JUDGMENT : Sharad Kumar Gupta, J. 1. In this criminal appeal, challenge is levied to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18-3-2002 passed by the IIIrd Addl. Sessions Judge, Bastar at Jagdalpur in Sessions Trial No. 302/2001 whereby and whereunder he convicted the appellant under Sections 314 and 315 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC') and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and 10 years respectively directing that they shall run concurrently. It is admitted by the appellant that P.W. 1 Ghasiram Mandavi, P.W. 3 Rameshwar and P.W. 4 Vishwanath know him and the deceased. 2. In brief, respondent's case is that the deceased was near about 25 years old and resident of Ward Achalapara, Dhanaura, Distt. Bastar. On 22-1-2001, at 7.00 P.M. appellant came to the house of the deceased and took the deceased with him. After some time, deceased returned back in her house and told her mother P.W.5 Smt. Danay Bai that she is feeling dizziness, she had illicit relation with the appellant and out of their relation she is carrying pregnancy of 3-4 months. The appellant had administered her country liquor mixing some bitter medicine. Said medicine was given to the appellant by co-accused Somaruram alias Thela. Thereafter, the deceased became unconscious. Smt. Danay Bai attempted to give solution of cumin and jaggery to the deceased for causing vomiting. After some time deceased died at about 11 pm. The Panchayat was held in village wherein appellant had admitted that the deceased was pregnant on account of illicit relationship between them, he had administered medicine mixed up with the liquor to the deceased. Uncle of the deceased P.W. 1 Ghasiram Mandavi lodged FIR in P.S. Dhanaura on 23-1-2001 at 10.40 am. After completion of the investigation charge sheet had been filed against the appellant and co-accused Somaruram alias Thela. The trial Court framed charges against the appellant and the co-accused Somaruram alias Thela for offences under Sections 376, 314, 315, 316, 302/34 of the I.P.C. In order to prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses. The appellant and the co-accused abjured the charges levelled against them and faced trial. They did not examine any witness in their defence. 3. After conclusion of the trial, the trial Court acquitted the co-accused Somaruram alias Thela from the aforesaid charges. The appellant and the co-accused abjured the charges levelled against them and faced trial. They did not examine any witness in their defence. 3. After conclusion of the trial, the trial Court acquitted the co-accused Somaruram alias Thela from the aforesaid charges. The trial Court also acquitted the appellant from Sections 376, 302 and 316 of the IPC however convicted him under Sections 314 and 315 of the I.P.C. and sentenced him as aforesaid. 4. Ms. Meenu Banerjee, counsel for the appellant assailed the conviction and sentence arguing that in the diary statement of mother of the deceased, it is not mentioned that some poison was given to the deceased by the appellant. Alleged dying declaration is not reliable. The statement of the mother of the deceased is not corroborated by any other evidence. Thus, aforesaid conviction and sentence are not sustainable, bad in law and deserve to be set aside. 5. Mr. R.K. Gupta, Dy. Advocate General appearing for the respondent submitted that aforesaid conviction and sentence are based on clinching evidence available on the record. The trial Court has properly appreciated the evidence and gave proper reasoning. Thus, the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence do not call for any interference. 6. As per the alleged post mortem report Ex. P-7. P.W. 6 Dr. A. Kachhap conducted the autopsy on the dead body of the deceased and found no external or internal injury. She was carrying pregnancy of 6 months, the foetus was of a girl, cause of death was shock due to unknown cause, therefore viscera organs were preserved and sent for chemical examination. The death occurred within 48 to 72 hours from the post mortem. 7. There is no such evidence available on record on the strength of which it could be said that Ex. P-7 is not believable. Thus, this Court believes on Ex. P-7. 8. As per alleged report of R.F.S.L., Sagar Ex. P-10, Organo Phosphorus insecticide 'Monocrotophos' was found in the viscera Articles A and B. 9. There is no such evidence on record which indicates that Ex. P-10 does not inspire confidence. Thus, this Court believes on Ex. P-10. 10. From Ex. P-7 and Ex. P-10, it is proved that deceased had died due to consumption of Organo Phosphorus insecticide 'Monocrotophos'. 11. PW. There is no such evidence on record which indicates that Ex. P-10 does not inspire confidence. Thus, this Court believes on Ex. P-10. 10. From Ex. P-7 and Ex. P-10, it is proved that deceased had died due to consumption of Organo Phosphorus insecticide 'Monocrotophos'. 11. PW. 5 Smt. Danay Bai in para 1 of her statement on oath says that after returning back, the deceased told her that she was feeling unwell, she was carrying pregnancy of 3-4 months on account of her relation with the appellant, the appellant gave her something mixed up with liquor for miscarriage. 