JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The State has filed present appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("Cr.P.C.", for short) feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 06.03.2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Godhra in Special (NDPS) Case No. 08 of 2004. 2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeal is that on 17.09.2004, the respondents - accused while travelling in coach of Shanti Express Train No. 9310 UP found with possession of poppy straw while intercepted between Dahod and Godhra Railway Station at about 3:50 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. It is the further case of the prosecution that present respondents - accused were travelling along with juvenile accused Laliben and Manjuben from whose possession 142.400 kg of poppy straw worth Rs. 14,240/- came to be seized. It is the further case of the prosecution that this poppy straw being contraband article was found possessed by respondents-accused without thereby being any valid pass or permit for having possessed or sell as required under the provisions of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and thereby case has been put up against the respondents accused for commission of offence punishable under Sections 8(c) and 15 of the NDPS Act. The offence of this incident is registered before Godhra Railway Police Station being II-C.R. No. 3308 of 2004 and pursuant to such registration the further investigation has been carried out and after completion of entire investigation process when sufficient material is found against the respondents - accused, they came to be charge-sheeted by filing charge-sheet before the concerned learned Magistrate. It has also been noted that since the case in question is triable by the Court of Sessions [a special forum], after committal of case by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (Railway), Godhra under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C., the case was registered as Special (NDPS) Case No. 08 of 2004 and put up for consideration before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Godhra. Thereafter the charge came to be framed vide Exh. 2 for offences alleged to have been committed under Section 8(c) read with Section 15 of the NDPS Act. The charge came to be read over to the respondents accused and their pleas were recorded vide Exhs. Thereafter the charge came to be framed vide Exh. 2 for offences alleged to have been committed under Section 8(c) read with Section 15 of the NDPS Act. The charge came to be read over to the respondents accused and their pleas were recorded vide Exhs. 3 and 4 but since the respondents accused have denied offences being committed the case was put up for trial. With a view to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution has examined as many as 18 witnesses and large number of documentary materials are adduced on record in following manner. ORAL EVIDENCE:- Prosecution Witness Number Name of Prosecution Witnesses Exh. 1 Parsottambhai Banvarilal Agraval 8 2 Lilaben Chhatrasinh 9 3 Police Constable Manishaben Rameshwarprasad Gaud 10 4 Police Constable – Mukeshkumar Kundanlal 11 5 Police Constable – Dharmendrakumar Kanaklal Thakkar 12 6 Parcel Booking Clerk – Chhaganbhai Ravjibhai 13 7 Bankin Dilip Karmakar 15 8 A.S.I. Bhupatsinh Pratapsinh 17 9 A.S.I. Madhubhai Somabhai 19 10 A.S.I. Naginbhai Parsottambhai Parmar 22 11 Police Constable Mohsinmiya Abbasmiya 24 12 olice Constable Bhikhbhai Virabhai 28 13 Sasikant Maganbhai Darji, Ass.Director 29 14 Rajeskumar Rameshchandra Mehta, Scientific Officer 37 15 Head Constable Ramkishor Shivraj Mathur 39 16 PSI Ramsing Bhagatsing Parmar 46 17 PSI Arjunsing Kautey 60 18 PSI Jagatsing Sivdansing Yadav 63 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE:- Sr. No. Particulars of Documentary Evidence Exh. 1 Report regarding registration of offence 23 2 Offence report 59 3 Complaint 58 4 Panchnama of recovery of muddamal (poppy straw) 52 5 Receipt regarding weight (produced during the evidence of P.W. No. 7, Bankim Karmakar, Exh.15) 16 6 Receipt regarding weight (produced during the evidence of P.W.No.6, Chhaganbhai, Exh.13) 51 7 Written letter to accused no.1 before the panchas 47 8 Written letter to accused no.2 before the panchas 48 9 Muddamal receipt 49, 50 10 Station diary of Godhra Railway Police Station (produced during the evidence of Bhupatsinh, Exh.17) 18 11 Xerox of muddamal register (produced during the evidence of Madhubhai, Exh.19) 20 12 Xerox of muddamal register (produced during the evidence of Madhubhai, Exh.19) 21 13 Written report by the complainant Ramkishor to his Superior Officer (Xerox and Original, It was given Exh.45 at the time of evidence of PW15, Exh.39 and Exh.45 original report is produced with the evidence of P.W.17, Exh.60 viz. Arjunsing) 45 14 Plastic bag Mark A 53 15 Plastic bag Mark B 54 16 Plastic bag Mark H 55 17 Jute bag Mark I 56 18 White bag Mark J 57 19 Ravangi Note 64 20 FSL Letter 65 21 FSL Report 30 22 Analysis report 38 23 Diary Report 62 24 Yadi regarding handing over muddamal to Court 66 25 Receipt issued by FSL regarding receipt of muddamal to Bhikhabhai 72 2.1 After leading the aforesaid evidences, a closer pursis came to be given by the prosecution before the Court below as no other evidence was led as a result of which further statements came to be recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. of the respondents - accused. In further statements, a categorical stand taken by respondents - accused that they have not committed any offence and claimed to have been tried. The case was then put up for final adjudication. It appears from the record that learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Godhra, on appreciation of overall material on record and on analysis of ocular evidence has come to the conclusion that no case is made out by the prosecution and establish beyond reasonable doubt. Resultantly, by judgment and order dated 06.03.2006, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 235 of the Cr.P.C., was pleased to grant benefit of doubt to the respondents - accused and order of acquittal came to be passed. It is this judgment and order which is made subject matter of present appeal. 