JUDGMENT : Shaffique, J. Original Petition is filed challenging Ext.P4 order by which an application filed by the petitioners as IA No. 603/12 was dismissed. The application was filed by the petitioners inter alia contending that the Family Court has no jurisdiction to try OP No. 562/2011 (Ext.P1) filed by the respondent herein. The original petition is filed seeking for a direction to set aside document No. 452/2009 of the Sub Registrar Office, Tirur and for other consequential reliefs by way of injunction etc. 2. The facts in the original petition are as under:- The respondent herein married the second petitioner on 18/3/2007. A child was born to them on 17/6/2009. The respondent was in possession of 33 cents of property which he had obtained as per a partition deed. Property was comprised in Re.Sy.No.300/1. It is stated that the above property was transferred by sale in favour of the first petitioner in collusion with the second petitioner. The first petitioner is the brother of second petitioner. The property was transferred in favour of the first petitioner without the knowledge of the respondent. The respondent had come to know about the same only when petitioners started receiving rent from the tenants. When he questioned about the same, the 2nd petitioner had taken all the belongings and other documents and had left the matrimonial house along with the minor child. Though several mediations took place, no action was taken by the second petitioner to return to the matrimonial house whereas she insisted that the respondent should live with the second petitioner at her house and should give the property to her brother. It is alleged that the respondent was informed by the petitioners that another property was available for sale very near to the property held by him and they insisted that the respondent should purchase the said property. Respondent had given a power of attorney as requested by the petitioners in favour of the second petitioner. The power of attorney was registered before the Sub Registrar office on 2/2/2009. After the respondent left abroad, it was noticed that the petitioners started receiving the rent from the premises and on enquiry it was noticed that the first petitioner had purchased the property. It is alleged that the sale deed was executed on the premise that what is being executed was Power of Attorney. After the respondent left abroad, it was noticed that the petitioners started receiving the rent from the premises and on enquiry it was noticed that the first petitioner had purchased the property. It is alleged that the sale deed was executed on the premise that what is being executed was Power of Attorney. According to him, he had not assigned any property in favour of the first petitioner and there was no necessity for the same. He further contends that he was asked to sign in a document prepared by the first petitioner on the bonafide belief that they were doing so for the purpose of the respondent. According to him, he never intended to assign the property in the name of the first petitioner and he had not signed any document as if it was a sale deed. He had signed a document believing that it is a Power of Attorney. 3. In the application filed challenging the maintainability of the Original Petition, it was contended that the averments made in the petition do not become a family dispute which requires adjudication by the Family Court. The Family Court after considering the matter observed that in the light of a few judgments of the High Court, a dispute regarding property can be considered by the Family Court and even as against a relative of a party to the marriage and therefore the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Original Petition. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that jurisdiction of the Family Court is confined to Explanation appended to Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and Explanation (c) and (d) will not help the respondent to contend that the suit can be entertained. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent supports the stand taken by the Family Court. Both sides relied upon various judgments of this Court in order to substantiate their respective contentions. 5. The short question to be considered in this OP is whether the Family Court has jurisdiction to entertain the OP. Explanation (c) and (d) appended to Section 7 reads as under:- "(c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them. (d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship." 6. Explanation (c) and (d) appended to Section 7 reads as under:- "(c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them. (d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship." 6. In Thomas v. Ponnamma Thomas and another (2013 (4) KLT 43), it was held that when a husband sues his wife for recovery of his property, such a suit will squarely fall within the jurisdiction of the Family Court and that suit could be tried and disposed of by the Family Court itself. Reference has been made by the Division Bench to the judgment in Suprabha v. Sivaraman ( 2006 (1) KLT 712 ) in which it was held that when either the husband or the wife is not alive and the suit is filed against the parents of either of them, it cannot be said that it is a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage. It is also observed in the said judgment that in the context of Section 7(c), the meaning of the words "parties to a marriage" cannot be given such a wide interpretation so as to include all those who are interested in the welfare of the couple or those who take part to the marriage ceremony. The suit or proceeding must be between the husband and wife with respect to the property of the parties or either of them. 7. In Shiny v. George and Others (1997 KHC 289), a learned single Judge of this Court held at para 5 as under:- "5. On the scheme of the Act and considering the conferment of jurisdiction on the Family Court, it is clear that a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or either of them comes within the purview of the Family Court. On the scheme of the Act and considering the conferment of jurisdiction on the Family Court, it is clear that a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or either of them comes within the purview of the Family Court. When a wife sues her husband for recovery of her property or which she claim to be her property, obviously the suit could be tried and disposed of only by the Family Court and when in such a suit the wife is, obliged to add a close relative of their husband or even a stranger on the allegation that the husband had made over the property to that close relative or stranger, it will be too much to hold that the jurisdiction of the Family Court is ousted to deal with the claim of the plaintiff in view of the mere presence of the stranger or the close relative of the husband. In such a situation, the close relative of the husband or the stranger could only be the agent of the husband or a confident of the husband holding the property claimed by the wife on behalf of the husband. It is not possible to accept the argument that in such a circumstance also the wife would be obliged to file the suit against the stranger in an ordinary Civil Court even while she is forced to maintain her suit against the husband in the Family Court. Would it make any difference if in a given case, the property of the wife was entrusted not merely to the husband but also to a close relative of the husband, in this case, the father-in-law? I think that it will be the very negation of the scheme of the Family Court Act and the attempt made by that Act to constitute a Special Civil Court for the purpose of dealing with all matrimonial disputes including dispute about property to hold that the wife would not be entitled to maintain a suit for recovery of her property against the father-in-law in the Family Court. If it were merely a suit against the father-in-law it is quite clear that the suit could be instituted only in the ordinary Civil Court. If it were merely a suit against the father-in-law it is quite clear that the suit could be instituted only in the ordinary Civil Court. Equally, if it is merely a suit against the husband for recovery of property, the same could only be maintained in the Family Court. In a case where the claims have to be combined or the same has to be made against both the husband and the father-in-law as in the present case, could it be said that the jurisdiction of the Family Court would stand ousted? My answer is an emphatic no. The suit will remain as a suit against the spouse for recovery of the property of the wife. No doubt even at the time of the marriage the property was handed over not only to the husband but also to the father-in-law. But that would not make the suit anything other than for recovery of the property of a party to the marriage from the other party to the marriage and persons connected with him or related to him. It is notorious that in our State, what is called Streedhanam or what is understood as the share of the bribe in the properties of her father is normally handed over at the time of the marriage not to the husband but to the father-in-law who receives it on behalf of the husband. It is really a case of the father-in-law acting for and on behalf of the husband while he receives the property of the wife. In the case of the streedhanam paid at the time of the marriage of a Christian woman, this Court has held that the father-in-law would be holding the property as a trustee for the bride. Taking in the sweep of the Family Court Act and the objects sought to be achieved by the Family Courts Act, I am of the view that merely because a stranger is also impleaded in the suit on the ground that the property of the wife or a portion of it also been handed over to him the suit cannot be entertained by the Family Court is not warranted. In any view such a construction of the statute to confine the jurisdiction of the Family Court only to the other spouse and not to anyone else who acts either for that spouse or under that spouse would tend to defeat the very object of the enactment of the Act and the establishment of the Family Courts. One of the important aims of the setting up of the Family Courts Act is to bring about a reconciliation between the spouses if possible and to permit them to separate with dignity only if all attempts at conciliation fail. Can there not be a conciliation even in a case where the wife sues her husband and her father-in-law for recovery of the property which she claims to be hers? The answer can only be in the affirmative. There cannot be any doubt that a special machinery has been constituted by the Family Courts Act for counselling, and for bringing about a conciliation between the spouses. Then, Family Court Judge is charged with the duty to attempt conciliation. Should the spouses be deprived of that machinery specially provided by the Family Courts Act and not available in that form in the ordinary Civil Court merely, because, one of them is compelled to sue not only the other spouse but also a close relation of that spouse or a confident or assignee of that spouse? The answer can only be 'no' since an answer otherwise would mean that the very scheme of the Act would stand defeated and the spouse who is sued can always take up the stand that he had made over the property to a stranger and when the suing spouse is compelled to implead that person, the suit would be taken put of the purview of the Family Court. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that so long as the suit is by one spouse against the other the suit would be maintainable in the Family Court even if for the purpose of seeking relief in respect of the cause of action put forward in the suit, the suing spouse is forced to implead persons other than the other spouse or including the close relatives of the other spouse." 8. The Division Bench in Thomas (supra) also considered Explanation (d) and it is held at para 14 as under:- "14. The Division Bench in Thomas (supra) also considered Explanation (d) and it is held at para 14 as under:- "14. This Court considered the provisions of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act in the following cases also. In Shyni v. George and Others, 1997 KHC 289:1997 (1) KLJ 573: AIR 1997 Ker.231, the original petition was filed by a spouse against her husband and her father in law. The learned Family Court Judge took the view that a suit could be entertained by the Family Court in respect of the property of one of the spouses only against the other spouse and not against the father of the other spouse and that consequently it was necessary for the plaintiff wife to delete the second defendant father in law from the array of parties and that only if she does so, the Family Court can proceed with the suit. Adverting to that aspect, in paragraph 5 of the judgment, it was held that having regard to the sweep of the Family Courts Act and the objects that are sought to be achieved, merely because a stranger is also impleaded in the suit on the ground that the property of the wife or a portion of it had also been handed over to him, it cannot be held that the suit cannot be entertained by the Family Court. It as held that even if a relative of the husband or a stranger is a party to the suit, the jurisdiction of the Family Court is not ousted." 9. Another Division Bench in Anil Kumar K.B. v. Sheela N.S. and others ( 2011 (4) KLT 120 ) had occasion to consider Explanation (d) to Section 7(1). That was a case in which claim was made by the wife against her husband's brother for return of money. Question considered was whether it was a matter arising under Section 7(1)(d). After considering various judgments on the point, this Court held that in so far as the amount was due from the appellant, who is the brother of the 1st respondent's husband, arose in circumstances arising out of marital relation, it is a dispute arising under Explanation (d) to Section 7(1) of the Act. 10. After considering various judgments on the point, this Court held that in so far as the amount was due from the appellant, who is the brother of the 1st respondent's husband, arose in circumstances arising out of marital relation, it is a dispute arising under Explanation (d) to Section 7(1) of the Act. 10. In yet another judgment in Vasumathi N. and another v. Valsan and others ( 2011 (3) KLT 638 ), this Court considered the scope and effect of section 7(1)(c) and 7(1)(d). While construing Explanation (c) to Section 7, Division Bench held that when there is a real dispute between the parties to the marriage with respect to the property of one of them, the matter can be adjudicated by the Family Court. In regard to Explanation (d) also, it was held that the words "as an order or injunction" must be held to cover all possible reliefs that may be claimed in such suit or proceedings including a decree. 11. In fact, the Apex Court had occasion to consider a question relating to the jurisdiction of the Family Court in Abdul Jaleel v. Shahida (2003 (2) KLT 403). That was a case in which the parties to the marriage became divorced. Later, a petition came to be filed before the Family Court in regard to the right over an item of property. A contention was raised stating that since the parties were divorced, the matter cannot be adjudicated under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. While upholding the fact that the petition was maintainable before the Family Court, it is held at paras 13 to 17 as under:- "13. The Family Court was set up for settlement of family disputes. The reason for enactment of the said Act was to set up a court which would deal with disputes concerning the family by adopting an approach radically different from that adopted in ordinary civil proceedings. The said Act was enacted despite the fact that O.32A of the Code of Civil Procedure was inserted by reason of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, which could not bring about any desired result. 14. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of a court created specially for resolution of disputes of certain kinds should be construed liberally. 14. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of a court created specially for resolution of disputes of certain kinds should be construed liberally. The restricted meaning if ascribed to Explanation (C) appended to S.7 of the Act, in our opinion, would frustrate the object wherefor the Family Courts were set up. 15. In Amjum Hassan Siddiqui's case (supra) an application was filed in terms of S.3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The question before the Allahabad High Court arose as to whether a Family Court could deal with such a dispute. It was held that no application could lie before the Family Court as the claim under S.3 of the 1986 Act would neither be a suit nor a proceeding within the meaning of S. 7 of the Family Courts Act inasmuch as such an application could only be moved before the First Class Magistrate having requisite jurisdiction as provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said decision, in our opinion, cannot be said to have any application whatsoever in the instant case. 16. In Smt. P. Jayalakshmi and Anr. v. V. Revichandran and Anr. ( AIR 1992 AP 190 ), the Andhra Pradesh High Court was dealing with a case under S.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was held that although the matrimonial proceeding was moved before the Family Court, the same could not have provided for a legal bar for the wife and the minor child for instituting a proceeding under S.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at Thirupathi where they were residing; as both the rights are separate. 17. As indicated hereinbefore, Balakrishnan, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for a Division Bench in a matter arising out of a preliminary issue on the question of jurisdiction held that the dispute over properties between parties to a marriage cannot be confined to the parties to a subsisting marriage. We agree with the said view. The said decision being inter-parties and having attained finality would operate as res judicata." 12. From the discussion made above, it has to be considered whether O.P. No. 562/11 is maintainable before the Family Court. In order to ascertain the maintainability, it is settled law that the averments in the original petition alone is required to be verified. The said decision being inter-parties and having attained finality would operate as res judicata." 12. From the discussion made above, it has to be considered whether O.P. No. 562/11 is maintainable before the Family Court. In order to ascertain the maintainability, it is settled law that the averments in the original petition alone is required to be verified. In the petition, it is stated that the respondent married the second petitioner herein on 18/3/2007 and the 1st petitioner herein is her brother. His contention is that he had constructed buildings in item No.1 of B Schedule property situated in Re.Sy.No.300/1. The said property was fraudulently transferred by the petitioners together in favour of the first petitioner. He has further alleged that while he was abroad, in order to take care of his properties, he intended to execute a Power of Attorney in favour of 1st petitioner. Believing that it is a Power of Attorney, a document was prepared on 2/2/2009. According to him, he proceeded on the basis that it is a Power of Attorney in favour of his wife and later it was understood that the document which was got executed was a document to transfer his property and he had come to know about the same when the petitioners started receiving rent from the property and he had come to know that the property had been transferred in the name of the 1st petitioner, her brother. According to him, this was done by the 1st petitioner with the connivance of the 2nd petitioner. All these factual materials would show that the property of the respondent happened to be got transferred on account of documents created at the instance of his wife. 13. While considering the question of maintainability of a matter before the matrimonial court, as held by the Apex Court in Abdul Jaleel (supra), the jurisdiction of a Court created for resolution of disputes of certain kind should be liberally construed. In other words, especially while considering the scope of Explanation appended to Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, a wide interpretation to the statutory format has to be given. In other words, especially while considering the scope of Explanation appended to Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, a wide interpretation to the statutory format has to be given. Further, in Shiny (supra), the learned Single Judge observed that in a case where the claims have to be combined or the same has to be made against both the husband and the father in law, the jurisdiction of the Family Court will not be ousted and what is to be verified is whether the right to property now claimed by the petitioner has occurred due to a matrimonial relationship. The very fact that there is an allegation of connivance between the wife and her brother for appropriating the property of the husband, can definitely be treated as a property dispute on account of marital relationship between the couple. This is an instance where husband complains that, with the connivance of his wife and during the matrimonial relationship, his property came to be assigned in favour of his wife's brother. The execution of the document happened only because of the marital relationship between the parties. Under such circumstances, we are of the view that this is a case which could be considered by the Family Court taking into account the fact that this is a dispute between the parties to a marriage with reference to a property belonging to one of the party to the marriage. Under such circumstances, we do not find any error on the part of the Family Court to have found so. OP(FC) is, therefore, dismissed.