JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The appellant - State has filed the present criminal appeal under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. against the judgment and order, dated 25.4.2006, passed in Sessions Case No. 5 of 2005, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Jamnagar whereby, the trial court has been pleased to acquit the respondents accused from the charges for which they have been tried. 2. The facts leading to the rise of prosecution case is that complainant - Hiralal Babulal Nakum was standing near the pan shop in Balnath chowk with Gopal Babu and Kantilal Jayantilal at about 7.00 to 7.30 p.m. in the evening. At that time the brother of the complainant Mahendra came there on motorcycle. They heard the shouts from the place near shop of Mavjibhai - accused No. 4 and one child accused Vimal Shamji were catching hold of the brother of the complainant Mahendra and in that process, accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were giving knife blows on the chest and abdomen. The case of the prosecution further is that accused No. 2 inflicted 3 blows on the body of the victim and two blows were given on right side and one blow was given on the left side. At that time Shamji Daya Parmar and his son Jayesh intervened but, on account of infliction of blows, the brother of the complainant Mahendra was profusely bleeding on the spot and on account of persons gathered, respondents accused ran away with their knife. The injured Mahendra was taken immediately to G.G. Hospital in auto rickshaw. But by that time deceased Mahendra succumbed to the injuries where hospital people declared him dead. During the transit to G.G. Hospital, deceased Mahendra was not in a position to speak. But it appeared that on account of the dispute related to road near the field and the accused were not allowing the complainant to use the road. Despite the compromise, said dispute as per the case of prosecution has led the present incident in question. This attack on deceased Mahendra has caused the death which has resulted into filing of complaint before the City "A" Division Police Station, Jamnagar which was registered as C.R. No. 348 of 2004 which was later on inquired into.
Despite the compromise, said dispute as per the case of prosecution has led the present incident in question. This attack on deceased Mahendra has caused the death which has resulted into filing of complaint before the City "A" Division Police Station, Jamnagar which was registered as C.R. No. 348 of 2004 which was later on inquired into. 2.1 Said first information report was investigated by police officer in-charge of City 'A' Division Police Station where upon the necessary required steps were taken of drawing panchnama of scene of offence, muddamal recovery of knife was done, test identification parade was also undertaken and arrest panchnama was also drawn and the material seized during the course of investigation was sent for analysis for FRSL after taking blood samples of accused and prima facie finding material against the respondents, the Investigating Officer has filed the charge-sheet before the learned Magistrate and the same was registered as Criminal Case No. 8235 of 2004. 2.2 The record indicates that since offence is triable by the court of sessions, the learned Magistrate has in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C., vide order dated 31.12.1994, was pleased to commit the case to sessions wherein, the case was registered then as Sessions Case No. 5 of 2005. Said sessions case came up for consideration before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Jamnagar, who framed the charge against the respondents accused vide Exh. 12 and the plea was recorded vide Exh. 13 to Exh. 16. The respondents accused have denied the offence being committed and therefore, the case was put up for further adjudication. The prosecution with a view to prove the case against the respondents accused has led oral as well as documentary evidence and as many as 14 witnesses have been examined and 3 eye witnesses have been examined and other witnesses 10 in number were also examined by the prosecution and in addition thereto, as many as 54 documentary evidence was led before the court for proving the case against the respondents accused and the same is in the following terms. Sr. No. Witness Name Exh.
