JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 397 read with Sections 401 and 482 of the CrPC, a prayer has been made to set-aside the impugned order dated 3.12.2016 passed by the learned Special Judge, Kangra, at Dharamshala in CC No. 19-J/2010 in case FIR No. 8/2008 Police Station SV&ACB Dharamshala, whereby charges for offence under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 201 of the IPC and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, have been framed against the petitioner accused. Petitioner-accused has further prayed for his discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.PC., after setting aside the aforesaid impugned order. 2. Briefly stated facts as emerge from the record are that on the basis of anonymous complaint, having been made by one Shri K.S. Thakur, R/o Village Ludret, Tehsil Dehra, District Kangra, FIR No. 8/2008 dated 8.7.2008 came to be registered with the Police Station SV&ACB, Dharamshala, alleging therein that the accused should have retired a year back but he was still continuing in service on the strength of wrong entry of date of birth made in the service book. 3. Though record suggests that during investigation, nobody in the name of Shri K.S. Thakur, was found to be the resident of that village but police on the basis of investigation came to conclusion that the accused namely Manohar Lal, PET Government Middle School Ludret, in connivance with some dealing hand in the office of Deputy District Education Officer, got incorporated his date of birth as 11.4.1948 instead of 11.4.146 and thereby continued to perform government duty for extra two years and caused undue loss to the Government and undue gain to himself. After completion of investigation, police presented the challan in the Court of learned Special Judge, Kangra, at Dharamshala, who after being satisfied that prima-facie case exists against the petitioner-accused framed charges against him under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 201 of the IPC and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid framing of charge, accused-petitioner has come before this Court in the instant proceedings; seeking his discharge under Section 227 after setting aside the impugned order dated 3.12.2016. 4. Mr. Ashwani Sharma, Senior Advocate, duly assisted by Mr. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid framing of charge, accused-petitioner has come before this Court in the instant proceedings; seeking his discharge under Section 227 after setting aside the impugned order dated 3.12.2016. 4. Mr. Ashwani Sharma, Senior Advocate, duly assisted by Mr. Nishant Kumar, Advocate, representing the petitioner, while inviting attention of this Court to the impugned order dated 3.12.2016, vehemently contended that impugned order is not sustainable in the eye of law as the same is not based upon the correct appreciation of material adduced on record by the Investigating Agency and as such, same deserves to be quashed and set-aside. Learned Senior counsel further contended that learned court below while framing charge against the accused, has failed to properly consider and appreciate that same issue stands already conclusively adjudicated upon and decided by this Court in CWP (T) No. 3608 of 2008 vide judgment dated 5.5.2011, whereby this Court while holding action of respondent-State to recover a sum of Rs. 420,431/- and to withheld his pensionery benefits to be illegal, specifically held that the petitioner would be deemed to have been retired from service on 30.4.2006. Mr. Sharma while inviting attention of this Court to the judgment dated 5.5.2011 (available at page 13 of the paper book) contended that it was specifically held by the writ Court that the petitioner would be deemed to have retired from service on 30.4.2006. Learned counsel further contended that while deciding aforesaid writ petition having been preferred on behalf of the accused, learned court had closed the matter for all times to come. Mr. Sharma further contended that since no appeal was preferred by the respondent-State against the aforesaid judgment passed by the writ court, same has attained finality and as such, no proceedings on the same issue can be allowed to continue against the petitioner-accused before the learned Special judge. Learned counsel for the petitioner while referring to aforesaid judgment passed by the writ court contended that in view of the specific findings having been returned by the writ court qua the date of birth of the petitioner, criminal prosecution against the accused ought to have been closed by the learned Special Judge, and the accused petitioner was entitled to be discharged under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. Apart from above, Mr. Sharma contended that it is undisputed that the petitioner had joined government service in the Education Department of H.P. as PET on 31.8.1966 at Government High School, Samloti, Kangra and at that relevant time, this area was under the administrative control of the Deputy DEO, Una, who prepared his service book. He further contended that entry in service book could only be made on the basis of matriculation certificate tendered by the petitioner-accused at the time of his joining service that too by the Deputy DEO Una, who after verification from original matriculation certificate, retained copy and consciously, recorded his date of birth in the service book to be 11.4.1948. Mr. Sharma, while inviting attention of this Court to Annexure A-3 (available at page 21) i.e. extract of service book, stated that bare perusal of the same suggests that there was no cutting/over-writing/tampering in the relevant service book entry as regards date of birth of the petitioner, rather principal of School certified that date of birth as per service of the petitioner, is recorded as 11.4.1948 and there is no over-writing/cutting or tempering of the entry in the service record. While concluding his arguments, Mr. Sharma, contended that throughout service career of any employee, service book is kept in the custody of the head office and is transferred with him, from office to office, strictly in terms of Supplementary Rules-197 & 198, whereby the procedure stands prescribed for maintaining the service book. Mr. Sharma contended that on the basis of the documents and material on record, no case much less prima-facie is made out against the petitioner accused for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201 of the IPC and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the accused has been incorrectly charged. Learned counsel further contended that since there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction of the accused petitioner, no fruitful purpose would be served in case trial is allowed to proceed after framing of charge, as has been done in the present case. Learned counsel further contended that the material on record nowhere justifies framing of charge against the petitioner accused; rather, criminal prosecution initiated against the accused on the basis of anonymous complaint ought to have been closed by ordering discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Cr.PC. Lastly, Mr. Learned counsel further contended that the material on record nowhere justifies framing of charge against the petitioner accused; rather, criminal prosecution initiated against the accused on the basis of anonymous complaint ought to have been closed by ordering discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Cr.PC. Lastly, Mr. Sharma, contended that the petitioner is 70 years' old and he would be driven to face ordeals of protracted trial in the matter, wherein this Court has already settled the issue in question for all times to come. 5. Mr. P.M. Negi, learned Additional Advocate General, while opposing the aforesaid submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there is no illegality and infirmity in the impugned order and same is based upon correct appreciation of material available on record by the police along with charge sheet filed under Section 173 of the CrPC and same deserves to be upheld. Mr. Negi further contended that there is no mis-appreciation of material adduced on record by the police along with charge sheet because it is well settled that at the time of framing of charge, learned court below is not expected to sift the entire evidence, rather it is required to be seen whether prima-facie case exists against the accused or not. He further contended that in the instant case, bare perusal of evidence collected on record by the Investigating Agency suggests that the petitioner accused in connivance with some dealing hand of the Deputy District Education Officer, got his date of birth incorporated as 11.4.1948 instead of 11.4.1946 and thereafter continued to perform the government duty for a period of extra two years and in this process, caused undue loss to the government. Mr. Negi further contended that findings returned by this