Research › Search › Judgment

Patna High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 729 (PAT)

Anjani Kumar Verma v. State of Bihar

2017-05-18

AJAY KUMAR TRIPATHI, NILU AGRAWAL

body2017
JUDGMENT : Ajay Kumar Tripathi, J. The petitioner before this Court was applicant before Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna. He filed O.A. No.97 of 2015 for quashing the decision dated 15.12.2014 where his demand for grant of benefit of promotion to Super Time Scale with effect from 18.1.2011, when his juniors were granted such benefits, was negated. This order was Annexure-A/8 to the O.A. application. The other relief prayed was for quashing of order dated 18.2.2015 where claim for interest on payment of DCRG was rejected by the Government. Quashing of this order was also prayed for which was Annexure- A/9 in the O.A. was application but annexed with an M.A. application filed in the O.A. 2. Petitioner is a promoted I.A.S. officer, who superannuated on 31.1.2011. His grudge is that even though his case was considered by the D.P.C. for grant of Super Time Scale in the meeting held on 6.1.2011 along with his batch mates of 1995, the juniors came to earn that benefit but his case was deferred on the ground of pendency of a disciplinary proceeding and his case was put in a sealed cover. The petitioner came to be exonerated of the charges vide order dated 1.9.2014, therefore, he pleaded that since he has been exonerated of the allegations, he deserves to be granted benefit of Super Time Scale like his juniors. He prayed for a pay scale of Rs. 37400-67000 with a grade pay of Rs. 10000. Subsequently, since there was delay in settlement of his post retrial dues due to the pendency of the disciplinary proceeding, settlement of DCRG also get delayed on which he prayed for grant of benefit of interest. 3. The respondent State of Bihar contested the claim of the petitioner by taking a stand that a departmental proceeding vide memorandum dated 05.01.2011 was initiated. Case of the petitioner for promotion to Super Time Sale was placed before the D.P.C. on 06.01.2011. Since a disciplinary proceeding was pending, the suitability of the petitioner was considered and kept in a sealed cover, which, on opening, found the petitioner unfit for promotion as per the grading, which he had earned for the relevant period. After the closure of the departmental proceeding on 01.09.2014, the case of the petitioner was placed before the D.P.C., which met on 15.12.2015. The D.P.C. considered the case in the light of para 18.1. After the closure of the departmental proceeding on 01.09.2014, the case of the petitioner was placed before the D.P.C., which met on 15.12.2015. The D.P.C. considered the case in the light of para 18.1. and para 8 (2) (d) of the guideline of promotion issued by the Government of India and Rule 2 (iv) of the IAS (Pay) Rules, 2007. The Departmental Promotion Committee when opened the sealed cover, found the opinion 'unfit for promotion'. In addition to that, since the petitioner had superannuated on 31.01.2011, much prior to the closing of the departmental proceeding on 01.09.2014, there was no occasion to consider grant of promotion on Super Time Scale to such a candidate, who was not only found unfit by the D.P.C. but had also superannuated much earlier. 4. On behalf of the petitioner it was argued before the Central Administrative Tribunal that his case was similar to the case of one Bhrigu Nath Dwivedi v. State of Bihar & Ors. and the order passed by the CAT in OA 143 of 2009. The date of passing of the order in the said OA is 02.04.2009 where a Co-ordinate Bench directed to hold a review D.P.C. for consideration of grant of Selection Grade from the date his juniors were granted, provided he was found fit. 5. The Central Administrative Tribunal went through the order passed in Bhigu Nath Dwivedi's case where relief was based on the set of facts where it was held that if juniors had been given promotion prior to the date of superannuation of the employee, in appropriate cases retrospective promotion can be ordered, if he was otherwise found fit. 6. The Tribunal did not disagree with the proposition as such but while dealing with the facts of the present case to be such, the said principle could not be applied across the board. The case for promotion to Super Time Scale of the petitioner was considered by the D.P.C. held on 06.01.2011. Name of the present petitioner was at Serial No.10. The D.P.C. found him 'unfit' for promotion in terms of the finding recorded and since the departmental proceeding was pending at the relevant time, a sealed cover procedure was adopted, which was opened after the conclusion of the departmental proceeding. Name of the present petitioner was at Serial No.10. The D.P.C. found him 'unfit' for promotion in terms of the finding recorded and since the departmental proceeding was pending at the relevant time, a sealed cover procedure was adopted, which was opened