Sr. No. Witness Name Exh. No. 1 PW-1 Dr.S.B.Bhatt 64 2 PW-2 Laxmidas Devji 33 3 PW-3 Hanif Kasam 34 4 PW-4 Shailesh Devji 35 5 PW-5 Jayrajbhai Madhusudan 36 6 PW-6 Naran Dhana 37 7 PW-7 Dinesh Amrutlal 38 8 PW-8 Pravin Babulal 40 9 PW-9 Shailesh Champaklal 41 10 PW-10 Mehmood Husen Shaikh 42 11 PW-11 Kishan Meghjibhai 43 12 PW-12 Faruk Nawazali 44 13 PW-13 Sattar Osaman 46 14 PW-14 Hitesh Subhashbhai 47 15 PW-15 Kadar Sattar 52 EYE WITNESSES 1 Witness-1 Hiralal Babulal 2 PW-20 Gopal Babubhai 70 3 PW-22 Kantilal Jayantilal 75 POLICE WITNESS 1 PW-22 Hitesh Ramniklal 50 2 PW-17 Ramsinh Parbatsinh 53 3 PW-19 Bhudar Thobhanbhai 64 4 PW-21 Dilip Kanji 72 5 PW-23 Kamleshsinh Kedarsinh 89 6 PW-24 Govind Nanji 101 7 PW-25 Amrubhai Dosalbhai 103 8 PW-26 Kiritsinh Pravinsinh 106 9 PW-27 Mahavirsinh Navalsinh 111 10 PW-28 Vikramsinh Dashrathsinh Gohil 123 Evidence led by prosecution:- 1 Panchnama as to recovery of clothes of the deceased 45 2 Copy of notification as to prohibition of weapons 51 3 Office copy of yadi as to conducting TI Parade of accused 54 4 Panchnama of TI Parade 55 5 Office copy of Yadi as to conducting postmortem of dead body of deceased 59 6 Office copy of PM Form 60 7 Postmortem Note 61 8 Short report of PM 62 9 Office copy of yadi as to receiving postmortem report 63 10 Yadi as to preparing map of place of incident 65 11 Map of place of incident 66 12 Office copy of yadi as to receiving map of place of incident 67 13 Forwarding letter as to sending of map of place of incident 68 14 Receipt as to handing over of dead body 71 15 Office copy of yadi as to obtaining blood sample of accused 78 16 Xerox copy of form for taking blood sample of accused Shamji Lakhman 79 17 Xerox copy of form for taking blood sample of accused Nathu Lakhman 80 18 Xerox copy of form for taking blood sample of accused Kapil Shamji 81 19 Xerox copy of form for taking blood sample of accused Jayesh Shamji 82 20 Office copy of yadi as to giving medical treatment to accused Nathu Lakhman and Kapil Shamji 83 21 Yadi as to giving of certificate for treatment of accused Nathu Lakhman and Kapil Shamji 84 22 Injury certificate of accused Nathu Lakhman 85 23 Injury certificate of accused Kapil Shamji 86 24 Xerox copy of village form 7/12 of R.S.No.686 87 25 Xerox copy of village form 8A of R.S.No.686 88 26 True copy of station diary entry dt.
16.11.2004 90 27 Xerox copy of yadi as to registering of offence 91 28 Copy of MLC Vardhi No.689/04 92 29 Office copy of special report as to heavy offence 93 30 Office copy of yadi to FSL mobile for visiting the place of incident 94 31 Xerox copy of settlement 102 32 Inquest Panchnama 104 33 Original complaint 105 34 Original copy of FIR being I CR No. 150/90 of Jamnagar B Division Police Station 107 35 Original copy of FIR being I CR No. 230/98 of Jamnagar B Division Police Station 108 36 Office copy of yadi sent to RTO requesting for information of vehicles used in offence 112 37 Office copy of yadi as to receiving cop of birth certificate of accused Kapil Shamji 113 38 Birth certificate of Kapil Shamji given by National High School, Jamnagar 114 39 Panchnama of place of incident 115 40 Panchnama as to seizure of clothes of the complainant 116 41 Panchnama of disputed land 117 42 Seizure panchnama of left foot shoe (chappal) of deceased 118 43 Arrest panchnama of accused 119 44 Seizure panchnama of vehicles used in the offence 120 45 Discovery panchnama 121 46 Preliminary report of place of incident by FSL mobile unit 122 47 Office copy of yadi sent to FSL, Junagadh for examination of muddamal 124 48 Office copy of certificate 125 49 Office copy as to sending of muddamal 126 50 Receipt as to receipt of muddamal by FSL, Junagadh 127 51 Analysis report along with forwarding letter of muddamal by FSL, Junagadh 128 52 Analysis report of muddamal by FSL, Junagadh 129 53 Serological analysis report along with forwarding letter of muddamal by FSL, Junagadh 130 54 Serological analysis report of muddamal by FSL, Junagadh 131 2.3 The record further indicates that after considering the evidence, a closure pursis was given by the prosecution and subsequent thereto, further statements have also been recorded of respondents accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The respondents accused have denied the offence being committed, the case was put up for trial for final adjudication wherein, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Jamnagar framed the issues. The record further indicates that respective sides have tendered their written arguments to assist the court. But after close scrutiny of entire evidence and after perusal of the documentary evidence, the learned Addl.
Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Jamnagar framed the issues. The record further indicates that respective sides have tendered their written arguments to assist the court. But after close scrutiny of entire evidence and after perusal of the documentary evidence, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Jamnagar was pleased to pass the judgment and order on 25.4.2006 whereby, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 235(1) of the Cr.P.C., the respondents accused came to be acquitted in respect of offences for which they have been tried and it is this judgment and order is made the subject matter of present criminal appeal. 3. Ms. Hansa Punani, learned APP for the appellant- State has vehemently contended that while passing the judgment and order, a serious error is committed by the trial court and such material error in appreciation of evidence is required to be corrected by quashing and setting aside the judgment and order of acquittal. Learned APP has submitted that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence in the form of ocular as well as documentary evidence and according to learned APP, such evidence is unimpeachably connected the crime with respondents accused and therefore, the trial court has not correctly appreciated the evidence as a whole. Ms. Punani has further submitted that the ocular evidence is in consonance with the medical evidence and there is no conflict between such evidence which may lead to raise any suspicion. On the contrary, the injuries have been well explained by the prosecution which has been corroborated by medical evidence. Ms. Hansa Punani has submitted that eye witness to the incident, namely, PW-1 - Hiralal Babulal, who was complainant and who sustained injuries which are very much reflected in postmortem note which are substantiated by medical opinion and in addition thereto, PW-20 and PW-22, namely, Gopalbhai Babubhai and Kantilal Jayantilal respectively have clearly supported the case of prosecution, who happened to be the eye witnesses and therefore, the trial court has completely misread the evidence in passing the ultimate order. Ms. Punani has further contended that the panchnama of scene of offence and serological report is clearly establishing the role played by respondents accused in commission of crime.
Ms. Punani has further contended that the panchnama of scene of offence and serological report is clearly establishing the role played by respondents accused in commission of crime. It has also been pointed out that the recovery which has been made during the course of investigation has also been proved which in no circumstance raises any doubt against the case of prosecution and therefore, when such a situation prevailing on record, there was hardly any justifiable reason for the trial court to pass an order of acquittal and therefore, such serious error committed by the trial court deserves to be corrected. 3.1 Ms. Hansa Punani, learned APP has further submitted that apart from this, there was a clear motive established by the prosecution and therefore, the circumstances which are clearly indicative about the guilt of the respondents accused, there was no earthly reason for the trial court to discard such evidence and not to appreciate. This error can be said to be a material error in exercising jurisdiction and therefore, the findings which have been arrived at are perverse to the record. Learned APP has further submitted that the voluminous evidence on record clearly establishing the role played by the respondents accused and therefore, overall comprehensive analysis without pointing out clearly finger towards the respondents accused in commission of crime, raising inference and creating doubt without any substance is nothing but an irregular exercise of jurisdiction and therefore, the error committed by the trial court is required to be corrected by quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment and order. Learned APP has further submitted that the reasons which are assigned by the trial court are not sufficient enough or cogent enough to substantiate the ultimate conclusion of acquittal and therefore, when the analysis undertaken by the trial court appears to be perverse as reflected from the order which has resulted into miscarriage of justice and such legal infirmity deserves to be corrected by setting aside the impugned order and therefore, by referring to and contending the aforesaid two submissions, Ms. Punani has ultimately requested the Court to set aside the impugned order and inflict appropriate punishment upon the respondents accused for the offence for which they have clearly committed. No other submissions are made by learned APP. 4. To oppose the stand taken by learned APP, Mr. Yogendra Thakore, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 and Mr.