3. The record indicates that this Hon'ble Court has entertained the appeal and admitted the same by granting leave on 18.12.2007 and after receipt of Records and Proceedings and preparation of paper-book the same has been put up for final adjudication which has come before this Court for final hearing. 4. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. L.R. Poojari representing the State has vehemently contended that serious error committed by the learned judge in passing the order of acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt. Learned APP has contended specifically that the prosecution has led cogent evidence and hence established the case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore a serious error is committed by learned judge in evaluating the evidence in its true perspective and therefore since the judgment and order is based upon such material error of exercise of jurisdiction Mr. Learned APP has contended specifically that the prosecution has led cogent evidence and hence established the case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore a serious error is committed by learned judge in evaluating the evidence in its true perspective and therefore since the judgment and order is based upon such material error of exercise of jurisdiction Mr. Pujari, learned APP has requested the Court to interfere with. Mr. Pujari, learned APP has further contended that specific details have been given by the witnesses which has been found to be consistent with the case of the prosecution and it has been contended that huge quantity of contraband material of poppy straw have been found to the extent of 142.400 kg which is seized by the Investigating Officer pursuant to which case is established by prosecution and thereby sufficient material is adduced which ought not to have been ignored by learned trial Judge. Mr. Pujari, learned APP has contended specifically that prima facie material which has been adduced and the testimony of witnesses have attracted the ingredients of offence under Section 8(C) and Section 15 of the NDPS Act and therefore in respectful submission when the ingredients of offences have been found to be established beyond reasonable doubt, there was no earthly reason for learned judge to discard the material and grant benefit of doubt. Mr. Pujari, learned APP has further contended that to grant a benefit of doubt it requires subjective satisfaction by strict application of mind. Bare reading of judgment, according to Mr. Pujari, learned APP, is reflecting a clear non-application of mind and satisfaction which has been arrived at is not supported or corroborated by any cogent material. Mr. Pujari, learned APP has contended that looking to the complaint and the testimony of Prosecution Witness No. 15, the entire details have been stated the manner in which muddamal is recovered from the respondents accused and the panchnama has also been carried out as per requirement. Mr. Pujari, learned APP has therefore contended that the steps which have been taken by investigating machinery are in complete consonance with the requirement of law and therefore simply because of some of the panchas have turned hostile and have not supported the case of the prosecution, it cannot be said, in any way, that benefit of doubt should lean in favour of accused. Mr. Mr. Pujari, learned APP has further contended that there is stiff contradiction between the testimony of Prosecution Witness No. 5 as well as complainant and the narration of the prosecution story and indisputably no cogent circumstance is available which requires the learned judge to grant benefit of doubt. While contending this to substantiate the stand taken by him, learned APP has drawn our attention to testimony of some of witnesses more particularly Prosecution Witness No. 5 viz. Dharmendrakumar Kanaklal Thakar, whose testimony is recorded at Exh. 12 and another Prosecution Witness No. 6 viz. Chhaganbhai Ravjibhai, whose testimony is recorded at Exh. 13 and these material testimonies are co-related by him with the version of the complainant - Ramkishor Shivraj Mathur, Prosecution Witness No. 15, who is a Head Constable, whose testimony is recorded at Exh. 39 and therefore Mr. Pujari, learned APP has contended that when the mandatory requirement of statute is completely taken care of by the prosecution while establishing guilt there is hardly any justifiable material on the basis of which benefit could have been granted and therefore there appears to be a serious error in exercising jurisdiction and the same is required to be granted by quashing and setting aside the order of acquittal impugned. Mr. Pujari, learned APP has drawn our attention to further material in the form of panchnama, in the averments contained in complaint and drawn our attention also to the written arguments as well. Mr. Pujari, learned APP has contended that though ample material is led before the Court, the learned judge has committed serious error in analysing the evidence and therefore this being an error of jurisdiction deserves to be corrected. No other submissions have been made. 5. To oppose the stand taken by learned APP appearing on behalf of the State, Mr. Hardik Raval, learned advocate representing respondents No. 1 and 2 has vehemently contended that this is nothing but a clear case of arraigning innocent persons in serious offence. There are several infirmities touching to the root of controversy erupted in the investigation to prove the case and therefore no error is committed by learned judge in evaluating the evidence to ultimately grant benefit of doubt. Mr. There are several infirmities touching to the root of controversy erupted in the investigation to prove the case and therefore no error is committed by learned judge in evaluating the evidence to ultimately grant benefit of doubt. Mr. Raval, learned advocate has further contended that the reasons which are assigned by the learned judge are sufficient enough to indicate that the same are in proper analysis and examination of material on record has properly undertaken to arrive at the decision and therefore there is no perversity nor any legal infirmity is visible in the judgment and order which requires no interference. Mr. Raval, learned advocate has further contended that mandatory procedure which is required to be observed while seizing the material and while sending the same for analysis. Hence such mandatory requirement having not been observed the case cannot be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt and therefore this being a serious lapse has rightly resulted into grant of benefit of doubt and it is this judgment and order which requires no interference. Mr. Raval, learned advocate has further contended that even in further statement there is categorical denial of offence being committed not only that but a clear explanation is given that these respondents accused were simply going for labour work and wrongly have been roped into and therefore when such explanation is put forth it was obligatory on the part of prosecution to establish case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore in this set of circumstance it is desirable in the interest of justice not to allow the judgment and order to be reversed. Mr. Raval, learned advocate has further submitted that there are certain self-imposed limitations on exercise of appellate jurisdiction and therefore unless and until there appears to be legal infirmity or any perversity which has resulted into miscarriage of justice then only the Court can exercise the jurisdiction to reverse the findings. Here no such infirmity is visible which requires any interference in respectful submission of learned advocate for the respondents - accused and therefore ultimately a contention is raised and request is made not to interfere with an order of acquittal. 6. Here no such infirmity is visible which requires any interference in respectful submission of learned advocate for the respondents - accused and therefore ultimately a contention is raised and request is made not to interfere with an order of acquittal. 6. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, having gone through the order in detail in consonance with the material on record and having given anxious consideration to the comprehensive analysis of evidence, it appears that the findings which are given are not such which cannot be arrived at. The entire analysis of evidence as a whole appears to be that view taken by the learned judge is a plausible view. On examination of material on record, the learned judge has specifically found veracity in testimony of witnesses, statements of some of relevant officers and between report at Exh. 45. The learned Judge has come to the conclusion that report which has been made to the higher officer by the complainant is indicating that total 10 articles have been found inside the latrine of compartment of the train consisting of 8 jute bags and two cloth bags, whereas in complaint a different version is reflecting and therefore the learned judge appears to have rightly observed that there is sift contradiction in the complaint and the report at Exh. 45. The further analysis has also revealed that prosecution has tried to rely upon the testimony of P.W. No. 5-Dharmendrakumar Kanaklal Thakar, whose testimony is recorded at Exh. 12, which has raised a serious suspicion as to whether actually the respondents - accused were possessed all the articles or not and therefore the case has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt about respondents accused being possessed with the contraband material. 7. The evidence is further revealing the fact that after seizing muddamal the same was unloaded at Godhra where it has been intercepted and further the said muddamal was got unloaded by the respondents accused and therefore this clearly indicates that the panchnama of the place, wherefrom the muddamal was found, has not been executed and panchnama has been executed at a different place despite the fact that at platform No. 4 said train i.e. Shanti Express was stopped. This panchnama could have been drawn at that place but the same has been chosen not to undertake and this circumstance is raising serious doubt to the credence of the evidence. This panchnama could have been drawn at that place but the same has been chosen not to undertake and this circumstance is raising serious doubt to the credence of the evidence. In addition thereto, the analysis of evidence has also further found that none of the panch-witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution and the serious circumstance which has been found is that though muddamal was recovered at the time of interception from 17.09.2004 to 23.09.2004, there is no explanation by the prosecution as to whether the it were kept at the same place or not and it has been found that the articles have been sent for FSL examination at Gandhinagar only on 23.09.2004. Meaning thereby articles were kept at a place in the custody at police station. Whether the same was kept in safe custody or not proper seal was applied or not, no evidence is coming out from the end of the prosecution and therefore this is a serious circumstance where it raises doubt about the case of the prosecution. Proper sealing and proper custody of the muddamal is vital issue when the case is under the provisions of NDPS Act and therefore as the explanation from the prosecution regarding the proper sealing and custody of the muddamal has remained silent for the period between 18.09.2004 to 21.09.2004, it appears that learned trial Judge has rightly exercised jurisdiction in giving benefit of doubt. 