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2017 DIGILAW 747 (ORI)

Orissa Cotton Mills, Cuttack v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court

2017-07-18

K.R.MOHAPATRA, VINEET SARAN

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JUDGMENT : K.R. Mohapatra, J. The Management of Orissa Cotton Mills (a unit of National Textile Corporation Ltd.) has filed this writ petition assailing the order dated 06.06.2001 (Annexure-4) passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhubaneswar in I.D. Case No. 447 of 1995, wherein, learned Labour Court has directed to consider the question of validity of the reference, raised by the Management-petitioner, to be considered at the time of hearing of the reference on merit. 2. The opposite party No.2, namely, Sri Shyam Sundar Rout, an employee of the Management-petitioner had approached the Labour machinery challenging the legality of his termination. Accordingly, a conciliation proceeding was initiated. On failure of conciliation, the State Government in Labour and Employment Department made a reference to the Labour Court, Bhubaneswar on 12.12.1995 (Annexure-1) for adjudication of the industrial dispute. Consequently, ID Case No. 447 of 1995 was initiated on the board of the Labour Court, Bhubaneswar. During pendency of the reference, the Central Government in the Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, issued notification dated 03.07.1998 (Annexure-2) delegating its power to be exercised under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ‘the ID Act’) to the State Government. Thus, the Management-petitioner filed a petition before the learned Labour Court on 21.07.1999 contending, inter alia that, in view of the notification under Annexure-2, the reference made by the State Government to the Labour Court would not be maintainable, as the Central Government, at the relevant time, was the appropriate government in respect of the Management-petitioner to make the reference, which power was delegated to the State Government only after issuance of notification under Annexure-2. The said petition was taken up for consideration on 06.06.2001 by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhubaneswar and the impugned order under Annexure-4 was passed holding, inter alia that, the question of validity of the reference would be considered at the time of hearing of the reference on merit. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that previously the Central Government was the appropriate Government to make reference to the Industrial Adjudicator in respect of the Management-petitioner, which is a Central Public Sector Unit. During pendency of the reference before the Labour Court, Bhubaneswar, the notification under Annexure-2 was issued delegating the power exercisable by the Central Government under the provisions of the ID Act to the State Government. During pendency of the reference before the Labour Court, Bhubaneswar, the notification under Annexure-2 was issued delegating the power exercisable by the Central Government under the provisions of the ID Act to the State Government. Since the reference in question was made by the State Government in the Department of Labour and Employment, Bhubaneswar, the same would not be maintainable in the eyes of law. In support of his contention, he relied upon a decision in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation Vs. United Labour Union and others, reported in AIR 1997 SC 645 and submitted that Central Government was the ‘appropriate government’ to make a reference at the relevant time. 4. Per contra, learned Government Advocate as well as learned counsel for the Workman-opposite party No. 2 refuted such contention and submitted that the said notification has no application to the case at hand, as it came into operation during pendency of the reference. Further, the question as to which would be the ‘appropriate Government’ is a mixed question of fact and law and can only be adjudicated after leading evidence in the matter. Thus, learned Labour Court has rightly refused to adjudicate the same as a preliminary issue and kept it open to be decided at the time of hearing of the reference on merit. Further contention of learned counsel for the opposite parties is that in view of the ratio decided in the case of D.P. Maheswari Vs. Delhi Administration, reported in AIR 1984 SC 153 , the law is well-settled that there should not be any piecemeal adjudication of a reference, which would certainly prejudice the workman, and should not be encouraged by the Industrial Adjudicator. Hence, they prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of record, the sole question that arises for consideration is that whether the learned Labour Court has committed illegality in not considering the issue of validity of the reference as a preliminary issue. 6. There is no quarrel over the fact that the Central Government in Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, vide its notification under Annexure-2, has delegated the powers to be exercised under the provisions of ID Act to the State Government, in respect of the Central Public Sector Units, Corporations and Autonomous body, more fully described in the schedule appended thereto. 6. There is no quarrel over the fact that the Central Government in Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, vide its notification under Annexure-2, has delegated the powers to be exercised under the provisions of ID Act to the State Government, in respect of the Central Public Sector Units, Corporations and Autonomous body, more fully described in the schedule appended thereto. The entry of the Management-petitioner Corporation is at Sl. No.95 of the said schedule. Ordinarily, a notification is prospective in nature, unless the same is made retrospective by express provision or by necessary implication. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that on the date of the reference, i.e., on 12.12.1995, Central Government was the appropriate government in making a reference to the Industrial Adjudicator and not the State Government, is a mixed question of fact and law and can only be adjudicated after taking into consideration the facts and law involved in the case. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of D.P. Maheswari (supra), which still holds the field, held as follows: “We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Art. 226 and Art. 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. Art. 226 and Art. 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections journeyings up and down. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Art. 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Art. 136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues.” 7. In the case law cited above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Industrial Adjudicators should take proper care and be cautious while deciding preliminary question like maintainability of the reference and recommended for early adjudication of the reference on merit. 8. In that view of the matter, we refrain ourselves from giving a definite opinion with regard to applicability of the notification under Annexure-2 to the case at hand and leave it open to be decided by the learned Labour Court, which can efficaciously decide the same, taking into consideration the facts and law involved in the case at hand. Since we are not delving into the issue as to which would be the ‘appropriate government’ in the case at hand, competent to make a reference, we do not express any opinion on the applicability of ratio decidendi in Air India Statutory Corporation (supra). 9. This Court, while issuing notice in the matter, vide order dated 06.08.2001, passed in Misc. Case No. 10196 of 2001, has stayed the further proceedings in I.D. Case No.447 of 1995 pending in the Court of the Labour Court, Bhubaneswar. The said interim arrangement is continuing till date. 10. 9. This Court, while issuing notice in the matter, vide order dated 06.08.2001, passed in Misc. Case No. 10196 of 2001, has stayed the further proceedings in I.D. Case No.447 of 1995 pending in the Court of the Labour Court, Bhubaneswar. The said interim arrangement is continuing till date. 10. We, therefore, dispose of the writ petition without interfering with the impugned order under Annexure-4, directing the learned Labour Court to decide the reference on merit, including the question of validity of reference, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. We make it clear that with disposal of this writ petition, the order dated 06.08.2001 passed in Misc. Case No.10196 of 2001 stands vacated.