Punani has ultimately requested the Court to set aside the impugned order and inflict appropriate punishment upon the respondents accused for the offence for which they have clearly committed. No other submissions are made by learned APP. 4. To oppose the stand taken by learned APP, Mr. Yogendra Thakore, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 and Mr. Nabil Bloch, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 and 4 have vehemently contended that no error of jurisdiction of any nature is committed and on the contrary, proper evaluation is made of the material on record. As a lead counsel for and on behalf of other, Mr. Yogendra Thakore, learned counsel has submitted that the evidence is not sufficient enough to absolve the prosecution from its obligation to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, the trial court has correctly appreciated the evidence and come to the conclusion that no case is made out. So far as respondent accused No. 1 is concerned, since during the course of time he has passed away, qua him the appeal came to be abated. 4.1 Mr. Yogendra Thakore has submitted that in the absence of any cogent evidence on record sufficient enough to dislodge the entire conclusion of the trial court, while exercising appellate jurisdiction even if plausible view is possible which view only can prevail, no interference is warranted in the background of present fact and ultimately by contending this, Mr. Yogendra Thakore has requested the Court not to allow such acquittal order to be disturbed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record and having independently assessed the evidence and compared the same with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court, following circumstances are not possible to be unnoticed. 5.1 The record indicates that the prosecution has not been able to explain the injuries in the manner in which it has to be explained and established. The testimony of eye witnesses is indicative of the fact whereby, it is not possible to co-relate the same with the medical evidence on record. It further appears from the record that PW-21 - Dilipbhai Kanjibhai, who is examined at Exh.
The testimony of eye witnesses is indicative of the fact whereby, it is not possible to co-relate the same with the medical evidence on record. It further appears from the record that PW-21 - Dilipbhai Kanjibhai, who is examined at Exh. 72, though he is not declared as hostile, his evidence has destroyed the theory of prosecution and therefore, a serious doubt is getting generated which appears to have been taken note of by the trial court. 5.2 Yet another circumstance that relevant witnesses have not corroborated the case of prosecution and the panchas have also not supported the case of prosecution and therefore, the recovery panchnama is also appears to have not been established. In addition thereto, a categorical finding is arrived at on the issue of unlawful assembly which has also not been established beyond reasonable doubt. The entire version of evidence and the analysis of it indicates that one of the co-accused - Jayesh, whose overt act has not at all been established and this has raised a serious doubt about the case of prosecution. Even the discovery panchnama is also not established in view of the fact that panchas have turned hostile and the manner in which the Investigating Officer is supposed to prove the discovery in view of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the same having not been done by the prosecution in trial, there appears to be no linking material cogent enough available to establish the case. 5.3 The prosecution has further examined PW-18 - Dr. Sunil Bhatt, whose testimony is reflecting at Exh. 58. Said witness has clearly opined that the injuries were possible only by a weapon having one side blade sharp and another side is blunt. Now, if this is to be co-related with a weapon which has been recovered, the same is not only not in consonance but, very discovery of the weapon is at a stake. Now, this medical opinion is to be examined from the further material on record, it would indicate that the injuries are not explained to such an extent which may in no circumstance would establish the guilt of respondents accused. In addition thereto, the prosecution has chosen to drop some of the witnesses by giving a pursis at Exh.
Now, this medical opinion is to be examined from the further material on record, it would indicate that the injuries are not explained to such an extent which may in no circumstance would establish the guilt of respondents accused. In addition thereto, the prosecution has chosen to drop some of the witnesses by giving a pursis at Exh. 109 which has also not been explained and all these circumstances appeared to have been taken note of by the trial court while arriving at a conclusion. 5.4 With a view to ascertain an acute corroboration, we have also undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the evidence which indicates that PW-2 - Laxmidas Devji, who is examined at Exh. 33, has not supported the case of prosecution. On the contrary, in his cross-examination, he has declared that panchnama has not been written in his presence nor it has been explained before taking the signature. Though his signature is appearing but, has not supported the case of prosecution and one another circumstance emerging from this testimony is that at the time when this witness was called at police station on 18.11.2004, there was a presence of an advocate in his rickshaw which circumstance also appeared to have been taken note of by the trial court while evaluating the evidence. Even the recovery panchnama of clothes of the deceased, PW-4 - Shailesh Devjibhai, who is examined at Exh. 35 has also not supported the case of prosecution and he also narrated the similar thing that at the time when panchnama came to be prepared, the same was neither prepared in his presence nor any explanation about writing is given and therefore, in sum and substance it appears that majority of panch witnesses have chosen not to support the case of prosecution which clearly indicates that the prosecution has not been able to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt. The very discovery of weapon is unexplained as is reflecting and therefore, this circumstance is also sufficient enough to indicate the manner in which an attempt is made to prove the case against the respondents accused. 5.5 The PW-20 - Gopalbhai Babubhai, who is an eye witness to the incident, has made an attempt to support the case of prosecution. But again this witness is a relative witness.
