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2017 DIGILAW 722 (ORI)

Nilabati Gouda v. Durga Prasad Mohapatra

2017-07-14

A.K.RATH

body2017
JUDGMENT : Dr. A.K. Rath, J. Plaintiff is the appellant against a confirming judgment. 2. The case of the plaintiff is that Faguna Gouda was the owner of the suit schedule property. He had one son, namely, Basu Gouda, who predeceased him. The plaintiff is the daughter of Basu Gouda. Basu Gouda died in the year 1970 and his wife predeceased him. Faguna Gouda died in the year 1975. The plaintiff was brought up by her maternal grandmother. In the hal settlement operation, a portion of the suit land was recorded in the name of Faguna Gouda and another portion was recorded in the name of the defendant. Thereafter she came to know that one Ashumati Gouda claiming to be the daughter of Faguna Gouda alienated the entire suit land by means of two registered sale deeds in favour of the defendant. Ashumati was not the daughter of Faguna. Thus the sale deeds were never binding upon her. She issued a legal notice to the defendant not to disturb her possession. The defendant gave reply that Ashumati being the Karta of the family had alienated the property for legal necessity and for the benefit of the estate. Plaintiff got the portion of the suit land mutated in her name in Misc. Case No.231 of 1990 in the court of the Tahasildar, Jeypore. Thereafter the defendant initiated a proceeding under Sec.145 Cr.P.C. vide M.C. No.419/1991 before the Executive Magistrate, Jeypore alleging that the plaintiff is trespassing into the suit property. With this factual scenario, the plaintiff filed T.S. No.15 of 2001 before the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.), Jeypore for declaration of right, title and interest and possession over the suit property and further declaration that the two nos. of sale deeds executed by one Ashumati Gouda in favour of the defendant are void and not binding on the plaintiff. 3. The defendant filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. The case of the defendant is that Basu and Ashumati are the son and daughter of Faguna Gouda. Nilabati, plaintiff, is the daughter of Basu. Basu and his wife are dead. Faguna was ill. Ashumati was managing the affairs of the family. Faguna Gouda died in the year 1974. She succeeded the suit property along with the house. Plaintiff was a minor. The financial condition of the family was not good. Nilabati, plaintiff, is the daughter of Basu. Basu and his wife are dead. Faguna was ill. Ashumati was managing the affairs of the family. Faguna Gouda died in the year 1974. She succeeded the suit property along with the house. Plaintiff was a minor. The financial condition of the family was not good. To perform the obsequies of Basu and for maintenance of the plaintiff, she incurred loan from the neighbours. With the permission of Faguna, she incurred the loan agreeing to execute the sale deeds. Being the guardian, she executed two deeds dated 2.7.1975 and 19.1.1980 in favour of the defendant for valid consideration and delivered possession. 4. Stemming on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck eight issues. To substantiate the case, the plaintiff had examined five witnesses and on her behalf three documents had been exhibited. The defendant had examined five witnesses and on his behalf seven documents had been exhibited. 5. Learned trial court held that as there was no male member in the house of Faguna after his death, Ashumati being the eldest member became manager of the family and guardian of the plaintiff. Ashumati was looking after the plaintiff. To press the legal necessity, Ashumati sold the property to the defendant by two sale deeds. The transaction is valid and binding on the plaintiff. Held so, it dismissed the suit. The plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged the judgment and decree of the learned trial court before the learned District Judge, Koraput at Jeypore in T.A. No.27 of 2001, which was eventually dismissed. 6. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law. “(1) Whether after death of Basu Gouda, Smt. Ashumati Gouda and Smt. Nilabati Gouda became the member of the Joint Hindu Family ? (2) Whether prior permission of the learned District Judge under the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 is a sine qua non for alienating the properties by Smt. Ashumati Gouda ? (3) Whether any allegation made by Smt. Ashumati Gouda is binding on plaintiff-Smt. Nilabati Gouda ?” 7. Heard Mr. Niranjan Sahoo, learned counsel, on behalf of Mr. J.R. Dash, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. P.K. Rath, learned counsel for the respondent. 8. Mr. Sahoo, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Faguna died in the year 1974. (3) Whether any allegation made by Smt. Ashumati Gouda is binding on plaintiff-Smt. Nilabati Gouda ?” 7. Heard Mr. Niranjan Sahoo, learned counsel, on behalf of Mr. J.R. Dash, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. P.K. Rath, learned counsel for the respondent. 8. Mr. Sahoo, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Faguna died in the year 1974. After death of Faguna, Ashumati and plaintiff inherited the suit property as joint tenants with 50% shares each. Ashumati stood on the footing of de facto guardian. She could not dispose of or deal with the minor’s property without permission of the court as per Sec.11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1956”). Rather if any such sale was made without authority of law, then that would bind to the extent of her share only leaving the minor’s sale aloof. Any alienation made by natural guardian in contravention of Sec.8(2) of the Act, 1956 is void. He submitted that the defendant has failed to prove the existence of legal necessity. He further submitted that recital in the sale deed about legal necessity do not by themselves proof legal necessity. Recitals are however admissible in evidence to corroborate the other evidence of legal necessity. Gouda family had total Ac.0.93 dec. of land, out of which Ashumati had sold Ac.0.90 dec. through 2 nos. of disputed sale deeds in 1975 and 1980 and had left only Ac.0.03 dec. for minor plaintiff. The suit land is a valuable homestead property situated in Jeypore town. 9. Per contra, Mr. Rath, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that though the plaintiff has disputed that Ashumati was not the daughter of Faguna, but from the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the defendant, it is clearly established that Ashumati was the daughter of Faguna. Both the courts concurrently held that Ashumati was the daughter of Faguna. This is essentially a finding of fact. Placing reliance on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Bharatha Matha and another vs. R. Vijay Renganathan and others, AIR 2010 SC 2685 , he submitted that findings of the status of the parties is a finding of fact. There is no perversity in the said finding. Thus the High Court cannot interfere with the same in a Second Appeal. He further contended that Basu and his wife predeceased Faguna. There is no perversity in the said finding. Thus the High Court cannot interfere with the same in a Second Appeal. He further contended that Basu and his wife predeceased Faguna. After the death of Faguna, Ashumati was the only adult and elder member of the family. She was looking after the joint family property as well as the plaintiff. Both the courts held that Ashumati, being the elder member after death of Faguna and Basu and their wives, was acting as the guardian of the minor plaintiff. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Mst. Kasturi Adabasia and others vs. Bishnu Dandasena and others, 70 (1990) CLT-335 and contended that in a Joint Hindu Family, if there is no Karta or male members are all minors or there is no male member, then there is no bar for the female representing the family as its manager. In the event the manager of Karta of the family has proved the legal necessity for making such alienation, then the alienation so made is valid. He placed reliance on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Sunil Kumar and another vs. Ram Prakash and others, AIR 1988 SC 576 and contended that coparceners are not entitled to seek permanent injunction restraining Karta from making alienation of the joint family properties. A joint family consists of all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor and includes their wives and unmarried daughters. Article 212(3) of Mulla’s Hindu Law provides that a joint family and undivided Hindu family even consist of two female members. To constitute a joint family, there must be at least two members. From the evidence, it is clearly established that Ashumati and Nilabati constitute a joint Hindu family. Ashumati was not the natural guardian of Nilabati. Thus no previous permission under Sec.8 of the Act, 1956 was necessary. He further contended that there is a distinction between the minors’ exclusive property and minors’ interest in the Joint Hindu family. So far as the minors’ interest in the Joint Hindu family, powers of the guardian to alienate the property, no prior permission for the same is necessary. Alternatively Mr. Rath contended that alienation made by the joint holder of the property in an un-partitioned/undivided joint property prior to partition is valid to the extent of his share. So far as the minors’ interest in the Joint Hindu family, powers of the guardian to alienate the property, no prior permission for the same is necessary. Alternatively Mr. Rath contended that alienation made by the joint holder of the property in an un-partitioned/undivided joint property prior to partition is valid to the extent of his share. In a joint family property transfer by co-owner is valid to the extent of their share. Ashumati being the rustic and illiterate lady did not know the position of law as to the requirement of permission for alienation of joint family property. He placed reliance on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Nasib Kaur and others vs. Colonel Surat Singh (Deceased) through LRs. and others, (2013) 5 SCC 218 and this Court in the case of Harekrushna Mahakud vs. Radhanath Mahakud and others, 2009 (Suppl-1) OLR-610. 10. Faguna Gouda was the owner of the suit schedule land. He died in the year 1974. Basu, son of Faguna predeceased him. The assertion of the plaintiff is that she the daughter of Basu. Both the courts concurrently held that Ashumati was the daughter of Faguna. There is no perversity in the findings of the court below. 11. According to the defendant, Ashumati had incurred loan from different persons for the treatment of her father. To press her legal necessity, she sold the land in question to the defendant by means of registered sale deeds. Ashumati was looking after the welfare of the plaintiff. Thus the sale deeds are valid. 12. Relying on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Radhakrishnadas and another vs. Kaluram (dead) and after him his heirs and legal representative and others, AIR 1967 SC 574 , this Court in the case of Gopabandhu Das and others vs. Maheswar Mundian and others, 86 (1998) CLT-35 held that where the alienation of joint family property is not approved by the sons, the burden is on the alienee to establish that the same was supported by legal necessity or benefit of the family or that he made reasonable enquiry about existence of such necessity. The apex Court in the case of Smt. Rani and another vs. Smt. Santa Bala Debnath and others, AIR 1971 SC 1028 held that recitals in a deed of legal necessity do not by themselves prove legal necessity. The apex Court in the case of Smt. Rani and another vs. Smt. Santa Bala Debnath and others, AIR 1971 SC 1028 held that recitals in a deed of legal necessity do not by themselves prove legal necessity. The recitals are, however, admissible in evidence, their value varying according to the circumstances in which the transaction was entered into. The recitals may be used to corroborate other evidence of the existence of legal necessity. The weight to be attached to the recitals varies according to the circumstances. 13. Ashumati was not examined as a witness. No evidence worth the name was adduced by the defendant to discharge the burden. As held by the apex Court in the case of Smt. Rani and another (supra) that recitals of the sale deed with regard to legal necessity are not sufficient to discharge the burden lies upon the alienee. The recitals in the sale deeds vide Exts.A and B executed by Ashumati in favour of the defendant do not themselves prove any legal necessity. Ashumati was the de facto guardian of the plaintiff. Sec.11 of the Act, 1956 provides that after the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to dispose of, or deal with, the property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of his or her being the de facto guardian of the minor. Thus any alienation done by Ashumati, de facto guardian of the plaintiff is void. Sec.11 of the Act, 1956 does not make any distinction between separate property and undivided interest of a Hindu minor in the joint family property. The de facto guardian may deal with the joint family property for legal necessity. 14. In Mst. Kasturi Adabasia and others (supra), this Court held that although a Hindu Joint Family can consist of males and females, a female cannot act or be treated as a Karta of the family even when there is no male member in the family. The position would, however, be different wherein a Hindu Family there is no Karta, or where the male members are all minors and there is no one who can act as Karta, or, where there are no males at all, there is no legal bar to a female representing a family as its manger. The power of a managing member of a Joint Family to alienate family property is subject to certain restrictions. The power of a managing member of a Joint Family to alienate family property is subject to certain restrictions. The power of alienation is confined, according to Mitakshara law to be exercised for any or all of three purposes, that is, (i) in the time of distress; (ii) for the sake or benefit of the family; and (iii) for pious purposes. It further held that whenever an alienation by the manager is impeached, the burden lies on the alienee, or any person claiming the benefit of the alienation in question, to prove that it was made, in case of need, or for the benefit of the estate, as the case may be. In other words, the alienees deal with the manager and the joint family property at their own risk. This rule proceeds upon the principle that whoever deals with a person with a limited power of disposition, must do so at his own risk. 15. In Smt. Pushpa Devi vs. The Commissioner of Income-tax, New Delhi, AIR 1977 SC 2230 , the apex Court held that a Hindu coparcenary is a much narrower body than the joint family and it includes only those persons who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property. These are the three generations next to the holder in unbroken male descent. A Hindu female therefore is not a coparcener. 16. Ashumati was the de facto guardian of the plaintiff. She had 50% share in the property. Thus alienation made by her by means of two registered sale deeds, Exts.A and B is valid to the extent of 50% share in the property. Any sale in excess to the share of Ashumati stands set aside. She had no authority to alienate the property of the plaintiff. The sale so far as the share of the plaintiff is void ab initio. 17. The next question arises whether this Court can direct to carve out the share of the plaintiff in the absence of any prayer in the plaint. The apex Court in the case of Firm Srinivas Ram Kumar vs. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 177 held thus: “xxx xxx xxx The question, however, arises whether, in the absence of any such alternative case in the plaint it is open to the court to give him relief on that basis. The apex Court in the case of Firm Srinivas Ram Kumar vs. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 177 held thus: “xxx xxx xxx The question, however, arises whether, in the absence of any such alternative case in the plaint it is open to the court to give him relief on that basis. The rule undoubtedly is that the court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings. In such circumstances, when no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff to a separate suit. xxx xxx xxx” The same view has taken in Khali Panigrahi vs. Kamala Devi, AIR 1967 Ori. 100 . 18. As held above, the plaintiff has ½ share in the entire property. The defendant is a bona fide purchaser. He is in possession of the property for the last three decades. Instead of driving the parties to another suit for partition, to give quietus to the issue, it would be just and proper to pass a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of ½ interest in the plaintiff. The same will not cause any prejudice to any party. The decree passed by the court below is modified as follows: The entire suit schedule land is to be divided ½ each between the plaintiff and defendant. The lands purchased by the defendant shall be carved out from ½ share of Ashumati and shall be allotted to him. Accordingly, a preliminary decree for partition is made between the plaintiff and defendant as aforesaid. Learned trial court shall appoint a commissioner to effect partition by metes and bounds of the suit land. 19. The lands purchased by the defendant shall be carved out from ½ share of Ashumati and shall be allotted to him. Accordingly, a preliminary decree for partition is made between the plaintiff and defendant as aforesaid. Learned trial court shall appoint a commissioner to effect partition by metes and bounds of the suit land. 19. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed to the extent indicated above. The plaintiff’s suit is decreed in part. No costs.