JUDGMENT : ROHIT ARYA, J. 1. Heard on IA No.4653/2016, an application under Order 22 Rule 4, 10 read with Order 1 Rule 10 CPC filed by one Smt. Rachna Agrawal W/o Shri Krishna Mohan Agrawal, reply whereto has been filed by the appellant vide document No.4088/2016. 2. Facts relevant for consideration and disposal of the aforesaid IA are that one Ganesh Prasad Agrawal had filed a suit for eviction against the present appellant/tenant on the ground of bonafide need under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rent Act") vide civil suit No.321A/1983. The suit was decreed by the trial court vide judgment and decree dated 23/5/1994. During pendency of suit Ganesh Prasad Agrawal passed away. Thereafter, his wife Smt. Rampyaribai and their daughters were substituted for the original plaintiff. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, appellant/defendant preferred an appeal. During pendency of the appeal an application under Order 41 Rule 27 as well as Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was filed bringing to the notice of appellate court that the entire suit property except suit shop has been transferred to three different persons, namely, Prahladbabu Agrawal, Ritesh Garg and Madan Mohan Agrawal vide even dated sale deeds dated 15/9/1994. As such, the need, if any, stood extinguished and, therefore, the impugned judgment and decree of the trial court deserves to be set aside. Applications were replied by plaintiffs inter alia contending that plaintiff-Rampyaribai since has not sold the suit property, shall do business with her daughter-Sangeeta and, therefore, the need of plaintiff subsists. The first appellate court upon consideration of rival contentions concluded that as the need of Rampyari subsists qua the suit shop, which continued to be of her ownership, therefore, even if remaining part of the entire property has been sold by sale deeds, the need cannot be said to have extinguished and proceedings may continue and consequently, decreed the suit. 3. 3. On appeal before this Court by the appellant/defendant, this Court admitted the second appeal on the following substantial question of law on 16/7/2008:- "Whether in the giving facts a decree for ejectment on the ground of bona fide need can be passed and Courts below committed error in decreeing the suit under section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act?" It appears that during pendency of second appeal Rampyaribai passed away on 22/3/2014, therefore, an application for deleting the name of Rampyaribai was filed vide IA No.2423/2014. The same was allowed vide order dated 23/6/2015. Thereafter, the instant application under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC vide IA No.4653/2016 has been filed by the present applicant, namely, Smt. Rachna Agrawal styling herself to be daughter-in-law of Shakuntala, who is daughter of Late Rampyaribai, in other words she claims to be the granddaughter-in-law of Late Rampyaribai and sought her substitution for Rampyaribai on the strength of a Will dated 5/7/2013, wherein, according to the applicant, the entire house in question have been bequeathed to her by Late Rampyaribai during her lifetime. 4. The application is replied, wherein following objections have been taken:- i. Rampyaribai and her daughters arrayed as plaintiff in the suit including Shakuntala have already sold the entire house in question to different persons by way of different registered sale deeds of the same date 15/9/1994. Nothing was left for Rampyaribai to bequeath by way of Will in favour of the applicant, who claims to be the daughter-in-law of Shakuntala. ii. That apart, consequent upon transfer of the suit house in favour of three subsequent buyers, the municipal records have also been corrected and the name of subsequent buyers are recorded. iii. Even otherwise, the applicant, who claims to be the granddaughter-in-law of Rampyaribai and daughter-in-law of Shakuntala, even remotely does not fall within the definition of "member of the family" as defined under Section 2 (e) of the Rent Act and does not have status of an unmarried daughter to seek entitlement of a decree of eviction on the ground of bonafide need under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Rent Act and, therefore, under these circumstances, the application which is with oblique motive to achieve collateral purpose of grabbing the property of Rampyaribai lacking in bonafides cannot be countenanced. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant during the course of arguments also submitted that it is a queer fact that leaving aside all the daughters, there is unusual affection allegedly shown by Rampyaribai in favour of applicant-Smt. Rachna Agrawal. As such, the Will itself is shrouded with suspicion, therefore, no credit whatsoever can be given to such a Will. With the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel submits that the application deserves to be rejected. 5. At this stage, Shri Bansal, learned counsel for applicant, submits that he may be permitted to withdraw the application. 6. Though normally this Court does not appreciate such kind of interception at the stage of dictation of the order, however, as learned counsel does not wish to press his application, the same is dismissed as withdrawn with cost of Rs. 2,000/-. 