after the conclusion of the departmental proceeding. The respondent State of Bihar considered the case of the petitioner as per the D.P.C. held on 15.12.2014 but since it found the petitioner unfit for grant of promotion on the ground that the screening committee, which was held in the year 2011, found him to be so. The second reason was that the petitioner had retired on 31.01.2011. Once the D.P.C. found him unfit for promotion at the time when even his juniors' cases were considered, it makes no difference whether he was exonerated in the departmental proceeding subsequently or not. The petitioner could have had a case provided the sealed cover revealed that he was otherwise eligible and fulfilled the parameters and the screening committee did not record its opinion as 'unfit'. 7. From the narration of facts it is evident that it was not because of the pendency of the departmental proceeding that the benefit of grant of promotion to Super Time Scale was denied to the petitioner. It was the content of the sealed cover, which had found the petitioner unfit, which proved to be the stumbling block after the closure of the departmental proceeding. If the screening committee had found the petitioner fit on the parameters and the assessment then surely a promotion could have been given even though the petitioner had retired in the meantime but prior to his retirement, the opinion of the screening committee was that the petitioner was unfit and, therefore, was not capable of earning a promotion at par with his juniors. 8. The Tribunal, therefore, did not agree with the submission of the counsel for the petitioner that it was only because of the pendency of the departmental proceeding and that too because the same was closed only on 01.09.2014, the petitioner did not earn his promotion. 9. The facts are otherwise if the man was found unfit by the D.P.C. in terms of the parameters then the opinion of the D.P.C. is not required to be overridden by a court of law. 9. The facts are otherwise if the man was found unfit by the D.P.C. in terms of the parameters then the opinion of the D.P.C. is not required to be overridden by a court of law. The assessment is best left to such expert bodies and there is no occasion for a court of law to apply its wisdom unless something really gross or glaring is pointed out by any officer in such decision making process. 10. On the claim with regard to payment of interest on the DCRG, the Tribunal was of the opinion that since the departmental proceeding was closed only in September 2014 exonerating him and full and final settlement of DCRG was made in February 2015, there has not been extraordinary delay in settlement of his claim. The period between the date of superannuation and the date when the departmental proceeding was closed, therefore, cannot earn any interest on the ground of delay. However, the Tribunal did not find it to be a fit case for grant of any interest even for the period September 2014 to February 2015 since there was no delay in sanction. 11. When the writ application was taken up the argument more or less veered around the same course as was made before the Central Administrative Tribunal. However, in addition to that, submission is made before the High Court that since the respondent authorities did not communicate any adverse entry in the ACR to the petitioner at any point of time, the same cannot be considered as adverse and used against him. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deo Dutt v. Union of India & others, reported in AIR 2008 SC 2513 . 12. In Deo Dutt's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court did take note of the office memorandum dated 10/11.9.1987 where only adverse entries were required to be communicated to the employee and not such entries, which are not considered adverse but may be below par, if an overall assessment is made by an screening committee. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down a new principle of law in following terms in paragraph 39: "39. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down a new principle of law in following terms in paragraph 39: "39. In the present case, we are developing the principles of natural justice by holding that fairness and transparency in public administration requires that all entries (whether poor, fair, average, good or very good) in the Annual Confidential Report of a public servant, whether in civil, judicial, police or any other State service (except the military), must be communicated to him within a reasonable period so that he can make a representation for its upgradation. This in our opinion is the correct legal position even though there may be no Rule/G.O. requiring communication of the entry, or even if there is a Rule/G.O. prohibiting it, because the principle of non-arbitrariness in State action as envisaged by Article 14 of the Constitution in our opinion requires such communication. Article 14 will override all rules or government orders." 