JUDGMENT : Introduction: O.P. Sheeja, a widow, has been claiming, for the last two decades, compassionate appointment because her husband died in harness. The scheme of compassionate appointment for the defence personnel provides for the appointment by two sources: by the State Government and by the Central Government. The State Government, on more than one occasion, rejected Sheeja's application; the Central Government, on the other hand, invited Sheeja twice, to apply for a post. But the widow did not. It seems, in all these two decades, she has been pinning her hopes on getting employment in the State Government, in Kerala. Do her hopes bear fruit? Facts: 2. The facts in brief are that, in 1998, Sheeja's husband was working as a Constable in 39 Battalions of the BSF. While the unit he was attached to was stationed at Amarkot, Punjab, it was proposed to be shifted to Jeruz, Jammu and Kashmir. On their way to Jeruz from Amarkot, on 16.05.1998, the unit camped by Tawi river at Udhampur. 3. On that fateful day, 16.05.1998, Sheeja's husband got drowned in the river while he was taking a bath. His body could be fished out after a couple of days and had been cremated there itself. Sheeja, in 1999, in her early 20s with a child of two years, applied to the State Government for a compassionate appointment. The Government rejected. But she followed up the matter again the next year. This time, the State Government required her to produce a certificate from the Military authority that her husband had died in combat. 4. After six years, Sheeja produced one, but from the BSF, her husband's employer, rather than from the military. Again, on 16.03.2007, the Government refused--not on the ground of delay, however. In 2008 and 2009, the BSF, on the other hand, asked Sheeja to apply for a suitable post, but she did not respond. Aggrieved by the State Government's final rejection, Sheeja filed this writ petition in 2010. Submissions: The Petitioner's: 5. In the above factual backdrop, Smt. Sreeja Sohan, the learned counsel for Sheeja, strenuously contends that Sheeja failed matriculation and is not familiar with the ways of the world. According to her, Sheeja has all along been, for the last about two decades, representing to all the authorities concerned in the State Government to provide to her compassionate appointment, but without any success. According to her, Sheeja has all along been, for the last about two decades, representing to all the authorities concerned in the State Government to provide to her compassionate appointment, but without any success. She has, first, contended that the BSF authorities have certified unambiguously that her husband had died in combat, and she is entitled to all the benefits, including compassionate appointment. According to her, the Government's repeated rejection is unjustified. 6. As to why Sheeja did not respond to BSF's offer to have a job, she submits that Sheeja is a woman barely educated and cannot be expected to go alone as a young widow to a far-off place, say Punjab or Kashmir, to secure employment. In the end, she has submitted that as Sheeja is eminently entitled to be provided compassionate appointment, the State Government ought to have considered her case positively. State Government's: 7. The learned Government Pleader, for her part, has submitted that there has been an inordinate delay and incurable latches on Sheeja's part. She has also submitted that Sheeja had to produce a certificate from the Military authority, within whose jurisdiction the BSF may have been stationed. But she could produce--very belatedly, at that--a certificate only from the Commandant of BSF, but not from the Military. She, in that context, submits that the Government has scrupulously followed the guidelines and eligibility criteria in G.O.(P) No.315/96/GAD dated 12.11.1996, and its action cannot be found fault with. Central Government's: 8. The learned Assistant Solicitor General has submitted that the BSF, the employer of Sheeja's husband, twice offered her compassionate appointment; but she did not accept it. 9. Heard Smt. Sreeja Sohan, the learned counsel for Sheeja, the learned Government Pleader for the State of Kerala, and the learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, besides perusing the record. Issues: 10. G.O.