JUDGMENT : A. HARIPRASAD, J. 1. Aggrieved by the convictions under Sections 341 and 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short "IPC") and the sentences handed over, the two accused persons in S.C. No. 237 of 2007 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge-I, Mavelikkara have preferred this appeal. 2. The prosecution case, as unfolded from the final report, is that on 14.09.2005, at about 9.30 p.m. PW-1 blasted fire crackers in the autorickshaw stand near Choonadu market of Vallikunnam Village. The appellants along with another person came on a motor cycle and demanded PW-1 to desist from blasting crackers. But he continued with his action. Infuriated by the attitude of PW-1, there was exchange of words between him and the appellants. The 1st appellant assaulted PW-1 and beat him on head and chest. PW-2 and deceased Biju intervened. Later at the instance of Biju, a complaint was filed against the appellants in connection with this incident. Due to the animosity, the appellants on the same day at 9.45 p.m. in furtherance of their common intention wrongfully restrained deceased Biju and others by stopping the autorickshaw in which they were taking PW-1 to hospital. When the appellants obstructed their passage, deceased Biju alighted from the autorickshaw and questioned the act. 1st appellant kicked on Biju's stomach causing his fall and the 2nd appellant stabbed him with MO1 knife on chest. Deceased Biju succumbed to the injuries on the way to hospital. 3. Prosecution examined 20 witnesses and 16 documents were marked. On the defence side, three witnesses testified and three documents marked. MOs. 1 to 5 are the material objects. 4. We heard learned Senior Counsel Sri. B. Raman Pillai appearing for the appellants and the learned Additional Director General of Prosecution Sri. Suresh Babu Thomas. 5. The trial court mainly relied on the testimony of PWs 3 and 4 to uphold the prosecution contention regarding the incident. PWs 1 and 2, though cited as eye witnesses, refused to support the prosecution case in its entirety. Testimony of the official witnesses, the investigating officer especially, were also relied on by the court below. 6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the court below failed to appreciate the evidence correctly and finding of the guilt entered by the trial court is not based on the true construction of evidence. Testimony of the official witnesses, the investigating officer especially, were also relied on by the court below. 6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the court below failed to appreciate the evidence correctly and finding of the guilt entered by the trial court is not based on the true construction of evidence. Before dealing with the legal questions raised, we shall deal with the facts of the case as spoken to by the witnesses. 7. PW-1 is the maker of Ext.P1 first information statement (FIS). In Ext.P1, the case narrated by him is as follows: On 14.09.2005 at about 9.30 p.m. he was attempting to blast crackers in the autorickshaw stand close to Choonad market junction. At that time, the appellants and one Ajay came on a motor cycle and restrained him from blasting crackers. A duel followed by a scuffle occurred. The 1st appellant hit PW1 with bare hand. On seeing this, PW-2 and deceased Biju came to his rescue. They attempted to take him to Oachira Hospital. When they reached near Shalimar Auditorium at Choonad South Junction, the appellants came on a motor cycle and waylaid. At that time, another person whose name was not known was also present with the appellants. PW-2 was driving the autorickshaw. Along with him, deceased Biju was sitting in the front seat. When Autorickshaw was stopped, Biju got down. He questioned the act of 1st appellant. At that time, instantaneously the 1st appellant kicked deceased Biju. He fell supine on the road. At that time the 2nd appellant took out a knife from his groin and stabbed on left side of the chest of Biju. Biju cried out on receiving the stab. Immediately Biju was boarded in the autorickshaw and went to a private hospital by name Choonad Medical Centre. On examination, the Doctor advised that Biju should be immediately taken to the Government Hospital, Kayamkulam. When he was admitted to the Government Hospital, Kayamkulam, Doctor examined him and found dead. The incident was at 9.45 p.m. on 14.09.2005. When PW-1 was examined, he spoke about the first part of the incident in accordance with the prosecution case. His deposition will show that there was a scuffle in connection with the breaking of fire crackers. Thereafter they went to the hospital in the autorickshaw driven by PW-2. On seeing some persons near Choonad South Junction, the autorickshaw was stopped. When PW-1 was examined, he spoke about the first part of the incident in accordance with the prosecution case. His deposition will show that there was a scuffle in connection with the breaking of fire crackers. Thereafter