13. Since the law has been otherwise all along that only adverse entries are required to be communicated to a government servant and since such a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has given a new dimension, the same can only be considered prospectively. But if the earlier ACRs recorded against an employee are not considered adverse, non-communication of the same cannot become a ground for sitting in appeal over overall assessment made by the screening committee or the D.P.C. in matters of grant of promotion. Since in the case of the present petitioner the entries, which have been made, may be sub-par but cannot be said to be adverse. Even the ACR has now been annexed with the supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, to show the bona fide of the decision making process. 14. Since this Court is not sitting in appeal over the decision taken by the authorities empowered with the duty of recording their opinion about performance of an employee, the Court is not willing to go into that aspect of the matter and the adjudication will be required to be made on the basis of the opinion of the screening committee i.e. the D.P.C. and since the D.P.C. had found the petitioner 'unfit', which was found to be so on opening of sealed cover, benefit of Super Time Scale from retrospective date when juniors earned that benefit, cannot be granted after superannuation of the petitioner. The Tribunal to that extent has committed no error of law in rejecting the prayer for grant of benefit of Super Time Scale. 15. Coming to the issue of grant of interest on the DCRG, the respondents in their counter affidavit filed on behalf of the General Administration Department by the Under Secretary have taken a stand as under : "(11) That in O.A. No.0050/0097/2015 the petitioner had claimed for interest on the amount of gratuity withheld in view of the departmental proceeding instituted against him this regard the facts noted below were placed before the Hon'ble CAT for consideration:- (a) As per the respective provisions of AIS (DCRB) Rules, 1958 interest for gratuity will be admissible if its payment is made after three months from the date of superannuation due to administrative lapses and will be withheld until the conclusion of proceedings initiated against the concerned officer. Texts of these provision are as follows :- Rule- 19(A) of AIS (DCRB) Rule, 1958 "If the payment of gratuity or death-cum-retirement gratuity has been authorized after three months from the date when its payment became due, and it is clearly established that the delay in payment was attributable to administrative lapses, interest at the rate prescribed by the Central Government from time to time shall be paid on the amount of gratuity or death-cum-retirement gratuity in respect of the period beyond three months." Rule- 6 (2) of AIS (DCRB) Rule, 1958 ".......... a provisional pension not exceeding the maximum pension which would have been admissible on the basis of his qualifying service up to the date of retirement, or if he was under the suspension on the date of retirement up to the date immediately preceding the date on which he was placed under suspension; but no gratuity or death-cum-retirement gratuity shall be paid to him until the conclusion of such proceedings and the issue of final orders thereon." (b) As per Rule- 6 (2) of AIS (DCRB) Rules, 1958 the petitioner's gratuity was kept undecided till the final conclusion of the departmental proceeding instituted against him. The said departmental proceeding was finally concluded vide, GAD's order contained in memo No.12053 dated 01.09.2014. Subsequently, sanctioning order of full pension and gratuity was issued expeditiously within 19 days only vide, letter No.1/pen-01/2011-Sa.pra.-13085 dated 19.09.2014. (12) That it is clear from the aforesaid facts that administrative lapses are not involved in this case. The said departmental proceeding was finally concluded vide, GAD's order contained in memo No.12053 dated 01.09.2014. Subsequently, sanctioning order of full pension and gratuity was issued expeditiously within 19 days only vide, letter No.1/pen-01/2011-Sa.pra.-13085 dated 19.09.2014. (12) That it is clear from the aforesaid facts that administrative lapses are not involved in this case. Thus, the claim of interest made by the petitioner was rightly rejected through department's letter No.1/pen-01/2011- Sa.pra.-2637 dated 18.02.2015. This date (i.e. date of the order passed by GAD in course of deciding the petitioner's claim of interest) has been shown in the judgment dated 08.02.2016 as the date of granting gratuity to the petitioner while it was sanctioned on 19.09.2014." 16. In view of the factual and legal position, which has been reproduced above, and also keeping in mind that the pension and gratuity was sanctioned within two weeks of the closure of the departmental proceeding, there is no extraordinary delay in grant of administrative sanction for payment to the petitioner, therefore, even claim for benefit of interest because of the delay in payment of DCRG is not entertainable. 