(P) No.315/96/GAD dated 12.11.1996 provides for compassionate appointment to the dependents of the army personnel who die in harness. The death can occur during the combat period or peacetime. Sheeja's husband, a BSF Jawan, died drowned in a river while camping by a river during the battalion's shift. Sheeja, a dependent, applied immediately, but could not produce the required certificates on time. The questions are these: (1) Has Sheeja been entitled to the compassionate appointment? (2) Does Sheeja's cause suffer from incurable latches? DISCUSSION: Issue No.1 11. Sheeja's husband, a BSF Jawan, died drowned in a river while camping by a river during the battalion's shift. Sheeja, a dependent, applied immediately, but could not produce the required certificates on time. The questions are these: (1) Has Sheeja been entitled to the compassionate appointment? (2) Does Sheeja's cause suffer from incurable latches? DISCUSSION: Issue No.1 11. Because there is an allegation by the respondents that the writ petition suffers from incurable latches, it pays to note the chronology of events: drowned in the river, on 16.05.1998 Sheeja's husband died. On 25.05.1998, the Udhampur Police Station issued the Ext.P1 certific’; ate testifying that Sheeja's husband died due to drowning. On 15.07.1998, the Commandant of the unit Sheeja's husband had been attached to provide his remarks, through the Ext.P2, about the death of Sheeja's husband. Both Exts.P1 and P2 certificates accord factually. 12. Later, on 05.08.1998 (the date being not clear, but claimed to be so by Sheeja's counsel), the Commandant also issued the "attributability certificate." In columns 12 and 14, the Commandant has recorded that the death of Sheeja's husband "was aggravated by military service." In 1999, for the first time, Sheeja applied to the State Government for compassionate appointment. It was rejected through Ext.P4, dated 25.09.1999. The reason assigned was that the cause of death does not come under the eligibility condition prescribed in G.O. (P) No.315/96/GAD, dated 12.11.1996. 13. On 08.06.2000, Sheeja submitted another application: this time, to the Hon'ble Chief Minister. She received from the Principal Secretary to Government Ext.P5 reply, dated 14.08.2000. The communication points out that, as for the Government Order governing the compassionate appointment, Sheeja had to produce a certificate from the Military authority that Sheeja's husband died while on military duty. Since that document was not enclosed, Sheeja's request could not be entertained. 14. It seems, Sheeja also approached the Sainik Welfare Vikas Bhavan, Thiruvananthapuram, for assistance. Through Ext.P6 order, dated 26.04.2002, the Director in charge told her that she was not entitled to secure compassionate appointment under the State Government, but she could apply to the Central Government, if not applied earlier. 15. At any rate, in December 2006, she secured Ext.P7 certificate from the office of the Commandant, BSF, and submitted another representation to the State Government. Once again, the Government, through Ext.P9 dated 16.03.2007, rejected Sheeja's request. Aggrieved, in 2010, three years later, Sheeja has filed this writ petition. 15. At any rate, in December 2006, she secured Ext.P7 certificate from the office of the Commandant, BSF, and submitted another representation to the State Government. Once again, the Government, through Ext.P9 dated 16.03.2007, rejected Sheeja's request. Aggrieved, in 2010, three years later, Sheeja has filed this writ petition. 16. As seen from the record, on parallel lines, on 16.12.2008, the 39th Battalion of BSF sent a letter to Sheeja asking her to apply, if interested, for a suitable post in the BSF in the recruitment that was to take place soon. Later, on 16.01.2009, it sent another letter. To both, Sheeja did not respond. 17. First, I may examine whether Sheeja is disqualified under G.O.(P) No.315/96/GAD dated 12.11.1996 to claim compassionate appointment. As seen from the eligibility criteria, Clause 3 of the Government Order reads thus: Killed/Missing/Disabled, in action. Killed/disabled in operation areas due to high altitude or adverse Climatic conditions or due to explosion of mines, booby traps, vehicle accidents, etc. Death/disability/missing in operation areas, due to accidents during peace time conditions circumstances of which are identical to activities during operational engagements. The operation area will be as decided by the Union Government from time to time. Encounters in such circumstances when Defence/GREF/BSF personnel are called in to assist Civil power may also be included for giving employment assistance under the scheme." 18. Clause 3 (i) says that the employee may have been killed in action. Sub-clause (ii) further specifies that the employee may have been killed in operation areas due to high attitude, or adverse climatic conditions, or due to explosion of mines, boobytraps, vehicle accidents, etc. First, this sub-clause is not exhaustive. The instances of the actions during which a jawan could have died are only illustrative, for the expression 'etc.' amply reveals that any other incident of the nature directly connected with the defence operations could also be reckoned. Sub-clause (iii), in fact, specifies that the same calamity as could strike a jawan during combat period could, as well, occur during peace time. Even then, the jawan or his legal heirs should be provided all the benefits. 