12. It would be pertinent to mention the provisions of Section 32 subsection (1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 1872'). it reads thus :- '32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc, is relevant Statements, written or verbal, or relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expenses which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:- (1) When it relates to cause of death-When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question." 13. Looking to the aforesaid provisions of Section 32 subsection (1) of the Act of 1872, this Court finds that the aforesaid statements made in para 1 by P.W. 5 Danay Bai allegedly amounts to dying declaration. 14. P.W. 5 Smt. Danay Bai in para 3 of her cross-examination says that she was in the house of Fagu, Chetram came and told her that deceased had become unconscious, then she went to house and saw that deceased Ku. Savitri was unconscious. 15. 14. P.W. 5 Smt. Danay Bai in para 3 of her cross-examination says that she was in the house of Fagu, Chetram came and told her that deceased had become unconscious, then she went to house and saw that deceased Ku. Savitri was unconscious. 15. P.W. 5 Smt. Danay Bai further says in para 3 that during unconscious state, deceased had told that the appellant had given some medicine in a glass. She further says in para-4 that this is incorrect that deceased had not given her any information because she became unconscious. Looking to these statements and aforesaid categorical statements of para 1 of the said witness, it could not be said that aforesaid statements of para 1 of the said witness is a result of tutoring, prompting or imagination, the deceased was not in a fit state of mind and was not capable of making a statement at the point of the time, when the dying declaration purported to have been made. Thus, this Court finds that aforesaid statements of para 1 of P.W. 5 Smt. Danay Bai is not a result of tutoring, prompting or imagination, the deceased was in a fit state of mind and was capable of making a statement at the point of the time, when the dying declaration purported to have been made. It was made voluntarily. Thus this Court believes aforesaid statement of para 1 of P.W. 5 Smt. Danay Bai. 16. There is no such evidence on record on the strength of which it could be said that P.W. 5 Smt. Danay Bai had stated aforesaid statements of para 1, because there was inimical relation between her family members and the appellant. Instead of it, she says in para 3 that this is true that the appellant is son of her brother and they have good relations. 17. There is no such evidence on record on the basis of which it could be said that the statements made in para 1 of P.W. 5 Smt. Danay Bai is not simple, not normal and not natural. Thus, this Court believes the statements of para 1 of P.W. 5 Smt. Danay Bai which amounts to dying declaration. 18. There is no such evidence on record which shows that alleged seizure memo Ex. P-9, seizure of the solution of cumin and jaggery is untrustworthy. Thus, this Court believes on Ex. P-9. 19. Thus, this Court believes the statements of para 1 of P.W. 5 Smt. Danay Bai which amounts to dying declaration. 18. There is no such evidence on record which shows that alleged seizure memo Ex. P-9, seizure of the solution of cumin and jaggery is untrustworthy. Thus, this Court believes on Ex. P-9. 19. As per the alleged seizure memo Ex. P-8, P.W. 7 R.K. Meena had seized two plastic containers containing viscera of deceased and some other articles through constable Shankar Lal Mandavi. There is no such evidence on record on the strength of which it could be said that Ex. P-8 is not believable. Thus, this Court believes on Ex. P-8. 20. Ms. Meenu Banerjee, counsel for the appellant placed reliance on judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Muppala Maheswara Raju v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1994 Cri.LJ. 814, para 9 of the judgment is quoted below :- "9. As early as in the year 1972 in a case of poison in Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1972 SC 656 : 1972 Cri.L.J. 473), the Supreme Court has observed that if the accused has poison in his possession and that he had an opportunity to administer the same, then the Court can infer that the accused administered the poison to the deceased resulting in his death. In this case, the death of ' deceased was due to consumption of poisonous arrack as found by the medical evidence and also during the inquest. The arrack in the arrack shop from which it was supplied to the deceased in the bottle supplied by A.1 has not been seized for sending the same for chemical analysis. The Chick which is alleged to have been administered the drops of poisonous arrack remaining in the bottle died. No doubt the death of the deceased was on account of the consumption of arrack brought by P.W. 3 in the bottle supplied by A.1 has been duly established. But, how A.1 came into possession of the alleged poison said to have been purchased by A.2 from P.W. 13 has not been established. In the absence of evidence to the effect that A.1 had come into possession of the poison and had an opportunity to administer the same to the deceased, it is difficult to infer that he administered the poison to the deceased." 