17. An impression was sought to be created before this Court that there was some kind of mischief, which was deliberately done by the authorities, to prevent the petitioner from begetting the benefit of Super Time Scale and, therefore, the departmental proceeding was initiated just one day prior to the meeting of the D.P.C. 18. The counsel for the State filed a chronological list of dates as to what had transpired in the departmental proceeding and the same was also taken on record since the same has significance. It shows lack of bona fide on behalf of the petitioner in cooperating in an early closure of the departmental proceeding. In fact, he has tried all tricks, which he could, to avoid an early conclusion of the departmental proceeding. The court would like to reproduce the chronological list of dates with the steps taken on those dates with regard to the departmental proceeding. It is not that the departmental proceeding was initiated on 5.1.2011. The ground was laid way back on 3.6.2009 but it was the petitioner who did not cooperate and avoided, if not evaded assistance. The court would like to reproduce the chronological list of dates with the steps taken on those dates with regard to the departmental proceeding. It is not that the departmental proceeding was initiated on 5.1.2011. The ground was laid way back on 3.6.2009 but it was the petitioner who did not cooperate and avoided, if not evaded assistance. The chronological list of dates are reproduced herein below for record : Jh vatuh dqekj oekZ] Hkk0Á0ls0 ¼95½ ds fo#/n lapkfyr foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh dk Øfed fooj.k A frFkh dkjZokbZ dk fooj.k lacaf/kr lafpdk dk voyksduh; i`”B fVIi.kh Hkkx i=kpkj Hkkx 03-06-2009 Jh oekZ ij xfBr vkjksi ds fy, tkus ds vkns’k ds lkFk xzkeh.k fodkl foHkkx dh lafpdk la[;k &1 ¼iwf.k;k½ vjfj;k &1@2009 dkfeZd ,oa Á’kklfud lq/kkj foHkkx ¼orZeku lkekU; Á’kklu foHkkx½ dks ÁkIr gqbZ A xfBr vkjksi ftyk dk;ZØe leUo;d ds #i esa Jh oekZ }kjk jk”Vªh; xzkeh.k jkstxkj vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk &14≶&ifBr /kkjk 3 ,oa 7 ds vkf/ku dkuwuh nkf;Ro ds fuoZgu esa foQyrk vkSj mlds fØ;kUo;u esa vfu;ferrk cjrus vkfn dk vkjksi Fkk A i`”B&18 & 09-06-2009 xzkeh.k fodkl foHkkx ds laxr i`”Bksa dk m}j.k ysdj lkekU; Á’kklu foHkkx dh lafpdk esa vuqorhZ dkjokbZ vkjaHk dh x;h A i`”B&19 & 15-10-2009 Ekkeys dh leh{kk ds mijkUr Jh oekZ ls ÁfrfØ;k dh ekWax foHkkxh; i=kad &10297 fnukad & 15-10-2009 }kjk dh x;h A i`”B & 22 & 24 i`”B & 78 & 76 04-05-2010 dfri; i=kpkjksa ds ckn Jh oekZ dk fnukad 30-04-2010 dk mRrj ÁkIr gqvk A & i`”B & 96 & 91 13-05-2010 foHkkxh; i=kad & 4369 fnukad 13-05-2010 }kjk Jh oekZ dk ÁkIr mrj xzkeh.k fodkl foHkkx dks earO; gsrq i= Ásf”kr fd;k x;k A i`”B&36 i`”B&97 21-12-2010 xzkeh.k fodkl foHkkx dk earO; ÁkIr gqvk A & i`”B&108&103 21-12-2010 Ekeys dh foospuk ds mijkUr Jh oekZ ds fo#/n foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh ds lapkyu dk ÁLrko foHkkx }kjk xfBr gqvk A i`”B&49 & 31-12-2010 foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh ds lapkyu ds ÁLrko ij jkT; ljdkj dk vuqeksnu ÁkIr gqvk A i`”B&49 & 03-01-2011 lacf/kr lafpdk lkekU; Á’kklu foHkkx dks ÁkIr gqbZ A i`”B&49 & 05-01-2011 foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh dk Kkiu] Kkikad & 147 fnukad & 05-01-2011 }kjk fuxZr gqvk A & i`”B&126 18-05-2011 lapkfyr dk;Zokgh esa Jh oekZ dk fnukad 13-05-2011 dk varfje mRrj ÁkIr gqvk A & i`”B&152&147 26-03-2012 dfri; i= O;ogkjksa ds ckn Jh oekZ dk fnukad & 20-03-2012 dk vafre mRrj ÁkIr gqvk A & i`”B&296&292 13-04-2012 Jh oekZ dk fnukad &13-04-2012 dk iwjd mRrj ÁkIr gqvk A & i`”B&299&297 12-08-2014 laxksikax leh{kk ds mijkUr ekeys esa Jh oekZ ds fo#/n lapkfyr vkyksP; dk;Zokgh dks lafpdkLr djus dk ÁLrko foHkkx }kjk xfBr fd;k x;k A i`”B&125 & 21-08-2014 foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh dks lafpdkLr fd;s tkus ds foHkkxh; ÁLrko ij jkT; ljdkj dk vuqeksnu ÁkIr gqvk A i`”B&125 & 25-08-2014 jkT; ljdkj ds vuqeksnu ds lkFk lafpdk lkekU; Á’kklu foHkkx dks ÁkIr gqbZ A i`”B&125 01-09-2014 foHkkxh; vkns’k Kkikad & 12053 fnukad & 01-09-2014 }kjk Jh oekZ ds fo#/n lapkfyr foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh dks lafpdkLr djus dk vkns’k fuxZr fd;k x;k A & i`”B&318 19. In other words, the insinuation, which was sought to be made upon the respondents that there was some kind of sinister design behind the refusal or rejection of the claim for grant of Super Time Scale to this petitioner viz- a- viz his other so-called juniors, is a myth and also imaginary. 20. In totality, therefore, the Court comes to a considered opinion that there has not been any miscarriage of justice in rejection of the O.A. application by the Tribunal. There is no error either of fact or law which requires rectification in judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.