JUDGMENT : Arindam Sinha, J. 1. Three convicted persons are the appellants in these two appeals. They were the accused in Sessions Case no.70/2003/Sessions Trial no.38/2005 in which judgment dated 29th June, 2015 was passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Katwa. The appellants in Criminal Appeal no.529/2015 had been found guilty of charges for offences punishable under sections 323/325 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The appellant in Criminal Appeal no.545/2015 was found, in addition to the above, guilty of the charge for offence punishable under section 302 of the IPC. 2. Katwa P.S case no.201/1999 dated 26th November, 1999 under sections 143/326/34 IPC was initiated on the basis of written complaint dated 26th November, 1999. Later, section 302 IPC was added on the death of one Anil Kumar Hazra. The police submitted charge-sheet dated 27th March, 2002 under sections 341/323/325/302/34 IPC on completion of investigation. Charges were framed accordingly and trial took place. 3. The written complaint dated 26th November, 1999 was that at about 3:00 in the afternoon trouble took place between the appellants and the said Anil Kumar Hazra, since deceased over the issue of drainage of water from the house. The appellants accompanied by 5/6 persons physically assaulted the deceased, his wife, also since subsequently deceased, his daughter Jayanti Hazra and son Sandip Hazra. All of them sustained serious bleeding injuries. Local people took them to Katwa hospital and admitted them there. The complaint stated the deceased was struggling for life and his wife also critical. 4. It appears from the inquest report that upon information received at 09:45 hrs. on 27th November, 1999, inquiry was made. The body of Anil Kumar Hazra was found in the male ward on the ground floor of Katwa S.D. Hospital. The post-mortem report, also dated 27th November, 1999 states, inter alia, one haematoma (3”x2”) over the mid-portion of fronto parietal region depressed at the middle of frontal bone and one haematoma over the right supraclavicular region (7”x3/4”). The doctor opined that cause of death was due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of injuries which were ante-mortem but could not say whether nature of injuries was accidental or homicidal. 5. Widow of the said deceased died on 10th October, 2006 and as such could not be examined in the trial. The doctor opined that cause of death was due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of injuries which were ante-mortem but could not say whether nature of injuries was accidental or homicidal. 5. Widow of the said deceased died on 10th October, 2006 and as such could not be examined in the trial. It may be mentioned here that the scribe and the complainant were respectively PW 1 and PW 2, the latter being the brother of the deceased. The daughter of the deceased was PW 3 while the son PW 4. Retired sub-inspector of police Sri S. Acharyya, who was entrusted with the investigation, was PW 12. 6. The prosecution case at trial was that all the prosecution witnesses had fully corroborated each other, particularly the eye witness accounts, about the incident and the roles played by the accused in the assault whereby one person died and three others were severely injured. Furthermore, the medical evidence fully corroborated the prosecution case and eye witness versions. 7. At trial two main contentions of defence were made out. Firstly that the scribe is admittedly an active worker of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and a resident of different locality, far away from the residence of the deceased. There was no earthly reason to pick up such a political person for writing the complaint when the complainant himself could have easily gone to the P.S and stated to the police officer whose duty was to record the same. The reason is not far to see since this contention of the defence was that Anil Kumar Hazra was a butcher and he used to sell meat of hogs which enraged the Muslims of the locality and in order to save his skin he took shelter of the BJP. Since the accused are supporters of Communist Party India (Marxist) [CPI(M)] party, a false complaint was lodged against them. The second line of defence was that when the deceased was returning home on 26th November, 1999 at about 3:30 p.m., he was heavily drunk and as a result fell down in Pana Pukur where garbage, pieces of tin, glass and other unused materials were thrown. Existence of Pana Pukur near alleged place of occurrence was admitted. The daughter (PW 3) had stated that her father fell down in Pana Bon. Existence of Pana Pukur near alleged place of occurrence was admitted. The daughter (PW 3) had stated that her father fell down in Pana Bon. It was evident that the deceased received injuries when he fell down in the Pana Pukur and the other alleged persons also received injuries when they too fell down in the Pana Pukur while attempting to lift the deceased. It was quite possible that in drunken state the deceased had accidentally fallen down and received injuries. In any event, the investigation was slip shod. The I.O. (PW 12) did not seize, inter alia, any blood stained earth. The seizure of the wooden buttam, alleged to be the murder weapon, is shrouded in mystery since even though there were many respectable persons in the locality but none of them were made witnesses to the seizure. The seizure was purportedly witnessed by a hawker of Katwa bus stand (PW 5) having no reason to be present at the place of occurrence and as such was highly suspicious. The seizure became material exhibit-I but the said exhibit is nothing but a piece of wood lying in the house of the deceased which was falsely shown by the prosecution as the weapon of offence. 