JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. By this application, the applicants-original writ applicants seek to recall the order passed by this Court dated 07.11.2016 in the Special Criminal Application No. 6879 of 2016. 2. It appears from the materials on record that the applicants herein preferred the Special Criminal Application No. 6879 of 2016 praying for the following reliefs; "(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow this petition; (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to quash and set aside the FIR being II C.R. No. 3575 of 2015, dated 09.11.2015 for alleged offences punishable under section 5 and 6 of the The Child Marriage Restrain ACT regard with Vatva Police Station, Ahmedabad in the interest of justice. (C) Pending admission and final disposal, be pleased to stay further proceedings/inquiry in FIR being II C.R. No. 3757/2015, dated 09.11.2015 for alleged offences punishable under section 5 and 6 of The Child Marriage Restrain Act regard with Vatva Police Station, Ahmedabad in the interest of justice. (D) Your Lordships may be pleased to grant such other and further relief/s that may deem, fit and proper." 3. The main matter was notified for admission on 07.11.2016. 4. Ms. Vandana J. Jani, the learned counsel, whose appearance was shown on behalf of the applicants, did not remain present before the Court. Instead of dismissing the matter for non-prosecution, this Court thought fit to look into the papers and examine the subject matter as well as the relief prayed for in the writ application. 5. After due examination of the matter and the materials on record, the following order was passed; "The investigation is still in progress. This application is not entertained at this stage. It shall be open for the applicants to come back to this Court if ultimately the charge-sheet is filed and there is no legal evidence for the purpose of framing of charge. This application is, accordingly, disposed of." 6. Mr. Salim M. Saiyed, the learned counsel appearing for the applicants submitted that although the appearance shown in the cause list was of Ms. Vandana J. Jani, yet the applicants had instructed him to appear in the matter, but on account of the personal difficulty, he could not remain present and conduct the matter. According to him, he should be given one opportunity to make good his case by recalling the order passed by this Court. 7. Vandana J. Jani, yet the applicants had instructed him to appear in the matter, but on account of the personal difficulty, he could not remain present and conduct the matter. According to him, he should be given one opportunity to make good his case by recalling the order passed by this Court. 7. On the other hand, the learned APP appearing for the State vehemently opposed this application and submitted that recalling the order passed by this Court will tantamountly amount to review of the order, which is impermissible in law in view of the provisions of section 362 of the Cr.P.C. 8. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned APP prays that there being no merit in this application, the same be rejected. 9. The learned APP would submit that although the main matter was a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, yet the provisions of the criminal procedure code as regards the power of the Court to alter the judgment as embodied under section 362 of the Cr.P.C. would apply or at least the principle analogous to the same would also apply. 10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the applicants are entitled to the reliefs prayed for in this application. 11. Ordinarily, the review of an order is permissible on the following grounds; (a) That there is an error apparent on the face of the record; (b) That there is Perversity in the impugned Order; (c) That there is patent Illegality, i.e. the impugned Order is not in accordance with law; (d) That the impugned Order was passed in breach of the principles of natural justice; (e) That the adversary has misled the Court and obtained the impugned Order by fraud. (f) That the Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it; (g) That the Court has acted beyond the jurisdiction vested in it; (h) That the Court has improperly exercised the jurisdiction. 12. On the other hand, an order can be recalled in certain circumstances like where the order was passed in breach of "natural justice"; where the order was obtained by misleading/perpetrating fraud upon the Court etc. 13. 12. On the other hand, an order can be recalled in certain circumstances like where the order was passed in breach of "natural justice"; where the order was obtained by misleading/perpetrating fraud upon the Court etc. 13. In the case of Vishnu Agarwal vs. State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC 1232 , the Supreme Court aptly reiterated the distinction between the exercise of review jurisdiction and recall jurisdiction. The Court observed; "Para 9: In Asit Kumar Vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. 2009 (1) SCR 469 , this Court made a distinction between recall and review which is as under: "There is a distinction between ...... a review petition and a recall petition. While in a review petition, the Court considers on merits whether there is an error apparent on the face of the record, in a recall petition the Court does not go into the merits but simply recalls an order which was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to an affected party. We are treating this petition under Article 32 as a recall petition because the order passed in the decision in All Bengal Licensees Association. Vs. Raghabendra Singth & Ors. [ 2007 (11) SCC 374 ] cancelling certain licences was passed without giving opportunity of hearing to the persons who had been granted licences." 14. In the case of State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, 2012 AIR SCW, the Supreme Court, inter alia, observed as under; "Para 27 ... If a judgment has been pronounced without jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural justice or where the order has been pronounced without giving an opportunity of being heard to a party affected by it; or where an order was obtained by abuse of the process of the court which would really amount to its being without jurisdiction, inherent powers can be exercised to recall such order, for the reason, that in such eventuality the order becomes a nullity and the provisions of section 362 CrPC would not operate. In such eventuality, the judgment is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice. The power of recall is different from the power of altering/reviewing the judgment. In such eventuality, the judgment is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice. The power of recall is different from the power of altering/reviewing the judgment. 1970 CrLJ 378 : 1985 CrLJ 23 : AIR 1987 Raj 83 (PB) : AIR 1972 SC 1300 : AIR 1981 SC 1156 : (2009) 2 SCC 703 : AIR 2011 SC 1232 ;" 15. In the case of Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit and Ors. vs. The State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 2014 SC 2291 , the Supreme Court, while dealing with section 362 of the Cr.P.C., 1973, ruled that a Judge can recall the order and change his mind even though the draft copy is signed and dictated in the open court. The relevant paras-7 and 8 are reproduced herein below; "Para 7: In Sangam Lal Vs. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad & Ors., AIR 1966 All 221 , while dealing with the rent control matter, the court came to the conclusion that until a judgment is signed and sealed after delivering in court, it is not a judgment and it can be changed or altered at any time before it is signed and sealed. Para 8: This Court has also dealt with the issue in Surendra Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 194 observing as under: "Now up to the moment the judgment is delivered Judges have the right to change their mind. There is a sort of locus poenitentiae and indeed last minute alterations often do occur. Therefore, however much a draft judgment may have been signed beforehand, it is nothing but a draft till formally delivered as the judgment of the Court. Only then does it crystallise into a full fledged judgment and become operative. It follows that the Judge who "delivers" the judgment, or causes it to be delivered by a brother Judge, must be in existence as a member of the Court at the moment of delivery so that he can, if necessary, stop delivery and say that he has changed his mind. There is no need for him to be physically present in court but he must be in existence as a member of the Court and be in a position to stop delivery and effect an alteration should there be any last minute change of mind on his part. There is no need for him to be physically present in court but he must be in existence as a member of the Court and be in a position to stop delivery and effect an alteration should there be any last minute change of mind on his part. If he hands in a draft and signs it and indicates that he intends that to be the final expository of his views it can be assumed that those are still his views at the moment of delivery if he is alive and in a position to change his mind but takes no steps to arrest delivery. But one cannot assume that he would not have changed his mind if he is no longer in a position to do so. A Judge's responsibility is heavy and when a man's life and liberty hang upon his decision nothing can be left to chance or doubt or conjecture; also, a question of public policy is involved. As we have indicated, it is frequently the practice to send a draft, sometimes a signed draft, to a brother Judge who also heard the case. This may be merely for his information, or for consideration and criticism. The mere signing of the draft does not necessarily indicate a closed mind. We feel it would be against public policy to leave the door open for an investigation whether a draft sent by a Judge was intended to embody his final and unalterable opinion or was only intended to be a tentative draft sent with an unwritten understanding that he is free to change his mind should fresh light drawn upon him before the delivery of judgment." 16. In the cases of fraud, although I am not concerned with the same so far as the case on hand is concerned, but since the issue has been raised, I may refer to few decisions of the Supreme Court in this regard. 17. In the case of S.P. Chengalvarau vs. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 , the Supreme Court had the occasion to explain the doctrine of fraud. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and describing the observations of the High Court as wholly perverse, Kuldip Singh, J., stated; "The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean-hands. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and describing the observations of the High Court as wholly perverse, Kuldip Singh, J., stated; "The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean-hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court - process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation". (emphasis supplied) The Court proceeded to state: "A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party". Every court has inherent powers to recall such judgment/order where order/judgment is alleged to have been obtained by fraud-suppression of facts-misrepresentation; or where it is brought to the notice. of the Court that the Court itself has committed a mistake. The Court concluded: "The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants". 18. In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550 , a two judge bench of the Supreme Court, after making reference to a number of earlier decisions rendered by the different High Courts in India, stated the legal position thus:" "...... where the Court is misled by a party or the court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order." Paras 20, 22, 23, 27, 28, 30 to 33. where the Court is misled by a party or the court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order." Paras 20, 22, 23, 27, 28, 30 to 33. In this case while referring to the case of Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 336; (1956) 1 All ER 855: (1956) 2 WLR 888, this Court stated; "The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C., to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court's business". (emphasis supplied) 19. Considering the fact that the learned counsel had no opportunity to make his submissions, I am inclined to recall the order passed by this Court dated 07.11.2016 and hear the matter once again on merits. 20. This application is, accordingly, disposed of.