Shelter Project Limited v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation
2017-08-30
ARIJIT BANERJEE
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner company (hereinafter referred to as the ‘petitioner’) is the owner of two adjacent premises in Calcutta. Being aggrieved by the refusal of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (in short the ‘KMC’) to grant amalgamation of the said two premises the petitioners have approached this Court. Contention of the petitioners:- 2. The petitioner purchased a property known as Sarkar Bazar situate at 8, Dr. Suresh Chandra Banerjee Road (formerly known as Beliaghata Main Road), Kolkata-10 as also an adjacent property situate at 1/1 K.G. Bose Sarani (Formerly known as Talpukur Road), Kolkata-10, Ward No. 35 in a Court Sale ordered in partition suit. A conveyance dated 12 August, 2009 was executed in favour of the petitioner by the Commissioner of Partition appointed in CS No. 2539 of 1955, representing the owners of the said premises. The petitioner claims to have paid a sum of Rs. 6.25 crores for purchasing the said premises. Mutation of the said premises has been effected by KMC in the name of the petitioner. 3. The petitioner planned to develop a commercial-cum-residential project on the said premise. For that purpose the petitioner applied to the KMC for amalgamation of the said two premises. 4. By a letter dated 29 June, 2013, the Assistant Assessor Collector of KMC called upon the petitioner to submit the details of devolution of the property by an affidavit of a First Class Magistrate in respect of the said two premises for processing the petitioner’s file. By a letter which was received by KMC on 27 August, 2013, the petitioner informed the Chief Manager (Rev), KMC that the department is asking for documents/papers which are not under the control of the petitioner and asked for the intervention of the Chief Manager. A letter dated 27 December, 2013 was also addressed to the Commissioner, KMC by the petitioner apprising the Commissioner of the petitioner’s pCans to modernize the existing market and requesting the Commissioner to extend necessary support. 5. In view of the inaction on the part of the KMC, the petitioner approached this Court by filing WP 2666(W) of 2014, which was disposed of by Soumitra Pal, J. (as His Lordship then was) by directing the Chief Manager (Revenue) KMC to dispose of the matter regarding amalgamation by passing a reasoned order within four weeks from the date of presentation of a certified copy of the order.
It was also ordered that in the event it was found that the contentions of the petitioner are correct and the rules do not provide for seeking an affidavit of a First Class Magistrate regarding devolution of the property, the amalgamation shall be effected after making necessary enquiry within four weeks from the date of passing the reasoned order. 6. Pursuant to the said order of this Court a hearing was held at the Chamber of the Chief Manager (Revenue), KMC. However, no order was communicated to the petitioner. Being aggrieved the petitioner again approached this Court by filing WP No. 25196 (W) of 2014. By an order dated 5 September, 2014, Debasis Kar Gupta, J. disposed of the said writ petition by directing the KMC authorities to complete the process of amalgamation of the said premises in accordance with law within two months from the date of communication of the said order, provided the petitioner was entitled to get the above amalgamation in accordance with law and in the event no relief is granted to the petitioner, the authorities were directed to communicate the reason therefore to the petitioner. 7. A further hearing was held before the Chief Manager (Revenue) on 22 September, 2014 and an order of the same date was communicated to the petitioner. This order of the Chief Manager (Revenue) is under challenge in the present writ petition. 8. Mr. Bhattacharya, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the petitioner’s application for amalgamation was rejected by the impugned order for non-compliance of certain pre-conditions which are not actually required to be complied with for processing the application for amalgamation and such pre-conditions are not found either in the KMC Act or in the rules or guidelines or circulars. There is no Assessment Code and the KMC is guided by circulars issued from time to time. 9.