7. On merits, learned counsel for the appellant/defendant contends that the original plaintiff filed a suit for bonafide requirement of himself seeking eviction of the suit shop (part of the house now sold by three sale deeds discussed above). After his death, Late Rampyaribai and her daughters were substituted for Late Shri Ganesh Prasad projecting the need that Rampyaribai requires the suit shop to run herself with the assistance of her unmarried daughter-Sangeeta. The trial court has decreed the suit without looking to the fact of subsequent developments in the matter of sale of the house where Rampyaribai with her unmarried daughters was residing and only the suit shop was left. At the appellate stage, though Rampyaribai was alive, but Sangeeta was married in the year 2000 and since then she had started residing at her husband/in-laws place at Bhopal. This fact was brought to the notice of the first appellate court on information being received by the appellant from the husband of Sangeeta as well as the fact that she neither intended to live at Sironj nor had any intention to do any business on an affidavit filed on 6/10/2001 before the appellate court. The same has though been discussed in para 66 of the judgment, but the same was rejected with the reasoning that at the appellate stage such an affidavit cannot be relied upon and accordingly, confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. However, during pendency of the second appellate proceedings, Rampyaribai has died on 22/3/2014. Accordingly, her name has been deleted from the array of respondents. However, during pendency of the second appellate proceedings, Rampyaribai has died on 22/3/2014. Accordingly, her name has been deleted from the array of respondents. Learned counsel contends that in view of aforesaid facts and circumstances in the light of definition of "member of the family" as provided under clause 2 (e) of the Rent Act, and the provisions contained under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Rent Act, as a matter of fact, nothing survives in this appeal to address upon inasmuch as neither Rampyaribai is alive nor Sangeeta can maintain her need having married during pendency of the appeal before the first appellate court. Learned counsel further submits that true it is that the crucial date for deciding as to the bonafide need of the requirement of landlord is the date of his application for eviction. It is also equally true that subsequent events in general are not required to be taken into account for judging the bonafides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord, but it cannot be an absolute proposition if the subsequent events are of such a nature and dimension which could logically be perceived to overshadow the genuineness of the need or the need propounded by the plaintiff in fact and in effect got eclipsed by subsequent events. Learned counsel relies upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Shrivastava, (2001) 2 SCC 604 . 8. Learned counsel also contends that one Smt. Rachna Agrawal had filed IA No.4653/2016, an application under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC for substitution as legal heir of Late Rampyaribai on the strength of Will, whereunder she had claimed that the entire property including the suit property since has been bequeathed to her by Late Rampyaribai by a registered Will dated 5/7/2013, therefore, as on date Sangeeta cannot claim any right, title or interest over the suit property in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appeal deserves to be allowed. 9. Per contra, Shri Singhal, learned counsel for the respondents contends that even if Rampyaribai has passed away and Sangeeta is married living with her husband at Bhopal, this by itself cannot render the decree of eviction otiose, as the decree for eviction was passed by the trial court at the time when she was unmarried. Her change of status shall not make any difference and the need still survives. Her change of status shall not make any difference and the need still survives. Learned counsel relies upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Shakuntala Bai and others v. Narayan Das and others, (2004) 5 SCC 772 . Learned counsel further contends that, therefore, even if she is not the owner of the suit property or ceases to be unmarried, the provisions of Section 12 (1) (f) of the Rent Act are still attracted and she is deemed to be the member of the family within the meaning of Section 2 (e) of the Rent Act. Further, as both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of facts as regards bonafide need, therefore, no interference is warranted under section 100 CPC. 10. Heard. Before adverting to rival contentions, it is expedient to quote the definition of "member of the family" under Section 2(e) and the provisions under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Rent Act:- "2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.- (a) to (d) xxxxxxxx (e) "member of the family" in case of any person means the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grand father, mother, grand mother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncle's wife or widow, or brother's son or unmarried daughter living jointly with, or any other relation dependent on him; 12. Restrictions on eviction of tenants. - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: (a) to (e) xxxxxxxx (f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned;" (Emphasis supplied) 11. A careful perusal of Section 2 (e) of the Rent Act suggests that married daughter is not included in the definition of member of the family, though referable to Section 12 (1) (e); residential premises, and not to Section 12 (1) (f); non-residential premises. A careful perusal of Section 2 (e) of the Rent Act suggests that married daughter is not included in the definition of member of the family, though referable to Section 12 (1) (e); residential premises, and not to Section 12 (1) (f); non-residential premises. Further, provisions of Section 12 (1) (f) suggests that the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of his ....... unmarried daughter may bring an action for eviction of the suit premises provided he is the owner thereof. 12. Looking to the factual matrix in hand, true it is that as on the date of decree passed by the trial court the need of Rampyaribai and that of Sangeeta was found to be bonafide nature in respect of the suit shop, but the subsequent events taken place, in the opinion of this Court, have eclipsed the aforesaid need and such subsequent events can be looked into in the light of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770 followed in Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad, (1981) 3 SCC 103 and Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram, 1992 Suppl (2) SCC 623 has held as under:- "4. We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis a vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair-play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice-subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair-play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice-subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case, has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into section 10(3) (iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact." 13. Similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ansuyaben Kantilal Bhatt v. Rashiklal Manilal Shah and another, (1997) 5 SCC 457 . 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gaya Prasad (supra) has held as under:- "13. In our opinion, the subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770 , which pointed to the need for re-moulding the reliefs on the strength of subsequent events affecting the cause of action in the field of rent control litigation, forewarned that cognizance of such subsequent events should be taken very cautiously. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770 , which pointed to the need for re-moulding the reliefs on the strength of subsequent events affecting the cause of action in the field of rent control litigation, forewarned that cognizance of such subsequent events should be taken very cautiously. This is what learned Judges of the Bench said then: "We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed." 15. So far as the judgment cited by learned counsel for respondents Shakuntala Bai (supra) is concerned, that is distinguishable on facts. In the said case, one Girdhari Lal had filed a suit for eviction of tenant Magan Lal from a non-residential premises on the ground that he requires the premises for carrying on his business. Suit was decreed by the trial court, against which an appeal was preferred by Magan Lal. During pendency of the appeal Girdhari Lal died and his wife and three sons were substituted as his heirs and legal representatives. Appellants sought an amendment in the plaint and pleaded that they bona fidely require the premises for carrying on business. Tenant Magan Lal had sought an amendment in the written statement to the effect that after the death of Girdhari Lal, the bona fide requirement of the premises for carrying on business pleaded in the suit came to an end. The lower appellate court allowed the amendment and remanded the case for fresh consideration. During pendency of the suit, appellants since again filed an amendment inter alia contending that they have attained majority and, therefore, they want to start cloth business in the premises in dispute. The trial court dismissed the suit. Appellant Magan Lal preferred an appeal. During pendency of appeal, original tenant Magan lal died and his sons were substituted. The appellate Court decreed the suit for eviction reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court. Appeal by defendant in the High Court was allowed by the judgment and decree under challenge before the Supreme Court. Appellant Magan Lal preferred an appeal. During pendency of appeal, original tenant Magan lal died and his sons were substituted. The appellate Court decreed the suit for eviction reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court. Appeal by defendant in the High Court was allowed by the judgment and decree under challenge before the Supreme Court. The High Court ruled that with the death of original plaintiff, bona fide need of landlord came to an end and, therefore, dismissed the suit. On these facts and circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while reversing the judgment has held that with the death of original plaintiff, need of the wife and sons, as brought on record through amendment, did not come to an end to run a business being entitled under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 16. Now turning to facts of the instant case, Sangeeta is married in the year 2000 living at Bhopal, Rampyaribai had died on 22/3/2014, a Will dated 5/7/2013 is placed on record by one Smt. Rachna Agrawal claiming herself to be the granddaughter-in-law of Rampyaribai with the claim that the entire property has been bequeathed to her to the exclusion of another person, therefore, Sangeeta though legal heir of Late Ganesh Prasad and Rampyaribai, but as on date with changed status; married, and in absence of any averments or material contrary to the Will placed on record has no right to claim as landlady of the suit property for the purpose of instant litigation. Under these circumstances, at this distance of time of more than 16 years looking to the provisions of definition of "member of the family" under Section 2 (e) of the Rent Act and ingredients of Section 12(1)(f) of the Rent Act, in the opinion of this Court, the factum of need, as found by the courts below, does not survive. Therefore, the question of law framed by this Court on 16/7/2008 is answered in affirmative and in favour of appellant/defendant. Accordingly, the second appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are hereby set aside.