JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant Letters patent appeal having been filed by the appellants is directed against the judgment dated 19.8.2011, passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP No. 7188 of 2010, whereby learned Single Judge has held that the J.B.T. course is the only academic course and mere passing of J.B.T. course successfully, does not confer any vested or accrued right to the candidates to be appointed in the Government job. Learned Single Judge has further held that the appointments in the State are to be made strictly as per the Recruitment and Promotion Rules and State cannot take any policy decision contrary to Constitution or the Recruitment and Promotion Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India and the Courts cannot direct the functionaries of the State to act in contravention of the validly enacted Recruitment and Promotion Rules. Learned Single Judge has further concluded that public employment by the State cannot be restricted to a particular batch or candidates belonging to a particular institution, rather, all the posts should be advertised enabling all the candidates, who are in possession of J.B.T. qualification to participate in the selection process because restricting the public employment to a particular batch or institution would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Learned Single Judge while dismissing the petition having been filed by the appellants-petitioner has directed the respondents to fill up the posts of J.B.T. teachers strictly as per the Recruitment and Promotion Rules. 2. Briefly stated facts as emerge from the record are that vide communication dated 13.6.2008, Principal Secretary (Elementary Education) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh directed the Director (Elementary Education), Himachal Pradesh, to initiate process for conducting common entrance test for admission for two years J.B.T. course (2008-2010). Pursuant to the aforesaid directions having been issued by the state of HP, H.P. Board of School Education issued advertisement (Annexure P-4), for holding common entrance test for admission for two years J.B.T. course. It would be apt to reproduce herein below condition No.5 of the advertisement as under:- “5. Neither the appearance in the test shall ipso facto entitle a candidate to get admission in this course nor the J.B.T. training guarantees Govt. service after the completion of training.” Pursuant to aforesaid test conducted by the respondent department, petitioner qualified the same and started pursuing two years’ J.B.T. course. Neither the appearance in the test shall ipso facto entitle a candidate to get admission in this course nor the J.B.T. training guarantees Govt. service after the completion of training.” Pursuant to aforesaid test conducted by the respondent department, petitioner qualified the same and started pursuing two years’ J.B.T. course. Subsequently, vide CWP No. 7188 of 2010 i.e. subject matter of the instant appeal, appellants-petitioners claimed that their case is also required to be considered for regular appointment at par with earlier batches since condition for considering the candidates for appointment on contract basis, came to be only incorporated for the admissions, which were made during the year, 2010, and same cannot be applied retrospectively. Appellants/petitioners further claimed that direction may be issued to the respondents to give relaxation to appoint them on regular basis instead of contract basis. Appellants/petitioners also placed on record admission notice (Annexure P-2), issued in the year, 2003, wherein condition No. 5 (referred supra) was also existing. Appellants/petitioners also made available on record copy of the advertisement for J.B.T. Common Entrance Test for the year, 2010, wherein conditions No. 6 and 7 were incorporated, which is being reproduced herein below:- “6. Since contractual appointment will be considered after passing of JBT course and subject to permission to fill up vacancies, hence, no bond will be executed to serve in the Education Department. 7. After successful completion of JBT course as above conditions, the candidates are eligible for employment against vacant pots of JBT teacher in Elementary Education Department. Actual appointment will be based on vacancies and necessary approvals to fill the posts. As per present policy fresh appointments are made on contract.” 3. Respondents while refuting the aforesaid claim of the appellants-petitioners stated that the Govt. vide letter dated 26.9.1997, had taken a conscious policy decision to execute bond only with the JBT Trainees of Batch 2006-08 for providing regular jobs against the vacant post of J.B.T. teachers in the State and accordingly, all pass out candidates of batch 2006-08 (except J.B.T. trainees of Trisha College of Education, Rangas District Hamirpur, HP) stand appointed on regular basis as J.B.T. teachers against the available vacancies. Respondents further contended that govt. Respondents further contended that govt. took policy decision during February, 2008 that all further appointments made on the contract basis and as such, J.B.T. students of petitioners’ batch 2008-10 could not be considered for the appointment on regular job and all the appointments were to be made on contract basis, which was further subject to availability of vacancies of teachers in the State. Respondents while specifically referring to the condition contained at Sr. No. 5 (i.e. General Rules/Guidelines for JBT Common Entrance Test) contended that neither the appearance in the test would ipso-facto entitle a candidate to get admission in the course nor the J.B.T. training guarantees Govt. service after the completion of the training. Respondents further claimed that completion of two years JBT training course by any candidate does not entitle him or her to claim regular appointment against the J.B.T. post in Government Primary Schools in the State. Apart from above, respondents also claimed before learned Single Judge that since all the trainees have completed two years of J.B.T. training and the examination has also been conducted, there is no question of executing bond. Trainees of Sessions 2008-2010, who have successfully passed out the examination of two years JBT training, shall be considered for the job on contract basis that too keeping in view the availability of vacancies as per the decision taken by the Govt. from time to time. On the basis of aforesaid pleadings, learned Single judge dismissed the writ petition issuing therein directions as referred herein above. 