JUDGMENT : Harsha Devani, J. 1. By this application, the applicant Gujarat Housing Board seeks the following reliefs: "(a) Your Lordships may be pleased to review of the judgment and order dated 2.12.2015 passed by this Hon'ble High Court (Coram: Harsha Devani and G.B. Shah, JJ.) in SCA No. 2484/2015 (Annexure-A) and be pleased to hold that the land acquisition proceedings have not lapsed by the provisions of section 24 (2) of the Act." Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013." 2. The respondents No. 1 to 10 herein had filed the above referred writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 2484 of 2015 invoking the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 2013") and sought a declaration that the acquisition proceedings in respect of their lands have lapsed. By the judgment and order dated 2.12.2015, this court held that for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act of 2013, the petitioners are required to show that: (i) the possession of the subject land has not been taken over till date; or (ii) the compensation has not been paid to them. After considering the documentary evidence placed on record, this court found that the possession of the subject land was never taken over after the award came to be made under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1894"). The court, accordingly, found that the first requirement of sub-section (2) of section 24 is clearly satisfied. As regards the second ground, regarding payment of compensation, this court found that though Gujarat Housing Board had deposited the compensation amount with the Executive Magistrate and Mamlatdar, such amount remained with the State authorities and at no point of time was such compensation deposited with the reference court. As regards the second ground, regarding payment of compensation, this court found that though Gujarat Housing Board had deposited the compensation amount with the Executive Magistrate and Mamlatdar, such amount remained with the State authorities and at no point of time was such compensation deposited with the reference court. Placing reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misrimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 , this court held that since the compensation amount had not been deposited with the reference court, the compensation could not be said to have been paid within the meaning of such expression as envisaged under Sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act of 2013 and accordingly, held that both the alternative contingencies envisaged under sub-section (2) of section 24 stand satisfied and accordingly, the acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. Being aggrieved, the applicant herein approached the Supreme Court by way of a petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 9527 of 2016. By the following order dated 13.4.2016, the special leave petition was disposed of by the Supreme Court: "Learned counsel has invited reference to the statement of taking possession, as reflected in the Award dated 31.01.1972. It is submitted that High Court has gone wrong in allowing the Special Civil Application filed by the petitioner under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. It is for the petitioner to approach the High Court by a review, since this aspect has not been given consideration by the High Court. If the review is filed within 30 days from today, the same may be considered by the High Court on merits. The special leave petition is disposed of with the above observations." 3. Thereafter, the applicant has moved the present application seeking review of the above referred judgment and order dated 2.12.2015. 4. Mr. Y.N. Ravani, learned advocate for the applicant invited the attention of the court to the award dated 31.1.1972 made under section 11 of the Act of 1894, to point out that in the said award, the District Deputy Collector, Godhra, under the heading "Interest or payment of rent", has observed that the possession of the acquired lands has been taken over by the acquiring body through private negotiations. Hence, from the date when the possession was taken over till the date of declaration of the award, interest be paid to the landholders at the rate of 4%. It was submitted that therefore, way back in the year 1972, the Collector has recorded that possession of the lands in question had already been taken over through private negotiations, and hence, the finding recorded by this court in the judgment and order under review that possession of the subject lands was not taken over is factually incorrect. It was submitted that there is no material on record to show that after the award came to be made in the year 1972, the possession of the subject lands has reverted to the owners. It was submitted that apart from the fact that the above referred award of 1972 clearly shows that the possession had been taken over, mutation entries have been made in the revenue record vesting the subject lands in the applicant in the year 1977 and, therefore, the subsequent material produced by the original petitioners would not come to their aid, when way back in the year 1972, the possession was already taken over. It was urged that the original petitioners, therefore, do not satisfy the first requirement of sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act of 2013. 4.1 It was submitted that insofar as the second requirement of sub-section (2) of section 24 is concerned, viz. compensation has not been paid, this court in the case of Bhupatsinh Vitthalbhai Vasava v. State of Gujarat, 2016 (4) GLR 2736 , has in a case where the amount was not deposited with the reference court held that the compensation had been paid to the land owner. It was submitted that the court has held that the term "paid" is not possible of precise definition and interpretation varies from statute to statute and, sometimes, depending on the situation. It was urged that the above decision would be clearly applicable to the facts of the present case and that the compensation having been paid over to the original petitioners, which they had not accepted, would amount to payment of compensation to them and hence, the second requirement of sub-section (2) of section 24 also does not stand complied with. It was urged that the above decision would be clearly applicable