JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Heard forthwith by consent of parties. 2. Petitioners in Criminal WP No. 140 of 2017 are accused nos. 2 to 4 while petitioner in Criminal WP No. 141 of 2017 is accused no. 1 in Regular Criminal Case No. 762 of 2007 filed by the respondent before the learned Magistrate. Basically, what is challenged in this writ petition is the order passed on 1.10.2016 by the Judicial Magistrate, FC, Court No. 2, Nagpur on the ground that this order of issuance of process as against the present petitioners could not have been passed when respondent (original complainant) has not complied with the order passed by the trial Court directing issuance of summons to these petitioners on 25.6.2008. 3. Shri Pankaj Dube, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the order passed on 25.6.2008 is an order of issuance of process to these petitioners and it is a conditional order made subject to payment of process fees. He further submits that as per subsection (4) of Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the process fees are not paid within the reasonable time and this reasonable time is between the date on which such an order is passed and the next date fixed in the matter, the learned Magistrate must dismiss the complaint. He placed his reliance upon Rajaram v. Sundram and ors reported in 1995 Cri.L.J. 3418. He further submits that as process fees were not paid at all, the learned Magistrate should have dismissed the complaint and ought not to have passed order of issuance of process on 1.10.2016 below exhibit 1. According to learned counsel for the respondent, the ground of challenge is untenable for the reason that there is no order as such passed by the trial Court on 25.6.2008. He points out that the socalled order is a noting taken in the ordersheet which is signed by the Presiding Officer, but it would not amount to any order of issuance of process in absence actual and separate order passed in the matter. 4. On going through the order dated 1.10.2016 the order impugned herein, as well as order dated 25.6.2008, I find that the impugned order cannot be equated with the socalled order passed on 25.6.2008. The impugned order is in terms, “Issue process against accused no. 4. On going through the order dated 1.10.2016 the order impugned herein, as well as order dated 25.6.2008, I find that the impugned order cannot be equated with the socalled order passed on 25.6.2008. The impugned order is in terms, “Issue process against accused no. 1 to 5 for Sections 120(B), 468, 471 IPC” passed below exhibit 1 “whereas the socalled order dated 25.6.2008 is to the effect “Issue summons to accused no. 2 to 5 on P.F.” made in the ordersheet or roznama dated 25.6.2008. This socalled order dated 25.6.2008 is actually in the nature of a noting taken in the ordersheet, which is admittedly signed by the learned Magistrate. A noting taken in the ordersheet is a reflection of happenings in the Court and ordersheet is a mirror of what has happened and what has been transacted as a court business and if there is no order passed as a part of court business, whatever noting taken in the ordersheet or roznama, cannot be considered as equivalent to order of the Court. However, learned counsel for the petitioners does not agree with this proposition although it is a settled one. He has tried to support his disagreement by referring to the judgment rendered by the Patna High Court in the case of Nand Kumar Sinha v. Emperor reported in AIR 1937 Pat 534. In this case, the Patna High Court has held that an ordersheet being record of the act of judicial officer, is a “public document” and the presumption is that it is genuine. There can be no two opinions about this proposition of law. An ordersheet is certainly a public document and it is also the record of an act of a public judicial officer and, therefore, a presumption that it is genuine, though rebuttable, would always be attached to it. This is what I have held while discussing about the settled principle of law laying down that the ordersheet is only a mirror of various acts of a public judicial officer which view is also found to be taken by the Patna High Court. Therefore, this case instead of supporting the case of the petitioners, would strengthen the case of the respondent. Therefore, this case instead of supporting the case of the petitioners, would strengthen the case of the respondent. It is an admitted fact that no order issuing summons to the accused persons (petitioners), though noted in the ordersheet of 25.6.2008, finds place below exhibit 1 or on any other application or document forming part of record of the court. Thus, a noting taken in the ordersheet could not be considered as the order of the Court itself. 5. If there is no order passed by the trial Court regarding issuance of summons on 25.6.2008, the question of dismissal of complaint for nonpayment of process fees by the original complainant (respondent no. 1) would not arise. It would have been so had there been any order asking for payment of process fees, actually passed by the Court below exhibit 1 or any other application filed in that regard, as a part of transacting of court business. But, the later order passed on 1.10.2016 does not ask for payment of process fees. Hence, the judgment of Madras High Court in the case of Rajaram v. Sundram & ors (supra) wherein it is held that if process fees is not paid within reasonable time, it would be justifiable for the Court to order dismissal of the complaint, would have no application to the facts of the present case. 6. In the circumstances, I find no substance in the petitions and the same deserve to be dismissed. Both the petitions are accordingly dismissed. Rule discharged.