Court in CWP (T) No. 3608 of 2008 decided on 5.5.2011, has no bearing as far as criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner accused are concerned. While inviting attention of this court to the judgment dated 5.5.2011 passed by this Court in aforesaid petition, Mr. Negi contended that vide aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Court has nowhere prohibited the respondent department to initiate criminal proceedings, if any, against the petitioner accused, for getting wrong date of birth recorded in the service record with a view to obtain unnecessary benefits. Mr. Negi contended that vide aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Court has nowhere prohibited the respondent department to initiate criminal proceedings, if any, against the petitioner accused, for getting wrong date of birth recorded in the service record with a view to obtain unnecessary benefits. Mr. Negi, further contended that it is well settled that the criminal proceedings, if any, initiated against the delinquent official is altogether independent of disciplinary proceedings and outcome of departmental proceedings has no bearing on criminal proceedings. Mr. Negi further contended that learned court below is/was not required to examine the material adduced on record by the prosecution in detail while framing the charge, rather, same was required to be considered and analyzed at the stage of trial and as such, this Court has no occasion whatsoever, to interfere with the well reasoned order passed by the court below, which otherwise appears to be based upon proper appreciation of material made available on record by the Investigating Agency. Mr. Negi placed reliance on judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court titled Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja and Ors., AIR 1980, SCC 52, 1979 CRI. L.J. 1390 as well as State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri (1999)2 SCC 452 , to suggest that court has limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the CrPC. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties as well carefully gone through the record 7. As far as scope of power of this Court while exercising revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another v. Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 SCC 241 ; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:- 8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to mete out justice. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:- 8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to mete out justice. In addition, the inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised revisional power under Section 397(1). However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order." 8. Before adverting to ascertain the genuineness and correctness of the submissions having been made by the learned counsel representing the respective parties, this Court deems it fit to reproduce impugned order as well as Charge sheet dated 03.12.2016, whereby present petitioner-accused has been charged for the commission of offence under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201 of the IPC and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Order dated 03.12.2016. "I have heard the contentions of ld PP for the State and ld defence counsel and have also perused the final report including the documents attached therewith, a prima-facie case is made out against accused for commission of offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201 IPC and Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Let charge be framed against the accused. Charge for offence under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201 IPC and Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 framed against accused accordingly, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Now for prosecution evidence PW's mentioned at serial no. 1 to 4 be summoned for 18.4.2017 and PW's mentioned at serial no. Charge for offence under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201 IPC and Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 framed against accused accordingly, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Now for prosecution evidence PW's mentioned at serial no. 1 to 4 be summoned for 18.4.2017 and PW's mentioned at serial no. 5 to 8 be summoned for 19.4.2017." "Charge Sheet dated 3.12.2016 I,..............do hereby charge you accused namely Manohar Lal, son of Raja Ram aged 68 years resident of VPO Nagrota Suriyan, Tehsil Jawali, District Kangra H.P., as follows:- Firstly, during the year 1966 while you were appointed as PTI teacher and you being in the aforesaid capacity deceived the department by dis-honestly making false/wrong entry of date of birth as 11.04.1948 instead of 11.4.1946 and thereby you have committed an offence punishable under Section 420 IPC and within the cognizance of this court. Secondly, during the year 1966 while you were appointed as PTI teacher you made false/wrong entry of date of birth in-order to obtain unnecessary benefit and thereby you have committed an offence punishable under Section 467 IPC and within the cognizance of this court. Thirdly, during the year 1966 while you were appointed as PTI teacher committed forgery by making false/wrong entry of date of birth for the purpose of cheating the department and thereby you have committed an offence punishable under Section 468 IPC and within the cognizance of this court. Fourthly, during the year 1966 while you were appointed as PTI teacher you used the forged date of birth document as genuine and caused the wrong entry be made in the service record and thereby you have committed an offence punishable under Section 471 IPC and within the cognizance of this court. Fifthly, you voluntarily caused dis-apearance of the evidence by concealing your matriculation examination with intention to screen yourself from legal punishment and thereby you have intentionally and voluntarily committed offence punishable U/S 201 IPC and within my cognizance. Lastly, during your service in the department you misconducted by abusing your official position as a public servant by corrupt or illegal means obtained for yourself excess salary of Rs.4,30,623/- by dis-honestly and fraudulently making false/wrong entry of date of birth as 11.04.1948 instead of 11.04.1946 thereby you have committed offence of criminal misconduct punishable under Section 13(2) Prevention of Corruption Act and within the cognizance of this court. And I hereby direct you accused to be tried on the said charge by this court." This Court certainly cannot find any quarrel with the submissions having been made by Mr. Negi that for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the legality or regularity of any proceedings or order made by an inferior Court, this Court needs to see that there is a well founded error and it may not be proper for this Court to scrutinize the orders which on the face of it, appear to be taken in accordance with law. Similarly, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that in plethora of judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court, it has been held that revisionary jurisdiction can only be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, and there is no compliance of the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. Similarly, this Court has no hesitation to agree with the contention of Mr. Negi that revisional jurisdiction of higher Court is very limited one and it cannot be exercised in a routine manner because admittedly exercise of this jurisdiction should not lead to injustice ex-facie. Exposition of law on this issue as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court certainly suggests that where court is dealing with question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to exercise its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the category mentioned herein above. Similarly, it is well settled that while framing charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out that if the facts emerging therefrom, taken on their face value, discloses the existence of all the ingredients, constituting the alleged offence or not and for the limited purpose, court may sift the evidence. Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and Anr., (2012) 9 SCC 460 held that framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial Court in terms of Section 228 of the CrPC unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 CrPC. Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and Anr., (2012) 9 SCC 460 held that framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial Court in terms of Section 228 of the CrPC unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 CrPC. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that under the sections 227 and 228 CrPC, the Court is required to consider the 'record of the case' and the documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the Court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall proceed to frame the charge. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that once the facts and ingredients of the Section concerned exists, then the Court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. Most importantly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has concluded that the satisfaction of the Court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. At this stage, this court deems it fit to reproduce the following paras of aforesaid judgment having been passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as follows:- "17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the 'record of the case' and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the Court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code. 18. It may also be noticed that the revisional jurisdiction exercised by the High Court is in a way final and no inter court remedy is available in such cases. Of course, it may be subject to jurisdiction of this court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Normally, a revisional jurisdiction should be exercised on a question of law. However, when factual appreciation is involved, then it must find place in the class of cases resulting in a perverse finding. Basically, the power is required to be exercised so that justice is done and there is no abuse of power by the court. Merely an apprehension or suspicion of the same would not be a sufficient ground for interference in such cases. 19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the well settled law laid down by this Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39 : "4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which-... (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused", as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. It the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227." 20. The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 397 can be exercised so as to examine the correctness, legality or proprietary of an order passed by the trial court or the inferior court, as the case may be. The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 397 can be exercised so as to examine the correctness, legality or proprietary of an order passed by the trial court or the inferior court, as the case may be. Though the section does not specifically use the expression 'prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice', the jurisdiction under Section 397 is a very limited one. The legality, proprietary or correctness of an order passed by a court is the very foundation of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 but ultimately it also requires justice to be done. The jurisdiction could be exercised where there is palpable error, noncompliance with the provisions of law, the decision is completely erroneous or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily. On the other hand, Section 482 is based upon the maxim quando lex liquid alicuiconcedit, conceder videtur id quo res ipsa esse non protest, i.e., when the law gives anything to anyone, it also gives all those things without which the thing itself would be unavoidable. The Section confers very wide power on the Court to do justice and to ensure that the process of the Court is not permitted to be abused. 21. It may be somewhat necessary to have a comparative examination of the powers exercisable by the Court under these two provisions. There may be some overlapping between these two powers because both are aimed at securing the ends of justice and both have an element of discretion. But, at the same time, inherent power under Section 482 of the Code being an extraordinary and residuary power, it is inapplicable in regard to matters which are specifically provided for under other provisions of the Code. To put it simply, normally the court may not invoke its power under Section 482 of the Code where a party could have availed of the remedy available under Section 397 of the Code itself. The inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code are of a wide magnitude and are not as limited as the power under Section 397. Section 482 can be invoked where the order in question is neither an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) nor a final order in the strict sense. Reference in this regard can be made to Raj Kapoor & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. Section 482 can be invoked where the order in question is neither an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) nor a final order in the strict sense. Reference in this regard can be made to Raj Kapoor & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. [ AIR 1980 SC 258 : (1980) 1 SCC 43 ]. In this very case, this Court has observed that inherent power under Section 482 may not be exercised if the bar under Sections 397(2) and 397(3) applies, except in extraordinary situations, to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This itself shows the fine distinction between the powers exercisable by the Court under these two provisions. In this very case, the Court also considered as to whether the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 stand repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. Rejecting the argument, the Court said that the opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude of the inherent powers preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482. There is no total ban on the exercise of inherent powers where abuse of the process of the Court or any other extraordinary situation invites the court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The distinction between a final and interlocutory order is well known in law. The orders which will be free from the bar of Section 397(2) would be the orders which are not purely interlocutory but, at the same time, are less than a final disposal. They should be the orders which do determine some right and still are not finally rendering the Court functus officio of the lis. The provisions of Section 482 are pervasive. It should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code but, however, inherent powers of the Court unquestionably have to be read and construed as free of restriction. 22. In Dinesh Dutt Joshi v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. [ (2001) 8 SCC 570 ], the Court held that :- "6. ... [Section 482] does not confer any power but only declares that the High Court possesses inherent powers for the purposes specified in the Section. As lacunae are sometimes found in procedural law, the Section has been embodied to cover such lacunae wherever they are discovered. [ (2001) 8 SCC 570 ], the Court held that :- "6. ... [Section 482] does not confer any power but only declares that the High Court possesses inherent powers for the purposes specified in the Section. As lacunae are sometimes found in procedural law, the Section has been embodied to cover such lacunae wherever they are discovered. The use of extraordinary powers conferred upon the High Court under this section are, however, required to be reserved as far as possible for extraordinary cases." 23. In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 ], the Court, while referring to the inherent powers to make orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, clarified that such power has to be exercise in appropriate cases ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the powers requires a great caution in its exercise. The High Court, as the highest court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State, has inherent powers to make any order for the purposes of securing the ends of justice. Being an extra ordinary power, it will, however, not be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a subordinate court of its powers. 24. If one looks at the development of law in relation to exercise of inherent powers under the Code, it will be useful to refer to the following details :- As far back as in 1926, a Division bench of this Court in Re: Llewelyn Evans, took the view that the provisions of Section 561A (equivalent to present Section 482) extend to cases not only of a person accused of an offence in a criminal court, but to the cases of any person against whom proceedings are instituted under the Code in any Court. Explaining the word "process", the Court said that it was a general word, meaning in effect anything done by the Court. Explaining the limitations and scope of Section 561A, the Court referred to "inherent jurisdiction", "to prevent abuse of process" and "to secure the ends of justice" which are terms incapable of having a precise definition or enumeration, and capable, at the most, of test, according to well-established principles of criminal jurisprudence. Explaining the limitations and scope of Section 561A, the Court referred to "inherent jurisdiction", "to prevent abuse of process" and "to secure the ends of justice" which are terms incapable of having a precise definition or enumeration, and capable, at the most, of test, according to well-established principles of criminal jurisprudence. The ends of justice are to be understood by ascertainment of the truth as to the facts on balance of evidence on each side. With reference to the facts of the case, the Court held that in the absence of any other method, it has no choice left in the application of the Section except, such tests subject to the caution to be exercised in the use of inherent jurisdiction and the avoidance of interference in details and directed providing of a legal practitioner. 