19. Here, I reckon, Clause 3 (iii) of the Government Order applies. Sheeja's husband died during peace time. But the BSF authorities have consistently certified that he died during operations. There is, to my mind, justification. We must agree that career in army --even BSF--is peripatetic. Even then, the jawan or his legal heirs should be provided all the benefits. 19. Here, I reckon, Clause 3 (iii) of the Government Order applies. Sheeja's husband died during peace time. But the BSF authorities have consistently certified that he died during operations. There is, to my mind, justification. We must agree that career in army --even BSF--is peripatetic. When a unit has been on the move to carry on its operations, presumably, the personnel are on duty. Their dying of an accident, drowning not excluded, is incidental to the operational activities; it is thus an accident during peacetime but directly relatable to the jawan's discharging his duties. 20. So, I reckon that the Government's rejection either through Exts.P4 or P7 cannot be sustained. Issue No. 2 Does Sheeja's cause suffer from incurable latches? 21. At any rate, given the persistent submission made by the learned Government Pleader, I need to answer whether the writ petition suffers from the vice of latches. Advisedly, the Framers of the Constitution have not deemed it proper to impose any prescriptive limits on a public law remedy, for example, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, importing the statutes of limitation into a public law remedy, especially involving the fundamental rights, would negate the constitutional objective of providing relief or succour to a citizen. 22. But the Constitutional Courts over the time have evolved the principle that inexplicable, inordinate delay may inflict adverse consequences on unsuspecting persons, be it State or third parties. Therefore, the doctrine of latches has been proposed. And it prospered. A suitor must be vigilant and must seek the redressal at an appropriate time, if not at the earliest. Unless there are compelling reasons for the delay, the Courts will be hesitant to resurrect or resuscitate the matters moribund or comatose. With the march of time, the very cause may disappear, or the need for succor may not survive, or, still, a third-party interest may arise, tilting the scales of equity. 23. Here, the learned counsel for Sheeja has vehemently contended that Sheeja has failed matriculation and, being a young widow, she had no wherewithal to approach the officials with dispatch and press for her cause. 23. Here, the learned counsel for Sheeja has vehemently contended that Sheeja has failed matriculation and, being a young widow, she had no wherewithal to approach the officials with dispatch and press for her cause. Sheeja could not respond to the BSF's invitation to apply for a suitable post because it could be impossible for Sheeja to work either in Kashmir, or in Punjab, or any other far-off place, given her familial conditions and educational background. She knows no other language than Malayalam. 24. As to the latches on her approaching the State Government, Sheeja contends that as a woman, she found it hard to approach the authorities stationed in Punjab or in Jammu and Kashmir to secure the certificates. Her pursuing the matter inevitably resulted in the delay, and it may be long. According to her, given her pathetic financial condition, relief cannot be refused to her on technicalities or on an ersatz legal-ground, such as latches. Precedent and Equity: 25. Stare decisis and "judicial minimalism" are adjudicatory virtues. But, at the same time, the Court cannot be obvious to ‘noxious real world consequences’. Indeed, the Constitutional Courts have time and again held that a compassionate appointment is devised only to provide a timely--temporary--succour to a dependent family because of the bread winner's sudden demise, in harness. Once the dependents survive for a considerable period, the court can presume that they do not require the out-of-turn assistance from the employer. Precedentially, the decisions are a legion. 26. But I cannot be unmindful that the stifling rigidity of precedent in Common Law has, in fact, given rise to the equity jurisprudence. The Common Law--judge-made and precedent-bound--as a system of judicial dispensation has its genesis in the reign of the William the Conqueror in the 12th century. The period "from the Norman Conquest to the reign of Henry III in the thirteenth century witnessed the inception and rapid growth of the common law." Thanks to stare decisis, the suitors felt deprived of justice because the precedent's mechanical application had been leading to an unjust or unconscionable outcome. They started petitioning the King: that the adjudicators, the circuit judges, had been missing the woods for the trees; they disregarded the finer, nuanced aspects of a case but applied the past decisions to the facts of the later cases with regimental rigour--inflicting injustice in the name of conformity. 27. They started petitioning the King: that the adjudicators, the circuit judges, had been missing the woods for the trees; they disregarded the finer, nuanced aspects of a case but applied the past decisions to the facts of the later cases with regimental rigour--inflicting injustice in the name of conformity. 27. The King assigned to his Chancellor the task of assuaging the distraught litigants. It led to the establishment of Chancery Courts, the courts of equity. The reign of King James I, later, provided equity an overriding authority. Thus, equity came to be dependent for its authority on the King's prerogative, to begin with. It was treated as a corrective device to common law shortcomings. 28. Equity is thus a body of rules or principles which from an appendage to the general rules of law, or a gloss upon them. In origin at least, it represents, according to Snell in his treatise Principles of Equity, the attempt of English legal system to meet a problem which confronts all legal systems reaching a certain stage of development. "To ensure the smooth running of society, it is necessary to formulate general rules which work well enough in the majority of cases. Sooner or later, however, cases arise in which, in some unforeseen set of facts, the general rules produce substantial unfairness." When this occurs, justice requires either an amendment of the rule or, if the rule is not freely changeable, a further rule or body of rules to mitigate the severity of the rules of law. This new body of rules (or ''equity'') is therefore distinguishable from the general body of law, not because it seeks to achieve a different end (for both aim at justice), but merely because it appears at a later stage of legal development. 29. This new body of rules (or ''equity'') is therefore distinguishable from the general body of law, not because it seeks to achieve a different end (for both aim at justice), but merely because it appears at a later stage of legal development. 29. A classic eighteenth century statement, continues Snell, is that ''Equity is no part of the law, but a moral virtue, which qualifies, moderates, and reforms the rigour, hardness, and edge of the law, and is a universal truth; it does also assist the law where it is defective and weak in the constitution (which is the life of the law) and defends the law from crafty evasions, delusions, and new subtleties, invented and contrived to evade and elude the common law, whereby such as have undoubted right are made remediless; and this is the office of equity, to support and protect the common law from shifts and crafty contrivances against the justice of the law. Equity therefore does not destroy the law, nor create it, but assist it. Common Law and Equity In India: 30. India, adopting the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, has inherited not only the common law--the doctrine of stare decisis--but also the equity jurisprudence. They both have come to India intermingled in one stream, whereas in England "the two streams of jurisdiction, though they run in the same channel, run side by side and do not mingle their waters." In fact, the doctrine of equity, more than anything else, governs Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That said, there is no escaping the principle, again, of equity that delay defeats equity. The Role of Precedent: 31. C. K. Allen in his influential book Law in the Making, tracing the sources of law in England, has observed that no intelligent system would so crudely paralyse the indispensable instruments of analogy and parity of reasoning. Hence in all systems some degree of judicial uniformity is certain to exist and even to be applauded. But great care is taken to 'save' the fundamental rule that "uniformity, however convenient, shall not degenerate into a line of least resistance; it must remain a guide, and never become a tyrant." In this theory the magistrate can never dispense himself, C. K. Allen notes, from his own individual duty, whatever the opinions of others, of applying the relevant rule of law and justice which is incumbent upon him. 32. 32. C. K. Allen quotes Lord Mansfield: "The reason and spirit of cases make law, not the letter of particular precedents." He feels this was as fundamental a tenet with Lord Mansfield as the doctrine of consistency and authority which he enunciated so earnestly in many cases. What Lord Mansfield was emphasizing, observes C.K. Allen, was the fundamental--indeed, the self-evident--cannon that "a case is of value as a precedent only for what it means. In and of itself, it means nothing; before it can have any relevance to the matter in hand, it must be interpreted; the principle which it embodies, or which it is said to embody, must be brought into logical correlation with the principle on which the decision of the instant case is to depend. In this sense, every precedent is, and can only be, an 'illustration of principle'. There is no other possible basis upon which it can be used as a dialectical instrument." 33. The learner author further goes on to observe that it is only by this analysis and synthesis of recorded decisions, in their bearing upon legal principles, that precedents can be of any true illumination; and there is no greater snare in the use of case-law than the mere 'letter of particular precedents' unaccompanied by the interpretative process. "Many warnings, besides those of Lord Mansfield, have been uttered from the Bench against this fatal misconstruction of the doctrine stare decisis." Lord Hardwicke denounced it with vigour: 'Neither law nor equity consists merely of causal precedents, but the general rules and principles by the reason of which, the several cases coming before the courts of justice, are to be governed'. 34. To contextualize, I observe that precedentially courts disapproved, even deprecated, the dependents' delayed approach to authorities or courts seeking compassionate appointment. But every delay has its reason--sometimes justified and sometimes unjustified. It serves well to remember Leo Tolstoy's poignant opening of Anna Karenina: All happy families are happy alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. Now, we will see whether the delay on Sheeja's part justified. Are Latches Condonable? 35. The Constitutional Courts have consistently held that the matter of laches is "more or less" left to judicial discretion. But like all matters left to the discretion of the court, in this matter too discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. Now, we will see whether the delay on Sheeja's part justified. Are Latches Condonable? 35. The Constitutional Courts have consistently held that the matter of laches is "more or less" left to judicial discretion. But like all matters left to the discretion of the court, in this matter too discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied, held the Supreme Court in Dehri Rohtas Light Rly. Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, is that the rights which have accrued to others because of a suitor's delayed approach should not be allowed to be disturbed unless the suitor reasonably explains the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the suitor should have come to the writ court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence on the suitor's part. The test is not as to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. 36. Here, Sheeja's case, I reckon, has to be viewed in the backdrop of her social status, educational background, and financial conditions. Widowed in her early twenties, and with a child of two years, Sheeja faced a herculean task of complying with the regulatory regimen. She has never abandoned her claim; though, in its pursuit, she might have faltered. But she never failed. On the Facts: 37. Reverting to the facts, I acknowledge, there was delay in Sheeja's approach. At the same time, I cannot say with equal conviction that Sheeja should be entirely blamed for the delay. The eligibility criteria are loud and clear in G.O.(P) No. 315/96/GAD dated 12.11.1996. Despite that, the authorities chose to reject Sheeja's application. For a young widow in her 20s with a girl child of two years' old, it could perhaps be an impossible task to make repeated trips to a place like Punjab or Jammu and Kashmir to obtain certificates. There could have been, in that sense, delay--and long, it may be. It is trite to observe that the reason for the delay, rather than the length of the delay, that matters. 38. The matter has been pending for the last five years. There could have been, in that sense, delay--and long, it may be. It is trite to observe that the reason for the delay, rather than the length of the delay, that matters. 38. The matter has been pending for the last five years. The Court too, with its inevitable, unavoidable adjudicatory delays, may have compounded the situation, ever so marginally. A jawan has lost his life in the service of the nation. His wife and a two-year-old child were left destitute, the terminal benefits notwithstanding. The widow is not much educated. Unaided, she has been pursuing the litigation, persistently but with intermittent lapses. 39. This Court, I would remind myself, could not boggle its adjudicatory discretion with misplaced sympathies and thrust a candidate--and an unqualified one, at that--on the unwilling, unsuspecting Government. Nor can it compel the Government to dole out State largesse contrary to the regnant rules or regulations. I have already held that Sheeja, under the compassionate scheme, is eligible. And the Government has erroneously rejected her claim. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that the delay on Sheeja's part is condonable. Conclusion: 40. Under these circumstances, I dispose of this writ petition directing the first respondent to consider the petitioner's application, given this Court's finding that she has been entitled to under G.O.(P) No.315/96/GAD dated 12.11.1996. No order on costs.