to the facts of the present case and that the compensation having been paid over to the original petitioners, which they had not accepted, would amount to payment of compensation to them and hence, the second requirement of sub-section (2) of section 24 also does not stand complied with. 4.2 The learned advocate for the applicant further drew the attention of the court to the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 2016 published vide notification dated 12.8.2016 issued by the Government of Gujarat whereby certain provisions of the Act of 2013 have been amended. It was pointed out that vide section 5 of the Gujarat Amendment Act, a proviso has been inserted after the existing proviso to sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act of 2013, which provides that in computing the period referred to in that sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction issued by any court or the period specified in the award of a Tribunal for taking possession or such period where possession has been taken but the compensation is lying deposited in a court or in any designated account maintained for this purpose, shall be excluded. It was submitted that in view of the fact that there were various proceedings pending before different courts wherein stay had been granted, such period is required to be excluded while computing the period of five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2103, in which case, the basic requirement of sub-section (2) of section 24 would not be satisfied. 4.3 It was, accordingly, urged that the above referred errors in the judgment and order under review are errors apparent on the face of the record which need to be rectified, and hence, the application requires consideration and deserves to be allowed. 5. Vehemently opposing the application, Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala, Senior Advocate, learned counsel with Mr. Sunil Joshi, learned advocate for the opponents No. 1 to 10.2, submitted that insofar as reliance placed by the applicant upon the award of 1972 is concerned, though the same was placed before this court in the writ petition, no submissions had been advanced based upon the same. R.S. Sanjanwala, Senior Advocate, learned counsel with Mr. Sunil Joshi, learned advocate for the opponents No. 1 to 10.2, submitted that insofar as reliance placed by the applicant upon the award of 1972 is concerned, though the same was placed before this court in the writ petition, no submissions had been advanced based upon the same. The attention of the court was invited to the fact that the State Government had vide letter dated 18.10.1972 accepted the appeal of tenant Shri Somabhai Kanjibhai and others and had set aside the declaration under section 6 of the Act of 1894 and had directed that further proceedings be taken in accordance with law. Thereafter, in view of some mistake in the area of the land, a new proposal was forwarded to the State Government whereafter notification under section 4 of the Act came to be issued and the proceeding culminated into an award dated 13.6.1974, which forms the basis of the present acquisition. It was submitted pointed out that in this award, there is no observation regarding the possession of the lands having been taken over by private negotiations. Moreover, the original petitioners have produced overwhelming documentary evidence on the record of the main writ petition to establish that the possession of the subject lands was not taken over. 5.1 The learned counsel invited the attention of the court to the order dated 1.1.1998 of the Joint District Judge, Panchmahals, Godhra, in Regular Civil Suit No. 16 of 1984, wherein the court had directed that the respondent shall not take possession of the suit lands from the appellants for a period of two months from the date of that order, to submit that even at that stage no stand had been taken by the applicant herein that the possession of the land had already been taken over by them. Reference was made to the order dated 11.9.2009 passed by this court in Second Appeal No. 77 of 1988, wherein it has been recorded that the learned advocate had stated that the possession of the property in question has not been taken over by the Land Acquisition Officer, and hence, in view of the statement made on behalf of the second respondent in the said proceedings that the acquisition proceedings are dropped by the first respondent, the proceeding does not survive. The attention of the court was further invited to the proposal dated 2.7.2013 of the Collector, Panchmahals to the Secretary, Revenue Department proposing to release the subject lands from acquisition, wherein reference has been made to the opinion of the District Government Pleader to the effect that the question of handing over the possession of the land to the Gujarat Housing Board does not arise. Reference was made to the communication dated 30.1.2015 of the Executive Engineer, Gujarat Housing Board Vadodara addressed to the original petitioner for demarcating the boundaries in respect of possession, to submit that the possession has not been taken over even at that stage. It was submitted that there is overwhelming material on record to show that it was never the case of the applicant, that possession of the subject lands was taken over. The attention of the court was also invited to the communication dated 7.3.1972 of the Executive Engineer, Housing Division, Vadodara, addressed to the Mamlatdar, Taluka Halol (Annexure-R2 to the further affidavit of the Gujarat Housing Board in the main petition) requesting him to intimate the date for handing over possession of the land to the Gujarat Housing Board at the earliest. It was submitted that if the possession of the land had already been taken over through private negotiations, as recorded in the award dated 31.1.1972, there was no question of the Executive Engineer writing to the Mamlatdar to hand over the possession of the land to the Gujarat Housing Board. It was submitted that, therefore, no reliance can be placed upon any such observation made in the award dated 31.1.1972 which in any case already stands quashed and set aside. 5.2 Insofar as the decision of this court in the case of Bhupatsingh Vitthalbhai Vasava v. State of Gujarat, (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the learned advocate for the applicant is concerned, it was submitted that the same was rendered in a totally different set of facts and would have no applicability to the facts of the present case. It was pointed out that in the facts of the said case, the Collector had already tendered the payment of compensation to the person interested, who accepted the payment voucher with an endorsement that he was receiving such money under protest, but thereafter, did not turn up before the Government Treasury to actually collect such sum. It was pointed out that in the facts of the said case, the Collector had already tendered the payment of compensation to the person interested, who accepted the payment voucher with an endorsement that he was receiving such money under protest, but thereafter, did not turn up before the Government Treasury to actually collect such sum. It was submitted that it was in these facts that the court did not think that the contingencies envisaged under sub-section (2) of section 31 of the Act of 1894 can be stated to have arisen. The court observed that the voucher was issued for the person interested to collect the money and that it was not a case where the person interested did not appear or refused to accept the compensation. 5.3 Insofar as the proviso inserted by the Amendment Act of 2016 below the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act of 2103 is concerned, the learned counsel submitted that such amendment is subsequent to the decision rendered by this court and hence, cannot be made applicable to this case. It was further pointed out that assuming for the sake of argument that such amendment would apply, there were several periods during the pendency of the different proceedings before the courts, when there was no injunction operating against the applicant and the State respondents. It was pointed out that vide order dated 29.4.1978, the High Court had rejected the Special Civil Application No. 922 of 1978 and vacated the interim relief. It was submitted that original petitioners had instituted Civil Suits No. 160 and 161 of 1982 on 30.4.1982 and hence during the period between 29.4.1978 to 30.4.1982, there was no interim relief operating. It was pointed out that the civil suit came to be dismissed vide order dated 14.11.1982 and the interim relief came to be vacated. Regular Civil Appeals No. 16 and 17 of 1985 were filed in the year 1985, and hence, during the interregnum from 14.11.1982 till the appeals came to be filed, there was no stay operating. It was pointed out that the above appeals came to be dismissed by order dated 1.1.1988 and the interim relief was extended for some time. Regular Civil Appeals No. 16 and 17 of 1985 were filed in the year 1985, and hence, during the interregnum from 14.11.1982 till the appeals came to be filed, there was no stay operating. It was pointed out that the above appeals came to be dismissed by order dated 1.1.1988 and the interim relief was extended for some time. It was submitted that Second Appeal No. 77 of 1988, which was filed before the High Court sometime in the year 1988, came to be disposed of on 11.9.2009 and the interim relief came to be vacated and the Act of 2013 came into force with effect from 1.1.2014. Thus, from 11.9.2009 till 1.1.2014 there was no interim order operating in favour of the original petitioners. It was emphatically argued that, therefore, for a period of more than five years prior to the commencement of the new Act, there was no interim relief operating against the respondents and in favour of the original petitioner. Therefore, even on merits, the said notification would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. It was further urged that the present application does not fall within the parameters envisaged under rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and hence, the review application being devoid of merits, deserves to be rejected. 6. Therefore, even on merits, the said notification would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. It was further urged that the present application does not fall within the parameters envisaged under rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and hence, the review application being devoid of merits, deserves to be rejected. 6. In the above backdrop, it may be noticed that a perusal of the memorandum of appeal presented before the Supreme Court reveals that in ground B thereof, the applicant has contended that the High Court failed to notice the finding recorded by the Collector way back on 31.1.1972 in the award made under section 11 of the 1894 Act that the acquiring body had taken possession of the land under acquisition through private negotiations and that the Collector had also directed the Gujarat Housing Board to pay rent to the land owners from the date of possession till the date of notification under section 4 of the Act; and in ground G it has been contended that the High Court failed to appreciate that the affidavit of the Collector alleging that the possession of the land could not be taken under sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 in his affidavit dated 22.7.2015 is wholly unreliable being contrary to the finding recorded by the Collector way back on 31.1.1972 in his award and the High Court ought to have relied upon the finding recorded in the award dated 31.1.1972 being contemporaneous. 7. In this regard, it may be noted that the award dated 31.1.1972 has been produced on record by the applicant together with a further affidavit dated 6.10.2015, with the following averments: "I state that land acquisition officer had passed award under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act on 31.1.1972 declaring compensation payable Rs. 16,456.50/- (Sixteen thousand four hundred fifty six & fifty paisa). The copy of the award declared under section 11 on 31.1.1972 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-R1." 8. In the entire affidavit, there is no reference as regards the Collector having recorded a finding regarding possession having been taken over. 16,456.50/- (Sixteen thousand four hundred fifty six & fifty paisa). The copy of the award declared under section 11 on 31.1.1972 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-R1." 