25. Having examined the inter-relationship of these two very significant provisions of the Code, let us now examine the scope of interference under any of these provisions in relation to quashing the charge. We have already indicated above that framing of charge is the first major step in a criminal trial where the Court is expected to apply its mind to the entire record and documents placed therewith before the Court. Taking cognizance of an offence has been stated to necessitate an application of mind by the Court but framing of charge is a major event where the Court considers the possibility of discharging the accused of the offence with which he is charged or requiring the accused to face trial. There are different categories of cases where the Court may not proceed with the trial and may discharge the accused or pass such other orders as may be necessary keeping in view the facts of a given case. In a case where, upon considering the record of the case and documents submitted before it, the Court finds that no offence is made out or there is a legal bar to such prosecution under the provisions of the Code or any other law for the time being in force and there is a bar and there exists no ground to proceed against the accused, the Court may discharge the accused. There can be cases where such record reveals the matter to be so predominantly of a civil nature that it neither leaves any scope for an element of criminality nor does it satisfy the ingredients of a criminal offence with which the accused is charged. In such cases, the Court may discharge him or quash the proceedings in exercise of its powers under these two provisions. 26. This further raises a question as to the wrongs which become actionable in accordance with law. It may be purely a civil wrong or purely a criminal offence or a civil wrong as also a criminal offence constituting both on the same set of facts. But if the records disclose commission of a criminal offence and the ingredients of the offence are satisfied, then such criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because a civil wrong has also been committed. The power cannot be invoked to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The factual foundation and ingredients of an offence being satisfied, the Court will not either dismiss a complaint or quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent or original jurisdiction. In the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors. [ (2006) 6 SCC 736 ], this Court took the similar view and upheld the order of the High Court declining to quash the criminal proceedings because a civil contract between the parties was pending. 27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be : 27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loathe to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a 'civil wrong' with no 'element of criminality' and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed with by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. {Ref. State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors. [ AIR 1982 SC 949 ]; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia & Anr. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. {Ref. State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors. [ AIR 1982 SC 949 ]; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia & Anr. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. [ AIR 1988 SC 709 ]; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. [ AIR 1993 SC 892 ]; Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Ors. [ AIR 1996 SC 309 ; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [ AIR 2000 SC 754 ]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [ AIR 2003 SC 1069 ]; M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. [AIR 1998 SC 128]; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [ (1996) 7 SCC 705 ]; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. s. Bangarappa & Ors. [ (1995) 4 SCC 41 ]; Zundu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Ors. [ AIR 2005 SC 9 ]; M/s. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Biological E. Ltd. & Ors. [ AIR 2000 SC 1869 ]; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala & Anr. [ (2009) 14 SCC 466 ]; V.V.S. Rama Sharma & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [ (2009) 7 SCC 234 ]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna & Anr. v. Peddi Ravindra Babu & Anr. [ (2009) 11 SCC 203 ]; Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors. [ AIR 1987 SC 877 ]; State of Bihar & Anr. v. P.P. Sharma & Anr. [ AIR 1991 SC 1260 ]; Lalmuni Devi (Smt.) v. State of Bihar & Ors. [ (2001) 2 SCC 17 ]; M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh & Anr. [ (2001) 8 SCC 645 ]; Savita v. State of Rajasthan [ (2005) 12 SCC 338 ]; and S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat & Anr. [ (2001) 7 SCC 659 ]}. 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. [ (2001) 7 SCC 659 ]}. 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance to the requirements of the offence. 28. At this stage, we may also notice that the principle stated by this Court in the case of Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra) was reconsidered and explained in two subsequent judgments of this Court in the cases of State of Bihar & Anr. v. Shri P.P. Sharma & Anr. [ AIR 1991 SC 1260 ] and M.N. Damani v. S.K. Sinha & Ors. [ AIR 2001 SC 2037 ]. In the subsequent judgment, the Court held that, that judgment did not declare a law of universal application and what was the principle relating to disputes involving cases of a predominantly civil nature with or without criminal intent." Close reading of the judgment supra suggests that normally court at the stage of framing of charge, is not required to make formal opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of having committed offence, rather, courts are required to see whether prima facie case exists against the accused or not? At this stage, this Court also takes assistance from the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. But at the same time, Hon'ble Apex Court has cautioned the courts below to sift evidence for the limited purpose as it is not expected even at the initial stage to accept the same as a gospel truth all that the prosecution states. But at the same time, Hon'ble Apex Court has cautioned the courts below to sift evidence for the limited purpose as it is not expected even at the initial stage to accept the same as a gospel truth all that the prosecution states. In nutshell ratio of aforesaid judgment is that at the time of stage of framing of charge, probative value of material on record cannot be gone into rather material of the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. 9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Satish Mehra v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr., (2012) 13 SCC 614, while deliberating on the issue of power of higher Court to quash proceedings after framing of charge, has held that power of High Court to interdict a proceeding either at the threshold or at an intermediate stage of trial is inherent in a High Court on the broad principle that in case allegations made in the FIR or the criminal complaint, as may be, prima facie do not disclose a triable offence there can be reason as to why the accused should be made to suffer the agony of legal proceedings that more often than not gets protracted. The relevant paras of the judgment referred supra are reproduced herein below:- "14. The power to interdict a proceeding either at the threshold or at an intermediate stage of the trial is inherent in a High Court on the broad principle that in case the allegations made in the FIR or the criminal complaint, as may be, prima facie do not disclose a triable offence there can be reason as to why the accused should be made to suffer the agony of a legal proceeding that more often than not gets protracted. A prosecution which is bound to become lame or a sham ought to interdicted in the interest of justice as continuance thereof will amount to an abuse of the process of the law. This is the core basis on which the power to interfere with a pending criminal proceeding has been recognized to be inherent in every High Court. The power, though available, being extra ordinary in nature has to be exercised sparingly and only if the attending facts and circumstances satisfies the narrow test indicated above, namely, that even accepting all the allegations levelled by the prosecution, no offence is disclosed. The power, though available, being extra ordinary in nature has to be exercised sparingly and only if the attending facts and circumstances satisfies the narrow test indicated above, namely, that even accepting all the allegations levelled by the prosecution, no offence is disclosed. However, if so warranted, such power would be available for exercise not only at the threshold of a criminal proceeding but also at a relatively advanced stage thereof, namely, after framing of the charge against the accused. In fact the power to quash a proceeding after framing of charge would appear to be somewhat wider as, at that stage, the materials revealed by the investigation carried out usually comes on record and such materials can be looked into, not for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused but for the purpose of drawing satisfaction that such materials, even if accepted in its entirety, do not, in any manner, disclose the commission of the offence alleged against the accused. 