaging contract Engineers-in-Charge at the Port Trust. It records that "the terms and conditions are being fixed for remunerating the Engineers appointed on a contract basis on the principle that people doing the same work with the same responsibilities must be given equal remuneration." 6. Smt. Sreekala, then, has drawn my attention to Ext.P7, which contains the terms for engaging contract Engineers-in-Charge at the Port Trust. In fact, Clause 2, dealing with the consolidated salary, expressly records that the pay will be revised if there is any revision in the salary of Engineers-in-Charge "such that the pay will be based on the total emoluments in the scale of Engineer-in-Charges in Cochin Port Trust." Therefore, in the end, Smt. Sreekala contends that the Port Trust ought to have paid Joseph the revised pay from the day he joined the service. To support her contentions, Smt. Sreekala has relied on State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh (2017) 1 SCC 148 . Respondent-Port Trust's: 7. Per contra, Sri K. Ananad, the learned Senior Counsel for the Port Trust has, with equal vehemence, contended that Ext.P1 reveals that Joseph was appointed only on a consolidated pay, and that pay stood fixed. According to him, the principle of equal pay for equal work is a discarded principle–a legal assertion beyond its sell-by date. In elaboration, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that many factors will influence the fixation of pay. For example, the mode and manner of appointment or the source of appointment will have an impact and an employee, having consciously agreed to abide by the terms of the contract, cannot negate them once he secured the employment. He is estopped. 8. As to the stipulation by the Board of the Port Trust in Ext.P7 that the consolidated employees would also be entitled to the pay revision benefits, the learned Senior Counsel has contended that the contractual appointment is annual. Every year, the Port Trust contracted with Jospeh. The pay revision was actually declared on 01.05.2011. So, after that date, Jospeh had been paid the consolidated pay as per the revised pay-scale. He, therefore, contends that Jospeh cannot be heard saying that he has been discriminated against or has been deprived of a benefit. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Port Trust, besides perusing the record. Issues: 10. He, therefore, contends that Jospeh cannot be heard saying that he has been discriminated against or has been deprived of a benefit. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Port Trust, besides perusing the record. Issues: 10. The employer's Board Resolutions extended the benefit of pay revision to the contract-employees, as well. It revised its regular employees' pay retrospectively. But it extended that benefit to the contract employees only prospectively. Can the contract employee claim pay parity on the basis of ‘equal pay for equal work' and by enforcing the employer's Board Resolutions? Discussion: 11. Indisputably, Jospeh was appointed through Ext.P1 order, which clearly records that Jospeh will be drawing a consolidated pay of Rs.27,000/-. Clause 5 in the order states that "the other terms and conditions" will be as per BR No. 17 dated 09.06.2006. That is, "other terms and conditions" than those already mentioned in the Ext.P1; the pay, in fact, stands mentioned in the Ext.P1. To that extent, I hold that the employer is right. 12. But, in Ext.P7, the employer specifically records that the contract employee's pay will be revised if there is any revision in the salary of the Engineers-in-Charge: The pay will be revised if there is any revision in the salary of Engineer in Charges such that the pay will be based on the total emoluments in the scale of Engineer in Charges in Cochin Port Trust. He shall be entitled for Honorarium that is applicable to regular Engineer-in-Charges for any extra duties carried out beyond his normal working hours over and above the consolidated pay. 13. So, the Port Trust, the employer, itself has undertaken to apply the revised pay to the contract employees. Its own undertaking, the Port Trust cannot negate. 14. In D. S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has invoked Chapter IV–especially, Art.38(1)–of the Constitution. Then, it holds that the State must strive to promote welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effective as it may a social order in which justice–social, economic and political–shall inform all institutions of the national life. In particular, the State shall strive to minimize the inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities. In particular, the State shall strive to minimize the inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities. Article 39(d) enjoins a duty to see that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women. 15. In SBI v. M.R. Ganesh Babu (2002) SCC 556, the Supreme Court has held that equal pay must depend upon the nature of work done. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work; there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the duty of fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So long as such value judgment is made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. 16. SAIL v. Dibyendu Bhattacharya (2011) 11 SCC 122 , holds that unless there is complete and wholesale/wholesome identity between the two posts they should not be treated as equivalent and the Court should avoid applying the principle of equal pay for equal work." Hukum Chand Gupta v. ICAR declares that prescription of pay scales on particular posts is a very complex exercise. It requires assessment of the nature and quality of the duties performed and the responsibilities shouldered by the incumbents on different posts. Even though, the two posts may be referred to by the same name, it would not lead to the necessary inference that the posts are identical in every manner. These are matters to be assessed by expert bodies like the employer or the Pay Commission. 17. Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana (1987) 4 SCC 634 holds that the only relevant consideration was whether the nature of duties and functions discharged and the work done was similar. On facts, the Court observed that the employees engaged on temporary basis as supervisors were entitled to be paid on the same basis, and in the same pay scale, at which those employed in the regular cadre discharging similar duties as supervisors were being paid. On facts, the Court observed that the employees engaged on temporary basis as supervisors were entitled to be paid on the same basis, and in the same pay scale, at which those employed in the regular cadre discharging similar duties as supervisors were being paid. State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh, (1996) 11 SCC 77 held that the employees working on daily- wage basis could not be treated on a par with persons employed on regular basis against similar posts. The facts of the case lend support to that proposition: The daily-rated workers in Jasmer Singh need not possess the same qualifications as possessed by the regular workers. Nor have they to meet the age criterion, at the time of recruitment. Daily-rated workers, Jasmer Singh observes, were not selected in the same manner as were the regular employees. 18. State of U.P. v. Putti Lal, (2006) 9 SCC 337 holds that if a daily wager is discharging the similar duties as those in the regular employment of the Government, he should at least be entitled to receive the minimum of the pay scale though he might not be entitled to any increment or any other allowance that is permissible to his counterpart in the Government. 19. State of U.P. v. Putti Lal has held that a daily-wager discharging similar duties, as those engaged on regular basis, would be entitled to draw his wages at the minimum of the pay-scale (drawn by his counterpart, appointed on regular basis), but would not be entitled to any other allowances or increments. 20. Uttar Pradesh Land Development Corporation v. Mohd. Khursheed Anwar (2010) 7 SCC 739 , almost under identical facts as seen in this case, has observed that certain employees were engaged on contract basis, on a consolidated salary. But, because they were actually appointed to perform the work of the post of Assistant Engineer, the Supreme Court directed the employer to pay to the contract employees wages in the minimum of the pay-scales ascribed for the regular post. 21. Jagjit Singh has examined all the above decisions and many more; it has summarized the precedential position on "equal pay for equal work." Shorn of internal quotations, the principles governing this fluctuating doctrine run as follows: (i) The 'onus of proof', of parity in the duties and responsibilities of the subject post with the reference post lies on the person who claims it. (ii) The mere fact that the post occupied by the claimant is in a "different department" vis-a-vis the referent post has no bearing on a claim for the parity of pay. (iii) For equal pay, the employee concerned should be performing work which, besides being functionally equal, should conform in quality and sensitivity with the regular post. (iv) Persons holding the same rank/designation (in different departments), but having dissimilar powers, duties and responsibilities, can be placed in different scales of pay, the nomenclature of the post playing no role. (v) Differentiation of pay-scales for posts with difference in responsibility, reliability and confidentiality, would fall within the realm of valid classification. (vi) For placement in a regular pay-scale, the claimant should have been selected through a regular process of recruitment. (vii) Persons performing the same or similar functions, duties and responsibilities, can also be placed in different pay-scales. Such as-'selection grade', in the same post. But this difference must emerge out of a legitimate foundation, such as-merit, or seniority, or some other relevant criterion. (viii) The qualifications must be the same. (ix) The referent post, with which parity is claimed, has to be at the same hierarchy in the service, as the post occupied. (x) A comparison between the occupied post and the referent post, cannot be made if they are in different establishments, having a different management; or even, where the establishments are in different geographical locations, though owned by the same master. (xi) Different pay-scales, in certain eventualities, would be permissible even for posts clubbed together at the same hierarchy or in the same cadre. For example, if the duties and responsibilities of one post are more onerous, or are exposed to higher nature of operational work/risk, the pay parity has no role. (xii) The priority given to several types of posts, under the prevailing policies of the Government, can also be a relevant factor for placing different posts under different pay-scales. (xiii) The parity in pay cannot be claimed merely on the ground that, at an earlier point of time, the occupied post and the referent post were placed in the same pay-scale. (xiv) For parity in pay-scales, equation of duties is of paramount importance. (xiii) The parity in pay cannot be claimed merely on the ground that, at an earlier point of time, the occupied post and the referent post were placed in the same pay-scale. (xiv) For parity in pay-scales, equation of duties is of paramount importance. (xv) There can be a valid classification of pay-scales, between employees holding posts with the same nomenclature, but working at different places; say, at the headquarters, and at the institutional/sub- office level, for the duties qualitatively differ. (xvi) Grade-pay to an employee to avoid stagnation does not amount to discrimination though the juniors with less pay may have been holding the same posts with the same duties. (xvii) Organizations under a common employer may have different pay-scales because the organizations are different entities. 22. Jagjit Singh, in the end, has observed that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' has also been extended to temporary employees (differently described as work-charge, daily-wage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual, and the like), subject to the parameters as enumerated above. 23. Jagjit Singh does not mince words in decrying what could be exploitative employment practices: It is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same work cannot be paid less than another who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare state. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. Any one, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage, does not do so voluntarily. He does so, to provide food and shelter to his family, at the cost of his self-respect and dignity, at the cost of his self-worth, and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows, that his dependents would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act, of paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate, constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation. 24. Given the emphatic pronouncement by the Honourable Supreme Court, I may examine whether Joseph fixed into the parameters fixed by Jagjit Singh. Indeed, Jospeh, fully qualified, was appointed in an existing vacancy–on a contract basis, though. Further, he has been discharging the same functions as are being discharged by a regular employee. To that extent, Joseph suffers no disqualification or limitation. Indeed, Jospeh, fully qualified, was appointed in an existing vacancy–on a contract basis, though. Further, he has been discharging the same functions as are being discharged by a regular employee. To that extent, Joseph suffers no disqualification or limitation. 25. Indeed, the employer itself had extended the pay revision benefit to Joseph from a particular date–prospectively. The learned Senior Counsel, of course, contended that the annual contract wipes out the past service, and every year it is deemed as if an employee had been entered the service afresh. That accepted, I still reckon that the pay revision was given effect from 01.01.2007. Joseph joined the service on 09.09.2008. Employing a legal fiction, we should assume that the revised pay had been the actual, regular pay from the beginning. 26. If that be so, Joseph, even on annual basis, ought to have been extended the benefit of pay revision. I see no discernible reason in the employer's action to deny the benefit to Joseph retrospectively, if it could be termed a retrospective extension of the benefit. Thus, essentially guided by Ext.P7 and bound by the definitive pronouncement of Jagjit Singh, I cannot but hold that Joseph is entitled to the benefit retrospectively. So this Court allows the writ petition. So, it declares that Joseph is entitled to the benefit of revised pay from 09.09.2008 to 30.04.2011, but without interest on the arrears.