4. This Court after having carefully perused condition No. 5 contained in the advertisement (Annexure-P4), sees no force in the arguments having been made by the learned counsel for the appellants-petitioners that the petitioners-appellants ought to have been offered regular appointment at par with earlier batches since condition for considering the candidate for appointment on contract basis was only incorporated in the admission proposed to be made during the year, 2010. 5. This Court is in agreement with the arguments having been made by learned Advocate General that applications, if any, were filed/submitted by the appellants-petitioners pursuant to the advertisement (Annexure P-4), wherein it was specifically provided that mere appearance in the test will not make any candidate ipso-facto entitled to get admission in the course, nor the J.B.T. training guarantees govt. service after the completion of training. service after the completion of training. Perusal of advertisement issued for filling up vacancies suggests that similar condition was also incorporated (Annexure P-2) where petitioners were put to caveat before hand that mere sitting in the examination will not entitle them to get admission in the course and subsequently, govt. service after completion of training. Aforesaid advertisement containing therein condition No.5, came to be issued in the year, 2008 and the last date of receipt of the application was 21.7.2008 but petitioners-appellants instead of laying challenge, if any, to the condition as stated above, appeared in the examination and chose to remain silent for approximately two years. Petition only came to be filed on 16.11.2010, i.e. after the examination of J.B.T. course was over. 6. We after having carefully gone through the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge vis-à-vis material placed on record by the respective parties, see no infirmity and illegality in the findings returned by the learned Single Judge that appointment to the post is required to be made strictly as per Recruitment and Promotion Rules and admittedly, in the instant case, State government has already framed Recruitment and Promotion Rules under Article 309 of the Constitution of India for filling up of the post of the J.B.T. teachers on contract basis. 7. True it is, that earlier respondents-State taking into consideration the availability of posts appointed the candidates, who had completed J.B.T. course, on regular basis as J.B.T. teachers, but subsequently took policy decision to give appointment to the candidates on contract basis. Careful perusal of communication dated 24.2.2009 (Annexure P-8) clearly suggests that all principals, DIETs, H.P., were apprised that government has taken policy decision in the month of August, 2007 that in future, appointment of J.B.T. teachers would be made on contract basis and as such, while advertising these posts, condition may be incorporated in the advertisement so that candidates applying for the same are put to the caveat. Vide aforesaid communication, principals were directed to bring it to the notice of all the trainees that they will be considered for the posts against the available vacancies once they qualify the J.B.T. course that too on contract basis only. 8. Since the petitioners were put to caveat by way of advertisement wherein condition Nos. Vide aforesaid communication, principals were directed to bring it to the notice of all the trainees that they will be considered for the posts against the available vacancies once they qualify the J.B.T. course that too on contract basis only. 8. Since the petitioners were put to caveat by way of advertisement wherein condition Nos. 6 and 7 (as have been reproduced herein above) were incorporated, appellants/petitioners cannot be allowed to claim that they ought to have been appointed on regular post immediately after completion of J.B.T. course like other batches. Since respondent-State took policy decision not to fill up posts on regular basis of the candidates 2008-2010 batch, no fault, if any, can be found with action of the State. Apart from above, since decision to offer appointment on contract basis after completion of J.B.T. course was taken in the year, 2007, as has been discussed supra, plea of the petitioners that decision has been made applicable retrospectively, was rightly rejected by the Learned Single Judge because admittedly advertisement was issued in the year, 2008 to appoint the candidates on contract basis, who had successfully completed the J.B.T. course. Petitioners cannot claim that after completion of J.B.T. course, they be appointed on regular basis, especially when they were made aware before hand at the time of issuance of advertisement. Since State govt. took policy decision to appoint the petitioners and similarly situated persons on contract basis as per Recruitment and Promotion Rules, court had no authority to direct the respondents to relax the Recruitment and Promotion Rules and as such, there is no illegality and infirmity in the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. 9. It has been repeatedly held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that it is beyond the scope of judicial review to ascertain the correctness of the reasons for adopting certain policies by the executive save and except breach of fundamental right, if any, is shown. In this regard, reliance, is placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Ekta Shakti Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2006) 10 SCC 337 , relevant paras whereof have been reproduced herein below:- “11. 5. In this regard, reliance, is placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Ekta Shakti Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2006) 10 SCC 337 , relevant paras whereof have been reproduced herein below:- “11. 5. While exercising the power of judicial review of administrative action, the Court is not the appellate authority and the Constitution does not permit the Court to direct or advise the executive in matter of policy or to sermonize any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of the Legislature or the executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory power. (See Ashif Hamid v. State of J. & K. ( AIR 1989 SC 1899 ), Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. v. Union of India ( AIR 1990 SC 1277 ). The scope of judicial enquiry is confined to the question whether the decision taken by the Government is against any statutory provisions or is violative of the fundamental rights of the citizens or is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution. Thus, the position is that even if the decision taken by the Government does not appear to be agreeable to the Court it cannot interfere. 6. The correctness of the reasons which prompted the Government in decision making, taking one course of action instead of another is not a matter of concern in judicial review and the Court is not the appropriate forum for such investigation. 7. The policy decision must be left to the Government as it alone can adopt which policy should be adopted after considering all the points from different angles. In matter of policy decisions or exercise of discretion by the Government so long as the infringement of fundamental right is not shown Courts will have no occasion to interfere and the Court will not and should not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the executive in such matters. In assessing the propriety of a decision of the Government the Court cannot interfere even if a second view is possible from that of the Government. 8. The Court should constantly remind itself of what the Supreme Court of the United States said in Metropolis Theatre Company v. City of Chicago (1912) 57 L Ed 730. In assessing the propriety of a decision of the Government the Court cannot interfere even if a second view is possible from that of the Government. 8. The Court should constantly remind itself of what the Supreme Court of the United States said in Metropolis Theatre Company v. City of Chicago (1912) 57 L Ed 730. "The problems of Government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is the best is not always discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review. [See: State of Orissa and others v. Gopinath Dash and Others (2005) 13 SCC 495 ]. 10. Hon’ble Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority and another v. Joint Action Committee Allottee of SFS Flats and other, (2008) 2 SCC 672 , which has also been taken note of by the learned Single Judge, has specifically held that policy decision is subject to judicial review on following grounds:- “a. if it is unconstitutional; b. if it is dehors the provisions of the Act and the Regulations; c. if the delegate has acted beyond its power of delegation; d. if the executive policy is contrary to the statutory or a large policy.” In the instant case, no material, if any, has been placed on record by the appellants/petitioners suggestive of the fact that decision taken by the respondents in offering appointment to the petitioners on contract basis is unconstitutional and same is dehors the provision of the act and regulation. Similarly, there is no material on record to demonstrate that policy decision taken by the Government is contrary to the statutory or legal policy. Hon’ble Apex Court has further held in case titled Shimnit Utsche India Private Limited and Anr. v. West Bengal Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited and other (2010) 6 SCC 303 , that Govt. policy can be changed with changing circumstances and merely on the ground of change, such policy will not be vitiated:- “52. We have no justifiable reason to take a view different from the High Court insofar as correctness of these reasons is concerned. v. West Bengal Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited and other (2010) 6 SCC 303 , that Govt. policy can be changed with changing circumstances and merely on the ground of change, such policy will not be vitiated:- “52. We have no justifiable reason to take a view different from the High Court insofar as correctness of these reasons is concerned. The courts have repeatedly held that government policy can be changed with changing circumstances and only on the ground of change, such policy will not be vitiated. The government has a discretion to adopt a different policy or alter or change its policy calculated to serve public interest and make it more effective. Choice in the balancing of the pros and cons relevant to the change in policy lies with the authority. But like any discretion exercisable by the government or public authority, change in policy must be in conformity with Wednesbury reasonableness and free from arbitrariness, irrationality, bias and malice. 53. In Association of Registration Plates1, this Court while dealing with the challenge to the conditions with regard to experience in foreign countries and prescribed minimum turnover from that business observed that these conditions have been framed in the NIT to ensure that the manufacturer selected would be technically and financially competent to fulfill the contractual obligations and to eliminate fly-by-night operators and that the insistence of the State to search for an experienced manufacturer with sound financial and technical capacity cannot be misunderstood. While maintaining the State Government's right to get the right and most competent person, it was held that in the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document and awarding a contract of the nature of ensuring supply of HSRP, greater latitude is required to be conceded to the State authorities and unless the action of tendering authority is found to be malicious and a misuse of statutory powers, tender conditions are unassailable. 54. On the contentions advanced, this Court examined the impugned conditions and did not find any fault and overruled all objections raised by the petitioners therein in challenge to these conditions. This Court has neither laid down as an absolute proposition that manufacturer of HSRP must have the foreign experience and a particular financial capacity to fulfill the contractual obligations nor it has been held that these conditions must necessarily be insisted upon in the NIT. 55. This Court has neither laid down as an absolute proposition that manufacturer of HSRP must have the foreign experience and a particular financial capacity to fulfill the contractual obligations nor it has been held that these conditions must necessarily be insisted upon in the NIT. 55. The judgment of this Court in Association of Registration Plates1 cannot be read as prescribing the conditions in NIT for manufacture and supply of HSRP. Rather this Court examined legality and justification of the impugned conditions within the permissible parameters of judicial review and recognized the right of the States in formulating tender conditions. In our opinion, there is no justification in denying the State authorities latitude for departure from the conditions of the NIT that came up for consideration before this Court in larger public interest to broaden the base of competitive bidding due to lapse of time and substantial increase in the number of persons having TAC from the approved institutes without compromising on the quality and specifications of HSRP as set out in Rule 50, Order 2001 and Amendment Order, 2001. 66. As regards the State of Orissa, it is an admitted position that it issued NIT for the first time on April 11, 2007 inviting bids for the manufacture and supply of HSRP in respect of the existing motor vehicles and vehicles to be registered in the State of Orissa. The said NIT was not taken to logical conclusion and a fresh NIT was issued on July 6, 2009 on BOO 2008 (1) GLT 1020 basis. In that NIT, inter alia, eligibility criteria has been provided that bidder should have experience of working in the field of HSRP having used the security features as mentioned in Rule 50 of 1989 Rules. However, NIT does not insist on conditions like experience in the foreign countries and minimum prescribed turnover from the said business. In what we have already discussed above, no case for judicial review or intervention in the said NIT is made out.” In the aforesaid judgment Hon’ble Apex Court has held that govt. has discretion to adopt policy or alter or change its policy to serve public interest and make it more effective but change in policy should be free from arbitrariness and irrationality. 11. has discretion to adopt policy or alter or change its policy to serve public interest and make it more effective but change in policy should be free from arbitrariness and irrationality. 11. Hon'ble Apex Court in P.U. Joshi v. Accountant General, (2003) 2 SCC 632 has held that questions relating to the constitution, pattern, nomenclature of posts, cadres, categories, their creation/abolition, prescription of qualifications and other conditions of service including avenues of promotions and criteria to be fulfilled for such promotions pertain to the field of Policy and within the exclusive discretion and jurisdiction of the State. The Apex Court has held as under: “10. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of both parties. Questions relating to the constitution, pattern, nomenclature of posts, cadres, categories, their creation/abolition, prescription of qualifications and other conditions of service including avenues of promotions and criteria to be fulfilled for such promotions pertain to the field of Policy and within the exclusive discretion and jurisdiction of the State, subject, of course, to the limitations or restrictions envisaged in the Constitution of India and it is not for the Statutory Tribunals, at any rate, to direct the Government to have a particular method of recruitment or eligibility criteria or avenues of promotion or impose itself by substituting its views for that of the State. Similarly, it is well open and within the competency of the State to change the rules relating to a service and alter or amend and vary by addition/substruction the qualifications, eligibility criteria and other conditions of service including avenues of promotion, from time to time, as the administrative exigencies may need or necessitate. Likewise, the State by appropriate rules is entitled to amalgamate departments or bifurcate departments into more and constitute different categories of posts or cadres by undertaking further classification, bifurcation or amalgamation as well as reconstitute and restructure the pattern and cadres/categories of service, as may be required from time to time by abolishing existing cadres/posts and creating new cadres/posts. Likewise, the State by appropriate rules is entitled to amalgamate departments or bifurcate departments into more and constitute different categories of posts or cadres by undertaking further classification, bifurcation or amalgamation as well as reconstitute and restructure the pattern and cadres/categories of service, as may be required from time to time by abolishing existing cadres/posts and creating new cadres/posts. There is no right in any employee of the State to claim that rules governing conditions of his service should be forever the same as the one when he entered service for all purposes and except for ensuring or safeguarding rights or benefits already earned, acquired or accrued at a particular point of time, a Government servant has no right to challenge the authority of the State to amend, alter and bring into force new rules relating to even an existing service.” 12. Hon'ble Apex Court in K. Samantaray v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2004) 9 SCC 286, has held that no one has a right to be promoted but only a right to be considered for promotion. The Apex Court has held as under: “6. In all services, whether public or private there is invariably a hierarchy of posts comprising of higher posts and lower posts. Promotion, as understood under the Service Law Jurisprudence, is advancement in rank, grade or both and no employee has right to be promoted, but has a right to be considered for promotion. The following observations in Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., AIR (1967) SC 1910 are significant : "The question of a proper promotion policy depends on various conflicting factors. It is obvious that the only method in which absolute objectivity can be ensured is for all promotions to be made entirely on grounds of seniority. That means that if a post falls vacant it is filled by the person who has served longest in the post immediately below. But the trouble with the seniority system is that it is so objective that it fails to take any account of personal merit. As a system it is fair to every official except the best ones; an official has nothing to win or lose provided he does not actually become so inefficient that disciplinary action has to be taken against him. As a system it is fair to every official except the best ones; an official has nothing to win or lose provided he does not actually become so inefficient that disciplinary action has to be taken against him. But, though the system is fair to the officials concerned, it is a heavy burden on the public and a great strain on the efficient handling of public business. The problem, therefore, is how to ensure reasonable prospect of advancement to all officials and at the same time to protect the public interest in having posts filled by the most able man? In other words, the question is how to find a correct balance between seniority and merit in a proper promotion-policy."” 13. Hon'ble Apex Court in Census Commr. v. R. Krishnamurthy, (2015) 2 SCC 796 , has held that the courts are not to plunge into policy making by adding something to the policy by way of issuing a writ of mandamus. The Apex Court has held as under: “23. The centripodal question that emanates for consideration is whether the High Court could have issued such a mandamus commanding the appellant to carry out a census in a particular manner. 24. The High Court has tried to inject the concept of social justice to fructify its direction. It is evincible that the said direction has been issued without any deliberation and being oblivious of the principle that the courts on very rare occasion, in exercise of powers of judicial review, would interfere with a policy decision. Interference with the policy decision and issue of a mandamus to frame a policy in a particular manner are absolutely different. The Act has conferred power on the Central Government to issue Notification regarding the manner in which the census has to be carried out and the Central Government has issued Notifications, and the competent authority has issued directions. It is not within the domain of the Court to legislate. The courts do interpret the law and in such interpretation certain creative process is involved. The courts have the jurisdiction to declare the law as unconstitutional. That too, where it is called for. The court may also fill up the gaps in certain spheres applying the doctrine of constitutional silence or abeyance. The courts do interpret the law and in such interpretation certain creative process is involved. The courts have the jurisdiction to declare the law as unconstitutional. That too, where it is called for. The court may also fill up the gaps in certain spheres applying the doctrine of constitutional silence or abeyance. But, the courts are not to plunge into policy making by adding something to the policy by way of issuing a writ of mandamus. There the judicial restraint is called for remembering what we have stated in the beginning. The courts are required to understand the policy decisions framed by the Executive. If a policy decision or a Notification is arbitrary, it may invite the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution. But when the Notification was not under assail and the same is in consonance with the Act, it is really unfathomable how the High Court could issue directions as to the manner in which a census would be carried out by adding certain aspects. It is, in fact, issuance of a direction for framing a policy in a specific manner. 25. In this context, we may refer to a three-Judge Bench decision in Suresh Seth V. Commr., Indore Municipal Corporation, wherein a prayer was made before this Court to issue directions for appropriate amendment in the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 so that a person may be debarred from simultaneously holding two elected offices, namely, that of a Member of the Legislative Assembly and also of a Mayor of a Municipal Corporation. Repelling the said submission, the Court held: “In our opinion, this is a matter of policy for the elected representatives of people to decide and no direction in this regard can be issued by the Court. That apart this Court cannot issue any direction to the legislature to make any particular kind of enactment. Under out constitutional scheme Parliament and Legislative Assemblies exercise sovereign power to enact laws and no outside power or authority can issue a direction to enact a particular piece of legislation. In Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (SCC para 51) it has been held that no court can direct a legislature to enact a particular law. Under out constitutional scheme Parliament and Legislative Assemblies exercise sovereign power to enact laws and no outside power or authority can issue a direction to enact a particular piece of legislation. In Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (SCC para 51) it has been held that no court can direct a legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly, when an executive authority exercises a legislative power by way of a subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to enact a law which it has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority. This view has been reiterated in State of J & K v A.R. Zakki. In A.K. Roy v. Union of India it was held that no mandamus can be issued to enforce an Act which has been passed by the legislature.” 14. Consequently in view of the detailed discussion made herein above, as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court sees no illegality and infirmity in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, rather this Court is of the view that impugned judgment is based upon correct appreciation of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court with regard to scope of judicial review qua the policy decision, if any, taken by the State and as such, same deserves to be upheld. Accordingly, present appeal is dismissed.