8. While going further to examine the evidence, it has been found that the aforesaid muddamal remained in the custody of Prosecution Witness No. 11 viz. Bhikhabhai Virabhai, whose testimony is recorded at Exh. 28. Surprisingly an explanation was given that office was closed and on account of night halt at Ahmedabad, the said muddamal was kept at a place and therefore it appears that the learned trial Judge has rightly appreciated the fact that muddamal was not at all kept in safe custody and therefore there appears to be serious legal infirmity while dealing with a contraband article. It has also been found that there are several discrepancies even in FSL examination and on the basis of such infirmity, it cannot be said that prosecution has established the guilty of accused respondents beyond reasonable doubt as appears to have been rightly concluded by the learned trial Judge. It has also been found that there are several discrepancies even in FSL examination and on the basis of such infirmity, it cannot be said that prosecution has established the guilty of accused respondents beyond reasonable doubt as appears to have been rightly concluded by the learned trial Judge. It is further emerging from the record that there is no explanation coming out from the prosecution case that out of four lady persons which lady is interrogated, whose statement was recorded and what statement has come forth. Beside the fact that large number of people are surrounding, no independent witness has been examined even for execution of panchnama and therefore there appears to be a clear violation of mandate of section 15 of the NDPS Act. This is only solitary circumstance upon which the case of prosecution is destroyed and this having been found by learned judge, in absence of any contrary material, the same finding arrived at by the learned judge cannot be said to be perverse. Further fact which is material is that accused persons were nabbed from railway station then why not arrested, nor any search is taken place till they were taken to police station and therefore when muddamal is found from public place, simply because the accused were found to have been standing nearby cannot be inferred so cogently that the same is belonging to very persons. Thus, probability of wrongly arraigned the accused in commission of offence as has been found by the learned Judge cannot be discarded. Entire tenor of evidence on record clearly suggests that conscious possession of contraband article with the respondents accused is not found by learned judge which requires to conclude that prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore the conclusion arrived at by learned judge is possible and probable on the basis of such kind of evidence which requires no interference. 9. The aforesaid analysis and the conclusion arrived at by learned trial Judge is probable and plausible and therefore sitting in an appeal against the order of acquittal, we are of the view that satisfaction arrived at by learned judge requires no interference. 9. The aforesaid analysis and the conclusion arrived at by learned trial Judge is probable and plausible and therefore sitting in an appeal against the order of acquittal, we are of the view that satisfaction arrived at by learned judge requires no interference. Had there been a case where only one view is possible and that too of guilt of respondents accused, the Court would not have hesitated in interfering with the order of acquittal, however, what has been laid down by learned sessions judge, what has been concluded by the learned sessions judge is a plausible view and therefore we are unable to exercise our discretion keeping in mind the self-imposed limitations propounded by catena of decisions by the Apex Court in regard to appellate jurisdiction particularly when the Court is dealing with the order against the acquittal. Thus, in absence of any legal infirmity which we are also unable to find out and in view of conclusion arrived at by learned trial judge on the basis of material on record, we are of the considered opinion that this is not a case where any interference of this Court is called for and accordingly we find that the State Appeal has no merits to stand. 10. We are also mindful of the fact that while coming to this conclusion about the scope of appellate jurisdiction we have taken the assistance of some propositions of law as laid down by Apex Court in catena of decisions, some of which are reproduced hereinafter. "In case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para.55, 56 and 57 which read as under : 55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598) as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : (2013 AIR SCW 6180) particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : ( AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318) to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : ( AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889) Govindaraju v. State (2012) 4 SCC 722 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994). In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014(9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed as observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31. In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015(5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: 10. In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015(5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: 10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : ( AIR 2004 SC 3249 ), this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld. The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph No. 21 observed thus: 21. The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph No. 21 observed thus: 21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 ." 11. Considering the aforesaid set of circumstances prevailing on record and in view of comprehensive analysis of evidence independently from that of learned trial judge the conclusion, we are of the view that this is not a fit case where any other view is possible to be substituted qua that of the view which has been taken by the learned trial judge more particularly keeping in view the scope of appellate jurisdiction as stated hereinabove and therefore we find no merit in the State Appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the judgment and order dated 06.03.2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Godhra in Special (NDPS) Case No. 08 of 2004 is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith.