ORDER : 1. The appellant/defendant who is a tenant has directed this appeal under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 1-12-2016 passed by 9th Upper District Judge, Bhopal in Civil Appeal No. 241/2015 whereby the judgment and decree passed by 15th Civil Judge, Class-I, Bhopal in Civil Suit No. 13-A/1973 dated 30-7-2015 decreeing the suit of the respondents for eviction against the appellants on the grounds enumerated under section 12(1)(a) and (c) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short “Act”) have been affirmed. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal in short are that a suit for eviction was filed by the original plaintiff Shri Ram Prakash Bairi on 24-12-1968 on the ground that the suit property was purchased by him by registered sale deed on 22-10-1965 from one Usman Khan. The appellant/defendant was admittedly a tenant of Usman Khan. After the purchase of the said property, a notice dated 30-10-1965 was issued to the appellant/defendant but he did not deposit the rent and a notice in this regard was also issued to him but instead of depositing the rent, the appellant disputed the ownership of the original plaintiff. In addition to the grounds under section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(c) of the Act, the suit was also filed on the grounds under section 12(1)(h) or (n), however, the trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the respondent only on the grounds enumerated under section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(c) of the Act. 3. Challenging the said decree, the appeal was filed which has also been dismissed by affirming the findings recorded by the trial Court on the grounds of section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(c) on which the appellant/defendant has come forward to this Court in the instant appeal to overturn the concurrent findings of the Courts below. It is relevant to mention here at this stage that the present suit was filed in year 1968 almost about 50 years back. It is relevant to mention here at this stage that the present suit was filed in year 1968 almost about 50 years back. The matter travelled many times in revision and appeal either before this Court or before lower Appellate Court, finally, by order dated 6-5-2010 passed in Civil Appeal No. 164/2009, the Appellate Court set aside ex parte judgment and decree dated 4-8-1989 and the suit was remanded and thereafter on 22-6-2010 the suit was again registered and renumbered and finally the impugned judgment and decree of eviction was passed by the trial Court on 30-7-2015. 4. The main plank of submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Courts below have erred while passing the decree on the ground under section 12(1)(c) on the ground that the appellant had denied the title of the plaintiff. He further contended that the appellant had every right to deny the landlord's title in case where the title of the landlord is transferred or devolves upon the third person and therefore he was not estopped from denying title of the plaintiff. 5. It is also submitted that the ground of eviction under section 12(1)(a) of the Act is dependent on the ground under section 12(1)(c) and therefore decree of the eviction on the ground under section 12(1)(a) is also bad in law. 6. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the appellants relied on the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Nirvikar Gupta v. Ram Kumar, 1991 MPLJ Online 3 : AIR 1992 MP 115 and the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Sheela v. Finn Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, (2002) 3 SCC 375 . He also referred the judgment passed in the case of Jamnalal v. Radheshyam, 2000 (2) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 385 : (2000) 4 SCC 380 . 7. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants, I have carefully examined the record of both the Courts below and also perused the impugned judgment, it is apparent on the record on appreciation of the evidence led by the parties that the Courts below concurrently held the existence of relationship between them as tenant and landlord and appellant to be defaulter in payment of the regular rent. 8. 8. The trial Court and the lower Appellate Court has discussed in para 18 of the impugned judgment and decree appreciating the evidence of original plaintiff Ram Prakash Bairi and Rajkumar Bajaj found that the property in question was purchased by wife of the original plaintiff on 22-10-1965 by registered sale deed from one Usman Khan and the appellant was tenant of Usman Khan. The relevant paras 18 and 19 of the impugned judgment and decree are reproduced as under:- ^^18- ÁFker% ;g Á'u fofu'p; ds ;ksX; gS fd D;k ÁR;FkhZ@oknh oknxzLr LFkku dh Hkou Lokeh vkSj vihykFkhZ@Áfroknh mldk fdjk,nkj gS \ okn i= esa ;g vfHkopu fd;k x;k gS oknh us oknxzLr LFkku mlds iwoZ Lokeh mLeku [kka ls iathd`r foØ; i= fnukad 22-10-1965 ds }kjk Ø; fd;k x;k Fkk vkSj bldh lwpuk Áfroknh dks nh x;h FkhA Áfroknh us fyf[kr dFku esa mDr vfHkopuksa dks vLohdkj fd;k gS fdarq Áfroknh us oknxzLr LFkku ij] mlds Lo;a ds vkf/kiR; dh Ád`fr vkSj vf/kdkj ds laca/k esa dksbZ vfHkopu ugha fd, x, gSA oknh lk{kh lquhy cSjh us bl vk'k; dk dFku fd;k gS fd mldh eka Jherh m"kk cSjh ¼ewy oknh½ us oknxzLr LFkku mLeku [kka ls Ø; fd;k FkkA ;g Hkh dFku fd;k gS fd Jh oYyHk uked O;fDr us ,d flfoy okn ØŒ 83,@1997 fnukad 30-4-1973 dks mLeku [kka] m"kk cSjh] lq[kuanu vkSj Áfroknh ckcwyky ds fo:} ÁLrqr fd;k Fkk] tks fnukad 13-11-1998 dks fujLr fd;k x;k Fkk rFkk blds fo:} Jh oYyHk dh ÁFke vihy ØŒ 197@1999 ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; }kjk fnukad 14-9-2010 dks fujLr dh x;h FkhA foØ; i= fnukad 22-10-1965 ¼Án'kZ ihŒ 8½ flfoy okn ØŒ 83,@1997 esa fn, x, fu.kZ; ,oa fMØh fnukad 13-11-1998 dh Áekf.kr Áfr ¼Án'kZ ihŒ 09 ,oa Án'kZ ihŒ 10½ rFkk ÁFke vihy ØŒ 197@1999 esa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 14-9-2010 dh Áekf.kr Áfr ¼Án'kZ ihŒ 11½ ÁLrqr fd, x, gSA oknh lk{kh lquhy cSjh ds Áfrijh{k.k esa oknxzLr LFkku oknh }kjk mLeku [kka ds Ø; fd, tkus ds dFku dks dksbZ pqukSrh ugha nh x;h gS dsoy ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; esa yafcr ÁFke vihy ØŒ 197@1999 dks iqu% uacj ij fy, tkus dh dk;Zokgh yafcr gksus dk lq>ko fn;k x;k gS ysfdu mDr vihy iqu% uacj ij yh x;h gS] bl rF; dh dksbZ lk{; vfHkys[k ij ugha gSA 19- oknh lk{kh jkeÁdk'k cSjh us ;g dFku fd;k gS fd mldh iRuh Jherh m"kk cSjh us oknxzLr LFkku mLeku [kka ls lafLFkr foØ; i= fnukad 22-10-1965 ds }kjk Ø; fd;k Fkk ftlesa Áfroknh 80 :i;s Áfrekg dh nj ls fdjk;snkj gSA blds iwoZ og mLeku [kka dk fdjk;snkj FkkA ;g Hkh dFku fd;k gS fd Ø; fd, tkus ds mijkar Áfroknh dks bldh lwpuk nh x;h Fkh ysfdu Áfroknh us lwpuk i= ds mRrj fnukad 30-7-1967 esa oknh dks Hkou Lokeh ekuus ls badkj dj fn;k gSA Áfroknh dks Ásf"kr lwpuk i= fnukad 29-6-1967 dh Áfr ¼Án'kZ ihŒ 1½] Mkd jlhn ¼Án'kZ ihŒ 2½] Áfroknh }kjk Ásf"kr tckc ¼Án'kZ ihŒ 4½] flfoy okn ØŒ 78,@1971 esa fn, x, fu.kZ; ,oa fMØh fnukad 25-8-1981 dh Áekf.kr Áfr;ka ¼Án'kZ ihŒ 5 ,oa Án'kZ ihŒ 6½ ÁLrqr fd, gSA oknh dh vksj ls ÁLrqr lk{kh jktdqekj ctkt us bl vk'k; ds dFku fd, gS fd oknxzLr LFkku ftl Hkw[kaM dk Hkkx gS] ml Áfroknh fdjk,nkj gS rFkk Hkw[kaM dk dqy {ks=Qy 6500 oxZQhV gS ftlds vk/ks ls vf/kd Hkkx ij mlds firk mLeku [kka ds fdjk,nkj Fks vkSj o"kZ 1965 ls Jherh m"kk cSjh ds fdjk,nkj jgs gSA mLeku [kka us mDr Hkw[kaM Jherh m"kk cSjh dks foØ; dj fn;k FkkA** 9. Thus, both the Courts held concurrently that the existence of relationship between the original plaintiff and the appellant as tenant and landlord was found to be proved and the appellant was defaulter in payment of regular rent as even after receiving the demand notice, the outstanding rent was neither paid within two months to the respondent nor deposited the same within one month from the service with the trial Court and also committed error in depositing the regular monthly rent in accordance with provisions of section 13(1) of the Act. 10. On elaborate considerations, the Courts below have concurrently held that the appellant by denying the title of the respondent caused substantial injury to his right and title in the property in dispute. In the present case, it is not denied by the appellant that he was the tenant of the original owner of the property Usman Khan and he also could not bring any evidence that how did he come in the possession of the suit land and continued on the same if he was not tenant of the appellant. By transfer of the property in favour of the original plaintiff by Usman Khan, for the purpose of the decree under section 12(1)(a), the appellant being tenant of the original owner shall become tenant of the transferee by virtue of the provisions of section 109 of the Transfer of the Property Act, 1882 as held by this Court in the case of Shankar Sahai v. Kanmal, 1971 M.P.L.J. 436 : 1971 JLJ 102 . It is also relevant to mention here that for the purpose of section 12(1)(a), it is not necessary that the landlord has to be owner of the property also. 11. From bare reading the provisions of section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(c) of the Act, this Court does not find any force in the contention of the appellant that section 12(1)(a) is dependent on the provisions of section 12(1)(c). So far as the case relied by the appellant, Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash (supra) is concerned, the same is based and decided on different facts and context. That was a case where the Apex Court was dealing decree for eviction being maintained by the owner-landlord under section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act and not under section 12(1)(a). That was a case where the Apex Court was dealing decree for eviction being maintained by the owner-landlord under section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act and not under section 12(1)(a). Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion the same would not extend any aid to the appellant in the circumstances of the present case. The other case laws relied by the counsel for the appellant in the case of Nirvikar Gupta v. Ram Kumar (supra) would also not apply in the facts of the present case as in the said case, the Court was considering the issue regarding the eviction decree under section 12(1)(c) only. In the present case, decree is also passed under section 12(1)(a) of the Act. The judgment relied in the case of Jamnalal v. Radheshyam (supra) is not an authority on the issue canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellants. 12. The question regarding the relationship of the landlord and tenant the same could not be turned to be question of law rather than substantial question of law as the concurrent findings of the Courts below holding such relationship between the parties being based on appreciation of evidence could not be interfered by this Court at this stage under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Kalyan Singh v. Ramswaroop, 1995 MPLJ Online 5 : 1996 JLJ 247 and Machalabai v. Nanakram, 2006 (2) M.P.L.J. 484. In the case of Jamnalal v. Radheshyam (supra), the Court held that the findings proved on facts cannot be interfered under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. 13. Even otherwise, it is well settled in law that the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the findings of the fact under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code is limited where the findings is either perverse or based on no evidence, This Court cannot interfere with the findings of the fact until and unless the same is perverse or based on no evidence or contrary to material on record. It is equally settled law that the Court in exercise of power under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot re-appreciate the evidence even if another view is possible, (see-Narayan Rajendra v. Lekshmy Sarojini, (2009) 5 SCC 264 , Hafazat Hussain v. Abdul Majeed, (2011) 7 SCC 189, Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148 , D.R. Rathna Murthy v. Ramappa, (2011) 1 SCC 158 and Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, 2012 (4) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 265 : (2012) 7 SCC 288 ). 14. That, so far the other ground canvassed under section 12(1)(c) is concerned, it has already been held by this Court that in the present case in view of the facts and findings of the Courts below it is established that there was a relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties and both the Courts below have concurrently held that the appellant by denying the title of the respondent caused substantial injury to the plaintiffs right and title in the property in dispute. 15. In the present case, this Court has taken note of the fact of the case that the present suit for eviction was filed in year 1968 and for last more than 48 years the LRs of plaintiffs have been contesting the suit after the death of original plaintiff. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I have not found any perversity or infirmity in appreciation of evidence by the Courts below or any circumstances giving rise to any question of law much less the substantial question of law requiring any consideration at this stage under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Hence, this appeal being devoid of any such question deserves to be and is hereby dismissed at the stage of admission. There shall be no order as to costs.