JUDGMENT : I.P. MUKERJI, J. 1. This Court is deeply embarrassed. By its order dated 15th September, 2016 it had appointed the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tapen Sen, a retired Judge of this Court as the arbitrator. At the outset, I make it absolutely plain that there was no time limit set by this order to make and publish his award. This Court had only made a request to the learned arbitrator "to conclude the reference within a period of ten months of the statement of claim being lodged before him". This part of the order was absolutely directory. 2. It was very gracious on the part of the learned arbitrator to consider the request made by the Court as a command and direct the parties to seek extension of time. 3. In spite of this belief of the learned arbitrator this Court would not treat the said direction as mandatory. Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, prior to its amendment on 23rd October, 2015 there was no time limit to make and publish the award. There is no dispute that this arbitral proceeding commenced before coming into force of the Amendment Act. It was sought to be contended that the provision in the amendment Act with regard to the time limit upon the learned arbitrator to make and publish the award was procedural and was not covered by the protection of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In other words, the said new provision could have retrospective operation. I am unable to agree. Take the case of an arbitral reference which had commenced 363 days before coming into force of the new Act. So, let us assume that 23rd October, 2015 was the 363rd day of the reference. If the old Act had continued the arbitrator would not have to think about any time limit to conclude the reference. When the amendment Act came into force on 23rd October, 2015, the arbitrator would have just two days to make and publish the award or become absolutely functus officio. This kind of an absurdity was never intended by the legislature. At any rate, the right to obtain an award from a particular arbitrator, without being bound by time is usually a part of an agreement between the parties. It cannot be said that this kind of a right is procedural. This kind of an absurdity was never intended by the legislature. At any rate, the right to obtain an award from a particular arbitrator, without being bound by time is usually a part of an agreement between the parties. It cannot be said that this kind of a right is procedural. Therefore, in my opinion, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 prior to its amendment applied to this arbitration. There was no requirement for the learned arbitrator to obtain an extension of time from this Court to make and publish the award. 4. Let us also assume for the sake of argument that the learned arbitrator was required to take an extension of time from the Court. 5. First of all, this Court had passed the order dated 15th September, 2016 and always retained the power to implement its own order or to extend the time of its performance. 6. Secondly, the facts of this case would show that the statement of claim was filed by the petitioner on 27th September, 2016. Several adjournments were taken by the respondent on one pretext or the other and eventually the counter statement was filed after nine months. Now, if the respondent has filed their counter statement after nine months having sought the accommodation of the claimant, would it lie in their mouth to oppose the application made by the claimant/petitioner for extension of time to make and publish the award. The decision of the Supreme Court in N.B.C.C. Ltd. v. J.G. Engineering Pvt. Ltd.; reported in AIR 2010 SC 640 : (2010)2 WBLR (SC) 698 and the unreported Division Bench judgment of our Court in the case of Shree Shree Iswar Satyanarayanjee & Ors. v. Amstar Investment Pvt. Ltd. in APO No. 242 of 2013, AP No. 630 of 2013 decided on 26th August, 2013 have, in my opinion, no application to the facts and circumstances of this case. This is for the reason that in those cases there was an agreement between the parties with regard to the time to make and publish the award. The Court said that under the 1996 Act [before its amendment] there was no time limit to make and publish the award. The time limit had been stipulated by the agreement between the parties. Therefore, the Court could not by its direction re-write the agreement between the parties and extend it. 7. The Court said that under the 1996 Act [before its amendment] there was no time limit to make and publish the award. The time limit had been stipulated by the agreement between the parties. Therefore, the Court could not by its direction re-write the agreement between the parties and extend it. 7. Here, the request was made by this Court on 15th September, 2016 to the learned arbitrator to conclude the reference within a period of 10 months of the statement of claim being filed with him. 8. Let us assume also the Court does not have the power to extend the time to make and publish the award under the 1996 Act. This can only be true in a situation where during the ordinary course of conduct of the arbitration, the time expires. Thereafter, a party wakes up and approaches the Court for extension of time. In that peculiar factual background the Court could possibly decline to extend the time. But, here when the time has been set by the Court and time has been allowed to run out because of adjournments sought by a particular party, and because of their dilatory tactics, at the request of the other party the Court cannot be blind and refuse extension of time relying on the above decisions. For all those reasons, this application succeeds. The learned arbitrator is most humbly requested by this Court to proceed with the reference and to conclude it by an award within such time, as his lordship thinks fit and proper.