21. In the absence of evidence to the effect that A.1 had come into possession of the poison and had an opportunity to administer the same to the deceased, it is difficult to infer that he administered the poison to the deceased." 21. In Pothakamuri Srinivasulu v. State of A.P. AIR 2002 SC 2780 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that if the deceased made statement to witnesses and their testimony is found to be reliable, the same is enough to sustain conviction of accused. 22. In Lakhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2010 AIR SCW 5993, the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the similar point, relevant portion of para 9 of the judgment is quoted below :- "10. This Court has considered time and again the relevance/probative value of dying declarations recorded under different situations and also in cases where more than one dying declaration has been recorded. The law is that if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and made voluntarily by the deceased, conviction can be based solely on it, without any further corroboration. It is neither a Rule of law nor of prudence that a dying declaration cannot be relied upon without corroboration. When a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be relied upon without having corroborative evidence. The court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased must be in a fit state of mind to make the declaration and must identify the assailants. Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details of the occurrence, it cannot be rejected and in case there is merely a brief statement, it is more reliable for the reason that the shortness of the statement is itself a guarantee of its veracity. If the dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot alone form the basis of conviction. Where the prosecution version differs from the version given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon.......". 23. In State of Gujarat v. Jayrajbhai Punjabhai Varu, AIR 2016 SC (sic), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 10 has observed that :- "10. Where the prosecution version differs from the version given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon.......". 23. In State of Gujarat v. Jayrajbhai Punjabhai Varu, AIR 2016 SC (sic), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 10 has observed that :- "10. The courts below have to be extremely careful when they deal with a dying declaration as the maker thereof is not available for the cross-examination which poses a great difficulty to the accused person. A mechanical approach in relying upon a dying declaration just because it is there is extremely dangerous. The court has to examine a dying declaration scrupulously with a microscopic eye to find out whether the dying declaration is voluntary, truthful, made in a conscious state of mind and without being influenced by the relatives present or by the investigating agency who may be interested in the success of investigation or which may be negligent while recording the dying declaration..........." 24. The aforesaid judgment cited by counsel for the appellant is not based on dying declaration but the present case in hand is based on dying declaration. Facts of this case are totally different. Thus, the aforesaid judicial precedents laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court are applicable against the appellant and the appellant does not get any help from the aforesaid judgment cited by his counsel. 25. After the appreciation of the evidence discussed herebefore, on the basis of dying declaration, Ex. P-7, Ex. P-8, Ex. P-9, Ex. P-10, this Court holds that the respondent has succeeded to prove the charge under Section 314 and 315 of the I.P.C. against the appellant. 26. Looking to the above-mentioned circumstances, this Court is not inclined to take a lenient view regarding sentence. The sentence awarded by the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Bastar at Jagdalpur is just and proper and does not call for any interference. 27. After complete and full appreciation of the evidence, this Court finds that the IIIrd Addl. Sessions Judge, Bastar at Jagdalpur has not committed any error in convicting and sentencing the appellant as aforesaid. 28. Thus, this Court confirms the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18-3-2002. Hence, the appeal being devoid of merit deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds are cancelled. Sessions Judge, Bastar at Jagdalpur has not committed any error in convicting and sentencing the appellant as aforesaid. 28. Thus, this Court confirms the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18-3-2002. Hence, the appeal being devoid of merit deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds are cancelled. He is directed to immediately surrender before the trial Court to serve the remaining part of sentence.