they went to the hospital in the autorickshaw driven by PW-2. On seeing some persons near Choonad South Junction, the autorickshaw was stopped. There was an altercation and he saw Biju falling down. He found Biju in a state of despair. He was taken to a hospital. Doctor in the private hospital examined and asked them to take Biju to a Government Hospital. The prosecution wanted this witness to speak that the 2nd appellant stabbed Biju with MO1 knife, which he refused. Therefore, this witness was declared hostile to the prosecution and the prosecutor cross examined him. In the cross examination by the prosecutor, he admitted much of the prosecution case, except the fact that the 2nd appellant inflicted a stab injury to the deceased. PW-1 admitted that he subscribed signature to Ext.P1. The hostility shown by this witness to the prosecution case will not weaken the prosecution case for the reason that there are certain aspects spoken to by this witness in support of the prosecution case. The first part of the incident has come out through this witness. That apart, the transactions immediately after the incident were also narrated by this witness. He only refused to implicate the 2nd appellant with the stabbing incident. 8. PW-2 was also participant in the first and second incidents. When examined by the prosecution, he also refused to state that the 2nd appellant assaulted deceased Biju with MO1 knife. But this witness would depose in chief examination that when he lifted the body of Biju from the road after the incident, deceased Biju told that the 2nd appellant stabbed him. This fact happened immediately after the incident, though not spoken to by PW-1, has come in evidence through this witness. The prosecutor with the permission of the court has cross examined this witness. In the cross examination, answers have been elicited to the effect that PW-3 was also present at the time of occurrence. All the transactions that took place immediately after the incident have been spoken to by this witness. 9. PW-3 is the star witness for the prosecution. His presence at the place of occurrence at the time of incident is unchallenged. All the transactions that took place immediately after the incident have been spoken to by this witness. 9. PW-3 is the star witness for the prosecution. His presence at the place of occurrence at the time of incident is unchallenged. He testified that on 14.09.2005 at about 9.30 p.m. the incident in relation to blasting of crackers had happened. Thereafter, the parties went away. PW-1 and deceased Biju wanted to file a complaint before the police in connection with the first incident. At that time, PW-1 stated that he was feeling pain over body. Then Biju said that he would better go to a hospital. While they were travelling in the autorickshaw of PW-2, he informed that there was no sufficient fuel to reach Kayamkulam. Therefore, they deviated the route to fill fuel before going to Kayamkulam. When they were proceeding, the autorickshaw was blocked by a motor cycle in which the appellants and another person came. Then, as stated by other witnesses, Biju came out of the autorickshaw and questioned the 1st appellant. Immediately he kicked Biju and he fell down. In the process of falling, the 2nd appellant stabbed Biju with MO1 knife. He made a loud cry. Thereafter all the witnesses lifted Biju to put him in the autorickshaw. He was taken to a private hospital and from there to the Government Hospital, Kayamkulam. Before reaching the hospital he died. This witness fully supports the prosecution case. 10. The defence counsel cross-examined this witness at length. This witness was an autorickshaw driver and all the parties were known to each other closely much before the incident. Answers elicited in the cross examination would show that he had taken active part in separating the combatants in the first incident. Thereafter they decided to file a complaint to police and went in PW-2's autorickshaw. The testimony of this witness would show that the incident had happened right in front of Shalimar Auditorium. It has also brought out that apart from the street lights, there were light from shops adjacent to the place of occurrence. There is no case for the defence that the accused were unfamiliar persons to the witnesses. It has also come out in evidence through the testimony of this witness that the incident had happened on the previous night of Thiruvonam, a festival celebrated all over Kerala. There is no case for the defence that the accused were unfamiliar persons to the witnesses. It has also come out in evidence through the testimony of this witness that the incident had happened on the previous night of Thiruvonam, a festival celebrated all over Kerala. It is the version spoken to by the witness that on account of the festival season all the shops were open even during late hours in the night. In spite of tough cross examination on PW-3, we do not find any reason to disbelieve his testimony. He has given a graphic account of the incident. 