JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of instant application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act, prayer has been made on behalf of the applicant for condoning delay of seven years, five months and one day, in maintaining the accompanying Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Briefly stated the facts as emerge from the record are that learned Single Judge of this Court, vide judgment dated 26.9.2008 passed in CWP No. 23 of 2002, directed the present applicant, who happened to be respondent No.2 in the writ petition, to deposit an amount of Rs. 30,000/- in the Registry of this Court with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, within four weeks, failing which, District Collector, Solan was directed to recover a sum of Rs. 30,000/- from the respondent No.2, as per security bond, as arrears of revenue from him and to deposit said amount in the Registry of this Court. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment having been passed by learned Single Judge, applicant preferred a review petition i.e. C. Rev. No. 69 of 2008, in the month of October, 2008. However, fact remains that aforesaid review petition came to be dismissed on 8.4.2009. Now, at this stage, petitioner being aggrieved and dissatisfied with aforesaid judgment dated 26.9.2008 passed in CWP No. 23 of 2002 and order dated 8.4.2009, passed in C. Rev. No. 69 of 2008 by learned Single Judge, has approached this Court by way of accompanying Letters Patent Appeal, which has been assigned Stamp No. 20039/10 dated 30.4.2010, pending condonation of delay in maintaining the appeal. 3. After having carefully perused the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay, we are afraid that sufficient explanation has been rendered by the applicant for condoning delay of seven years, five months and one day. Applicant has stated that since review petition against judgment dated 26.9.2008 was filed by him, he remained under bona fide belief that review petition would be allowed. But, aforesaid explanation is not wroth credence, solely for the reason that even review petition having been filed by the applicant came to be dismissed on 8.4.2009 i.e. seven years prior to filing of present application. But, aforesaid explanation is not wroth credence, solely for the reason that even review petition having been filed by the applicant came to be dismissed on 8.4.2009 i.e. seven years prior to filing of present application. Another explanation having been rendered by the applicant is also without any merit, that he was under bona fide impression that he has already complied with judgment dated 26.9.2008, passed by this Court in CWP No. 23 of 2002. Bare perusal of the review petition (available at page 24 of the paper-book), nowhere suggests that ground as referred to above, was ever taken by the applicant before learned Single Judge. Rather, in the review petition, applicant claimed that he being illiterate person, could not directly communicate with the Court that amount was released by Hon'ble Court for disbursal of same in favour of workman and same stood disbursed to him immediately after said amount was released to him by the Hon'ble Court. Apart from aforesaid two grounds having been specifically taken by applicant for condonation of delay, that too, approximately after seven and a half years, no other sufficient cause has been rendered so as to enable this Court to consider the prayer for condonation of delay in maintaining the appeal. 4. True it is, that as per settled law, Courts should adopt liberal approach in condoning delay so that matter are heard and decided on merits, but, in the instant case, as clearly emerges from record, no steps, whatsoever were taken by the applicant for laying challenge, if any, to the impugned judgment passed in review petition as well as writ petition. It is only after receipt of notice from Assistant Collector 1st Grade-cum-Tehsildar (Recovery) Solan, wherein he was called upon to deposit an amount of Rs. 30,000/- in terms of judgment passed by learned Single Judge, applicant approached this Court by way of accompanying Letters Patent Appeal, laying therein challenge to judgment passed by learned Single Judge in writ petition as well as order passed in review petition. 5. 30,000/- in terms of judgment passed by learned Single Judge, applicant approached this Court by way of accompanying Letters Patent Appeal, laying therein challenge to judgment passed by learned Single Judge in writ petition as well as order passed in review petition. 5. This Court, after having carefully perused instant application as well as reply thereto, having been filed by respondent No. 1, has no hesitation to conclude that present application is wholly misconceived and same is an attempt on the part of applicant to defeat the mandate of the Court i.e. judgment passed in CWP No. 23 of 2002, as such, allowing of the instant application, that too at this belated stage, would definitely cause loss and injury to respondent No.2, who has been already waiting for compliance of judgment dated 26.9.2008, for the last more than eight years now. 6. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. V. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another, (2010) 5 SCC 459 have held that the liberal approach should be adopted in condoning the delay of short duration and stricter approach in cases of inordinate delay. Their Lordships have held as under: “14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. 29. The expression “sufficient cause” employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. 29. The expression “sufficient cause” employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate – Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 , N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106 . In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has, while emphasizing that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table consumes considerable time causing delay – G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142 , State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132 , State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra (1996) 9 SCC 309 , State of Bihar v. Ratan Lal Sahu (1996) 10 SCC 635 , State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao (2005) 3 SCC 752 , and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan (2008) 14 SCC 582 . 7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lanka Venkateshwarlu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others (2011) 4 SCC 363 have held that liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not override substantial law of limitation, especially when court finds no justification for delay. Their Lordships have held as under: “19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts in this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts in this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors. ( (1987) 2 SCC 107 ). 29. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh (supra), as follows:- “25. We may state that even if the term “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation.” “26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” 26. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our opinion, such a course was not open to the High Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by the respondents in the application seeking condonation of delay. 27. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our opinion, such a course was not open to the High Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by the respondents in the application seeking condonation of delay. 27. This is especially so in view of the remarks made by the High Court about the delay being caused by the inefficiency and ineptitude of the government pleaders. 28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.” 8. Consequently, in view of discussion made herein above, as well as exposition of law cited above, we are not inclined to condone the delay. Accordingly, present application is dismissed being devoid of any merits.