JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Shri Sobhit Mohan Shukla, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant-State, and Shri Adnan Ahmad, learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner. The appeal questions the correctness of the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 18.4.2016 on the ground that the learned Single Judge has practically reviewed and recorded a finding contrary to as recorded in the final judgment between the same parties dated 19.11.2015. The submission, therefore, is that the learned Single Judge sitting as a co-ordinate bench could not have entertained the writ petition giving rise to this appeal and the cause of action shown in the writ petition was barred by the principles of estoppel and res judicata. 2. Shri Adnan, however, submits that the respondent-petitioner was entitled to the payment of the entire salary and therefore, the learned Single Judge has simply clarified the said position and has nowhere tinkered with the final judgment dated 19.11.2015. The contention, therefore, is that the principles of res judicata are neither attracted, inasmuch as, the issue with regard to the arrears of salary for the period the respondent-petitioner had been not allowed to work, was not the subject-matter of the decision in the earlier round of litigation. 3. We have considered the submissions raised and what we find is that the dispute related to the benefit of the academic session being available to those teachers who are retiring in mid-session. Earlier the end of academic session was 30th June of each year, but on account of the alteration in the rules, the said date of the academic session stood converted to 31st March of the year following the age of retirement of a teacher. 4. Consequently, in the present case, the respondent-petitioner who had to retire on 30th June, 2015, on account of this alteration of rules, was entitled to continue till 31st March, 2016. This legal position is now settled by the decisions that govern the field. 5. The respondent-petitioner had also filed a writ petition seeking his continuance till 31st March, 2016 and payment of salary. The said writ petition No. 5378 (S/S) of 2015 was clubbed alongwith a bunch of writ petitions. Initially, the respondent-petitioner was granted an interim order to continue which order is Annexure-3 to the memo of appeal dated 16.9.2015. 5. The respondent-petitioner had also filed a writ petition seeking his continuance till 31st March, 2016 and payment of salary. The said writ petition No. 5378 (S/S) of 2015 was clubbed alongwith a bunch of writ petitions. Initially, the respondent-petitioner was granted an interim order to continue which order is Annexure-3 to the memo of appeal dated 16.9.2015. The judgment finally delivered in the said case clearly recites that the petitioners therein were entitled to salary only for the period they had actually worked. 6. Undisputedly, the respondent-petitioner had not functioned after 30th June, 2015 and even after the passing of the interim order dated 16.9.2015, the respondent-petitioner was allowed to function w.e.f. 2.11.2015 upon the issuance of a Government Order in this regard. 7. Thus, under the final judgment dated 19.11.2015, the respondent-petitioner has been paid his salary from 2.11.2015 up till 31.3.2016 but the salary from 01st July, 2015 to 01st November, 2015 has not been paid to him, as he had not worked in the institution. 8. The respondent-petitioner thereafter filed writ petition No. 8067 (S/S) of 2016 giving rise to this appeal claiming the entire salary. The writ petition was allowed on 18.4.2016 on the first day of its institution by the learned Single Judge without granting any time for counter-affidavit to the State in the matter. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that firstly the writ petition was not entertainable as the final judgment dated 19.11.2015 inter-parties equally bound the respondent-petitioner who was only entitled to salary for the period he had actually worked. In the event the respondent-petitioner wanted salary for the period for which he had not been allowed to work, as stated by him, i.e. from 01st July, 2015 to 01st November, 2015 then in that event, the course open to the respondent-petitioner was to seek a judicial review of the judgment dated 19.11.2015, if at all it was permissible in law. No appeal was preferred against the said judgment. Once the judgment dated 19.11.2015 had been accepted by the respondent-petitioner, it was nowhere open to him to file a fresh petition for the payment of salary or for the balance part as indicated above. No appeal was preferred against the said judgment. Once the judgment dated 19.11.2015 had been accepted by the respondent-petitioner, it was nowhere open to him to file a fresh petition for the payment of salary or for the balance part as indicated above. Shri Shukla, learned counsel for the appellant, further submits that the impugned judgment having been delivered on the very first day without any opportunity to the State to contest the matter also was unjustified and consequently, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. 9. Shri Adnan, on the other hand, submits that while disposing off the writ petition on 19.11.2015, the Court did not disallow the salary for the period during which the respondent-petitioner had not been allowed to work by the appellants themselves. In such a situation, the respondent-petitioner was entitled to raise this issue, inasmuch as, this was neither a issue raised nor decided in the earlier set of proceedings and hence, the principle of res judicata would not apply. It has also been urged by Shri Adnan that if that is the correct position then there is no material for which any counter-affidavit is required and the same being a purely legal issue, the learned Single Judge was justified in disposing off the matter on the very first day. 10. It remains undisputed that the respondent-petitioner had been paid salary from 2.11.2015 till 31.3.2016 according to the judgment dated 19.11.2015. In our considered opinion, the issue of payment of salary was directly involved in the earlier writ petition filed by the respondent-petitioner being W.P. No. 5378 (S/S) of 2015 which also included the said period for which the respondent-petitioner claims that he had been prevented from functioning. It was open to the respondent-petitioner to raise this issue before the learned Single Judge or obtain an order and in the event such pleadings were available, then in that event, it was also open to the respondent-petitioner to apply for a review of the judgment, if the ingredients of review were available or file an appeal. 11. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the second writ petition in relation to the said cause, which might and ought to have been raised in the previous petition or had escaped the notice of the learned Single Judge while disposing off the matter on 19.11.2015, could not be made subject-matter of a fresh writ petition. 11. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the second writ petition in relation to the said cause, which might and ought to have been raised in the previous petition or had escaped the notice of the learned Single Judge while disposing off the matter on 19.11.2015, could not be made subject-matter of a fresh writ petition. The principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata are both attracted in the present case on the facts disclosed. Learned Standing Counsel, therefore, is right in his submission that the learned Single Judge could not have entertained the subsequent writ petition for the said cause of action, consequently the appeal deserves to be allowed. The special appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 18.4.2016 passed in W.P. No. 8067 (S/S) of 2016 is set aside without prejudice to the rights of the respondent-petitioner to seek his remedy as observed hereinabove in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed with the said observations.