5.5 The PW-20 - Gopalbhai Babubhai, who is an eye witness to the incident, has made an attempt to support the case of prosecution. But again this witness is a relative witness. Not doubt, the relative witness is not to be discarded at all but, while examining his testimony some further corroboration is very much required in view of settled position of law. This testimony appears to have been supporting the case of prosecution. However, it seems that this testimony in the veracity of it is put to stake by another PW-21 - Dilipbhai Kanjibhai. This independent witness Dilipbhai is a rickshaw driver, who does not know deceased Mahendra. But, upon receiving a call, he drove his rickshaw to Balanath Chowk and has stated that some unknown person has put the deceased in his rickshaw so as to reach Irvin hospital and thereafter, from the corner, another witness Kantibhai has stepped in the rickshaw and only 3 persons went to the Irvin hospital. Now, this independent witness has clearly distorted the version of Kantibhai, who claimed to be an eye witness to the incident. Because had there been a presence of this witness on the spot, he would not have got himself in rickshaw from a distant place and therefore, this independent witness is destroying the testimony of PW-22 - Kantibhai Nakum, who is claiming to be an eye witness to the incident and therefore, the consistency is not reflecting from the version of prosecution witnesses. This further travels to a spot where PW-22 - Kantibhai Nakum, who is claiming to be an eye witness, his testimony is indicating an unnatural conduct. Had this PW-22 been on the spot at the time of occurrence, as a natural conduct he must have taken some steps not only to intervene but to call for help of other persons as well. This testimony is indicating that when rickshaw came, he along with deceased went to the hospital which fact is not clearly established looking to the independent version of PW-22 and therefore, there seems to be inconsistent story put up by independent witness which has raised serious doubt about the trustworthiness of the witnesses.
This testimony is indicating that when rickshaw came, he along with deceased went to the hospital which fact is not clearly established looking to the independent version of PW-22 and therefore, there seems to be inconsistent story put up by independent witness which has raised serious doubt about the trustworthiness of the witnesses. No other independent witness appears to have been examined who can lead the case of prosecution to a stage where it can be culled out that prosecution has establish the guilt of respondents accused beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, this comprehensive analysis of the entire evidence on record is suggesting one thing that even if plausible view is to be taken then also, the same view is not possible to be the only view which can be taken and therefore, in such a situation, when the trial court had an opportunity to see the demeanor of witnesses, the same having been analyzed to arrive at a decision, sitting in an appeal against an order of acquittal, the view cannot be substituted as has been laid down by series of decisions. 6. In the context of aforesaid analysis of evidence on record if the reasons which are assigned by the trial court based upon consideration of material on record of the trial court, especially the reasons which are assigned in Para.32 onwards, it appears that the view taken by the trial court is plausible view and therefore, it is not possible to take a different view in substitution thereof. The trial court has evaluated the evidence of eye witnesses upon which the prosecution is heavily relying upon. But then the analysis of the trial court indicates that those witnesses were the relatives of the deceased, it requires some independent corroboration which is completely missing and main disturbing fact which is taken note of by the trial court is that by giving a pursis at Exh. 109, some of the independent witnesses have been dropped by the prosecution for no just reason and the said pursis at Exh. 109 is reflecting on Page-947 of paper-book compilation and therefore, on overall analysis of the version of these witnesses, it is not possible to believe so cogently that prosecution has been able to establish the guilt of respondents accused beyond reasonable doubt. 7.