15. The above nature and extent of the power finds an exhaustive enumeration in a judgment of this court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others which may be usefully extracted below : (SCC pp. 702-03, para 7) "7. The second limb of Mr Mookerjee's argument is that in any event the High Court could not take upon itself the task of assessing or appreciating the weight of material on the record in order to find whether any charges could be legitimately framed against the respondents. So long as there is some material on the record to connect the accused with the crime, says the learned counsel, the case must go on and the High Court has no jurisdiction to put a precipitate or premature end to the proceedings on the belief that the prosecution is not likely to succeed. This, in our opinion, is too broad a proposition to accept. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 2 of 1974, provides that: . . . . . This section is contained in Chapter XVIII called "Trial Before a Court of Session". It is clear from the provision that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be recorded, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is clear from the provision that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be recorded, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the Sessions Judge to record his reasons is to enable the superior court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The High Court therefore is entitled to go into the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of his order and to determine for itself whether the order is justified by the facts and circumstances of the case. Section 482 of the New Code, which corresponds to Section 561-A of the Code of 1898, provides that: . . . . . In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction." 16. It would also be worthwhile to recapitulate an earlier decision of this court in Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. It would also be worthwhile to recapitulate an earlier decision of this court in Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. v. State of Maharashtra noticed in L. Muniswamy's case holding that: (SCC p. 704, para 10) "10........the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore it is the duty of the court to consider judicially whether the materials warrant the framing of the charge." It was also held that the court ought not to blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. 17. While dealing with contours of the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a criminal proceeding, another decision of this court in Padal Venkata Rama Reddy alias Ramu v. Kovvuri Satyanaryana Reddy and others reported in (2011) 12 SCC 437 to which one of us (Justice P. Sathasivam) was a party may be usefully noticed. In the said decision after an exhaustive consideration of the principles governing the exercise of the said power as laid down in several earlier decisions this court held that: 31. . . . . When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in detail in Bhajan Lal. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 are very wide and at the same time the power requires great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution." 18. In an earlier part of this order the allegations made in the FIR and the facts disclosed upon investigation of the same have already been noticed. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution." 18. In an earlier part of this order the allegations made in the FIR and the facts disclosed upon investigation of the same have already been noticed. The conclusions of the High Court in the petitions filed by the accused for quashing of the charges framed against them have also been taken note of along with the fact that in the present appeals only a part of said conclusions of the High Court is under challenge and therefore, would be required to be gone into. 19. The view expressed by this Court in Century Spinning's case (supra) and in L. Muniswamy's case (supra) to the effect that the framing of a charge against an accused substantially affects the person's liberty would require a reiteration at this stage. The apparent and close proximity between the framing of a charge in a criminal proceeding and the paramount rights of a person arrayed as an accused under Article 21 of the Constitution can be ignored only with peril. Any examination of the validity of a criminal charge framed against an accused cannot overlook the fundamental requirement laid down in the decisions rendered in Century Spinning and Muniswamy (supra). It is from the aforesaid perspective that we must proceed in the matter bearing in mind the cardinal principles of law that have developed over the years as fundamental to any examination of the issue as to whether the charges framed are justified or not." 10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali alias Deepak and Ors., (2013) 5 SCC 762 , has held that opinion for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, is to be formed by the Court on basis of the record of the case, documents submitted therewith and to a limited extent, plea of defence, in order to be satisfied that ingredients of offence substantially exist. However, the Hon'ble Apex Court while making aforesaid observation has also observed that prosecution case at this stage requires to be examined on the plea of demur i.e. presumption is of very weak and mild nature. Relevant paras of the judgment are being reproduced herein below:- "16. However, the Hon'ble Apex Court while making aforesaid observation has also observed that prosecution case at this stage requires to be examined on the plea of demur i.e. presumption is of very weak and mild nature. Relevant paras of the judgment are being reproduced herein below:- "16. Once the Court examines the records, applies its mind, duly complies with the requisite formalities of summoning the accused and, if present in court, upon ensuring that the copies of the requisite documents, as contemplated under Section 173(7), have been furnished to the accused, it would proceed to hear the case. 17. After taking cognizance, the next step of definite significance is the duty of the Court to frame charge in terms of Section 228 of the Code unless the Court finds, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, that there exists no sufficient ground to proceed against the accused, in which case it shall discharge him for reasons to be recorded in terms of Section 227 of the Code. 17.1. It may be noticed that the language of Section 228 opens with the words, 'if after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence', he may frame a charge and try him in terms of Section 228(1)(a) and if exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, commit the same to the Court of Sessions in terms of Section 228(1)(b). Why the legislature has used the word 'presuming' is a matter which requires serious deliberation. It is a settled rule of interpretation that the legislature does not use any expression purposelessly and without any object. Furthermore, in terms of doctrine of plain interpretation, every word should be given its ordinary meaning unless context to the contrary is specifically stipulated in the relevant provision. 17.2. Framing of charge is certainly a matter of earnestness. It is not merely a formal step in the process of criminal inquiry and trial. On the contrary, it is a serious step as it is determinative to some extent, in the sense that either the accused is acquitted giving right to challenge to the complainant party, or the State itself, and if the charge is framed, the accused is called upon to face the complete trial which may prove prejudicial to him, if finally acquitted. These are the courses open to the Court at that stage. 17.3. Thus, the word 'presuming' must be read ejusdem generis to the opinion that there is a ground. The ground must exist for forming the opinion that the accused had committed an offence. Such opinion has to be formed on the basis of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith. To a limited extent, the plea of defence also has to be considered by the Court at this stage. For instance, if a plea of proceedings being barred under any other law is raised, upon such consideration, the Court has to form its opinion which in a way is tentative. The expression 'presuming' cannot be said to be superfluous in the language and ambit of Section 228 of the Code. This is to emphasize that the Court may believe that the accused had committed an offence, if its ingredients are satisfied with reference to the record before the Court. 18. At this stage, we may refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Amit Kapur v. Ramesh Chander & Anr. [JT 2012 (9) SC 329] wherein, the Court held as under : (SCC pp. 476-77, paras 16-18) "16. The above-stated principles clearly show that inherent as well as revisional jurisdiction should be exercised cautiously. If the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code in relation to quashing of an FIR is circumscribed by the factum and caution afore-noticed, in that event, the revisional jurisdiction, particularly while dealing with framing of a charge, has to be even more limited. 17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the 'record of the case' and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the Court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the Court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code. 18. It may also be noticed that the revisional jurisdiction exercised by the High Court is in a way final and no inter court remedy is available in such cases. Of course, it may be subject to jurisdiction of this court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Normally, a revisional jurisdiction should be exercised on a question of law. However, when factual appreciation is involved, then it must find place in the class of cases resulting in a perverse finding. Basically, the power is required to be exercised so that justice is done and there is no abuse of power by the court. Merely an apprehension or suspicion of the same would not be a sufficient ground for interference in such cases." (emphasis in original) 19. On analysis of the above discussion, it can safely be concluded that 'presuming' is an expression of relevancy and places some weightage on the consideration of the record before the Court. The prosecution's record, at this stage, has to be examined on the plea of demur. Presumption is of a very weak and mild nature. It would cover the cases where some lacuna has been left out and is capable of being supplied and proved during the course of the trial. For instance, it is not necessary that at that stage each ingredient of an offence should be linguistically reproduced in the report and backed with meticulous facts. It would cover the cases where some lacuna has been left out and is capable of being supplied and proved during the course of the trial. For instance, it is not necessary that at that stage each ingredient of an offence should be linguistically reproduced in the report and backed with meticulous facts. Suffice would be substantial compliance to the requirements of the provisions. 11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment titled L. Krishna Reddy v. State by Station House Officer and Ors, (2014) 14 SCC 401 , has held that Court is neither substitute nor an adjunct of the prosecution, rather once a case is presented to it by the prosecution its bounden duty is to sift through the material to ascertain whether prima-facie case has been established, which would justify and merit the prosecution of a person. The relevant paras are as follows:- "10. Our attention has been drawn to Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia as well as K. Narayana Rao but we are unable to appreciate any manner in which they would persuade a court to continue the prosecution of the parents of the deceased. After considering Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, this Court has expounded the law in these words: (Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad case, SCC p. 721, para 14) "14. ... In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The 'ground' in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The Court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor it is necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the Court has to consider is whether the evidenciary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into" 11. The court is neither a substitute nor an adjunct of the prosecution. Nor it is necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the Court has to consider is whether the evidenciary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into" 11. The court is neither a substitute nor an adjunct of the prosecution. On the contrary, once a case is presented to it by the prosecution, its bounden duty is to sift through the material to ascertain whether a prima facie case has been established which would justify and merit the prosecution of a person. The interest of a person arraigned as an accused must also be kept in perspective lest, on the basis of flippant or vague or vindictive accusations, bereft of probative evidence, the ordeals of a trial have to be needlessly suffered and endured. We hasten to clarify that we think the statements of the complainant are those of an anguished father who has lost his daughter due to the greed and cruelty of his son-in-law. As we have already noted, the husband has taken his own life possibly in remorse and repentance. The death of a child even to avaricious parents is the worst conceivable punishment." 12. In the recent judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court in case bearing Criminal Appeal No.577 of 2017 (arising out of SLP (CrL.) No.287 of 2017) titled Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., while considering the scope of interference under Section 397 CrPC and 482 CrPC, by the High Courts, has held that High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to quashed. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that the saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that the saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Apex Court taking note of seven categories, where power can be exercised under Section 482 of the CrPC, as enumerated in the judgment titled as State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, i.e. where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, quashed the proceedings:- "19. We have considered the submissions made by the parties and perused the records. 20. Before we enter into the facts of the present case it is necessary to consider the ambit and scope of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. vested in the High Court. Section 482 Cr.P.C. saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 21. This Court time and again has examined scope of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and laid down several principles which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699 , held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In paragraph 7 of the judgment following has been stated: "7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction." 22. The judgment of this Court in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. Although in the above case this Court was considering the power of the High Court to quash the entire criminal proceeding including the FIR, the case arose out of an FIR registered under Section 161, 165 IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. This Court elaborately considered the scope of Section 482 CR.P.C./Article 226 in the context of quashing the proceedings in criminal investigation. After noticing various earlier pronouncements of this Court, this Court enumerated certain Categories of cases by way of illustration where power under 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or secure ends of justice. Paragraph 102 which enumerates 7 categories of cases where power can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are extracted as follows: "102. Paragraph 102 which enumerates 7 categories of cases where power can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are extracted as follows: "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 23. A three-Judge Bench in State of Karnataka v. M. Devenderappa and another, 2002 (3) SCC 89 , had occasion to consider the ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. By analysing the scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court laid down that authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice the Court has power to prevent abuse. It further held that Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. Following was laid down in paragraph 6: "6......All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto." Further in paragraph 8 following was stated: "8.....Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal." 24. In Sunder Babu and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2009 (14) SCC 244 , this Court was considering the challenge to the order of the Madras High Court where Application was under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash criminal proceedings under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. It was contended before this Court that the complaint filed was nothing but an abuse of the process of law and allegations were unfounded. The prosecuting agency contested the petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. taking the stand that a bare perusal of the complaint discloses commission of alleged offences and, therefore, it is not a case which needed to be allowed. The High Court accepted the case of the prosecution and dismissed the application. This Court referred to the judgment in Bhajan Lal case (supra) and held that the case fell within Category 7. Apex Court relying on Category 7 has held that Application under Section 482 deserved to be allowed and it quashed the proceedings." 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in its judgment L. Krishna Reddy referred supra has categorically held that Court is neither substitute nor an adjunct of the prosecution, rather once a case is presented to it by the prosecution, its bounden duty is to sift through the material to ascertain whether prima-facie case has been established which would justify and merit the prosecution of a person. The Hon'ble Apex Court, while making aforesaid observation has also held that while carrying out aforesaid exercise, interest of a person arraigned as an accused, must be taken into consideration lest he/she may have to suffer the ordeals of a trial based on flippant or vague or vindictive accusations, bereft of probative evidence. 14. True, it is that at the initial stage of framing of charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with the strong suspicion whether the accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove him guilty. In all the judgments, referred supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that at the time of framing of charge, Court should come to conclusion that prima-facie case, if any, exists to the satisfaction of the Court against the accused. In all the judgments, referred supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that at the time of framing of charge, Court should come to conclusion that prima-facie case, if any, exists to the satisfaction of the Court against the accused. The Hon'ble Apex Court in L. Krishna Reddy's case supra, taking note of judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in cases titled "Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia" as well as "K. Narayana Rao", wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that though Courts need not undertake an elaborate enquiry while sifting and weighing the material but court needs to consider whether evidenciary material on record, if generally accepted would reasonably connect the accused with the crime or not, it has held that once a case is presented to the Court by the prosecution, it is the duty of the Court to sift through the material to ascertain whether prima-facie case has been established against the accused or not? 15. Now, on the basis of aforesaid principles as have been laid down in the judgments supra, this Court would proceed to examine whether, learned trial court while exercising power under Section 228 of the CrPC, actually perused material made available on record by the prosecution, to ascertain whether prima-facie case exists against the accused or not? 16. At this stage, it may be noticed that at the time of issuance of notice, this Court had called for the records of the court below, which was duly received by this Court, careful perusal whereof suggests that complaint dated 12.4.2005 sent by one Shri K.S. Thakur, R/o Village Ludret, Tehsil Dehra, was received in the office of Superintendent of Police Station SV and ACB, Dharamshala, alleging therein that petitioner accused should have retired a year back but he was still continuing the service and there was discrepancy in the entry made in the service book as well as certificate of his date of birth. On the basis of aforesaid complaint, FIR No. 8 of 2008 dated 8.7.2008, came to be registered by the police for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201 IPC and Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. On the basis of aforesaid complaint, FIR No. 8 of 2008 dated 8.7.2008, came to be registered by the police for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201 IPC and Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Perusal of report submitted by the police suggests that though three allegations were made by the complainant in the complaint but there was only one allegation against the petitioner accused that he should have retired last year but still, he is serving the department and there is a difference in his date of birth as far as service book and certificate is concerned. Since other allegations leveled against Principal of the school were not found to be correct, no action was taken against Principal as well as other person named in the complaint. However Investigating Agency in investigation found that petitioner accused namely Manohar Lal PET, at the time of his appointment as PTI in Education Department on 31.8.1996 got incorporated his date of birth as 14.4.1948 instead of 14.4.1946, wrongly in the service book in connivance with some dealing hand in the office of the District Education Officer, and thereby, continued to perform the government duty for a period of two years extra and in this process, caused undue loss to the government and undue gain to himself. Interestingly, witness namely Raj Kumar Malik, got his statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.PC and categorically stated that he had recorded the date of birth of the petitioner accused as 11.4.1948 after verifying the same from the matric certificate produced by the petitioner accused. He has categorically stated that he verified date of birth as 11.4.1948 at the time of making entry in the service record on the basis of matric certificate. Apart from above, Investigating Agency also took into custody form as well as medical certificate filled/submitted by the petitioner accused at the time of making prayer for issuance of driving license, wherein he has recorded his date of birth as 11.4.1948. Police also got compared signatures of petitioner accused appended on service book as well as on aforesaid forms filled by him for issuance of driving license from RFSL, who verified the same to be signatures of petitioner accused. Police also got compared signatures of petitioner accused appended on service book as well as on aforesaid forms filled by him for issuance of driving license from RFSL, who verified the same to be signatures of petitioner accused. Since petitioner accused failed to produce his matric certificate, Investigating Agency came to conclusion that he destroyed the same after getting his date of birth incorporated in the service book. Most importantly, it has come in the final report of Investigating Agency that entry in the service book has been made on the basis of matric certificate produced by the petitioner accused at the time of his appointment, which was duly verified by Raj Kumar Malik, the then Deputy DEO Una. He stated that he had verified the date from the matric certificate. Interestingly, Investigating Agency on the basis of record came to conclusion that Raj Kumar, Deputy DEO Una, who had incorporated entry in service record has not been found to be involved in the case and accordingly, no case is made out under Section 120-B of the IPC. It has been specifically stated in the final report submitted by the Investigating Agency that during investigation, it has been found that date of birth of the petitioner accused is 11.4.1946. But interestingly, as has been taken note above, Investigating Agency has specifically concluded that no case is made out against the official of Education department as far as recording of wrong date of birth of the petitioner in the service book is concerned. Needles to say, entry in service record of the petitioner accused at the time of his appointment could only be made by the competent and authorized officer i.e Deputy DEO Una, after verifying the date of birth of the petitioner accused from matric certificate. As per rules service book of an employee is kept in safe custody of the head of office under which department, the servant is serving and is transferred with him from office to office. In nutshell, proper maintenance of the service book is the duty of the head of office. As per rules service book of an employee is kept in safe custody of the head of office under which department, the servant is serving and is transferred with him from office to office. In nutshell, proper maintenance of the service book is the duty of the head of office. In the instant case, wherein deputy DEO Raj Kumar has categorically stated that entry in the service book was made on the basis of matric certificate produced on record by the petitioner accused, there is no force much less substantial in the argument of Shri P.M. Negi, learned Additional Advocate General that petitioner accused got his date of birth incorporated as 11.4.1948 in service book in connivance with some dealing hand in the office of Deputy District Education Officer. This is none of the case of the Investigating Agency that cutting/overwriting/tempering in the relevant service book was made by the petitioner accused as far as date of birth of the petitioner is concerned. Perusal of relevant extract/record of service book, wherein date of birth of the petitioner accused has been recorded as 11.4.1948 also suggests that there is no overwriting cutting/tempering of entry in the service record. 17. Investigating Agency has been not able to establish on record the connivance, if any of the government official with the petitioner accused, who allegedly got his date of birth recorded as 11.4.1948 instead of 11.4.1946 fraudulently. Proper maintenance of the service book is the duty of the head of office and in the instant case, petitioner has served the department nearly for about 40 years, and this court believes that during this period, his service book was properly maintained and verified by the concerned head of office after regular intervals as per rules and to this effect, Head of office is required to furnish certificate every year. 18. Record of writ court which has been taken note of above, clearly suggest that it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that he is a Pong Dam Oustee and he has lost his matric certificate in the process of shifting. Leaving everything aside, this Court finds from the record that writ court vide judgment dated 5.5.2011, passed in CWP (T) No. 3608 of 2008, has accepted 11.4.1948 to be the date of birth of the petitioner accused and accordingly, held that the petitioner accused had to superannuate on 30.4.2006. Leaving everything aside, this Court finds from the record that writ court vide judgment dated 5.5.2011, passed in CWP (T) No. 3608 of 2008, has accepted 11.4.1948 to be the date of birth of the petitioner accused and accordingly, held that the petitioner accused had to superannuate on 30.4.2006. In the aforesaid judgment, writ court has specifically held that the petitioner will be deemed to have been retired from service on 30.4.2006, meaning thereby, his date of birth i.e. 11.4.1948 has been accepted to be correct for all intents and purposes. It also emerge from the aforesaid judgment that no inquiry was initiated against the petitioner accused with regard to wrong entry allegedly got incorporated in service record by the petitioner in connivance with dealing hand of the department and as such, writ court concluded that entry of birth recorded in service book requires to be accepted. Writ Court in the aforesaid judgment has further held that the petitioner has already worked up to 24.3.2016 and he had superannuated on 30.4.2016, accordingly, matter is closed. It is quite evident from the aforesaid judgment that no permission, if any, was granted to the respondent-State to hold inquiry to determine the date of birth of the petitioner. Once, finding qua the date of birth of the petitioner accused has attained finality, no fruitful purpose would be served, in case proceedings, consequent to aforesaid FIR, which has been admittedly registered on the ground that the petitioner has fraudulently, got his date of birth recorded in service book as 11.4.1948, are allowed to continue. 19. This Court after having carefully perused the judgment passed by the writ court in the judgment referred supra, sees substantial force in the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no prospect of case ending in conviction of the accused, rather, valuable time of court would be wasted holding trial. This Court also cannot lose sight of the fact that in terms of judgment passed by the writ Court, all benefits already stand granted to the petitioner accused and as such, there is no justification for framing of charge against the petitioner accused that too on the basis of inquiry which was admittedly conducted on the basis of some anonymous complaint. Investigating Agency has been not able to identify the complainant and as such, court below ought to have not framed charged against the petitioner accused under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 201 of the IPC and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In case court is allowed to continue with the proceedings on the basis of material adduced on record by the Investigating Agency, which otherwise does not appear to be sufficient to hold the petitioner guilty of having committed offence, petitioner would be driven to face the ordeals of the protracted trial. 20. The Hon'ble Apex Court in L. Krishna Reddy, case supra has specifically held that the interest of a person arraigned as an accused must also be kept in perspective, lest, on the basis of flippant or vague or vindictive accusations, bereft of probative evidence, the ordeals of a trial have to be needlessly suffered and endured. In the instant case, perusal of impugned order nowhere suggests that learned trial Court while proceedings to frame charge made an endeavor to sift/peruse the material adduced on record by the Investigating Agency. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further held in the judgments referred above that once a case is presented to it by the prosecution, it is bounden duty of Court to sift through the material to ascertain whether a prima-facie case has been established or not. But even if otherwise, ratio as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in other cases cited above are also taken into consideration, it clearly emerge from the same that in all probabilities, learned court below while framing charge is required to ascertain whether prima-facie case exists or not. Needles to say, exercise, if any, carried out by the Court while ascertaining whether prima-facie case, if any, exists against the accused or not, must reflect in order, whereby charge is proposed to be framed. In the instant case, as has been discussed in detail, there appears to be no attempt, if any, made by the learned trial Court to ascertain whether prima-facie case exists against the accused at the time of framing of charge or not and as such, impugned order is not sustainable being totally contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment referred herein above. It appears that learned court below has failed to appreciate the judgment passed by this Court in writ petition in its right perspective while ascertaining prima-facie case, if any, exists against the accused or not. Similarly, learned court below has not examined/analyzed material on record with a view to ascertain whether there is prospect of case ending in conviction of the accused on the basis of material adduced on record. 21. Once it has come in the statement of Deputy DEO that entry in service book was made on the basis of matric certificate produced by the petitioner accused, there is a strong presumption in favour of the petitioner accused that his date of birth as recorded in matric certificate is/was dated 11.4.1948. It is not understood when aforesaid explanation rendered by the then Deputy DEO, Shri Raj Kumar, was accepted by the investigating agency that entry was recorded in service book on the basis of matric certificate, wherein admittedly, date of birth was recorded as 11.4.1948, why explanation rendered by the petitioner for not making available matric certificate could not be accepted by the Investigating Agency. On the top of everything, as has been discussed above, once no government official has been found to be guilty of conniving with the petitioner accused, in making wrong entry in the service record, charges as farmed against the petitioner accused cannot be held to be sustainable, especially, when service book is maintained and kept in safe custody by the higher authorities. 22. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the present revision petition is allowed and impugned order dated 3.12.2016 passed by the court below is quashed and set-aside and petitioner is discharged of charges framed against him vide order dated 3.12.2016. Records of the case be sent back forthwith. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of.