There is no Assessment Code and the KMC is guided by circulars issued from time to time. 9. Learned Senior Counsel relied on a Circular No. 61 of 2002-03 dated 29 January, 2013 issued by the Municipal Commissioner whereby in partial modification of Municipal Circulars No. 29 of 1997-78 and 34 of 2001-02 it was ordered that amalgamation/separation of plots may be allowed without the consideration of the means of access/abutting street which is to be considered by the Building or Town Planning Department and lack of access or shortage of access shall not be a bar to disposing of such mutation cases of amalgamation and separation by the Assessment-Collection Department. Upon the writ petition being moved by an order dated 24 February, 2015, this Court had directed the respondent no. 3 to visit the locale once more and to submit a report to this Court as to whether the application for amalgamation could be processed or not. Such report dated 31 March, 2015 was submitted. However, this Court did not agree with the grounds stated in the said report for not allowing amalgamation. On 25 August, 2015, Learned Counsel for the KMC submitted that there was some discrepancy in the dimension in the sketch map submitted by the writ petitioner for the purpose of processing the amalgamation application and that is why the application could not be processed. By an order dated 25 August, 2015 this Court directed the KMC to intimate to the writ petitioner in clear terms within 10 days from date of communication of the said order the exact documents and information required for the purpose of processing the amalgamation application. The petitioner was directed to furnish all necessary documents and information to KMC within 10 days from receipt of such intimation. The KMC was directed to complete the process of amalgamation within three weeks from the date of receipt of such documents and information. By an order dated 3 September, 2015, the KMC communicated to the petitioner the information and documents that were required for processing the amalgamation application. The petitioner could not furnish the requisite information/documents within the time specified in this Court’s order dated 25 August, 2015. By an order dated 14 October, 2015, this Court extended the time for furnishing the information/documents called for by the Corporation till 21 October, 2015.
The petitioner could not furnish the requisite information/documents within the time specified in this Court’s order dated 25 August, 2015. By an order dated 14 October, 2015, this Court extended the time for furnishing the information/documents called for by the Corporation till 21 October, 2015. Under cover of a letter dated 16 October, 2015, the petitioner submitted the requisite documents/information. 10. Thereafter the KMC issued a memo dated 9 November, 2015 regarding its inability to grant amalgamation for the reasons stated in the said memo. The said memo has been brought on record by way of supplementary affidavit dated 26 November, 2015 filed pursuant to leave granted by this Court. 11. By way of a supplementary affidavit the respondents have sought to place on record an order dated 7 November, 2015 approved by the Municipal Commissioner, KMC which is at variance with the Memo dated 9 November, 2015 issued by the Assessor-Collector (North), copy whereof has been brought on record by way of supplementary affidavit by the petitioner. The KMC claims that this is the exact departmental order as approved by the Municipal Commissioner and there were some typographical errors in the letter of communication of the said order by the Memo dated 9 November, 2015. Learned Counsel submitted that the purported ‘exact departmental order’ has been brought into existence subsequently to try and cover up the lacunae in the Memo dated 9 November, 2015. The purported copy of the exact departmental order as approved by the Municipal Commissioner on 7 November, 2015 and the impugned order as communicated by the Memo dated 9 November, 2015 are significantly different and such difference cannot be explained by the plea of ‘typographical errors’. Such an action is a clear case of mala fide exercise of administrative power. 12. In the Memo dated 22 September, 2014, the Chief Manager, (Revenue-North) recorded that pursuant to the hearing given by the then Chief Manager (Revenue) on 22 April, 2014, a Team was constituted for necessary inspection of the subject premises and after physical inspection a report was submitted. Learned Counsel submitted that the petitioners had no notice of such inspection and, hence, naturally nobody on behalf of the petitioner company was present at the time of the alleged inspection. The date and time of the inspection was never disclosed to the petitioner nor copy of the inspection report supplied to the petitioner.
Learned Counsel submitted that the petitioners had no notice of such inspection and, hence, naturally nobody on behalf of the petitioner company was present at the time of the alleged inspection. The date and time of the inspection was never disclosed to the petitioner nor copy of the inspection report supplied to the petitioner. The Chief Manager (Revenue-North) relied upon such undisclosed document to arrive at certain conclusions adverse to the petitioner and the actions of the respondents amount to total violation of the principles of natural justice. The Chief Manager (Revenue-North) came to the abrupt conclusion without any basis that since the boundary of the two plots for which application for mutation/amalgamation was filed, is not clear, amalgamation cannot be processed. 13. Learned Counsel then submitted that in the impugned Memo dated 9 November, 2015, the Assessor-Collector (North), has made certain remarks which are irrelevant for the processing of the amalgamation application in question. The issues raised in the said Memo were also considered by this Court and only thereafter order was passed for completion of the process of amalgamation. The views taken by the Assessor-Collector (North) is not supported by any provision of law and in the impugned memo, he does not refer to or rely upon any provision of law or any Rule/Regulation/Circular/Guideline. 14. Mr. Bhattacharyya, Learned Sr. Counsel, then submitted that the Assessor-Collector (North) took into account irrelevant considerations in observing that none of the two premises is found to be under physical possession of the petitioner company and that according to the petitioners there are unauthorised occupiers in both the said premises. Learned Counsel submitted that the question of whether or not physical possession of the property is in the hands of the petitioner company is not relevant at all as the property was purchased in Court sale and no third party has come forward claiming any right, title or interest in respect of the properties in question. Anyone occupying the land in question is doing so illegally and KMC as a statutory body should not support or encourage any such illegal and unauthorised encroachment or construction made in violation of law. 15. It was next submitted that no provision of law has been pointed out on behalf of the KMC which would justify refusal of the petitioner company’s application for amalgamation.