11. PW4 is yet another witness who was cited to prove the incident. According to him, he came to the occurrence place at about 9.30 p.m. He was waiting for someone who owed money to him. At that time, he saw the incident. He also deposed that when Biju came out of the autorickshaw, the 1st appellant kicked him and the 2nd appellant stabbed him on chest while he was falling down. It is his version that immediately thereafter he went home on receiving money. According to him, he was not aware then that the injury was so serious. Biju was PW-4's neighbour. He also testified that enough light was present at the area to understand the role played by each one in the commotion. 12. PW-5 was cited to prove that immediately after the incident he saw two persons running away from the front side of Shalimar Auditorium and one of them had held a knife. He deposed that he did not see the incident, but the events happened immediately after the incident were spoken to by him. He identified MO1 knife which was allegedly held by the 2nd appellant at the time when he was running away. 13. PW-6 refused to support the prosecution case. PW-7 deposed that on 14.09.2005 at about 9.15 p.m. while he came for shopping at Choonadu market, he saw an altercation near the autorickshaw stand. When he reached there, he found the 1st appellant beating PW-1. His testimony reveals the presence of PWs. 1 and 2, deceased Biju and others at the scene of occurrence. It is his version that he heard the appellants' saying that one among the prosecution party will not be allowed to celebrate Onam festival. When he reached there, he found the 1st appellant beating PW-1. His testimony reveals the presence of PWs. 1 and 2, deceased Biju and others at the scene of occurrence. It is his version that he heard the appellants' saying that one among the prosecution party will not be allowed to celebrate Onam festival. This version, even according to the chief examination, has not been stated to police. Therefore, this cannot be completely relied on. 14. PW8 is leader of an autorickshaw union. He was cited to prove the first incident and the fact that there was a complaint filed in connection with it. He is a witness to Ext.P2 scene mahazar as well. Regarding filing of the complaint in connection with the first incident, as submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the defence, there is no clinching evidence. However, the facts that there was a scuffle between PW-1 and 1st appellant and also that deceased Biju had intervened have come out through the testimony of this witness. 15. PW-9 is a witness to Ext.P3 inquest report. PW-10 doctor was cited to prove the fact that on 14.09.2005 at 9.50 p.m. Biju had been taken to his hospital and on examination, PW-10 found him in unconscious. He advised the persons, who brought Biju to hospital, to take the injured to the Government Hospital, Kayamkulam. It is evident from the testimony of this witness that he did not give any medical attention to the victim. 16. PW-11 is a witness to the inquest report. PW-12 is the wife of deceased Biju. She identified MOs.2 to 4, the dress worn by the deceased at the time of incident. She testified that on the fateful night at about 9.15 p.m. while deceased was taking supper, he received a phone call and thereafter he hurriedly finished eating and started off on his motor cycle. 17. PW-13 is the Doctor who had seen the victim in the Government Hospital, Kayamkulam. He issued Ext.P4 intimation. PW-14 is a witness to Ext.P5 mahazar whereby MO1 knife was recovered at the instance of the 2nd appellant while in custody. This witness identified the 2nd appellant and he deposed that the 2nd appellant was a person known to him even before the incident. 18. PW-15 is the Village Officer, who prepared Ext.P6 site plan. The plan would show the presence of light at the scene of occurrence. This witness identified the 2nd appellant and he deposed that the 2nd appellant was a person known to him even before the incident. 18. PW-15 is the Village Officer, who prepared Ext.P6 site plan. The plan would show the presence of light at the scene of occurrence. PW-16 conducted autopsy on the deceased. Ext.P7 is the postmortem report. Injury No. 1 is the stab injury received by the deceased on the left side of chest causing damage to both the ventricles of heart. This witness stated that depth of the injury was 7.2 c.m. It tallies with the description of MO1 knife. MO1 knife was shown to this witness at the time of investigation and he was questioned. It is the deposition of this witness that the injury was not horizontal and it was backwards and slightly upwards. According to the prosecutor, this will account for the fact that he received the stab injury while he was falling down. 19. PW-17 guarded the body of the deceased. PW-18 is the Sub Inspector of Police, who recorded Ext.P1 FIS and Ext.P1(a) first information report (FIR). PW-19 is the Circle Inspector of Police, who conducted the investigation. PW-20 is the Doctor cited to prove the wound certificate of PW1, which is marked as Ext.P14. 20. Defence examined three witnesses. DW1 was cited to prove that there was a group fight inside the compound of Shalimar Auditorium and in that incident, deceased Biju might have sustained injury. According to him, there was no incident on the public road as shown in Ext.P6. Even though he deposed that he was working in a shop close to the place of occurrence, it has come out in cross examination that he was not the owner of the shop. But no material was produced to show his presence. DW1 admitted that the shop belonging to Nazar, which is described in the scene mahazar, is opposite to Shalimar Auditorium. Even though he stated that lot of vehicles came there at the time of occurrence, he could not convincingly identify in which vehicle the deceased was taken to the hospital and who were all gathered at the place of occurrence. All the witnesses testified that the incident was on the previous night of Thiruvonam, a public holiday. Even though he stated that lot of vehicles came there at the time of occurrence, he could not convincingly identify in which vehicle the deceased was taken to the hospital and who were all gathered at the place of occurrence. All the witnesses testified that the incident was on the previous night of Thiruvonam, a public holiday. There is no material to hold that there was any function happening in Shalimar Auditorium and gate of the auditorium compound was lying open. Apart from the interested testimony of DW1, we do not find anything to hold that the incident had happened inside the Shalimar Auditorium compound. 21. Learned Senior Counsel raised a contention that the incident might not have happened on a public road. The group fight must have happened inside the compound of the auditorium. It is the further contention that had there been a fight on the road and had there been profuse bleeding, certainly blood stains must have been seen on the road. Absence of blood stains on the road falsifies the prosecution case, argued the learned Senior Counsel. Learned prosecutor challenged this contention that all the material witnesses have stated that the incident was on the black top portion of the road. Scene mahazar was prepared at noon on the next day. Lot of vehicles were plying through the road. Further, there was no profuse bleeding from the wound could be seen from the testimony of eye witnesses. On an evaluation of the entire evidence, we are of the view that absence of blood on tar road could be explained for a host of reasons. That will not affect the credibility of the prosecution case. 22. DW2 is a witness examined by the defence to prove the case that stabbing incident had not happened as stated by the prosecution. On a reading of his testimony, we do not find any reason to hold that he is supportive of the defence version. This witness would say that he saw from the road in front of Shalimar Auditorium that a person was taking in an autorickshaw. This witness does not support the defence case to any extent. 23. DW3 is the Secretary of Vallikunnam Grama Panchayat. He was cited to prove that there was no house as described in Ext.P5 mahazar wherefrom MO1 knife was recovered at the instance of the 2nd appellant. This witness does not support the defence case to any extent. 23. DW3 is the Secretary of Vallikunnam Grama Panchayat. He was cited to prove that there was no house as described in Ext.P5 mahazar wherefrom MO1 knife was recovered at the instance of the 2nd appellant. This witness deposed that EULP number shown in the register is assigned by the revenue department and not the local authority. Therefore, he did not materially support the defence case that MO1 knife was not recovered from the house as described in Ext.P5. 24. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that going by the prosecution case, after the first incident, the appellants had gone to the places where their houses are situated. 1st appellant's family house and 2nd appellant's house are close to the place of occurrence. According to the learned Senior Counsel, there was no occasion for the prosecution witnesses to go to Choonadu South Junction as they could have gone through some other route to reach the hospital. For this the explanation given by the prosecution witnesses is that they went through the public road, where the incident had happened, to fill fuel in the autorickshaw. Learned Senior Counsel would contend that the prosecution party must have went in search of the appellants to avenge the first incident and the prosecution case that the appellants attacked the prosecution party on a public road is highly imaginative. Per contra, learned ADGP submitted that the convincing testimony of PW-3 supported by that of PW-4 would establish the prosecution case. It is to be remembered that there is no reason brought out in cross examination of PW-3 to hold that he had any special reason to falsely implicate the appellants in the crime. Presence of PW-3 is clear from the testimony of all the witnesses examined. That apart, he was aware of the first incident as he tried to separate the fighting parties. According to the prosecution case, the motive of committing murder, though not relevant, is the incident happened at about 9.30 p.m. on the same day. It is all the more important to note that there is no challenge against the prosecution case that an incident had happened prior to the incident in question. 