ORDER : Ashok B. Hinchigeri, J. The petitioner, who is working as a peon in Nada Kacheri, Tavaragere Village, is calling into question the fourth respondent's enquiry report, dated 30-11-2016 (Annexure-G) and the third respondent's letter, dated 3-12-2016 (Annexure-H) recommending to the Government to impose the penalty of compulsory retirement from service on the petitioner. 2. Sri H.C. Shivaramu, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is only working as a peon and that therefore he has no power whatsoever to effect the mutation entry sought by the de facto complainant. He submits that the Deputy Commissioner himself has deposed that the petitioner does not have the power to effect the mutation entry in the revenue records. He submits that it is nobody's case that the petitioner ever demanded and received any bribe amount. 3. He submits that the petitioner is already acquitted in Special Case (PC) No. 4 of 2011 by the Sessions and Special Judge, Koppal. As the witnesses examined before the Criminal Court and before the Enquiry Officer are the same, materials relied upon before the two forums are the same. The Enquiry Officer is not justified in arriving at conclusions, which are at variance with the conclusions reached by the Sessions Court. In support of his submissions, he relies on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy and Another v. Superintendent of Police and Another, (2015) 2 SCC 365 . Head Note 'B' of the said decision read out by Sri H.C. Shivaramu is extracted herein below: "B. Service Law - Departmental Enquiry - Criminal proceedings - Acquittal - Effect of, on departmental proceedings - Criminal case and departmental proceedings based on similar facts and evidence-Honourable acquittal of appellants by Trial Court - On facts held, both the Tribunal and High Court erred in not considering undisputed fact that appellants (Armed Reserved Constables) were honourably acquitted by Trial Court for same charge - Hence, dismissal order set aside - Instead of directing reinstatement, appellants to be compulsorily retired and pensionary benefits including arrears from date of judgment of Sessions Court directed to be paid." 4. He also sought to draw support from the Apex Court's judgment in the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and Another, (2006) 5 SCC 446 . He also sought to draw support from the Apex Court's judgment in the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and Another, (2006) 5 SCC 446 . The portion below Head Note 'A', read out by him, is as follows : "In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the Criminal Court are one and the same. This is a case of no evidence. There is no iota of evidence against the appellant to hold that the appellant is guilty of having illegally accumulated excess income by way of gratification. The Investigating Officer and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the Criminal Court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. The judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand." 5. Sri H.C. Shivaramu submits that the petitioner's name does not figure in the complaint. He submits that accepting the report of the Enquiry Officer and the recommendations of the Upalokayukta by the disciplinary authority is a foregone conclusion. He submits that this has happened in about 32 cases. He submits that the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal has already granted interim stay for the operation of the punitive orders passed in respect of other Government employees. 6. Sri D. Ashwathappa, the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 submits that the petitioner is presumptuous. There is no basis for the apprehension that the disciplinary authority would invariably accept the recommendations of the Additional Registrar of the third respondent-Upalokayukta. He submits that the second show-cause notice is already issued to the petitioner. 6. Sri D. Ashwathappa, the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 submits that the petitioner is presumptuous. There is no basis for the apprehension that the disciplinary authority would invariably accept the recommendations of the Additional Registrar of the third respondent-Upalokayukta. He submits that the second show-cause notice is already issued to the petitioner. If he has given the reply, it is bound to be considered by the Disciplinary Authority before taking a decision on the recommendations of the third respondent-Upalokayukta. He submits that under Section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984, the report is submitted and the recommendations are made to the Government and that under Section 12(4) of the said Act, the Competent Authority would examine the report sent by the Upalokayukta. He would submit that as of now none of the rights of the petitioners are infringed. According to him, the stage for approaching this Court has not yet come. He brings to our notice the Division Bench's order in the case of Jayaprakash K. v. State of Karnataka and Others, 2016 (4) KCCR 3700 (sic). Paragraph 4 of the said decision is extracted herein below : "4. The report of the Upalokayukta impugned herein cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. The report impugned herein, by itself does not affect any legal right of the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved of the report." 7. He has also relied on the Division Bench's order, dated 25-1-2017 passed in C. Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka and Others, W.P. No. 1831 of 2017 (GM-KLA). The relevant portion of the said decision reads as follows : "........ Further, it is stated in the said decision that the Disciplinary Authority is at liberty to disagree with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and/or the recommendation of Upalokayukta by giving reasons to record its own findings. The recommendation given under the above extracted Rule is not declared as final under any provision of law. Therefore, the apprehension of the petitioner that the recommendation of Upalokayukta is the final order in the matter is not correct. It is for the Disciplinary Authority to consider the matter and to make a final order. With this observation, the writ petition is disposed of." 8. Therefore, the apprehension of the petitioner that the recommendation of Upalokayukta is the final order in the matter is not correct. It is for the Disciplinary Authority to consider the matter and to make a final order. With this observation, the writ petition is disposed of." 8. Sri Mallikarjun C. Basareddy, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents 3 and 4 submits that no cause of action whatsoever has arisen for the filing of this petition. 9. The submissions of the learned Counsel have received our thoughtful consideration. The following questions fall for our consideration : (i) On the ground of the acquittal of the delinquent in the criminal 1 case, whether this Court can halt the disciplinary proceedings? (ii) Whether the writ petition can be entertained for considering the challenge raised to the enquiry report and the letter containing the recommendations for taking action? In Re: Question No. (i): 10. To answer this question, we may usefully refer to the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 . Paragraph 23 of the said decision reads as follows : "23. We are of the view that the mere acquittal of an employee by a Criminal Court has no impact on the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Department. The respondent, it may be noted, is a member of a disciplined force and non-examination of two key witnesses before the Criminal Court that is Adiyodi and Peter, in our view, was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case by the prosecution. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the possibility of winning over P.Ws. 1 and 2 in the criminal case cannot be ruled out. We fail to see, why the prosecution had not examined Head Constable Adiyodi (No. 1368) and Peter (No. 1079) of Tenkasi Police Station. It was these two Head Constables who took the respondent from the scene of occurrence along with P.Ws. 1 and 2-husband and wife, to Tenkasi Police Station and it is in their presence that the complaint was registered. In fact, the Criminal Court has also opined that the signature of P.W. 1 (complainant-husband) is found in Ex. P. 1-complaint. It was these two Head Constables who took the respondent from the scene of occurrence along with P.Ws. 1 and 2-husband and wife, to Tenkasi Police Station and it is in their presence that the complaint was registered. In fact, the Criminal Court has also opined that the signature of P.W. 1 (complainant-husband) is found in Ex. P. 1-complaint. Further, the doctor-P.W. 8 has also clearly stated before the Enquiry Officer that the respondent was under the influence of liquor and that he had refused to undergo blood and urine tests. That being the factual situation, we are of the view that the respondent was not honourably acquitted by the Criminal Court, but only due to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 turned hostile and other prosecution witnesses were not examined." 11. The aforesaid view was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and another v. Purushottam, (2015) 3 SCC 779 . The Apex Court has this to say in paragraph 14 of its said decision: "13. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787 , the question before the Constitution Bench was that the petitioner therein had been suspended owing to the pendency of criminal proceedings against him which was challenged on the anvil of Article 314 of the Constitution. Thus, this decision is not of much relevance for the resolution of the legal nodus before us, save for the observations that (AIR p. 792, para 9) "if the trial of the criminal charge results in conviction, disciplinary proceedings are bound to follow against the public servant so convicted, even in case of acquittal proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable". However, on this aspect of the law we need go no further than the recent decision in Inspector Deputy General of Police v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 , since it contains a comprehensive discourse on all the prominent precedents. This Court has concluded, and we respectfully think correctly, that acquittal of an employee by a Criminal Court would not automatically and conclusively impact departmental proceedings." 12. It is trite that the standard of proof required in a criminal case is proof beyond doubt. In the departmental enquiry, the standard of proof required is the preponderance of probabilities. This Court has concluded, and we respectfully think correctly, that acquittal of an employee by a Criminal Court would not automatically and conclusively impact departmental proceedings." 12. It is trite that the standard of proof required in a criminal case is proof beyond doubt. In the departmental enquiry, the standard of proof required is the preponderance of probabilities. The petitioner herein and two others are acquitted by the Sessions Court in Special Case (PC) No. 4/2011, giving the benefit of doubt to them, as is discernible from its judgment, dated 9-4-2015 (Annexure-B). We answer question No. (i) in the negative. That is, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be halted on the ground of the petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case. In Re: Question No. (ii): 13. It is the inherent right of the employer to hold the enquiry into the misconducts committed or alleged to have been committed by its employees. Further, the employer has the right to take them to their logical culmination. The holding of the enquiry or the submission of the enquiry report by the Enquiry Officer do not by themselves give any firm cause of action to the delinquent to approach this Court. It is possible that after considering the delinquent's explanation, the disciplinary authority may drop the proceedings. It is only when the disciplinary authority passes any punitive order that a delinquent gets a firm cause of action to approach this Court. In saying so, we are fortified by the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Union of India and Another v. Kunisetty Satyanarayanax, AIR 2007 SC 906. The portion below Head Note 'A' of the said reported decision is extracted herein below : "Ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well-settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is j only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance" 14. The aforesaid view is also reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Defence and Others v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565 . Paragraph 12 of the said decision reads as follows : "12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the charge-sheet cannot generally be a subject-matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the charge-sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings." 15. Following the two afore-cited decisions, we have no hesitation in holding that this writ petition is premature. We find no good grounds for entertaining the challenge to the enquiry report and the letter recommending I the punishment. Admittedly the petitioner has submitted his reply to the second show-cause notice and the competent/disciplinary authority is bound to apply its mind, consider the report of the Enquiry Officer, recommendations of the Upalokayukta, reply of the petitioner and all the materials placed on record and then take a call on what action, if any, has to be taken. 16. The authorities relied upon by the petitioner also would not come to his rescue, because in the said cases also the employees approached the Court only on the passing of the order of dismissal from service. 17. 16. The authorities relied upon by the petitioner also would not come to his rescue, because in the said cases also the employees approached the Court only on the passing of the order of dismissal from service. 17. The second question is therefore liable to be answered against the petitioner. This petition is premature. If, as and when the Disciplinary Authority passes any order either imposing the punishment or affecting the rights of the petitioner adversely in any way, the petitioner gets the right to challenge the same in appropriate proceedings. 18. This petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.