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2017 DIGILAW 730 (KAR)

G. E. Thermometrics India Pvt. Ltd. v. Shaju James

2017-04-10

ANAND BYRAREDDY

body2017
ORDER : Anand Byrareddy, J. The present petition is filed by the complainant. 2. The complainant had alleged offences against Respondent No. 1. However, after investigation, the Investigating Officer had thought it fit to implicate Accused Nos. 2 to 4. However, they were not charge-sheeted. It is after the evidence of PW-1 was recorded that the court below had thought it fit to allow the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to implicate Accused Nos. 2 to 4. The same had been questioned by way of a criminal petition in Crl.P.C. 6300/2009 before this court. This court has relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohamad Shafi v. Mohammad Rafiq and others AIR 2007 SC 1899 which is to the effect that the satisfaction in exercising discretionary jurisdiction in terms of Section 319 Cr.P.C. should be arrived at inter alia upon completion of the cross-examination of the concerned witness and has therefore quashed the order passed on the application and has opined that it was open for the prosecution to renew its application after completion of the cross-examination of PW-1. 3. The question therefore is whether such an exercise of cross-examination of the witness was essential for the court to arrive at its satisfaction as to exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner would draw attention to a Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab and others ( AIR 2014 SC 1400 ), wherein the Constitution Bench has referred to and discussed the law as spelt out in the case of Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq ( AIR 2007 SC 1899 ) and has opined that all that is required for the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is that, it must appear to the court that some other person also who is not facing the trial, may also have been involved in the offence. The pre-requisite for the exercise of this power is similar to the prima facie view which the magistrate must come to in order to take cognizance of the offence. The pre-requisite for the exercise of this power is similar to the prima facie view which the magistrate must come to in order to take cognizance of the offence. Therefore, no straight jacket formula can and should be laid with respect to conditions precedent for arriving at such an opinion and, if the Court is convinced even on the basis of evidence appearing in Examination-in-Chief, it can exercise the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and can proceed against such other persons. Further, it is noticed that the section also uses the words 'such person could be tried' instead of 'should be tried". Hence, what is required is not to have a mini-trial at this stage by having examination and cross-examination and thereafter rendering a decision on the overt act of such person sought to be added. It is mini-trial that would affect the right of the person sought to be arraigned as an accused rather than not having any cross-examination at all, for in light of sub-section (4) of Section 319 Cr.P.C., the person would be entitled to a fresh trial where he would have all the rights including the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and examine defence witnesses and advance his arguments upon the same. Therefore, even on the basis of Examination-in-Chief, the Court or the Magistrate can proceed against a person as long as the court is satisfied that the evidence appearing against such person is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. In fact, Examination-in-Chief untested by Cross Examination, undoubtedly in itself, is an evidence. Further, it is reasoned that the logic behind waiting till the cross-examination of the witness is over. It would have to be kept in mind that at the time of exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., the person sought to be arraigned as an accused, is in no way participating in the trial. Further, it is reasoned that the logic behind waiting till the cross-examination of the witness is over. It would have to be kept in mind that at the time of exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., the person sought to be arraigned as an accused, is in no way participating in the trial. Even if the cross-examination is to be taken into consideration, the person sought to be arraigned as an accused cannot cross examine the witnesses prior to passing of an order under Section 319 Cr.P.C., as such a procedure is not contemplated by the Cr.P.C. Secondly, the State would not oppose or object to naming of more persons as an accused as it would only help the prosecution in completing the chain of evidence, unless the witness is obliterating the role of persons already facing trial. Further, it is noticed that only prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination. The test that should be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. In Section 319 Cr.P.C., the purpose of providing if ' it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence' is clear from the words "for which such person could be tried together with the accused." The words used are not ' for which such person could be convicted'. There is, therefore, no scope for the Court acting under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused. 4. Therefore, in the light of the above observations of the Supreme Court distinguishing the decision in Mohd. Shafi's case ( AIR 2007 SC 1899 ), this Court was not justified in holding that the prosecution should renew its application after completion of the cross-examination of PW-1. This was not relevant in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. 5. Consequently, the petition is allowed and the order dated 30.11.2016 in C.C. No. 2350/2008 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bangalore Rural District is quashed. This was not relevant in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. 5. Consequently, the petition is allowed and the order dated 30.11.2016 in C.C. No. 2350/2008 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bangalore Rural District is quashed. In the result, the earlier order passed by the Magistrate allowing the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. revives. 6. I.A.1/2017 is disposed of as a consequence.