15. It was next submitted that no provision of law has been pointed out on behalf of the KMC which would justify refusal of the petitioner company’s application for amalgamation. The KMC Act or the circulars of KMC do not provide for consideration of occupiers while processing an application for amalgamation. In any event, the respondents have failed to explain how such occupiers would be adversely affected by amalgamation of the two premises into one. 16. Learned Counsel finally submitted that the KMC has created unnecessary stumbling blocks to the process of amalgamation resulting in a lengthy process of litigation. Referring the matter back to the Corporation for reconsideration, would be nothing but a time wasting exercise and would be simply a case of ‘Appeal from Caesar to Caesar’s wife’. As such, this court should itself decide the matter finally and direct the respondent authorities to amalgamate the two premises, submitted learned Sr. Counsel. In this connection, he relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kalabharati Advertising-vs.-Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437 . Contention of the respondents:- 17. Mr. Alok Kr. Ghosh, learned Counsel, appearing for KMC referred to the conveyance deed dated 12 August, 2009 whereby the petitioner company purchased the two premises in question. He submitted that in the report dated 21 February, 2007 filed by the Valuer appointed in CS No. 2439 of 1955, a view was expressed that physical partition of the said two premises by metes and bounds would not be possible. He submitted that undivided shares in the said premises were sold, conveyed and transferred to the petitioner company. 18. Learned Counsel then submitted that the answers and/or information given/furnished by the petitioners pursuant to KMC’s requirements contradict the recital and main portion of the conveyance deed. If such answers are considered with reference to the conveyance deed, various orders passed in GA NO. 1546 of 2004 filed in CS No. 2539 of 1955 and/or report of the Valuer as well as the suggestion of the Partition Commissioner, it will be found that most of the answers of the answers are not proper and correct in many respects. 19. Learned Counsel submitted that since the petitioners want amalgamation of two premises, the dimensions of the two premises and also demarcation thereof are required.
19. Learned Counsel submitted that since the petitioners want amalgamation of two premises, the dimensions of the two premises and also demarcation thereof are required. It is not a matter of amalgamation of the Municipal numbers of the two premises but it is a case of amalgamation of two physically separated existing premises. Mutation in respect of Municipal numbers of two premises may be done without the respective dimensions and demarcation thereof, but in the case of amalgamation, the dimension and demarcation of the two premises are required. 20. It was submitted that while submitting the application for amalgamation or mutation-cum-amalgamation, the applicant is required to submit, inter alia, a site plan duly signed by the Licensed Buildings Surveyor/Architect showing therein, inter alia, as follows:- (a) The different premises sought to be amalgamated (each site and the total site are to be shown in different colours) (b) Entrance mentioning the road width (c) Floor lay out plan for the construction area (d) The area of each premises and the total premises (e) Land area and covered area (f) Road width of the street It is the duty of KMC to see the physical condition along with dimension and demarcation of two premises and the same is not a mere formality. The petitioners have failed to specifically identify the two premises. Amalgamation is sought for to obtain certain benefits and as such the identification, proper dimension and demarcation of the concerned premises are necessary. 21. Learned Counsel then submitted that the order under challenge clearly specifies as to why amalgamation could not be granted. The following irregularities are apparent on the face of the documents furnished by the petitioners:- (a) The boundaries of both the premises have not yet been clearly drawn. (b) Both the premises are not separately identified with proper dimension and demarcation. (c) The registered boundary declaration is not supported by any plan. (d) The site plan showing the dimension of boundaries of both the premises as now submitted clearly indicates that the earlier site plan was completely wrong mainly in respect of the dimension of both the premises.