109 is reflecting on Page-947 of paper-book compilation and therefore, on overall analysis of the version of these witnesses, it is not possible to believe so cogently that prosecution has been able to establish the guilt of respondents accused beyond reasonable doubt. 7. Further, it also reflects from the evidence that even the said rickshawwala is found to be a distant brother of the said complainant and this very witness has destroyed the version of the eye witnesses which has raised a serious doubt about the truthfulness and this appears to have been one of the strongest reasons adopted by the trial court while passing an order of acquittal. Yet another circumstance is taken note of by the trial court is that in such a serious offence of murder, first the inquest panchnama has been drawn and thereafter, the complaint came to be lodged which circumstance is not understandable as found by the trial court and therefore, the material witnesses have not only been proved the relatives of the deceased but, whose presence itself has created a doubt which circumstance cannot be ignored and same appears to have been rightly analyzed by the trial court. A further fact has also been taken note of by the trial court that the testimony of Gopalbhai is also not clearly establishing and supporting the case of prosecution because this very witness has not till 2nd day informed anybody about he being an eye witness to the incident and therefore, lot of improvements appear to have been made by this witness to assist the prosecution in establishing the case. But this testimony is in conflict with the testimony of rickshawwala, who has not turned hostile but, has clearly distorted the version of eye witnesses. 8. The record further indicates that so far as the aspect with respect to unlawful assembly is concerned, the trial court has categorically found on the basis of overall analysis that accused Shamjibhai Dhaya Parmar and his son Jayesh were merely standing without any overt act at a distant place and though the complaint has been made against six persons with specific names, these two persons i.e. Shamji Dahya and his son Jayesh were at all not part of unlawful assembly and therefore, the very basis of the case of prosecution about formulation of unlawful assembly is not believed by the trial court has having not established beyond reasonable doubt.
A further fact has also been noted, rightly so, by the trial court that the blood group of the deceased and accused Shamjibhai Nakum and Nathubhai Nakum were of the same group and two knives which have been discovered during the course of investigation, no blood stains were found. This reflects the credence of the evidence upon which the prosecution has come out to prove the case against the respondents accused. So much so that discovery of muddamal is concerned, no doubt the panchas have not supported the case to establish that panchnama. But then it was obligatory on the part of Investigating Officer to prove the same in consonance with the requirement of law. That having not been done, the very discovery is at stake, cannot be said to be proved beyond the reasonable doubt and therefore, on overall analysis it has been found by the trial court that simply because the blood of the deceased is found on the spot, it cannot be said that the case has been established against the respondents accused. It appears from the reading of the entire order that each and every witness has been analyzed by the trial court to find out the connectivity of the respondents accused with commission of crime. But unfortunately there appears no inconsistency found by the trial court which ultimately led an order of acquittal and therefore, when this kind of analysis has been undertaken by the trial court, the view which has been taken can be said to be a plausible view and therefore, in the absence of any contrary extraordinary material to dislodge this finding, we are unable to exercise our appellate jurisdiction more particularly when we are dealing with an order of acquittal and therefore, considering well propounded proposition of law on exercise of appellate jurisdiction in acquittal appeal, we are of the considered view that this is not a fit case in which there appears to be any perversity or any legal infirmity which results into miscarriage of justice and therefore, in the absence of any such circumstances, we are unable to exercise our appellate jurisdiction to substitute a different view. The following propositions laid down by the decisions delivered by the Apex Court which we worth to take note of and reproduce hereinafter.
The following propositions laid down by the decisions delivered by the Apex Court which we worth to take note of and reproduce hereinafter. 8.1 In the decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para.55, 56 and 57 which read as under : "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598) as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so.
In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : (2013 AIR SCW 6180) particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : ( AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318) to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.
Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : ( AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889) Govindaraju v. State (2012) 4 SCC 722 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994)." 8.2 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014(9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed as observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31. 8.3 In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015 (5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : ( AIR 2004 SC 3249 ), this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed.
31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 8.4 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph No. 21 observed thus: "21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 ." 9.
The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 ." 9. Considering the aforesaid position prevailing on record and based upon comprehensive analysis of entire evidence on record in co-relation with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court, we are of the considered opinion that the judgment and order passed by the trial court is not required to be interfered with keeping in mind the proposition of law on exercise of appellate jurisdiction stated herein before and therefore, in view of this prevailing set of circumstances on record, we are of the considered opinion that no error committed by the trial court in passing the order of acquittal and therefore, the appeal filed by the State being merit-less deserves to be dismissed. 10. The present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order, dated 25.4.2006, passed in Sessions Case No. 5 of 2005, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Jamnagar, is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith.