JUDGMENT : Alok Aradhe, J. In this appeal, the appellant has assailed the validity of judgment dated 31.01.2004 passed by the Trial Court by which the appellant has been convicted for the offences under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120-B of the Ranbir Penal Code (for short ‘RPC’) and has been sentenced to undergo five years’ simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, the appellant to undergo for six months simple imprisonment in respect of offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Act’) and in respect of offence under Section 120-B of the RPC, the appellant has been convicted for four months’ imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of payment of fine, he is directed to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 2. The Prosecution story in a nutshell is that in the year 1977, the Indian Army requisitioned 2253 kanals and 12 marlas of land situate at Birpur, Tehsil Samba for defence purposes. An order in this regard was passed under Section 3(3) and Section 4 of the Jammu and Kashmir Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1960. The aforesaid land was handed over to the Army Authorities on 31.07.1977 by the then Naib-Tehsildar, Bari Brahmana. Out of the aforesaid land so requisitioned, 433 Kanals, 2 marlas was Government land whereas 1813 kanals and 10 marlas was Class-III land and remainder calculated 7 kanals of land was Class-II land and was also Government land. Out of the aforesaid land, 1600 kanals of land belonged to the Forest Department and rest of the land measuring 213 kanals and 10 marlas defined as Class-III land, 175 kanals was in the ownership of different persons and whereas 37 kanals 15 marlas was Shamlat land. 3. In the year 1980, the army authorities decided to have the aforesaid chunk of land acquired for the use of the army on permanent basis and accordingly the competent authority under J&K Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act initiated the acquisition proceeding. The Deputy Commissioner started the proceeding and recommended the government for acquiring the piece of land for Ministry of Defence, Government of India and the compensation was fixed in accordance with the norms. The Deputy Commissioner started the proceeding and recommended the government for acquiring the piece of land for Ministry of Defence, Government of India and the compensation was fixed in accordance with the norms. The Defence Estates Officer, Jammu who dealt with the requisition of the land for defense forces worked out the compensation on ad hoc basis at the rate of Rs.10,000/- per kanal for Class-II private land and Rs.5000/- per kanal for Class-II State land and Rs.25000/- for Class-III State land and Rs.7005/- as cost of the trees. Accordingly, the compensation was quantified at Rs.1,92,59,755/-. The Defence Estates Officer was subsequently advised to pay compensation for 1600 kanals of forest land used as Kacharai at par with private land whereafter he worked out the compensation of 1813 kanals and 10 marlas defined as Class-II land and also of private land. The Defence Estates Officer released Rs.1,54,07,804/- i.e. eighty per cent of the assessed amount of compensation and forwarded the same to the Deputy Commissioner, Jammu on 07.12.1990 along with bankers cheque issued by State Bank of India in favour of the Deputy Commissioner. The aforesaid cheque was received by accused No.1, Late Khazan Chand Rana, the then Additional Deputy Commissioner, Jammu on 07.12.1990 itself. It is the case of the prosecution that Late Khazan Chand for ulterior motive retained the cheque and subsequently sent to J & K Bank, Link Road, Jammu for crediting it in his account after getting the word additional inserted in the said cheque through accused No.9, Keshav Chandra, the then clerk in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Jammu and account was opened on 12.12.1990 with J&K Bank Branch, Link Road, Jammu for the reasons that he did not have any account in the State Bank of India as he was not required to deal with financial matters. 4. It was stated in the charge sheet that Late Khazan Chand has no competence to open a separate account in the bank because opening of the account for Government transactions requires approval of the government. Therefore, account was opened in violation. Thereafter the cheque was deposited on 07.12.1990 and was credited in account on 12.12.1990. 5. In the year 1976, J&K Agrarian Reforms Act came into force and entry of the year Kharif 1971 as effected in the revenue record with regard to the possession was considered as correct. Therefore, account was opened in violation. Thereafter the cheque was deposited on 07.12.1990 and was credited in account on 12.12.1990. 5. In the year 1976, J&K Agrarian Reforms Act came into force and entry of the year Kharif 1971 as effected in the revenue record with regard to the possession was considered as correct. However, before law was made applicable to the revenue records for the year Rabi 1976 were complete and Kharif 1976 were to be prepared and by that time the army had taken over the land and were in physical possession thereof although on papers, the requisitioning of the said land became operative from 13.07.1977 and first attempt to interpolate the records were made in the register when in 1976 Khasra entries were to be made in the concerned records to show possession of accused No.11 and 12 namely Rachpal Singh and Ravail Singh with regard to Khasra No.1035. In the register of Khasra Girdwari for the year 1976 between first and second column, an entry in respect of 81 kanals and 4 marlas of land in favour of Ravail Singh and Rachpal Singh, co-sharers has been made which is in different ink and in different hand and after manipulation of these entries in Khasra Girdwari register for the year Kharif 1976 to Rabi 1981, this position continued in the revenue record up to Rabi 1991. 6. As per the aforesaid entry, land to the tune of 81 kanals and 4 marlas was reflected in the name of accused Nos. 11 and 12, Rachpal Singh and Ravail Singh but contrary to this, the same land has been shown under the occupation of Army in Form J and khasra wise statement dated 21.12.1988 prepared by accused No.4, Uttam Chand Dingra, the then Settlement Tehsildar, Jammu and in the Acquisition Rolls. The accused nos. 11 and 12 filed a suit in respect of the land, which in fact belong to the Forest Department, before the Deputy Commissioner under Section 32 of the J & K Land Revenue Act, which was transferred to the appellant. The appellant who was vested the powers of the Collector under the Act, thereupon, after spot inspection and after recording the statement of the witnesses passed an order by which it was held that accused nos.11 and 12, namely, Rashpal Singh and Ravail Singh, are the owners of the land in question. The appellant who was vested the powers of the Collector under the Act, thereupon, after spot inspection and after recording the statement of the witnesses passed an order by which it was held that accused nos.11 and 12, namely, Rashpal Singh and Ravail Singh, are the owners of the land in question. Admittedly, the aforesaid order was upheld in appeal by the appellate authority under the Act. The police filed charge sheet inter alia against amongst other accused, the appellant who at the relevant time was posted at Assistant Commissioner and was vested with the powers of Collector under the provisions of the J & K Land Revenue Act. The police after completion of the investigation filed the charge sheet against the appellant and other co-accused for the offence as aforesaid. The trial Court vide impugned judgment has convicted the appellant as aforesaid and imposed the sentence as well as fine which has been stated supra. 7. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial court ought to have appreciated that the appellant in his capacity as a quasi judicial authority was exercising quasi judicial powers under the provisions of J&K Land Revenue Act and the appeal which was filed against the order which was passed by the appellant was dismissed by the appellate authority and the order passed by appellant was upheld. It is further submitted that the appellant had visited the spot and had recorded the statement of five witnesses. Even assuming the fact that the order passed by the appellant was without jurisdiction, its validity could have been examined only by the authority under the Act. It is submitted that issue whether or not the appellant had jurisdiction to pass the impugned order could not be examined by the trial Court especially in the absence of any allegation that the appellant had passed the impugned order in favour of the accused Nos. 11 and 12 for any extraneous consideration, that is, by accepting bribe. Learned Senior Counsel has also invited the attention of this Court to Section 77 of the RPC which deals with protection afforded to a judge and the expression judge which is defined under Section 19 of the Penal Code defines a Judge as a person who decides a case which attains finality unless an appeal is filed and unless it is set aside in an appeal. It is further submitted that in view of the provisions of the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1971, even a civil suit cannot be filed against the appellant. Lastly, it is urged that the trial court has acquitted accused No.3 who was the Assistant Settlement Officer and who had submitted the report that the accused Nos. 11 and 12 are in possession of the land in question. However, the trial Court in respect of accused No.3 has held that accused No.3 was doing his official duty and no loss has been caused to the public exchequer. Therefore, in any case, the appellant was entitled to parity with accused No.3. 8. On the other hand, learned Dy. AG has submitted that the appellant had initiated the proceeding under the Land Revenue Act even though he was transferred and had no power to initiate the proceeding under the Act and to adjudicate the rights of the accused Nos. 11 and 12 which vested with Assistant Commissioner, Revenue Jammu. It is further submitted that the appellant had exercised the power in hot haste and had thrown the procedure prescribed in law to winds. It is further submitted that under the provisions of Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 1950, the appellant had no power to initiate the proceeding. However, it is submitted that the trial Court also committed an error in acquitting the accused No.3 on the ground that no loss was caused to the public exchequer and the respondent No.3 was dealing with a separate piece of land. Lastly, it is urged that the area in question was under settlement and the appellant had no jurisdiction to deal with the land in question. 9. We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have scanned the record carefully. The Trial Court in the impugned judgment has dealt with the case of the appellant from internal page 192 onwards and has held that the appellant with a view to transfer the ownership and possession of the land admeasuring 1500 kanals in favour of the accused namely Rachpal Singh and Rabail Singh has acted in conspiracy with the other co-accused persons and the action is motivated obviously by act of such magnitude that it sent shivers down the spine of everyone. It has been further held that the appellant had acted in hot haste and has by-passed all the procedure. It has been further held that the appellant had acted in hot haste and has by-passed all the procedure. It has also been held that he had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order under Section 32 of the Land Revenue Act. It has also been held that the impugned judgment has been passed with a view to confer undue benefit to accused Nos. 11 and 12. It has also been held that merely because the appellate court has been remiss, callous or indifferent in deciding the appeal, it would not mean that the appellant under the garb of the order passed by the appellate authority which is without jurisdiction and wherein the procedure for trial and suit has not been followed and which has caused huge loss to the state exchequer can ever be justified. It has been further held that proceeding has been concluded by the appellant within a period of eleven days from the date of its institution and from the statement of the Division Forest Officer, it is evident that he was not summoned. 10. At this stage, before proceeding further, we deem it appropriate to take note of Section 19 as well as Section 77 of the Ranbir Penal Code, Svt.1989 which reads as: “19. Judge. The word “Judge” denotes not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive, or who is one of a body of persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment.” “77. Act of Judge when acting judicially Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which is good faith he believes to be, given to him by law.” 11. Act of Judge when acting judicially Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which is good faith he believes to be, given to him by law.” 11. From a perusal of Section 19 of the Code, it is evident that the definition of the expression judge is an inclusive definition and would include within its ambit even a person who is not officially designated as a Judge but also a person who is empowered by law to give any legal proceeding civil or criminal in definite judgment which if not appealed against would be definitive or a judgment which if confirmed by the same other authority would be definitive. Section 77 of the Code provides that nothing is an offence which is done by a judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is or which is good faith he believes to be given by law. 12. In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal provisions, facts of the case may be seen. In the instant case, admittedly, there is no allegation against the appellant that he had passed the order for any extraneous consideration, that is, by accepting the bribe. The only allegation which is levelled by the prosecution against the appellant is that he had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order and in a hot haste, the appellant concluded the proceeding. From perusal of the record, we find that appellant had directed Naib Tehsildar, Bari Brahmana to submit the report who after recording the statement of seven witnesses had submitted a report that accused persons namely Rashpal Singh and Ravail Singh were in possession. Thereafter the appellant visited the spot on 27.10.1990 and found the accused persons namely Rashpal Singh and Ravail Singh to be in possession of the land in question. The appellant had also taken into account the report prepared by Mohan Lal, the Settlement Officer who has been acquitted by the Trial Court. It is also pertinent to mention here that the order passed by the appellant in exercise of quasi judicial powers under the J&K Land Revenue Act which was upheld by the appellate authority and the validity of the order passed by the appellant as well as by the appellate authority under the Act could not have been examined by the Trial Court. The appellant, in our considered opinion, is entitled to benefit of Section 19 as well as Section 77 of the RPC. The Supreme Court in the case of P C Joshi v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 2001 SC 2788 while referring to the decision in the case of Ishwar Chand Jain vs. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 1395 has held that the Judicial Officers are under constant threat of complaints and enquiries on trivial matters and the action should be taken to protect the honest judicial officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints. Besides that, Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Rajeev Jain, 2002 (1) Crimes 113 M.P. (HC) has held that if Collector passed an illegal order which is grossly mistaken, while acting as a judicial or quasi judicial authority, it cannot always form the basis for initiating criminal proceeding. In the case of P. Sujanpal v. State of Kerala and Ors., the Division Bench of Kerala High Court has held that the judge may become liable to be proceeded against if he misuses his judicial power for personal gains or where erroneous use of judicial power is shown to be dishonest or mala fide except for these exceptional circumstances, a judicial officer is protected from legal action of whatever nature for wrong order rendered by him. Thus, when a judicial officer is acting judicially, even if he commits an error and passes an erroneous order, he would be protected from legal action. In the instant case, as stated supra, there is no allegation against the appellant that he passed the order for any extraneous consideration, that is, by accepting bribe. The order has been passed by the appellant in exercise of quasi judicial powers under the provisions of J &K Land Revenue Act which has been upheld even by the appellate authority. However, the aforesaid aspect of the matter has neither been appreciated nor taken into account by the trial Court while convicting the appellant in respect of the offences aforesaid. 13. In Balya V. State of M.P., (2012) 9 SCC 696 , It has been held by the Supreme Court that common intention and conspiracy are matters of inference and if while drawing an inference, any benefit of doubt creeps in, it must go to the accused. 13. In Balya V. State of M.P., (2012) 9 SCC 696 , It has been held by the Supreme Court that common intention and conspiracy are matters of inference and if while drawing an inference, any benefit of doubt creeps in, it must go to the accused. Similar view was taken in the case of Raju alias Devendra Choubey v. State of Chhatisgarh, (20014) 9 SCC 299. It is equally well settled in law that in absence of evidence of any conspiracy or common object being established, the accused are liable for their individual acts only. (See. Vijay Pandurang Thakre and others. v. State of Maharashtra, (2017) 4 SCC 377 ). In the instant case, the Trial Court has stated that the appellant entered into criminal conspiracy with the accused namely Rashpal Singh and Ravail Singh and passed an order setting aside the mutation in favour of the land which had escheated in favour of the State Government. It was further held that the order was passed in hot haste within a period of eleven days. 14. It is pertinent to mention here that Khasra statement dated 21.12.1988 which was prepared by accused Uttam Chand Dingra in which the land admeasuring 81 kanals and 4 marlas was shown to be in possession of accused Rashpal Singh and Ravail Singh has been acquitted by the Trial Court. It is also pertinent to mention here that appellant while passing the order had also taken into account the report submitted by Naib Tehsildar Bari Brahmana who prepared the report after recording statement of seven witnesses. Thereafter, the appellant visited the spot on 27.10.1990 and found the accused persons namely Rashpal Singh and Ravail Singh to be in possession of the land. It is also pertinent to note that proceedings were concluded by the appellant before his transfer. The appellant was transferred vide order dated 31.10.1990 and he had pronounced the judgment on 01.11.1990. There is no material on record especially in view of the fact that accused Vijay Kumar who was a patwari, as well as accused Mohan Lal, who was Settlement officer and had prepared a report were acquitted by the Trial Court, to draw an inference with regard to criminal conspiracy by the appellant. Therefore, the Trial Court grossly erred in convicting the appellant in respect of an offence under Section 120-B of the RPC. 15. Therefore, the Trial Court grossly erred in convicting the appellant in respect of an offence under Section 120-B of the RPC. 15. In view of preceding analysis, we are inclined to quash and set aside the judgment dated 31.01.2004, in so far as it pertains to the appellant. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.