8. Mr. Jayanta Narayan Chatterjee, learned advocate appeared on behalf of the appellants. He submitted that without abandoning the contentions of defence made out at trial the alternative contention in appeal is that the conviction under section 302 IPC should be converted to one under section 304 Part II IPC and the other two appellants acquitted. According to him at best the principal accused had knowledge that the injury inflicted would cause death but not intention. He submitted, it would be clear from the evidence that the principal accused without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel had committed culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In the facts and circumstances the principal accused was covered under exception 4 in section 300 IPC. He relied on several judgments of the Supreme Court of India submit that defective investigation can lead to conversion of conviction, if not acquittal. (i) Surajit Sarkar v. State of West Bengal reported in (2013) 2 SCC 146 , paragraphs 49 and 63 to 65. (ii) Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2002) 3 SCC 327 , paragraphs 14, 17 to 19 and 21. (i) Surajit Sarkar v. State of West Bengal reported in (2013) 2 SCC 146 , paragraphs 49 and 63 to 65. (ii) Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2002) 3 SCC 327 , paragraphs 14, 17 to 19 and 21. (iii) Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2013) 3 Calcutta Criminal Law Reporter (SC) 826, paragraphs 6 and 27. (iv) Judgment dated 25th September, 2014 in Criminal Appeal no.111 of 2008 (Murlidhar Shivram Palekar and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, paragraphs 19 and 20. He also relied on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Noyel Barla v. State of West Bengal reported in 2006 (2) CHN 442 , paragraph 18. 9. Mr. Saibal Bapuli, learned advocate, Additional Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State submitted that impugned judgment was well reasoned and should not be interfered with in appeal. The eye witnesses were correctly held to be credible witnesses. The prosecution had proved its case to the hilt regarding the principal, other accused and the occurrence which resulted in death of the victim and injuries to the others assaulted. There was no omission in the investigation fatal to the prosecution case. The wooden buttam had been duly seized and marked as material exhibit-1. The defence could not contradict the prosecution case. Lastly, the inconsistent contentions of the defence being one of communal and political overtones and the other of accident did not merit consideration. He relied on a judgment dated 8th March, 2011 of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Naresh And Ors. in particular to the following passages therein : “23……..The evidence of an injured witness must be given due weightage being a stamped witness, thus, his presence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. The witness would not like or want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to implicate a third person falsely for the commission of the offence. ………… 25. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety…….” 10. The Sessions Court held there is no legal requirement that the FIR should contain each and every aspect of the prosecution case. Relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Hari Ram reported in AIR 1983 SC 1081 , the said Court found it to be so settled. In Hari Ram (supra) the Supreme Court said the FIR does not contain full or meticulous details of the incident but is merely meant to narrate the brief facts which led to the incident, viz., names of the assailants and the place of occurrence, etc. The Sessions Court went on to find that the prosecution case is based mainly on the evidence of two eye witnesses namely, PW 3 and PW 4. They stated that they got injured in the incident. The said Court found these witnesses had totally corroborated each other and the prosecution case. These witnesses had also stated in detail how the incident happened, the context thereof, respective roles and actions of each of the accused in the same and also the injuries received by the deceased and others. They stated that they got injured in the incident. The said Court found these witnesses had totally corroborated each other and the prosecution case. These witnesses had also stated in detail how the incident happened, the context thereof, respective roles and actions of each of the accused in the same and also the injuries received by the deceased and others. They were extensively cross-examined by the defence but their evidence was in no way shaken. For appreciation of evidence of injured witnesses the said Court relied upon