(b) Both the premises are not separately identified with proper dimension and demarcation. (c) The registered boundary declaration is not supported by any plan. (d) The site plan showing the dimension of boundaries of both the premises as now submitted clearly indicates that the earlier site plan was completely wrong mainly in respect of the dimension of both the premises. (e) The B Schedule property as referred to in the Conveyance Deed states that the Premises No. 1/1, KG Bose Sarani exists on the North of the purchased premises 1/1, KG Bose Sarani whereas the site plan indicates the existence of the premises No. 1/2, KG Bose Sarani on the North of the purchased premises 1/1, KG Bose Sarani. (f) Schedules of properties in the Conveyance Deed show that the municipal market known as Sarkar Bazar is covered by both the said premises. In fact, one part of Sarkar Bazar is in premises No. 8, Dr. S.C. Banerjee Road whereas the other part is in premises No. 1/1, KG Bose Sarani. It is thus clear that both the premises are not clearly identified and separated with proper dimension and demarcation. (g) The site plan as submitted indicates that there are temple sheds at premises No. 1/1, KG Bose Sarani covering an area of 1 cottahs, 4 chittacks, 22 sq. ft. but the said temple shed area was excluded while executing the Conveyance Deed. (h) A copy of the detailed plan of the premises No. 8, Dr. S. C. Banerjee Road and the premises No. 1/1, KG Bose Sarani certified by the Commissioner of Partition shows that the total area left for passages in both the said premises is 7 cottahs, 12 chittacks & 10 sq. ft. Amalgamation of both the premises cannot be effected as the said areas are to be left out for passages. (i) The said detailed plan further shows that one passage measuring about 4 cottahs, 9 chittacks 30 sq. ft. is within the premises No. 1/1, KG Bose Sarani and in fact the said passage has separated the said premises from one another. The other passage measuring about 3 cottahs, 2 chittacks, 25 sq. ft. is on the West of the Premises No. 8, Dr. SC Banerjee Road. Since the passages have to be maintained, amalgamation of the two premises is not possible and feasible.
The other passage measuring about 3 cottahs, 2 chittacks, 25 sq. ft. is on the West of the Premises No. 8, Dr. SC Banerjee Road. Since the passages have to be maintained, amalgamation of the two premises is not possible and feasible. (j) No scale has been mentioned for drawing the site plan of the said premises for amalgamation but it appears that scale no. 16 was taken into consideration in respect of the said site plan but the said scale does not tally with the dimension shown in the said plan. (k) No specific dimension has been mentioned in respect of the following portions:- (i) A portion of East side of the Premises No. 1/1, KG Bose Sarani. (ii) The portion of Northern & Western side of the premises no. 1/1, KG Bose Sarani. (iii) Dimensions written in the different portions of the Western Side of the premises No. 1/1, KG Bose Sarani & the Premises No. 8, Dr. SC Banerjee are illegible. (iv) No separate demarcation of the two subject premises is shown. (v) Amalgamated site plan as submitted indicates that the green marked areas are identified as the Premises No. 1/1, KG Bose Sarani whereas the blue marked areas are identified as the premises No. 8, Dr. SC Banerjee Road but the entire proposed amalgamated sites have been marked with grey ink. (l) It is not clear whether or not the petitioner no.1 has purchased both the said premises in their entirety. (m) Two identified separate premises having their respective dimensions on all sides may be amalgamated into one premises but the Valuer in his report dt. 21st February, 2007 filed in the said suit stated clearly that physical partition by metes and bounds of the said marked and the adjacent land at the said two premises respectively would not be possible and feasible for the reason as stated in the report. (n) The petitioner no. 1 accepted the view of the Valuer while purchasing the premises by Conveyance Deed. 22. Relying on the aforesaid submission, Learned Counsel submitted that the order passed by the Department concerned as approved by the Municipal Commissioner on 7 November, 2015 rejecting the prayer of the petitioners for amalgamation of two premises in question should be upheld and the writ petition should be dismissed. Court’s View:- 23. I have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties. 24.
Court’s View:- 23. I have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties. 24. Three orders issued by the Officers of KMC are on record. These are the order dated 22 September, 2014 issued by the Chief Manager (Revenue-North), order dated 9 November, 2015 passed by the Assessing Officer-Collector (North) and the order dated 7 November, 2015 issued by the A-C (North) which appears to be approved by the Municipal Commissioner. The first of the said three orders was the subject matter of challenge when the present writ application was filed. The second order was brought on record by way of supplementary affidavit and has also been challenged by the petitioners. The KMC authorities have brought the third order on record by filing supplementary affidavit contending that the second order was an incorrect/inaccurate communication of the third order which is the real departmental order and such incorrect communication was due to typographical errors. 25. In the order dated 22 September, 2014 it is specifically recorded that as per the departmental books of records, both the premises stand recorded in the name of the petitioner company and as per site plan submitted by the applicant, it appears that the premises are contiguous and under the same ownership. The said order refers to a physical inspection report of the site in question. Such report is not in disclosed before me. It is the specific case of the petitioners that no prior notice of such inspection was served on the petitioners and the petitioners were not present when such inspection took place. No copy of the inspection report was ever made available to the petitioners. These statements of the petitioners could not be contradicted by learned Counsel for the KMC. The Officer passing the said order specifically relied upon such inspection report in rejecting the prayer for amalgamation. This clearly amounts to breach of the principles of natural justice. No inspection report could be relied on by the authority passing the said order to reject the petitioner’s prayer for amalgamation without making available a copy of such report to the petitioners. The petitioners were entitled to know the contents of the report. In fact, such report has not been placed before me either. On this ground alone, the order dated 22 September, 2014 is liable to be set aside. 26.
The petitioners were entitled to know the contents of the report. In fact, such report has not been placed before me either. On this ground alone, the order dated 22 September, 2014 is liable to be set aside. 26. Further, in the said order the Chief Manager has stated that ‘since the boundary of the two plots against which application for mutation-amalgamation was filed, is not clear, amalgamation cannot be processed’. No Rule/Regulation/Circular/Guideline has been referred to by the respondents to show that clarity of the boundary of the two plots, amalgamation whereof is sought for, is a pre-condition for allowing such amalgamation. As I understand, amalgamation is of the Municipal numbers of the two premises by assigning one single Municipal number to the two premises. How clearness of boundary of the two plots is relevant is beyond my comprehension. According to me, this is a wholly irrelevant consideration. The same view was expressed by Debangsu Basak, J. in His Lordship’s order dated 5 May, 2015. Further, existence of a passage or of a playground or of a children park also cannot be a relevant consideration for refusing amalgamation. Amalgamation does not alter the physical status of the properties. It is the process of bringing two premises having different Municipal numbers under one Municipal number. Logically, this is permissible in case of two or more contiguous premises. It is admitted in the impugned order dated 22 September, 2014 that in the present case the two premises in question are contiguous. For the reasons aforesaid, the order dated 22 September, 2014 cannot be sustained and is set aside. 27. Coming to the orders dated 9 November, 2015 and the so-called exact departmental order dated 7 November, 2015, I do not find any material difference between the two in as much as the 9 November, 2015 memo appears to be a communication of the operative portion of the departmental order dated 7 November, 2015. The contents of the memo dated 9 November, 2015 are almost identical with the contents of the departmental order dated 7 November, 2015 starting with the fourth paragraph at page 4 of such departmental order till the end. The earlier portion of the departmental order records facts and not the decision of the respondent authorities.
The contents of the memo dated 9 November, 2015 are almost identical with the contents of the departmental order dated 7 November, 2015 starting with the fourth paragraph at page 4 of such departmental order till the end. The earlier portion of the departmental order records facts and not the decision of the respondent authorities. Hence, I am unable to accept the contention of the petitioners that the departmental order dated 7 November, 2015 has been brought into existence by way of an afterthought to improve upon the memo dated 9 November, 2015. 28. The submissions made by learned Counsel for KMC, both in course of argument as also in the written notes of argument filed on behalf of KMC, is substantially a reiteration of the contents of the departmental order dated 7 November, 2015. In fact, the reasons urged by Learned Counsel for upholding the said departmental order or for that matter the memo dated 9 November, 2015 are exactly the reasons recorded in the said departmental order/memo for rejecting the petitioner’s prayer for amalgamation. Hence, I do not wish to record the reasons for rejection of the prayer for amalgamation once again. 29. However, I am of the opinion that none of the reasons recorded in the departmental order dated 7 November, 2015 or in the memo dated 9 November, 2015 can be a valid ground for rejecting the petitioner’s prayer for amalgamation. 30. The word amalgamation has not been defined in the KMC Act. The word ‘amalgamation’ has been defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Ed. as an act of combining or uniting; an act of consolidation. Although, under the KMC Act no specific power has been given to the authorities to amalgamate two or more separate premises, such power must be deemed to be there on a meaningful reading of Sec. 178(3) and (4) of the Act. The expression amalgamation connotes fusion of two interests into one. In a sense, it is a merger of two or more properties in the notional sense. Two or more properties when amalgamated, loss their separate identities and come to be identified by a single Municipal premises number. Physically such properties may continue to be separate but notionally for the purpose of identification, assessment etc. such properties become one.