8. In the entire affidavit, there is no reference as regards the Collector having recorded a finding regarding possession having been taken over. The submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties before the court have been extensively referred to in the judgment and order under review, a perusal whereof shows that no such submission with reference to the award dated 31.1.1972 has been made before the court. It is highly unfortunate that without advancing any submission, either oral or written before this court, the applicant has raised a new ground before the Supreme Court for the first time and has contended that the High Court has failed to consider a factor which was never urged before it. Be that as it may. 9. It may be noted that insofar as the award dated 31.1.1972 is concerned, the same was set aside by the State Government and a fresh award came to be made on 13.6.1974. In the fresh award made on 13.6.1974, under the heading "Interest or payment of rent" it has been recorded that from the date when the possession of the acquired lands has been taken over, till the date of declaration of award, interest be paid at the rate of 4 percent and if the possession has been taken over after the declaration of the award, then from the date the possession is taken over till the date of payment of compensation, interest be paid at the rate of 4 percent. Thus, the subsequent award which forms the basis for the present acquisition does not record that possession of the acquired lands has been taken over through private negotiations. Pertinently, though the award dated 31.1.1972 records that possession has been taken over through private negotiations, by a communication dated 7.3.1972 (Annexure R2 to the affidavit in reply of the original respondent No. 1, namely, Executive Engineer of the applicant Gujarat Housing Board), the Executive Engineer of the applicant has requested the Mamlatdar to intimate the date of handing over possession of land to the Gujarat Housing Board at the earliest. 10. 10. It may also be germane to refer to the communication dated 29th May, 2015 of the applicant, addressed to the Secretary, Urban Development and Urban Housing Department, requesting that the possession of Survey No. 132 of Mouje Halol, District Panchmahals be handed over to the Board at the earliest for construction of affordable housing. Therefore, the applicant has taken contrary stands, inasmuch as while based upon an award dated 31.1.1972, which has already been set aside, it is sought to be contended that the possession has already been taken over by the applicant through private negotiations, on the other hand, the applicant has requested the State Government to ensure that possession of such land is handed over to it at the earliest. Moreover, no material has been brought on record to show that possession of the subject land was taken over through private negotiations, namely as to when and how and on what terms, such possession was taken. 11. The most significant aspect of the matter is that this court has allowed the petition on the ground that both the eventualities provided under sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act of 2013 have been satisfied. The court has also noted that even if one of the eventualities, viz. possession has not been taken over or the compensation has not been paid, is satisfied, the acquisition would be deemed to have lapsed. In the present case, apart from the fact that the applicant has not been able to establish that possession was taken over, and the original petitioner has by placing overwhelming documentary evidence on record (as has been discussed in detail in the judgment and order under review,) succeeded in establishing that possession has not been taken over, even if the factor as to whether or not the possession had been taken over is not taken into consideration, on the second count, namely, compensation has not been paid, the acquisition would still lapse. 12. 12. Insofar as non-payment of compensation is concerned, this court has applied the decision of the Supreme Court in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misrimal Solanki, (supra), and on facts has found that the applicant had deposited the amount of compensation with the Executive Magistrate and Mamlatdar and that the amount had remained with the State authorities and that at no point of time was such compensation deposited with the reference court as contemplated under sub-section (2) of section 31 of the Act of 1894, and that the amount was not made available to the interested persons as provided in sections 32 and 33 of the Act of 1894. Therefore, whether or not the possession of the subject land was taken over, the applicant is bound to fail in the writ petition. 13. As noticed earlier, now at this stage in the review, the learned advocate for the applicant has sought to place reliance upon a subsequent decision of this court in the case of Bhupatsingh Vitthalbhai Vasava v. State of Gujarat (supra); however, in the light of the peculiar facts in the context of which the said decision was rendered as referred to hereinabove, this court is in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for the original petitioners that the said decision would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 14. As regards the proviso which has been inserted below the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act of 2013 by the Amendment Act of 2016, apart from the fact that the said amendment is subsequent to the decision of this court and is also beyond the scope of review, even otherwise, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the original petitioners, from the time when the award came to be passed till the commencement of the Act of 2013, at various periods, in all exceeding five years, no interim relief was operating in favour of the original petitioners. Therefore, even if the provisions of the Amendment Act are taken into consideration, the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 24 as inserted by the Amendment Act, would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 15. In the light of the above discussion, no case has been made out for review of the judgment and order dated 2.12.201. 15. In the light of the above discussion, no case has been made out for review of the judgment and order dated 2.12.201. (sic) the application being devoid of merits is, accordingly, rejected. Appeal Dismissed