the law as declared by the Supreme Court in the cases of— 1. Ramaswamy Ayyangar vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1976 SC 2027 ; 2. State of U.P. vs. Kishan Chand, (2004) 7 SCC 629 ; 3. Vishnu & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 10 SCC 477 ; 4. Kartik Malhar vs. State of Bihar (1996) 1 SCC 614 ; 5. Sonelal vs. State of M.P., AIR 2009 SC 760 ; and 6. Akhtar & Ors. vs. State of Uttaranchal (2009) 13 SCC 722 ; The said Court also relied on the case of Hari Narayan Singh vs. State of West Bengal decided by a Division Bench of this Court reported in 2009 Criminal Law Journal 4001 (Cal) for the view taken that the number of prosecution witnesses does not matter in a criminal case as long as those who have been examined remain cogent and credible even after cross-examination by the defence, to resist the argument on behalf of the defence that there were many others who could have been but were not produced as witnesses by the prosecution. 11. At this point it is necessary to deal with what we noticed being that the I.O (PW 12) had said in cross-examination, he had examined the daughter of the deceased (PW 3) who stated before him that her father fell down in Pana Bon. The said Court found it to be a stray statement which could not wither away the entire prosecution case, particularly the eye witness versions which stood searching and extensive cross-examination. The I.O (PW 12) in his examination-in-chief had said, inter alia, the following : “I searched for arresting the accused persons but on that date I could not arrest them. I examined available witnesses and recorded their statements u/s 161 Cr.P.C. I met the injured persons in Katwa S.D. hospital. The I.O (PW 12) in his examination-in-chief had said, inter alia, the following : “I searched for arresting the accused persons but on that date I could not arrest them. I examined available witnesses and recorded their statements u/s 161 Cr.P.C. I met the injured persons in Katwa S.D. hospital. I examined Sushil Hazra, Sandip Hazra, Kalpana Hazra, Jayanti Hazra, Mithu Ghosh, Md. Maniruddin, Lalu Rajbanshi, Nayan Hazra, Falguni Rudra and Mina Bhaduri as witnesses.” Then in cross-examination he had stated, inter alia, : “I examined witness Jayanti Hazra (PW 3). She stated before me that her father fell down on ‘Pana Ban’.” Though it appears from the cross-examination of PW 3 suggestion was put to her that she had stated before the I.O her father had fallen down on Pana Bon, she having denied the same, but we do not find the requirements of the proviso under sub-section (1) of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were complied with by the defence. In our view such statement not duly proved could not be of use to the accused. 12. Now to consider the new plea made before us. All the three accused in their respective explanations under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 said they were willing to answer questions put to them and made statements but not about a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel nor had any of them claimed to have any injury. The eye witness (PW 3 and PW 4) accounts of the incident are that in the afternoon while the deceased was returning from office, upon hearing altercation and noise they along with their mother, since subsequently deceased, rushed to the place of occurrence. They witnessed the principal accused assault the deceased on the head with wooden buttam. The deceased had caught hold of his head, sat down having sustained bleeding injury and his brain materials came out. The other accused also assaulted them. They in their respective cross-examination stated, inter alia, as follows : PW 3: “We came to the P.O. from the first floor of our house. The deceased had caught hold of his head, sat down having sustained bleeding injury and his brain materials came out. The other accused also assaulted them. They in their respective cross-examination stated, inter alia, as follows : PW 3: “We came to the P.O. from the first floor of our house. It is fact that when we came to the P.O. my father was shouting but it is not a fact that he was shouting for his drunken state.” PW 4: “It is outright false to say that on that date my father went for cutting hogs as butcher. Not a fact that I have falsely stated that there was shouting for killing my father in the afternoon of 26.11.99. Not a fact that none of the accused persons assaulted my father or my mother or my elder sister or to me as alleged by me. Not a fact that we received injuries due to fall into Pana Pukur.” 13. Applicability of exception 4 in section 300 IPC has to be upon analysis of the evidence. The evidence is that there was altercation and noise upon hearing which the eye witnesses along with their mother, since subsequently deceased, went to the place of occurrence. Evidence points to the place of occurrence as being on the path or passage leading to the house of the deceased. The accused were found to be with the deceased. The deceased was shouting but not because he was drunk. The principal accused assaulted the deceased with wooden buttam and the other accused assaulted him and the eye witnesses. On receiving injury from the principal accused the deceased caught hold of his head, sat down and his brain materials came out. He then became senseless (cross-examination of PW 3) and died later that evening at 10:40 p.m. This with the absence of any injury inflicted on the accused persons makes it difficult for us to accept the argument on behalf of the appellants that there was a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. The evidence is clear that the deceased was alone at the place of occurrence where the accused were present and he had been assaulted on the head with a wooden buttam by the principal accused. The deceased became senseless and later died. The evidence is clear that the deceased was alone at the place of occurrence where the accused were present and he had been assaulted on the head with a wooden buttam by the principal accused. The deceased became senseless and later died. There is no evidence either ocular or circumstantial to indicate that there was a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel between the accused and the deceased person. In this context, defence case put to the eye witnesses was confined to suggestions that the deceased was not returning from office at the time of occurrence and that he was drunk. 14. In view of our finding as above it is to be seen whether the authorities cited on behalf of the appellants are in their aid. The Supreme Court in Sukhbir Singh (supra) found the circumstances of the case to be that after altercation over the splashing of mud and receiving two slaps on his face, the accused had declared he would teach the complainant party a lesson and went home. Immediately thereafter he along with others came on the spot and, as held by the High Court, wanted to remove the obstructions caused in the flow of water. As the common object was not discernible, it could, at the most, be held that Sukhbir Singh intended to cause the fatal blow to the deceased and the other accused accompanied him for the purpose of removing the obstruction or, at the most, for teaching a lesson to the complainant party. The said Court explained that to avail the benefit of exception 4, the defence is required to probabilise that the offence was committed without premeditation and the offender had not taken any undue advantage nor acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Sudden fight, though not defined under the Act implied mutual provocation. The said Court found that in the case concededly there was no enmity between the parties and that the occurrence took place when, inter alia, the deceased gave slaps to his assailant for no fault of his. In the case before us, suggestions were put to the eye witnesses (PW 3 and PW 4) that they did not even know the identities of the accused, that the accused were not related to each other and, most significant of all, not their neighbours. In the case before us, suggestions were put to the eye witnesses (PW 3 and PW 4) that they did not even know the identities of the accused, that the accused were not related to each other and, most significant of all, not their neighbours. In this regard the Sessions Court found as follows : “45……..However, from the Order Sheet of this case, it is found that before framing of Charge, accused Bula Mallick @ Paul @ Gouranga Paul @ Mafizul Haque filed an application for discharge from the case raising a similar plea. The said application was dismissed by this Court taking into consideration the fact that accused Bula Mallick @ Paul @ Gouranga Paul @ Mafizul Haque, after being granted bail in the matter, furnished bail bond in the name Bula Paul @ Gouranga @ Mafizul Haque and he was released after acceptance of such bail bond. The Court also found that thereafter he appeared on several dates by filing Haziras in the matter and he did not raise any objection in this regard at the time of commitment. Furthermore, this Court noted that the other two accused of this case never raised any objection regarding this and never stated that they were not the wife and son of the accused Bula Mallick @ Paul @ Gouranga Paul @ Mafizul Haque. Later Charge was framed by this Court on 27.07.2005. It is also found from the record of this case that even after framing of Charge the said accused filed Haziras on the dates of trial as sometimes as “Mafizul Haque @ Bula Paul” or sometimes as “Mafizul Haque @ Bula”.” Inference drawn can only be in support of our finding from either of the two following situations. One situation as per the evidence of PW 3 and PW 4 is that there was altercation in the morning, when the deceased was leaving for office, regarding drainage of water from the house of the deceased linking that incident to the occurrence in the afternoon. That would be consistent with the said witnesses knowing the accused to be related to each other and being their neighbours. Such situation militates against inference of there being later in the afternoon a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. That would be consistent with the said witnesses knowing the accused to be related to each other and being their neighbours. Such situation militates against inference of there being later in the afternoon a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. However, if the accused had not held out as being related to each other and were not neighbours of the deceased, their presence at the place of occurrence and plea of a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel between them and the deceased persons is based on no evidence. In the circumstances we find the court below had taken a lenient view in being of the opinion that the elements of “prior meeting of minds” or “prearranged plan” or “suddenly formed plan” was not proved for the charge under section 34 IPC against the appellants. 15. In Surajit Sarkar (supra) while the Apex Court was not prepared to accept as a broad proposition of law that in no case can defective or shoddy investigation lead to an acquittal as it would eventually depend on the defects pointed out, on the facts of that case being, inter alia, the nature of injuries, the said Court held it was difficult to accept the view that the accused intended to cause death of the deceased or that the injuries were so imminently dangerous that they would, in all probability, cause death. The injuries were (1”x1/2”) cut mark over the right fronto parietal region and (1/2”) cut mark over the back of right parietal region. There were some abrasion marks over right ear and right knee and the right parietal bone was fractured. The membrane and brain matter were ruptured. Two ribs and a right radius was also fractured and dislocation of the right elbow joint. The doctor had deposed that the injuries to the parietal region may be caused by contact with a hard and blunt weapon or even by a fall. In the case before us the injury was (3”x2”) over the mid-portion of fronto parietal region depressed at the middle of frontal bone and one haematoma over the right supraclavicular region (7”x3/4”). The nature of injuries inflicted on the deceased in this case were imminently dangerous, the evidence being that the deceased became and died later that evening. In the case before us the injury was (3”x2”) over the mid-portion of fronto parietal region depressed at the middle of frontal bone and one haematoma over the right supraclavicular region (7”x3/4”). The nature of injuries inflicted on the deceased in this case were imminently dangerous, the evidence being that the deceased became and died later that evening. We are unable to hold that in the facts and circumstances the principal accused in inflicting such injuries did not have intention to kill. 16. In Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad (supra) the Supreme Court in paragraph 27 said as follows : “27. Coming back to the case at hand, we are of the opinion that the nature of the simple injury inflicted by the accused, the part of the body on which it was inflicted, the weapon used to inflict the same and the circumstances in which the injury was inflicted do not suggest that the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased. All that can be said is that the appellant had the knowledge that the injury inflicted by him was likely to cause the death of the deceased. The case would, therefore, more appropriately fall under section 304 Part II, IPC.” The above decision is not applicable on facts. In Murlidhar Shivram Palekar (supra) the accused were husband and wife. It was their contention that the wife was raped by the deceased and on the day next when they were proceeding to report the incident, the deceased had tried to obstruct them. A scuffle broke out and according to the accused, the deceased had a knife on which he fell and injured himself causing his death. The prosecution case of murder led to conviction up to the High Court but such conviction was converted by the Supreme Court to a conviction under section 304 Part II, IPC. The conversion was essentially upon the following reasons given in the judgment : “14………The fact that all the above witnesses saw the incidence of scuffle is not disputed; however they entered the scene only after they heard the shout of Asaram. What transpired prior to that, between the accused and the deceased has not been corroborated by anyone save the accused no.2. None of the witnesses seem to know the cause of the scuffle and neither were they able to hear the altercation that was going on between them. What transpired prior to that, between the accused and the deceased has not been corroborated by anyone save the accused no.2. None of the witnesses seem to know the cause of the scuffle and neither were they able to hear the altercation that was going on between them. Further, all the witnesses saw accused no.1 inflicting injury to deceased-Asaram by way of a knife that was later produced as the murder weapon. However, none of the witnesses have stated anywhere that the knife belonged to the accused no.1, therefore, the question that who had actually possessed the knife first is still unknown.” This Court in Noyel Barla (supra) acquitted the accused for non-examination of two eye witnesses. The said decision is not applicable in the present case. 17. The appellants have thus failed to make out any ground for interference with the impugned order. Their plea of conversion of conviction and acquittal is also without substance. The impugned order is confirmed. As such the appeals fail and are dismissed. The appellants will serve out their respective sentences.