25. According to the prosecution case, the motive of committing murder, though not relevant, is the incident happened at about 9.30 p.m. on the same day. It is all the more important to note that there is no challenge against the prosecution case that an incident had happened prior to the incident in question. 25. Learned Senior Counsel contended that even though there is a prosecution version that there were three persons at the time of restraining the autorickshaw, the prosecution has not stated about the third person. On scanning through the evidence of PWs 3 and 4, it can be seen that overt act attributed is only against the appellants. Even if a third person was there, there is no material to hold that either he nurtured any intention to commit the offence or he had participated in the incident in any manner. 26. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that non- explanation of other injuries seen on the body of the deceased is fatal to the prosecution case. According to him, the deceased sustained multiple abrasions and contusions as described in the postmortem certificate. The testimony of PWs 3 and 4 is to the effect that the 1st appellant kicked the deceased and the 2nd appellant stabbed him either at the time of fall or immediately after he touched the ground. According to the contentions of the defence, there is no satisfactory explanation for seeing other injuries on the body of deceased, if the incident had happened as stated by the witnesses. In answer to this contention, learned ADGP contended that a person receiving a stab injury cannot be expected to lie motionless. He may whirl or curl due to acute pain. The incident had happened on a tar road. Rolling over on a hard surface may cause superficial abrasions. We cannot ignore the possibility of a person trying to save his life by rolling over. The contention of the defence that the incident might have taken place inside the Auditorium compound cannot be accepted for want of reliable evidence. The surface on which he had fallen is suggestive of the fact that there was a possibility for sustaining such minor injuries. 27. Learned Senior Counsel challenged the testimony of PW-4 by contending that he is a planted witness. It is the contention of the defence that the prosecution has intentionally placed this witness who had never seen the incident. The surface on which he had fallen is suggestive of the fact that there was a possibility for sustaining such minor injuries. 27. Learned Senior Counsel challenged the testimony of PW-4 by contending that he is a planted witness. It is the contention of the defence that the prosecution has intentionally placed this witness who had never seen the incident. According to the learned Senior Counsel, he has not given any satisfactory explanation for his presence. This contention is opposed by the learned ADGP. According to the testimony of this witness, he was waiting for a friend of him to pay back money on the eve of Thiruvonam. It is true that the police has not recorded the name of person for whom PW-4 was waiting, because that was not asked for. We do not find any reason to hold that PW-4 is a planted witness. 28. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the appellants could not have anticipated that the prosecution witnesses might pass through Choonad South Junction to go to hospital as they had no reason to pass through that area. None of the prosecution witnesses, especially PWs 3 and 4, had no case that this was a premeditated incident. According to the reliable evidence adduced by the prosecution, on seeing the autorickshaw driven by PW2 coming through the public road, the appellants had waylaid and thereafter the incident happened. The prosecution witnesses have unanimously stated that they went to that area only to fill fuel in the autorickshaw. 29. On an over all assessment of the testimony of PWs 3 and 4 and also the testimony of PWs 1 and 2, though they failed to support the prosecution case to hilt, leads us to the conclusion that the appellants were involved in the act of stabbing. The unshaken testimony of PW3 supported by that of PWs. 4, 5 and 7 would lead us only to complicity of accused persons in the crime. 30. In addition to this, the recovery of MO1 knife by Ext.P5 mahazar was also properly proved through PW-14. The defence contention that the description shown in Ext.P5 did not relate to the house of 2nd appellant cannot be believed. The formalities under Section 27 of the Evidence Act have been complied with in this case. The confession leading to the discovery of a material fact, viz. The defence contention that the description shown in Ext.P5 did not relate to the house of 2nd appellant cannot be believed. The formalities under Section 27 of the Evidence Act have been complied with in this case. The confession leading to the discovery of a material fact, viz. recovery of MO1 knife, has been properly established through the testimony of the independent witness, as well as that of the investigating officer. This is also correctly relied on by the court below. 31. It is evident that the 1st appellant kicked the deceased and immediately thereafter the 2nd appellant pulled out a knife from his groin and stabbed heavily on the chest causing a penetrating wound damaging the heart of the deceased. In this context, learned Senior Counsel contended that the 1st appellant cannot be roped in murder with the aid of Section 34 IPC. In order to attract the vicarious liability under Section 34 IPC, the evidence must reflect a common intention prior to the incident. Learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Ibrahimkutty vs. State of Kerala, 1983 KHC 298. Relevant portion of paragraph 11 of the decision reads as follows: "We do not, however, agree with the prosecution that the 1st accused can be convicted for the offence punishable under S.302 I.P.C. with the aid of S.34 of the I.P.C. The overt-acts attributed to the 1st accused are that he struck the deceased Basheer with the chopper before the 2nd accused used the knife and caused the fatal injury. There had been no act on the part of the 1st accused either by words or deed calling for assistance or aiding the 2nd accused in committing the murder. He did not exhort the 2nd accused and there is no evidence that the 2nd accused came out of the tea-shop at the behest of the 1st accused. There is no proof of a pre-arranged plan or prior concert between the two. The mere fact that both accused 1 and 2 came together to the tea-shop, a place ordinarily visited by the local labourers, by itself is not sufficient to make the 1st accused liable for the impulsive acts committed by the 2nd accused, in the absence of proof that the act was committed in furtherance of their common intention. The mere fact that both accused 1 and 2 came together to the tea-shop, a place ordinarily visited by the local labourers, by itself is not sufficient to make the 1st accused liable for the impulsive acts committed by the 2nd accused, in the absence of proof that the act was committed in furtherance of their common intention. The essence of S.34 I.P.C. is simultaneous consensus of mind of persons participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result. Before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of both. It is not enough to have the same intention independently of each other. It is true that the common intention may develop in the course of the commission of offence. But it must precede the act constituting the offence............." Learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. AIR 2009 SC 1 also. It is held that under the provisions of Section 34 IPC the essence of liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. What is important to attract Section 34 IPC is the meeting of minds of co- accused that the particular criminal act should be committed. It is settled law that the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was a plan or meeting of minds of all the assailants to commit the offence, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of the moment, but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. It is argued by the learned Senior Counsel that in this case, prosecution has no contention that the 1st appellant exhorted to kill the deceased and on hearing the exhortion, the 2nd appellant stabbed him. It is also pointed out that none of the prosecution witnesses has spoken to that the 1st appellant was aware of the fact that the 2nd appellant was armed with a knife intended to be used against the deceased. It is also pointed out that none of the prosecution witnesses has spoken to that the 1st appellant was aware of the fact that the 2nd appellant was armed with a knife intended to be used against the deceased. It is the testimony of PWs 3 and 4 that when the 1st appellant kicked the deceased, the 2nd appellant all on a sudden drew out a dagger from beneath his shirt and hit on the chest of the deceased. From the totality of evidence of the prosecution case, it cannot be held that there was a premeditation and agreement between the appellants to kill Biju by stabbing. If that be so, every accused should be held liable for his independent action. On appreciation of the entire evidence, we are of the view that the prosecution evidence falls much short of establishing that the 1st appellant had also shared a common intention to kill the deceased and he instigated the 2nd appellant to inflict a stab injury. In that case, the 1st appellant can be held liable only for his action and he cannot be roped in murder with a vicarious liability for the action of the 2nd appellant. To this extent, we accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants. 32. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that the FIR is delayed and it has to be viewed with great suspicion as there is every possibility of manipulating the facts. The learned Senior Counsel relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Marudanal Augusti vs. State of Kerala, 1980 SCC (Cri) 985 and Meharaj Singh vs. State of U.P. 1994 SCC (Cri) 1390 and a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Biju vs. State of Kerala, 2012 (2) KLD 743 in support of the contention that undue delay in registration of a crime may cast suspicion in the veracity of the prosecution case. It is settled law that the material question is whether the delay has been properly explained or not; duration of delay is not material under all circumstances. In this case the incident happened at about 9.45 p.m. on 14.09.2005. The deceased was declared dead by about 11 O' clock in the night on 14.09.2005. Ext.P1 FIS was recorded by PW-18 at 2.00 a.m. on 15.09.2005. There is a considerable distance between the Government Hospital, Kayamkulam and the police station. In this case the incident happened at about 9.45 p.m. on 14.09.2005. The deceased was declared dead by about 11 O' clock in the night on 14.09.2005. Ext.P1 FIS was recorded by PW-18 at 2.00 a.m. on 15.09.2005. There is a considerable distance between the Government Hospital, Kayamkulam and the police station. There cannot be any complaint that there was undue delay in registering the FIR. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel is that Ext.P1 was placed before the Magistrate concerned only on 16.09.2005 at 10.00 a.m. The investigating officer has explained the delay satisfactorily. According to him, 15.09.2005 was a public holiday because of Thiruvonam. On 16.09.2005, it was placed before the Magistrate. It is evident from the face of Ext.P1 that it was placed not before the court, as the court seal is absent. What is seen is an endorsement by the Magistrate that final report is awaited. This is suggestive of the fact that FIR could have been received by the Magistrate, probably at his house, on a public holiday. That apart, there is no material brought out in cross examination of PW-1, who gave Ext.P1 FIS or PW-18 (investigating officer), who recorded Ext.P1, to find that there was intentional delay in placing the FIR before the Magistrate and the prosecution has gained any undue benefit on account of one day's delay. Even though, the principles mentioned in the above decisions rule the field, when we consider the facts of this case, we do not find any reason to hold that the delay in this case caused any prejudice to the accused. 33. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the story unfolded by Ext.P1 has been deviated by the prosecution at the time of evidence. According to him, this also caused doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case. As mentioned above, we have gone through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses meticulously. The statements in Ext.P1 FIS were not supported by PW-1 on examination. It is well settled that registration of FIR under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is only to initiate criminal law in motion. It need not be the catalogue of all the events. Materials revealed in the investigation ultimately may reveal a slightly different case. The statements in Ext.P1 FIS were not supported by PW-1 on examination. It is well settled that registration of FIR under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is only to initiate criminal law in motion. It need not be the catalogue of all the events. Materials revealed in the investigation ultimately may reveal a slightly different case. We do not find any reason to hold that the reliable testimony of the prosecution witnesses were intentionally changed from the initial version in Ext.P1. In spite of cross examination of the investigation officer, no material could be brought out to discredit the impartiality of investigation. Therefore, we find all the contentions of the appellants in that regard are unsustainable. 34. Learned Senior Counsel contended that PW-16, who conducted autopsy on the deceased, did not depose that injury No. 1 was sufficient to cause death in the normal course. On a reading of Ext.P7 postmortem report and deposition of PW-16, it is crystal clear that injury No. 1 is a stab injury having a depth of 7.2 c.m. received by the deceased on the left side of his chest causing extensive damage to both the ventricles of his heart. Even if the Doctor did not depose that it was sufficient in the normal course to cause death, it is clear from the medical as well as ocular evidence of the witnesses that the stab injury inflicted by the 2nd appellant was the cause of death. Therefore, this contention cannot be accepted. 35. To sum up, we hold that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the records produced clearly establish that the 2nd appellant stabbed deceased Biju with MO1 knife on 14.09.2005 at about 9.45 p.m. from the place of occurrence and that led to his death. It is clear that even though there was only one stab injury inflicted, it affected the vital part of human body and it is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. His intention to inflict an injury on the chest is evident from the force with which it was inflicted, as revealed from the postmortem certificate. That apart, the fact that a dangerous weapon like MO1 was used and the part of the body selected would reveal his intention to commit the offence of murder. His intention to inflict an injury on the chest is evident from the force with which it was inflicted, as revealed from the postmortem certificate. That apart, the fact that a dangerous weapon like MO1 was used and the part of the body selected would reveal his intention to commit the offence of murder. It is settled law that death caused by a single injury could be regarded as murder considering the weapon used and part of the body selected for the assault. (See: Pappu vs. State of M.P. AIR 2006 SC 2659 and Chenda alias Chanda Ram vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2013) 12 SCC 110 ). Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the 2nd appellant is guilty of murder as defined under Section 300 IPC. We also hold that the prosecution failed to establish that the 1st appellant shared any common intention with the 2nd appellant to commit murder. In the absence of any material to hold that both the appellants premeditated to kill Biju before the incident, the benefit of doubt should go to the 1st appellant. He can only be held guilty for an offence punishable under Section 323 IPC. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of 2nd appellant under Sections 341 and 302 IPC is confirmed. 1st appellant is acquitted of charge under Section 302 IPC. His conviction under Section 341 IPC is confirmed. We find that he is liable for voluntarily causing hurt on the deceased and therefore convict him under Section 323 IPC. For the said offence, we sentence him for rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. His conviction under Section 341 IPC by the trial court is confirmed. Both sentences of the 1st appellant shall run concurrently. Since he has been undergoing imprisonment for more than the said period, we direct that the 1st appellant shall be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. 1. This Court having considered Crl. Appeal No. 1792 of 2011, arising out of S.C. No. 237 of 2007 on the file of the Additional Sessions Court-I, Mavelikkara, pronounced judgment today and the conviction of the 2nd appellant, viz. Shan @ Shamon, S/o Subair Kutty, Puthenveettil, Elippakulam Muriyil, Vallikunnam Village, imposed by the trial court under Sections 341 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (in short "IPC") has been confirmed. The conviction of the 1st appellant, viz. Shan @ Shamon, S/o Subair Kutty, Puthenveettil, Elippakulam Muriyil, Vallikunnam Village, imposed by the trial court under Sections 341 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (in short "IPC") has been confirmed. The conviction of the 1st appellant, viz. Mujeeb @ Mujeeb Rahman, S/o Abdul Kareem, Karunyam Veedu, Elippakulam Muriyil, Vallikunnam Village, imposed by the trial court under Section 302 IPC has been set aside and he has been acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. He has been convicted under Section 323 IPC. A sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment is imposed on him for the offence under Section 323 IPC. His conviction and sentence by the trial court under Section 341 IPC has been confirmed. It is made clear that the sentences under Sections 341 and 323 IPC imposed on the 1st appellant shall run concurrently. 2. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that the 1st appellant had undergone imprisonment for more than the period imposed by this Court. It is submitted therefore that he be released. 3. Considering the facts and circumstances, we direct the Superintendent of Central Jail, Thiruvananthapuram to release the 1st appellant, viz. Mujeeb @ Mujeeb Rahman, S/o Abdul Kareem, Karunyam Veedu, Elippakulam Muriyil, Vallikunnam Village, who is now lodged at Netukalchery Open Jail, involved in S.C. No. 237 of 2007 on the file of the Additional Sessions Court-I, Mavelikkara, forthwith if he had undergone the sentence of imprisonment awarded by this Court. 4. Registry shall communicate the gist of judgment to the Superintendent of Central Jail, Thiruvananthapuram for appropriate action.