In a sense, it is a merger of two or more properties in the notional sense. Two or more properties when amalgamated, loss their separate identities and come to be identified by a single Municipal premises number. Physically such properties may continue to be separate but notionally for the purpose of identification, assessment etc. such properties become one. Since it is a notional thing, in my opinion, none of the reasons stated in the departmental order dated 7 November, 2015 and the memo dated 9 November, 2015 can justify refusal of the petitioner’s prayer for amalgamation. By amalgamation, physical nature and character of the properties in question do not undergo any change in any manner. Hence, the occupants of the said properties are not affected in any manner. It is irrelevant whether there are tenants or trespassers in the said properties. It is irrelevant that the boundaries of the premises have not been clearly drawn. These are wholly irrelevant considerations which find reflection in the departmental order dated 7 November, 2015 and the memo dated 9 November, 2015. Further, as per the Municipal Commissioner’s Circular No. 61 of 2002-03 dated 29 January, 2013, lack or shortage of access to the premises in question cannot be a ground for refusing request for amalgamation. The said Circular still appears to be in force and no submission to the contrary has been made on behalf of KMC. 31. When a decision of an authority is based on irrelevant considerations, it is settled law that the same cannot be sustained. In the event, the decision is based partly on relevant considerations and partly on irrelevant considerations but the same cannot be severed and it cannot be said as to how much the authority was influenced by the irrelevant considerations, then also the order must be held to be bad. The present case is such a case. The impugned order/memo records certain findings as indicated above which are wholly irrelevant in my opinion and it is impossible to say to what extent the same have prompted the authorities to reject the prayer of the petitioner for amalgamation. 32. Further, in the impugned order/memo there is absolutely no reference to any rule or circular or guideline issued by the KMC according to which an application for amalgamation would be decided one way or the other.
32. Further, in the impugned order/memo there is absolutely no reference to any rule or circular or guideline issued by the KMC according to which an application for amalgamation would be decided one way or the other. Learned Counsel for the Corporation also could not draw to my attention any such rule/circular/guideline. If the corporation authorities have framed such rules/guidelines by way of issuing circulars or otherwise, the same must find reflection in an order refusing a party’s application for amalgamation. Such rules/guidelines must be referred to and it must be explained how such rules/guidelines would be violated if amalgamation is allowed. If, however, no such rules/guidelines have been framed by the authorities, then the entire procedure and exercise would become arbitrary. The authorities would then be deciding an application for amalgamation by a rule of thumb and at their sweet whim which cannot be countenanced in law. In such a case the authorities must forthwith frame guidelines/rules which would govern applications for amalgamation. 33. In view of the aforesaid, I am unable to uphold the departmental order dated 7 November, 2015 which was communicated to the petitioners by the memo dated 9 November, 2015. Both the departmental order and the memo are accordingly quashed. I remand back the matter for fresh consideration of the petitioner’s application by the Municipal Commissioner himself. From the impugned departmental order copy whereof has been annexed to the supplementary affidavit of KMC, it appears that the same was prepared by the A-C (North) and the same only bears a signature of the Municipal Commissioner by way of approval. The order does not reflect independent application of mind by the Municipal Commissioner. Hence, I am of the view that the Municipal Commissioner should himself consider the petitioner’s application for amalgamation and take a reasoned decision in the matter in the light of the observations made in this judgment and I order accordingly. 34. The Municipal Commissioner shall give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and shall pass an order in accordance with law. The entire exercise must be completed within four months from the date of communication of this order by the petitioners to the Municipal Commissioner. 35. WP 1218 of 2014 is accordingly disposed of, without, however, any order as to costs. 36.
The entire exercise must be completed within four months from the date of communication of this order by the petitioners to the Municipal Commissioner. 35. WP 1218 of 2014 is accordingly disposed of, without, however, any order as to costs. 36. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities.