JUDGMENT : B.R. SARANGI, J. The petitioner, while working as Deputy Manager, State Bank of India at Regional Business Office, Bhawanipatna, was asked to show cause that during the period from 13.07.2005 to 11.05.2007, when he was working as a Branch Manager at Charbahal Branch, he had committed certain irregularities in sanction and disbursement of ‘P’ segment loan by deviating the norms of the Bank. Pursuant thereto, he submitted his reply on 13.05.2008 denying the allegations and justified his action by stating that he had not deviated any of the norms of the Bank in the matter of disbursement of such loan. A memorandum of charge dated 24.10.2008 was served on the petitioner with the articles of charges that, while discharging the duty as Branch Manager at Charbahal Branch during the period from 13.07.2005 to 11.05.2007, he had not discharged his duties with utmost devotion, diligence, honesty & integrity and acted in a manner unbecoming of an officer. On receipt of such memorandum of charge, the petitioner submitted written statement of defence denying each of the allegations levelled against him and also denied all the 19 imputations of alleged misconduct specifically. The disciplinary authority appointed an inquiring officer, namely, the Deputy General Manager (O & C), who caused an enquiry and submitted his report to the disciplinary authority on 05.02.2010, wherein he found that the charge no. 15(a) was not proved and some other charges like charge nos. 3, 8, 9(i), 9(iii), 9(iv), 10 and 11 were partly proved and so far as other charges are concerned, i.e. charge nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9(ii), 12, 13 and 15(b) were proved. The said enquiry report was communicated to the petitioner to give his reply. On receipt of the same, the petitioner submitted his written submission in respect of all the charges as was found by the inquiring officer. But the disciplinary authority on 19.04.2010 confirmed the finding of the inquiring officer except imputation no. 15(b), wherein the disciplinary authority differed with the inquiring officer and held that the allegation no. 15(b) was not proved. So far as other allegations are concerned, the disciplinary authority not only accepted the finding of the inquiring officer but also recommended for punishment. But the disciplinary authority on 19.04.2010 confirmed the finding of the inquiring officer except imputation no. 15(b), wherein the disciplinary authority differed with the inquiring officer and held that the allegation no. 15(b) was not proved. So far as other allegations are concerned, the disciplinary authority not only accepted the finding of the inquiring officer but also recommended for punishment. Accordingly, in view of the provisions contained under Rule 67(h) and Rule 68(3)(iii) of the State Bank of India Officers’ Service Rules, 1992 ( for short the “Rules, 1992”), a major penalty of compulsory retirement was imposed on the petitioner by order dated 19.04.2010. Against the imposition of major penalty by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner preferred appeal and the appellate authority, by order dated 15.04.2011, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of penalty of compulsory retirement imposed by the disciplinary authority, hence this application. 2. Mr. B. Routray, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Mr. S. Jena, learned counsel for the petitioner specifically urged that, while conducting enquiry, the inquiring officer had not given opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, inasmuch as, while recording the finding in respect of imputation no.3, the inquiring officer held erroneously that the remarks of the Bank’s Officer had not been complied with, i.e., not obtaining no objection certificate from the sisters and mother of the borrower at the time of creation of equitable mortgage. So far as imputation no.2 is concerned, in absence of any material produced to show that the petitioner had deliberately and intentionally disbursed housing loan, it is stated that the charge was proved. Similarly, the irregularities in the process of enquiry had been pointed out, but neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority had given any opportunity to the petitioner, and as such, in absence of any 2nd show cause, the imposition of major penalty like compulsory retirement cannot sustain in the eye of law. It is specifically urged that as per Rule 68(3)(iii) of the Rules, 1992 no opportunity of hearing was given by the appointing authority while imposing the major penalty against the petitioner. Relying upon the judgment of the apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 3233 of 2005 (State Bank of India & Ors. It is specifically urged that as per Rule 68(3)(iii) of the Rules, 1992 no opportunity of hearing was given by the appointing authority while imposing the major penalty against the petitioner. Relying upon the judgment of the apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 3233 of 2005 (State Bank of India & Ors. v. Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty & Anr) disposed of on 30.07.2008, he further stated that referring to the said judgment the State Bank of India issued necessary circular on 21.10.2010, wherein it was stated that the judgment of the apex Court has to be adhered to with letter and spirit. It is further case of the petitioner that as per Rule 68(3)(iii) of the Rules, 1992, it is the duty of the appointing authority to give opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer, while imposing major penalty on the basis of the report submitted by the disciplinary authority. It is further contended, on the basis of the information received under Right to Information Act, that no record/document is available before this Court regarding personal hearing before imposing major penalty. Therefore, an inference can be drawn that no opportunity whatsoever had been given to the petitioner by the appointing authority as required under Rule 68(3)(iii) of the Rules, 1992, while imposing major penalty of compulsory retirement from service. Thereby, due to non-compliance of principle of natural justice, the order of the disciplinary authority imposing major penalty and the order of the appellate authority confirming the same cannot sustain and are liable to be quashed. 3. Mr. R.K. Rath, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Mr. P.V. Balkrishna, learned counsel for the State Bank of India stoutly denied the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and stated that action was taken in compliance of the provisions of the service rules governing the field. As such, the grievance of the petitioner was considered by the disciplinary authority, as well as by the appellate authority, and on the basis of the articles of charges, statement of imputations of misconduct, defence statement of the official, the records of enquiry, finding of inquiring authority, official statement on the finding of the inquiring authority and views/comments of the disciplinary authority in their entirety the penalty of “compulsory retirement from bank’s service” in terms of Rule 67(h) of the Rules, 1992 was imposed against the petitioner. With regard to circular dated 21.10.2010, he strenuously urged that the final order of punishment by appointing authority was passed on 19.04.2010, whereas the circular for personal hearing of supervising staff came on 21.10.2010. Therefore, at the time when the final order was passed, there were no such corresponding provisions. It is further urged that the petitioner has not exhausted all the remedies available to him under the statute. Against the order passed by the appellate authority, he could have filed review petition before the review committee, corporate centre within six months of the date of the final order of the appellate authority. The alternative remedy having not been availed, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. To substantiate his contention he has relied upon the judgments of the apex Court in U.P. State Textile Corporation Ltd. v. P.C. Chaturvedi and others, AIR 2006 SC 87 , State of U.P. v. Ram Bachan Tripathi, (2005) 6 SCC 496 and Union of India v. Y.S. Sadhu, Ex-Inspector, (2008) 12 SCC 30 . 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the records, since pleadings between the parties have been exchanged, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, this matter is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 5. Admitted fact being that the petitioner was subjected to a disciplinary proceeding by opposite parties on the allegation of committing some irregularities, while he was continuing as Branch Manager, Charbahal Branch of the State Bank of India. He was asked to show cause, when he was continuing as Deputy Manager at Regional Business Office, Bhawanipatna, which the petitioner replied. Having not satisfied with such reply, the memorandum of charge was served on him. In response thereto, the petitioner filed written statement of defence. Consequentially, an inquiry officer was appointed who caused enquiry to the imputations levelled against the petitioner. On the basis of inquiry report, the disciplinary authority imposed major penalty of compulsory retirement from service. Such order of punishment, being appealed against, was confirmed by the appellate authority. 6. In response thereto, the petitioner filed written statement of defence. Consequentially, an inquiry officer was appointed who caused enquiry to the imputations levelled against the petitioner. On the basis of inquiry report, the disciplinary authority imposed major penalty of compulsory retirement from service. Such order of punishment, being appealed against, was confirmed by the appellate authority. 6. The main contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that, while imposing major penalty, no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner either by the disciplinary authority or by appellate authority and, as such, the enquiry had been conducted in a perfunctory manner without adherence to the provisions of law, more particularly, Rule 68(3)(iii) of Rules, 1992 and also the law laid down by the apex Court in Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty (supra). 7. Rule 68(3)(iii) of the Rules, 1992, on which much emphasis has been laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner, reads thus: “If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in rule 67 should be imposed on the officer, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule(4), make an order imposing such penalty. Provided that where the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that the penalty to be imposed is any of the major penalties specified in clauses (e)(f)(g) and (h) of rule 67 and it is lower in rank to the Appointing Authority in respect of the category of officers to which the officer belongs, it shall submit to the Appointing Authority the records of the enquiry specified in clause (xxi)(b) of sub-rule (2), together with its recommendations regarding the penalty that may be imposed and the Appointing Authority shall make an order imposing such penalty as it considers in its opinion appropriate.” The aforesaid provisions clearly envisaged that if the recommendation is made by the disciplinary authority or appointing authority for imposing a major penalty, the same has to be communicated to the officer concerned. Non-communication of the same will amount to denial of fundamental right of getting a fair hearing, which resulted in serious prejudice. 8. As per Rule 68(1)(ii) of the Rules, 1992, the disciplinary authority or any authority higher than it, may impose any of the penalties in Rule 67 on an officer. Non-communication of the same will amount to denial of fundamental right of getting a fair hearing, which resulted in serious prejudice. 8. As per Rule 68(1)(ii) of the Rules, 1992, the disciplinary authority or any authority higher than it, may impose any of the penalties in Rule 67 on an officer. Provided that where the disciplinary authority is lower in rank than the appointing authority in respect of the category of officers, to which the officer belongs, no order imposing any of the penalties specified in clause (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) and (j) of Rule 67 shall be made except by the appointing authority or any authority higher than it on the recommendations of the disciplinary authority. The appointing authority shall make an order imposing such penalty, as it considers in its opinion appropriate. In other words, where it is the case of punishment under Rule 67(e) to (j), the final punishment order up to MMGS-III must be passed by the senior most General Manger of the Circle, who will be the appointing authority. But then question arises, while imposing such major penalty, the officer is entitled to get an opportunity of personal hearing in consonance with Rule 68(3)(iii) of the Rules, 1992. By order dated 09.11.2015, this Court called upon the opposite parties to produce the relevant records whether opportunity of hearing was given by the appointing authority or not in consonance with Rule 68(3)(iii) of the Rules, 1992 and also the ratio decided by the apex Court in Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty (supra). But nothing was produced before this Court to substantiate the contention that opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner by the appointing authority or the disciplinary authority, while imposing such major penalty in consonance with Rule 68(3)(iii) of the Rules, 1992. 9. The admitted position is that punishment was imposed on 19.04.2010 in Annexure-5 and by that time the apex Court had already delivered the judgment on 30.07.2008. 9. The admitted position is that punishment was imposed on 19.04.2010 in Annexure-5 and by that time the apex Court had already delivered the judgment on 30.07.2008. Although the circular regarding affording of opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer before imposing major penalty under Rule 68(3)(iii) of Rules, 1992, to give effect to the judgment dated 30.07.2008 of the apex Court, was issued on 21.10.2010, i.e., after imposition of penalty dated 19.04.2010, but, by the time the order imposing penalty was passed, the judgment of the apex Court dated 30.07.2008 was staring at face, which is in consonance with the provisions of Rule 68(3)(iii) of Rules, 1992. As already indicated hereinbefore, there is nothing on record to show that either the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority had given adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, while imposing major penalty of compulsory retirement from service against him. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that there is non-compliance of principle of natural justice and also Rule 68(3)(iii) of the Rules, 1992 read with the law laid down by the apex Court in Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty (supra). 10. The contention was raised on behalf of the opposite parties that an alternative remedy by way of review is available to the petitioner under the statute, but that by itself cannot preclude this Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State of U.P. v. Md. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 , the apex Court held that if an inferior Court or Tribunal or first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceeding before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules or natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior Court’s sense of fair play the superior Court may quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ. In L. Hirday Narain v. I.T.O. Barailly, AIR 1971 SC 33 the apex Court held that the High Court having already entertained the writ petition and giving hearing on merits, it cannot be rejected on ground that statutory remedy was not available of. In L. Hirday Narain v. I.T.O. Barailly, AIR 1971 SC 33 the apex Court held that the High Court having already entertained the writ petition and giving hearing on merits, it cannot be rejected on ground that statutory remedy was not available of. In M.C. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood, (2001) 8 SCC 151 , the apex Court held that law Courts exist for the society and they have an obligation to meet the social aspirations of citizens since law Courts must also respond to the needs of the people. Law Courts will lose efficacy if they cannot possibly respond to the need of the society-technicalities there might be many but the justice oriented approach ought not to be thwarted on the basis of such technicality since technicality cannot and ought not to outweigh the course of justice. The same view has also been taken in Union of India v. Hindalco Industries, (2003) 5 SCC, 194. In view of the above settled position of law, mere availability of alternative remedy cannot be a bar in filing of the application under Section 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. Coming to the decisions cited by Mr. R.K. Rath, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite parties, in Ram Bachan Tripathi (supra), the apex, referring to the judgment in Managing Director, ECIL V. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 , held as follows: “If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any, and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.” In U.P. Textile Corporation Ltd. (supra), similar view has also been taken and the apex Court also held that direction for payment of full back salary and consequential benefits cannot be sustained. That will also be the correct position in law.” In U.P. Textile Corporation Ltd. (supra), similar view has also been taken and the apex Court also held that direction for payment of full back salary and consequential benefits cannot be sustained. In Y.S. Sadhu, Ex-Inspector (supra) the apex Court held that there should not be any reinstatement, but the proceedings shall continue from the stage where it stood before the alleged vulnerability surfaced. None of these decisions touches the crux of the issue involved in this case and, therefore, are in no way helpful to the opposite parties. 12. In the backdrop of above factual and legal analysis, this Court is of the considered view that, before imposing major penalty of compulsory retirement, the petitioner, having not given adequate opportunity of hearing in consonance with Rule 68(3)(iii) of the Rules, 1992 read with the law laid down by the apex Court in Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty (supra) and circular dated 21.10.2010, is seriously prejudiced and his fundamental right has been infringed. Consequentially, the order dated 19.04.2010 in Annexure-5 of the disciplinary authority imposing major penalty of compulsory retirement and confirmation thereof made by the appellate authority in Annexure-6 dated 15.04.2011 are hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back to the disciplinary authority so as to act in consonance with the provisions contained under Rule 68(3)(iii) of the Rules, 1992 read with law laid down by the apex Court in Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty (supra) and circular dated 21.10.2010. Meaning thereby, the disciplinary authority, before imposing the major penalty, shall give opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is also made clear that so far as the entitlement of the benefit is concerned, the same shall also be considered in consonance with the judgments of the apex Court as discussed above. 13. The writ petition is allowed in part. No order as to cost.